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MAKING A PLACE IN EARTH’S COMMONWEALTH OF VIRTUE

‘All thinking worthy of the name must now be ecological.’ 
—	Lewis Mumford

‘Humankind's real wealth lies in the health of the planet - if it dies, so do we all.’ 
—	Jean Lambert 1988: 137

‘Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Willing is not enough; we must do.’ 
—	Goethe

‘The task of humankind is not simply to create a world that is good for us, but to arrange this Earth to accommodate our own reasonable needs and those of our fellow creatures, or at least a good proportion of them, as long as the future lasts.’




I should point out from the first that this work is preparatory and exploratory, a clarification of the main lines of more substantial work to come. Although there are plenty of insights and original arguments along the way, these apply more to the overall argument and arrangement of the materials than any close analysis. I have relied greatly on certain key texts and thinkers, and quoted heavily from them. The result is the product of three months’ work, which is nothing in research terms. It should come as no surprise that there is plenty of hard philosophical work still to do with respect to the arguments introduced in these pages. I have presumed the truth of certain philosophical concepts and positions – ‘rational freedom’, essentialism, virtue ethics, and critical realism. In my defence, I supply references to the works of mine in which I have covered these subjects in depth. So any presumption on my part here is the presumption that the heavy philosophical lifting that ought to have been done in this work has already been done in my other work or will be done in the more substantial work to come. At this stage, I am reporting back from the frontiers with a few observations and recommendations.

Being at One is part of a much larger work in preparation entitled Being and Place. I have been gathering materials for this larger book for a number of years now, drawing on the full range of disciplines. Being at One is a work of clarification and preparation, laying foundations and establishing future directions. I am writing now to share thoughts and materials that I have unearthed in a lifetime of activism, observation, research and reflection. I will, throughout, make references to my own work from over the years, where many of the arguments I make below have been developed in greater depth.

In my work, I am concerned to develop an approach that may be called moral ecology. This approach examines the relationships between the social and natural environments whilst seeing human beings as creative moral agents participating as co-creators in the emergence of these environments. Recognising that the wealth and health of human beings depends upon ecosystems and the services they perform in supporting life is easy enough. But, as Goethe states, ‘knowing is not enough’. This book concerns virtue as the willingness and capacity to act, something cultivated as a moral disposition in each and all. To count as a virtue, knowledge would need to be appetitive. If we have learned anything from the crisis in the climate system, it is that the increasing knowledge of encroaching environmental threats has proven insufficient to mobilise the action that is required to head off the catastrophe we face. For many, it is already too late. I have no interest in predictions, other than to say that death comes to all natural things. If that doesn’t satisfy you craving for meaning, you will have to look further and deeper. A few years ago, Clive Hamilton wrote a book entitled Requiem for a Species (2010). 





Events in the years since have confirmed rather than contradicted Hamilton’s assessment here. But what struck me most of all about Hamilton’s argument was his statement that, for all of our much vaunted rationality, ‘scientific facts are fighting against more powerful forces.’ This doesn’t just refer to the institutional factors that have prevented early action — the organised power of industry, the corporate capture of the state, the systemic constraints upon political action. Alongside institutional inertia we should add psychological inertia, the fact that far too many have been unwilling and/or incapable of weening themselves away from the false prospectus of ‘jobs, growth and investment’ in response to the clear warnings of the scientists. A closer analysis reveals that we are confronted by layers and layers of dependency here, constraining actions at every level. Having supposedly conquered natural necessity by means of technique and organisation, we have rendered ourselves subject to a new social necessity that makes all our hopes and expectations conditional upon economic imperatives, functional requirements and institutional demands. Far from being self-conscious, self-determining agents of the world we have created, we are the servants of powers which are external to us, our powers in alien form. In these alienated conditions, knowledge cannot be appetitive, cannot motivate action, and so comes and goes without response. Hamilton writes that ‘Humanity's determination to transform the planet for its own material benefit is now backfiring on us in the most spectacular way, so that the climate crisis is for the human species now an existential one.’ Here he describes what Marx understood to be a condition of alienation, a situation in which ‘things’, human creations, have assumed existential significance – ‘money talks’ – whilst the human creators have been reduced to the status of objects, dependent upon their creations. And herein lies the ambiguity in the human condition. For, in alienated social conditions, the human transformation of the planet is destined to misfire and, ultimately, backfire. The result is indeed an existential crisis. Human beings are charged not with abandoning their praxis but with mastering it, assuming responsibility for their actions and recognising that the forces driving the world to ecological catastrophe – capital, commodities, money, the state, bureaucracy etc. – are their own powers in alien form, devising the mechanisms that enable the exercise of a common conscious control on their part. Colin Tudge’s view that the task of humankind is to ‘arrange this Earth to accommodate our own reasonable needs and those of our fellow creatures’ may sound too close to the kind of self-interested manipulation that has got us into trouble in the first place but, as I shall argue, since we are co-creators of the world we live in, then we need to get good at this co-creating. And this is indeed an existential question, a question that concerns coming to know ‘who’ we are and ‘where’ we are. Whether or not we avert climate catastrophe, these remain the fundamental questions, and it is upon these that I shall concentrate.

My approach incorporates key ecological principles such as interdependence and interrelatedness, and embraces a concern with population, environment, resources and development within an integral moral and psychological framework concerned with what it is to be human. There are no purely technical questions within this approach. Always, I ask questions of meaning and purpose in relation to right living within the natural and social environment. Patrick Geddes wrote of the insurgency of life. I see human beings as ever-insurgent and ever-resurgent agents capable of seeing through and breaking through any artificial constraints and determinisms which inhibit their free and full development. But that capacity needs to be developed further in full recognition of natural limits, also social limits. The ‘self’ in any self-realization has to be socially and ecologically bounded if it is not to become a limitless fantasy incapable of fulfilment. I shall therefore attempt to connect the acquisition of the virtues as qualities for successful living with creating capabilities, setting the question of human development within social and natural boundaries. 

I shall argue for the necessity of politics, but the understanding of ‘politics’ here should be distinguished from the conventional understanding of the term. My approach conceives ‘politics’ in an expansive sense, as entwined with ethics and concerned with creative human self-realisation. Politics as creative self-realization and freedom as self-determination are central to human fulfilment so long as they are attached to human self-responsibility and co-responsibility with respect to the social and natural environments. 

The unity of politics and ethics within a conception of moral ecology thus binds the different threads of my argument together. Ecology is all about interconnection, seeing how the various parts relate to one another within the whole. When human beings enter the picture, these connections are revealed to be vital, possessing an animating spirit or purpose. Most of all, human beings bring a moral concern to the world of physical facts and processes. The question therefore concerns how to integrate natural processes and ecological principles within communities of place and practice, fostering a sense of common identity and developing a sense of belonging in the process. 

So I should make it clear that this book is part of a much bigger project, one which develops an integral perspective and which gains its strength from its combination of different elements. Being at One is very much a signpost, indicating the general direction of my current work and, as such, contains plenty of unfinished philosophical and methodological business. Unfinishable business, even, for, in the conception of eco-praxis within the creative universe adumbrated here, the greater part is left over to the agents themselves. Being at One is a philosophy for living, emphasising worldly experience and facts as existentially meaningful.

1 Introduction
[Taking a close look at ourselves and our values and political systems]
Addressing climate change is now more a question of trying to mitigate its worst effects, seeking viable forms of living here and there, rather than preventing its occurrence. The alarm bells rang long ago, and the response fell far short of what was required to prevent climate crisis. The situation looks hopeless, beyond recall. There is no denial of the facts here. We have already passed 400 ppm in the atmosphere of CO2 based on emissions released in the past four decades, and this doesn't take into consideration the fact emissions have continued to increase, despite the worst economic depression for eighty years.

So why continue? Because there remain factors which can be influenced by human agency, and differences of degrees matters a great deal. Any climate or environmental necessity which is beyond human influence are simply that and will have the effects they will have regardless of what we do or say. There is value in coming to terms with the constraints upon human action. At the same time, we should be focusing our energies upon the things we can change, and change for the better, or the least worst as the case may be. The human ability to influence outcomes may be less than we have previously thought, but it remains significant. There is a humility, too, to be gained through recognising the things we cannot change. At the same time, a focus on the humanly mutable retains its meaning and is a very productive field of endeavour. The situation we face is complex and multidimensional and requires that we make the effort to find a way forward. Views that it is already too late and that no matter what we do we are facing irrevocable climate catastrophe leads either to hedonism or despair. I have been called ‘insensitive’ in expressing this view, but I consider these positions to be an abdication of responsibility for action, a continuation of the self-absorption and narcissism that brought us to environmental crisis in the first place. It is never too late to take ownership of our powers, actions and consequences. And it is never too late to make confessions for past errors and make ones peace. So I take the view that ‘politics’ will be with us as long as there are human beings on the planet. The issues I address here will be with us in the times to come, whatever the precise character of the environment in which we come to live.

In this book, I address the problem of resolving potential conflict arising from clashes of interest, so as to reconcile individual self-interest with the common good we need. I examine ‘the logic of collective action’, with its related conflicts such as the ‘tragedy of the commons’, and ‘the prisoner's dilemma’. Various measures for environmental regulation remain pertinent to the question of sustainable governance - environmental taxes and rules, pollution controls, investment in alternate energy, and so on – but they are secondary to the primary need to change our institutional arrangements, decision-making processes, policy frameworks and most of all economic systems. More than this, however, these transformations in the entire social metabolic order must be buttressed by a close self-examination. We need to ask who we are, what our place in the wider scheme of things is, what meaning our lives have. 

Answering the question of how to achieve the common good on the common ground must go further than institutional arrangements. The crisis in the climate system is an existential crisis. The environmental crisis points to a need to address the metaphysical, spiritual and cosmological dimensions of our existence. In the process, we come to develop an overall system of values by which to make sense of our lives, guiding our choices and giving direction.

As I write this Introduction, I am reading this charge against environmentalists: ‘I wonder when more environmentalists will realize that it is their own intransigence and unwillingness to think creatively about global change that directly contributes to this risk of collapse.’

To properly respond to this charge requires that the identity of these ‘intransigent environmentalists’ be defined more clearly. Many environmentalists have been thinking creatively, and have been ignored by vested interests and the general public both. That said, I shall argue that a focus on eco-design and technologies can diminish the importance of politics and ethics as crucial in creating the will for change. I shall also argue that debates over the intrinsic worth of nature and living things can take an intransigent form, and that a myopic concern for principle and purity can stifle political and technological creativity in attempting to address the crisis that is unfolding in our environment. This is certainly the view of the likes of Stewart Brand, Mark Lynas and all those who would like to geo-engineer our way out of climate crisis to secure the future of the planet (Brand 2009; Lynas 2011). In reply, ecologists would point out that the idea that the things of nature possess an intrinsic worth is precisely the point of environmental ethics, and to compromise on that commitment is to return to the very self-interested anthropocentric transformation of the planet that lies behind the exploitation and destruction of natural systems.

Evan Eisenberg distinguishes between planetary managers and planetary fetishizers. ‘Planet Management has become the dominant worldview among scientists and policy-makers. It is the silicon version of the "Judeo-Christian" ethic of stewardship, which sees the earth as a garden that we are to dress, keep, and humanize.’ And this they do through technology and technological manipulation:

Satellite images and computer models can play the same role, but with a difference: they make the Manager think he grasps and controls the world itself. Like Chaplin's Great Dictator spinning the globe on his finger, he gets microcosm and macrocosm mixed up. One of the many problems this causes is that, in his confidence that he has got the big picture, he thinks he knows what is best for everyone and everything. Often, it seems that the interests of the planet, the human species, and the educated elites of the industrial democracies just happen to coincide. 
I would feel a lot more comfortable about Planet Management if it were hands-off management: giving as free a rein as practicable not to humans (the time for that is long past) but to nature. Many of the Managers do think in these terms, even if their jargon sometimes clouds the fact. Restoring stricken ecosystems, preserving genetic diversity (especially when this is done in situ rather than in vitro), controlling human population—all these are ways of keeping wildness alive and letting it work. 
But the Managers believe that, in a world with anything like our present population and technology, human intervention will be needed not only to get wilderness going, but to keep it going. The Fetishers believe this, too— at least, the sane ones do—but conclude that we must therefore reduce both our numbers and our technological level. In other words, rather than keep wilderness in an oxygen tent, we must back off and give it room to breathe. And while they may take it too far, I think they have a point. 




I believe this to be a misconceived debate, one without resolution in its own terms, and wholly unnecessary. We can avoid having to take sides between planetary fetishizers and planetary managers. We can be practical and innovative whilst at the same time valuing nature and natural systems as well as ourselves. 

In this book, I will address the inertia of mentalities and modalities with respect to the approaches we have been taking to the global ecological and social crisis – examining economic imperatives, incentives, public policies, morals, and rational choice. The increasing awareness of this crisis has been accompanied by an acute sense of the extent to which the institutions reflecting the dominant worldview are falling far short of what is required to resolve the problems we face. Carolyn Merchant calls for a radical revisioning and restructuring of the spheres of interaction between humans and nonhuman nature — production, reproduction, and consciousness – so as to bring about a sustainable way of living on the planet. (Merchant 1995 9). I will seek to identify the demand for creative thought and action with the development of a moral and social intelligence within the everyday lifeworld. New ways of thinking involve new ways of acting, and a new vision has to be spelled out in terms of new practices and ways of doing.

 The media mantra, repeated over and over, is that the real bottom line must be the marketplace, free trade and the global economy. When the media are dominated by wealth and large corporate interests, this economic faith is like religious dogma and is seldom challenged.
As we struggle to find a new vision and concrete strategies for achieving it, we have to pass beyond rancour, confrontation and divisiveness to establish the real bottom line: the non-negotiable human needs that must be met by any society that aspires to a sustainable future and a high quality of life for its citizens. Those needs are neither dreams nor abstract ideals but very concrete requirements if we are to enjoy good health and rewarding challenges and to realize our fullest human potential. When such needs are not met, we suffer both physically and psychically, destined to lead maimed, truncated of unfulfilled possibilities - or we die. Those fundamental requirements are rooted in the Earth and its life-support systems. They are worthy of reverence and respect; that is, they are sacred. By acknowledging and respecting the balance of these elements of the Earth, we can construct a way of life that is ecologically sustainable, fulfilling and just.

David Suzuki, The Sacred Balance: Rediscovering Our Place in Nature 2007 Pref

In developing this view, I shall seek to extend Kant’s ethic of ends to nature and locate morality in the world of action, notwithstanding the view that Kant’s ethics are inherently human-centred and hence of uncertain value in developing an environmental ethic.

The Ethic of Ends
I have over the years written plenty on Immanuel Kant (Critchley 2007; Critchley KAR 2001; Critchley 2001 KCE; Critchley 2012 KV; Critchley 2012 SIK), and Kant’s Formula of the End in Itself is a good place to start in searching for a common moral foundation for living a humane life together on our earth. For Kant, every person must be treated as an end.





Whilst this ethic of ends appears thin, it contains revolutionary implications. Treating human beings as ends, and never merely as means, entails that persons should never solely be considered objects of ends which are external to them, a view which demands a critical perspective on the exploitative and manipulative practices and relations which prevail in economics, politics and culture. 

The ethic of ends applies to all human beings as worthy of respect and protection. But it is capable of being extended to the lives of animals and plants, provided we modify Kant’s qualifications with respect to the possession of rationality. All living things with which we share this planet are worthy of respect and deserve protection, preservation and care. As human beings, we have responsibility for our actions. To go further and argue that we have responsibility for the planet may be a step too far, with its suggestion of human beings as planetary managers and engineers and the kind of interfering, instrumental and improving mentality that has got us in a mess in the first place. We can re-phrase this to say that human beings have responsibility for ensuring that their actions preserve, and do not degrade, the air, water and soil, for future generations. The domination of humanity over nature is rejected in favour of living in harmony with nature, our own included, which involves the cultivation of ways of living and acting which correspond to that end.

Holism, awareness and the web of life
[expanding our awareness to include and care for the whole web of life]
We are living in a period of crisis and opportunity. We should be careful not to flatter our sense of our historical self-importance. Humanity seems ever to have lived in such periods. ‘Oh! pleasant exercise of hope and joy! ... Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,’ wrote Wordsworth on the French Revolution, before having a change of mind.
In this sense, our predicament is no more than evolution evolving as it should, in terms of environmental challenge and human response. But the challenge of our age seems unusually great, and demands a response of similar magnitude from us. We live in an age of unparalleled challenge. The social and environmental problems we face are global in scope. We are being challenged to resolve all the key questions posed by philosophy, religion and science since their incipience, and resolve them quickly. We are being asked to know ourselves and know our world, finally and fully and at last, for the first time. The fact that that degree of self-knowledge has so far eluded us, for all of our cultural evolution, should concentrate thoughts. We have gambled our lives and our futures on our skill and ingenuity in managing and manipulating the planet. We will win big or lose big with such a gamble, but there is no way we can refuse the bet at this late stage. We certainly need new mentalities and modalities. 

Phrasing our predicament this way suggests game theory. I shall examine the Prisoner’s Dilemma and TIT-FOR-TAT at length later on. Here, it is worth making reference to something that John Von Neumann said in respect of game playing. Fellow mathematician Jacob Bronowski asked von Neumann about his Theory of Games. ‘You mean, the theory of games like chess.’ ‘No, no,’ Neumann objected. ‘Chess is not a game. Chess is a well-defined form of computation. You may not be able to work out the answers, but in theory there must be a solution, a right procedure in any position. Now real games are not like that at all. Real life is not like that. Real life consists of bluffing, of little tactics of deception, of asking yourself what is the other man going to think I mean to do. And that is what games are about in my theory.’ (Bronowski The Ascent of Man 2011: 324).

There is more to games than knowledge. We need to factor in human relations. We bluff each other to gain an advantage. It’s just that we fool ourselves if we think we can fool nature. The human race has been bluffing for far too long. And that is how I read games theory. John von Neumann had understood that real-life situations are different from computer situations, lacking the precise solutions that chess or engineering calculations have. Von Neumann made the distinction between short-term tactical thinking and grand, long-term strategic thinking. Whilst tactics can be calculated exactly, strategies cannot. In the his Silliman Lectures of 1956, von Neumann sees the brain as having a language in which the activities of its various parts are interlocked in such a way that we may devise a plan, a procedure, what Jacob Bronowski calls ‘a grand overall way of life’. Call it a new game. In philosophy, this would call it a system of values, one that embraces all equally, regardless of power and position, class, race and ethnicity, sex and gender. (see Bronowski 2011: 324-326). And this is what I seek to outline in this book in terms of a common ethic.

New approaches creating a grand overall way of life are certainly possible. We live in a world of free-flowing information, escaping old patterns of control and continually evading constant attempts by authorities to recover that control. That freedom of information in a network society enables us to take spirituality, education and development back into our systems of conscious (co)responsibility. Such self-management requires that we develop a psychological literacy, becoming able to supply and live by shared moral values without reverting to fundamentalist or authoritarian certainty. And this requires also that we develop an ecological literacy so that we may come to generate the ecological sensibility that enables us to respect and care for the whole web of life in which we live and upon which we depend.

The solutions to the dilemmas in game theory all involve communication and relation between agents, and this is how I develop my thesis here. Free from the old dogmas and doctrines, we can appreciate our aliveness in connection to others, nature and the cosmos. The origin, end and meaning of our existence can only be known by being experienced on the inside. It is natural and good to participate in the mystery of the creative universe as it unfolds, and to make a positive contribution to this unfolding. Participating in the whole in this way, we share in its significance and grandeur, investing ourselves and our actions with a cosmic significance. Attaining an ecological sensibility of this kind, we take our place within the community of life, as active members rather than as exploiters, parasites and colonisers. 

Rather than reject rationality, rationality is to be enriched through its connection with emotion, intuition and feeling, with all being joined together within an overall ethical conception designed to allow us to regain conscious control and assume moral responsibility for our actions and powers.

The problem at present is that, within alienative and exploitative relations, our power is abstracted from us and turned against us as an alien force. The challenge before us is to replace the fragmented forms of knowledge and power that confront and control us as an external, collective, coercive force – climate change being one example, economic crisis another - with our own forms of common life. And this requires an inner as well as an outer change. Social transformation and self-transformation are aspects of the same process, overcoming alienating separations and dualisms both in our lives and within ourselves, extending loyalties and ties between each other and between our societies, between humanity and other species, between the social world and the natural world.

The removal of barriers is not the removal of boundaries; boundaries are like containers, setting limits for natural growth. The challenge is to create necessary boundaries within human society whilst respecting planetary boundaries, the natural threshold beyond which we must not go. This is about earthcare, creating a mixed social and natural community which is characterised by concern, consideration and reverence. And it is about soulcare, housing the sacred, finding a place of our own.
 
A Transformation of Consciousness
[The need to alter behaviour, will and consciousness]
Recent experience of the repeated failures to act on warnings of climate crisis demonstrates that there can be no social transformation of the depth required without an alteration in the behaviour, will and consciousness of individuals. Hence the emphasis I place on the virtues and on character and character formation. There is something of a circular quality to the reasoning. What produces character? Experience. What produces experience? Character. Plainly, we need to get into the patterns of behaviour and innermost orientations of individuals so as to conceive the changing of society as a self-change. We need to envision and enact transition strategies and we need to extend networking, leading others and drawing increasing numbers in by the power of example. I emphasise changes in inner orientation, character formation through the acquisition and exercise of the virtues, and the creation of appropriate contexts so as to enable people to develop, learn and reproduce what Tocqueville called the ‘habits of the heart’. Real change involves the participation of human beings as active, creative agents of change. This is to conceive change as self-change.

I am also convinced that this common global ethic can become a genuine universal only if it is constituted by as many groups and organizations as possible, from professional bodies to community movements. The common moral framework has content only to the extent that it is formed on the basis of a socially useful, ecologically wise, pluralist, collaborative, respectful practice. At the same time, I also insist on a transformed civil society. There is little value in pluralism and diversity in conditions of social inequality.

[ecology vs economics]
This work charts the growing personal and social unease which has resulted from our increasing disconnection from the natural world, which in turn is associated with our increasing separation from each other and from the society in which we live. There is a loss of commonality and belonging in our lives, a withdrawal into purely personal space. Character formation and the acquisition of the ecological virtues is about developing habits and practices that are consistent with the supportive environments and communities within which we evolve and grow interdependently.

To realize our fullest human potential and flourish as human beings, we must address what is meant by human nature, identify our needs and examine how they come to unfold with our social and historical development. And we should see social relations and natural relations in their interconnection. If human beings are, as is claimed, rational beings, unique in the possession intelligence, insight, foresight, we are nevertheless animals, dependent upon our bodily natures and upon resources which lie outside of us. To fully grasp human potentiality, then, we must first recognize the facts of our biological nature. I explore this throughout, placing a great emphasis upon Alasdair MacIntyre’s description of human beings as ‘dependent rational animals’. (MacIntyre 1999). 

The problems we face have always arisen from the tendency to see reason (and culture) and nature as apart from each other and set in antagonistic relation. The result is that human beings suffer a bifurcated identity and existence, something that we now see has potentially fatal consequences in respect of the climate crisis. As biological beings, we have physical needs, dependent on nature. But, as rational animals, we have a degree of moral independence. We are value centred beings, and our values are more than biological imperatives. That moral autonomy is the source of some of our greatest achievements as meaning seeking creatures. But it can also give us an inflated sense of our own importance, encouraging us to ignore our natural and biological rootedness and to become neglectful of the bases of a healthy and flourishing life. In short, we are tempted to turn a relative moral independence into a declaration of an absolute independence from nature, divorcing our social purpose from the conditions of life on Earth. Throughout, I discuss this moral independence in relation to our natural dependence, conceiving both to be essential aspects of our nature and setting them in the context of interdependence.

In addition to being rational natural beings we are also social beings. We need others in order to be ourselves. We have social needs, which are met in and through our relation with others. We also have spiritual needs, a longing for significance which defines our lives as a quest for meaning. 

The way we are living today is undermining our ability to meet all these needs, bringing division and separation where we need unity and harmony. But where there is life there is hope, and where there is hope there is life. The peerless philosopher-poet Dante Alighieri wrote of di viva speme, 'the living hope’. (Paradiso XX 109), and the hope that the eternal Love brings: ‘none is so lost that the eternal Love cannot return, as long as hope maintains a thread of green’ (Purgatorio III 133-135). Hope is not a passive condition of waiting on events and circumstances, it is an active condition that needs to be lived.

I weave that thread of eternal Love and Hope throughout the passages that follow. These are research directions showing lines of thought to be developed in future work. But, here and there, there are signposts and suggestions, outlining the contours of the ecological civilisation to come, pointing the way to what I call Ecopolis. These pages are concerned most of all with how we can create the character that encourages and equips us to become eco-citizens capable of constituting and sustaining the kinds of communities and social forms that enable us to lead rich and fulfilling lives while at the same time respecting the Earth's biosphere so that all of life may flourish. We can put this in biological terms and call it surviving. And, given our present predicament, survival would be no mean achievement. Even better, though more difficult to achieve, is flourishing. The most powerful principle behind the survival of life is diversity – biological diversity, certainly, but also cultural diversity. Ever-insurgent life flourishes hand in hand with ever-resurgent human creativity. I wish to switch the focus from an ethics based on immobilised ideal forms to the Aristotelian emphasis on concrete particulars, and in the process emphasise that there is no single right way independent of experience, there are countless ways, reflecting the fecundity of nature. The key to a species' survival in the natural world is its ability to adapt to its habitats. In like manner, the key to human survival will be our dynamic and adaptive ability in relation to our environment, whether or not we come to create the ‘happy habitat’ (Ward 1990:9) that allows us to realise our potentials without impairing the growth of all the other things in life upon which we depend. If we can create vibrant, interdependent eco-communities which are respectful of planetary boundaries, communities based on cooperation, friendship as philia and biophilia, sharing the things of life in common, living lightly but living well on the Earth, then we will avoid the ‘silent spring’ Rachel Carson warned us of. We will come to see the Earth as a sacred place in which to dwell. (Skolimowski 1993).

The attainable ‘hope’ that I argue for involves no facile optimism and blind faith; it is an active, informed and socially and morally equipped hope. That is, it is a hope that is based not only on an awareness of the technique and know-how at our disposal. We have rarely been short of these things. More than technical and instrumental power, hope is based upon self-knowledge, developing the character which gives us the qualities that enable us to see, judge and act so as to live right and live well on the land. I agree with E.O. Wilson in this respect:

By the end of the new century, if we are both lucky and wise, we will exit in better shape than we entered... People everywhere will have acquired a decent quality of life, with the expectation of more improvement to come... Whether it happens... depends fundamentally on the shift to a new ethic, which sees humanity as part of the biosphere and its faithful steward, not just the resident master and economic maximizer.

E. O. Wilson, Vanishing Before Our Eyes, TIME, "Vanishing Before Our Eyes," April 26, 2000, pp. 28-31, 34. Copyright (c) 2000 by the Los Angeles Times Syndicate.
http://env.chass.utoronto.ca/env200y/ESSAY04/wilson.htm

If we are wise … we will shift to a new ethic of common living. But being wise is about making the effort to be wise, acquiring the character traits required for wise actions and wise living. Wilson believes that this requires a shift to a new ethic. Let’s call it a biospheric ethic. I believe that this ethic is actually based on something quite old, something with a long and successful pedigree when it comes to building and sustaining civilisations – virtue theory. True, any presentation of the virtues needs now to take account of our dependence upon the biosphere and upon natural systems, but this can be done. I shall, therefore, suggest how we can develop virtue theory into a concept of ecological virtue, showing how we may develop the kind of character we need for right living in respect of planetary boundaries. Ecological virtue nurtures an ecologically wise character that eschews such notions of technological mastery and economic self-maximisation and instead places the focus upon wise living.

Tim Flannery acknowledges that we are living at a time ‘when hope that humanity might act to save itself from a climatic catastrophe seems to be draining away.’ He is not, however, without hope: ‘for I believe that as we come to know ourselves and our planet we will be moved to act. Indeed, provoking that action is the purpose of this book.’ (Flannery 2010 pref).

My argument is that we need to do more than ‘provoke’ action. And we need more than scientific knowledge. All the knowledge in the world and of the world will not be sufficient to motivate action. Knowledge as such is not a virtue, in that it is not appetitive and does not stimulate action alone. To be moved to act requires the right qualities. To be inspired by knowledge, we need have acquired the right virtues which make us disposed to act in light of knowledge and thus do the right thing in response to arguments, evidence, crises, opportunities etc.

Narrow horizons and short time frames are always misleading. That's why it's impossible to determine whether, even in the dramatic changes we see over a lifetime, we're witnesses to a descent into chaos, or a profound revolution that will lead to a better future. A wider view, one that encompasses humanity over the millennia and the world over the aeons, is required if we are to discern the true path of our evolutionary trajectory. In writing this book I've taken that long view, and, despite the challenges we now face, I feel optimistic—for ourselves, our children and our planet.




I shall argue for an environmental pragmatism, eco-praxis and citizen science, for a need to form an eco-public on the basis of ecological virtue and citizenship. We need to look not merely at what constitutes the common good but at how that good is constituted through civic involvement and democratic participation. 

Just after I had finished writing this book, Jonathon Schuldt, assistant professor of communication at Cornell University, published an article in the December 2014 issue of Nature Climate Change which broadly fits the approach I take here. He notes the impasse we have reached with respect to climate science and suggests a way forward. Schuldt argues that climate science and the larger climate change movement suffers from a lack of ethnic and racial diversity which undermines its efforts to bring about change. This can only be overcome by creating a ‘science of climate diversity’. I agree but go further to argue for a public constituted through the active consent and participation of the various members of society. 

According to Schuldt, ‘there is an invisible, but very real barrier to climate engagement. We need to engage with all kinds of diverse folks if we’re going to face this challenge. It will be a problem if the perception, and the reality, is that it’s a bunch of white male scientists at the table.’

In ‘Facing the diversity crisis on climate science, Schuldt and co-author Adam Pearson, an assistant professor of psychology at Pomona College, note the lack of diversity in environmental organisations. The existence of a ‘white Green Insiders club’, they argue, narrows research and limits public engagement. To overcome this, Schuldt argues that more than institutional changes are required. ‘What is missing is science-based solutions that focus on the fundamentally social nature of this problem. Research from social psychology offers insight into factors that can powerfully influence participation.’ (Adam R. Pearson & Jonathon P. Schuldt, Facing the diversity crisis in climate science, Nature Climate Change volume 4, pages 1039–1042, 2014).

The authors are concerned principally with racial and ethnic diversity, but their point is capable of general application. Schuldt argues for the need to highlight diversity while pointing toward a common goal: ‘We are all different, but we’re all in this together.’ The long-range goal, Schuldt and Pearson argue, is the creation of a new science of climate diversity. To this end, the authors envisage a collaboration of climate science with psychology and the social sciences, with partnerships within academic, public and private institutions creating a ‘new nexus of research’. As a result, fact-based findings can be used to guide public climate advocacy and policy reform efforts. For Schuldt, such a nexus is the only way a problem as complex and far-reaching as climate change can effectively and equitably be addressed. ‘Diverse teams are better at solving complex problems, and there’s every reason to believe this is the same, if not more important, when facing climate change.’ (Adam R. Pearson & Jonathon P. Schuldt, Facing the diversity crisis in climate science, Nature Climate Change volume 4, pages 1039–1042, 2014). (http://www.newswise.com/articles/commentary-calls-for-new-science-of-climate-diversity)

I agree with this as far as it goes. I take the argument further in valuing value citizen knowledges and citizen involvement to create an inclusive eco-public. Further, to treat the issue with the psychic moral depth it deserves requires an examination of the character of individuals and groups and the habitus in which they live, relate and act.

Of course, the case for virtue can become circular. How do we acquire the right character? Through experience. How do we gain experience? Through character. For this reason, I embrace a conception of eco-praxis which emphasises living as a learning process in which character and experience proceed apace with each other. It is not a case of gaining the one as a condition of the other but of acquiring both together in a mutual growth. As Murray Bookchin puts the point:





In this respect, we are not without hope. Environmental crisis is a challenge to us to come to know ourselves and know our world and our place in it for the first time. In this sense, the ecological crisis is Gaia calling us back to the profoundest wisdom: know thyself. It’s that call to self-knowledge that lies at the quest for meaning that makes for a human life. 

The call for a new ethical vision
[crisis – new modes - the emergence of new ideologies – the call for a new ethical vision to encompass the pressing social issues of our times – nature, life, development]

As the world is confronted by a series of critical challenges, it is becoming apparent that the old methods and tools are failing badly and that the way forward requires a substantial social transformation. It is also clear that such a transformation involves a profound change in behaviour on the part of human beings, and this means that the political, social and ecological questions we face possess an ethical dimension. 

‘A crisis is a terrible thing to waste’ (attributed to the Stanford economist Paul Romer). We should never waste a crisis. Many repeat the saying that crisis is an opportunity, but opportunity can be understood in many ways. Often, this opportunity is seen in terms of developing a more efficient, more productive economy, something that can easily slide into a demand for a better version of what we already have. A socially just and ecologically benign social metabolic order is something much better to aim for. Much more profound, though, is to push further than questions of social organisation and begin to develop the foundations of a new ethical vision. Whilst the precise character of this new vision cannot be defined in advance of its attainment, its general features can be discerned, and this will be my concern in what follows.

Certainly, any relevant ethics must, by definition, address the pressing social issues of our times, indicating the character traits appropriate to the new forms of action and relations required to move society towards a more harmonious order. We can call the new vision a holistic morality or an integral ecological morality; we can refer to a moral ecology which envisages human beings assuming (co)responsibility for their actions in clear recognition of the dependence of human society upon the natural world. By whatever name we may call the new ethic, its expansive and comprehensive character is clear. The looming environmental crisis highlights the importance of developing an ethics of nature concerning how we incorporate the principles of ecology into our social practices and thus come to relate respectfully to the ecology of the planet. 

Such an ethics would also have a place for a conception of human nature, taking a view of human potentiality, the forms of life which enable human flourishing, the development of capabilities enabling human development, and the acquisition of virtues. The end in view is to create a habitus which consists of channels capable of connecting the predispositions we are born with to the dispositions we develop and which allow and enable us to act in order to realise our potentials. A new ethics would also possess a pronounced social and political dimension, taking a distinctive view with respect to social relationships, how human beings organise their relations with each other, apportion duties, undertake tasks, allocate resources, address asymmetries in power and resources, arrange the division of labour, organise production.

But this new worldview reaches further than reason itself and invites a new view of ourselves and our world, developing an integral vision that joins science, art, ethics, politics, and spirituality within a commitment to the ideal of the good life well lived. The planet and all its life is worthy of reverence in its holistic functioning. This is to see the Earth as a sacred place in which to dwell. We can call it living with reverence upon the Earth. The commonwealth of virtue is a commonwealth of life. There is a place for all of us in this commonwealth. We need only to claim it. 
And claiming it is a moral project.

Lives lived appropriately to reality
The ecological transformation we require cannot be achieved by appeals to science, reason, enlightened self-interest, and moral (intrinsic) worth alone. The question goes deeper and touches the roots of human character. There is a need to rework patterns of behaviour that have been cultivated for generations and which are reinforced by prevailing social relations, relations that make individual self-interest more rational than altruistic behaviour. To be effective, any appeal that is made to securing the common good on common ground will have to touch the motivations and appetites of people and express their basic yearnings in lives lived appropriately to social and ecological reality.

Freedom, justice, and equality are all products of common living: living with each other, living with the world around us. Virtuous living in this sense is the participation in the forms of the common life that shape the social habitat and personal identity, recognising that those forms are natural as well as civil. I will therefore develop the idea of the Earth’s commonwealth of life as a commonwealth of virtue, establishing a vital place for human beings as creative moral agents within a flourishing whole. We are born dependent and we remain dependent on nature’s life-support system. We acquire a degree of independence as we learn to govern ourselves and our common affairs in community. We attain a balanced life in interdependence, in partnership, with the world around us. Oneness is always, therefore, a dialectic of independence, dependence and interdependence.

My claim here is that a participatory conception of democracy infused by ecological virtue is the only viable form that public life can take. This is a conception of democracy understood in terms of a biospheric politics, as self-government set in an ecological context. An Ecopolis. 

I wish, now, to outline the contours of this conception of the Ecopolis, setting out the vision of the ecological society which informs the argument of this book.

The Ecopolis
In Being at One: Making a Home in the Earth’s Commonwealth of Virtue, I set biology and ecology in the context of ethics and politics, recontextualising public life along the lines of natural processes at the same time. I seek to outline a way forward in environmental ethics and politics by adopting a praxis-oriented approach that transcends debates between anthropocentrism, ecocentrism and biocentrism as to where true value lies. I will argue for an environmentalism that sets natural processes and ecosystem health within a larger moral and political framework, a framework that is concerned to revitalize public life through civic participation, foster community identity and belonging, and build local and regional culture so as to generate a sense of place, purpose and public interest that goes beyond short-term self-interest. In this conception, ecology is developed as a moral and political ecology that offers both a critical and transformative approach to social and political life. In developing the practical roots of our relation to the world, my intention is to bring an expansive conception of ‘the political’ to the heart of the attempts to resolve the various environmental crises that beset us. In the process, we generate the community spirit and civic mindedness central to our coming to assume responsibility for our actions. We find the common good as we claim our place on common ground.

The approach I take is organic and holist and seeks to integrate environmental, ethic and social dimensions in the way we come to organise and live our interchange with nature. This approach recognises the mutual impor​tance and continuous interaction between the social world and the natural ecosystem. In this understanding, the organised social existence of human beings is based on an empathetic connection with the complex ecological region. The approach integrates a concern with the health and preservation of the ecological region within a conception of politics, planning and regulation, expressing an effective concern with the long-range common good. This is to re-envision ecology as a social and political ecology, defining ‘the political’ in the expansive terms of a civic-minded, participatory, social order. Planning for ecological preservation and restoration therefore proceeds hand in hand with social, cultural and political renewal. 
 
Whilst developing a philosophical ethic for the wise treatment of non-human nature, I therefore also argue for the civic enrichment of public community, and for planning and design solutions in the context of an effective social movement in order to give these commitments practical form. The appreciation of nature, valuing the worth of natural things, therefore entails a civic dimension, one that recognises the importance of citizenship in a stewardship that benefits both human and natural community.

The approach I take here attempts to switch the focus in environmental ethics away from an increasingly sterile debate between anthropocentric, ecocentric and biocentric positions towards politics, civic structures, and community involvement. Drawing on ecology, ethics, philosophy and political theory, I argue for a praxis-based, democratic style of environmental ethics, one that envisions a civic environmentalism mediating between rival human-centred and nature-centred outlooks. I will attempt a rethinking of environmental ethics in light of the interconnections of principle, politics and practice. The intention is to set the critical debates in environmental philosophy in a context that integrates ethics, politics, and practice by providing a comprehensive framework for an engaged and cooperative environmentalism that is concerned with both problem solving and democratic governance. It enables concerted action that is based upon both reason and consent.

The emphasis is placed on an environmental politics, with politics understood in the expansive sense of a public life infused with value, meaning and purpose. I therefore seek to revalue the rich moral tradition of virtue ethics by conceiving a politically grounded and civic minded environmentalism. Conceived in recognition of ecological constraints, this virtuous environmentalism incorporates prudence, wise use and preservation so that civic renewal and ecological restoration become twin processes. In this way, environmentalism is developed in terms of a mixed conception of human and natural community, expressing a concern for the natural world through a conception of ecological citizenship that embraces civic participation, community involvement, collective responsibility, and sees local and regional culture as constitutive of the common good.

There remains plenty of work to do in fleshing out the detail supporting this conception of the Ecopolis. For now, all I can do is establish the important directions.

Civic Environmentalism
Environmentalism has always had a core preservationist content. We need, however, to recognise that conservation is failing. (Jordan 2001; Scott 1999; Freyfogle 2006). What I term civic environmentalism seeks to move from the protective conception we have with respect to the environment to a developmental conception in which citizens are proactive and live in active relation with and conscious appreciation of their environment. We need to move forward from a concern to protect the environment from destructive forces to a context in which these destructive forces have been checked and eliminated so that the environment does not need to be protected. The great merit of a civic environmentalism is that it enables individuals to come forward and act as eco-citizens, assuming responsibility in relation to the environment and participating in a public realm that embraces nature and culture. The conservationist ideal has failed. The attempt to put a protective shield around nature, keeping it separate, pure and pristine, can offer no more than a rear-guard action, fighting a battle that is constantly being lost against the encroachment of human development. We have to recognise that there is no way of keeping that development at bay. We need to ensure that such development is humanly meaningful and ecologically wise – appropriate in means, rich in ends.

Climate change, rapid urbanization, ecological degradation, loss of biodiversity, and all manner of other accelerating anthropogenic forces all attest to the fact that we are now living in the Anthropocene, the age of humans. Lamentation in light of this fact will achieve nothing. Stewart Brand begins his book Whole Earth Discipline with the quote: ‘We are as gods and HAVE to get good at it.’ He is wrong. We are human beings living in the age of humans – and we had better get good at being human – appreciating the wealth of our social and natural connections - if we are to survive, let alone thrive. Brand’s focus in his book is upon technology and technological solutions to planetary crisis. The questions of the exploitation and the preservation of nature need, however, to be set within a much greater frame, that of the relation of human development as a creative self-realisation within an ecological context.

This book draws on several fields – science, philosophy, ethics, ecology, design and planning, civic activism - to address the question of what kind of environmentalism is required in order to meet the challenges we face. Those arguing for a non-anthropocentric ethic are sceptical of an argument developed in terms of what human beings should do. Arguing for a more humble and restrained view of human action on the planet, they may think the question of becoming and being human is misguided. Human beings, on their view, should do as little as possible (and, in more misanthropic accounts, should, preferably, go away). I argue for an approach which respects the value of nature, both in itself as well as for its benefits to human beings. This approach recognises the facts of human intervention, and demands that human beings become wise in their actions and assume responsibility for the consequences of those actions. I seek to overcome the split between human-centred and nature-centred approaches, replacing the notion of a centre with the conception of a relational field of materialist immanence. The result is a critical environmental realism which emphasises prudence and wise action in respect of planetary boundaries, an approach which is capable of a sustained practical engagement with the key problems we face.

At the heart of this presentation of civic environmentalism is a conception of eco-praxis, the idea that the transformation of the world around us is also a self-transformation. In making the world around us, we make ourselves; in coming to know that world, we come to know ourselves. In changing circumstances, we change ourselves. In the process of engaging in ecologically wise actions, we become eco-citizens. I seek to show how eco-praxis is effective in relation to the environmental crises we face. 

I see ethics and politics in terms of practical reason. In emphasising the practical dimension, I am concerned that environmental ethics should not be allowed to pursue fine distinctions, subtlety and purity at the expense of policy relevance and political effectiveness. Practical irrelevance renders even the most sophisticated theory pointless. If environmental ethics is to be more than an esoteric discipline pursued within academic confines, it needs to strike a chord amongst members of the general public; it must have a practical relevance to our current condition, which, to be frank, is parlous. If environmental ethics doesn’t find a popular home, then it is nowhere, of interest only to moral philosophers. In recovering the sense of ‘the political’ in terms of a public realm defined along ecological lines, I affirm the possibility of an ecological citizenship, a view which is capable of making the democratic ideal of social self-governance an active reality.

My argument seeks to live up to the title of Being at One, seeking unity in terms of values which rest on a firm foundation in our environment, in our sensuous, active, lived relation to it and to each other. I build upon the ideal of an active, informed and involved citizenry to deepen and broaden the democratic basis for the ecological society, supporting a pluralistic way of life by which human beings as creative agents are able to determine, and seek to realise, environmental values together.

I therefore recognise that ‘morality matters’ and defend ethics and the search for meaning whilst going on to present a praxis-oriented civic environmentalism attuned to the demands of living within planetary boundaries in the coming era of climate adaptation. In the process, I offer reasons for rethinking conventional approaches to intrinsic values, not so much arguing for or against anthropocentrism, ecocentrism or biocentrism as affirming a relationism that is beyond all such centrism. Call my view eccentric. The ethical debates concerning whether the things of nature have a value or their own, or whether we value those things for their ability to serve human interests or contribute to human well-being, seem to have reached an impasse. The distinctive positions in environmental ethics are mapped out with a wealth of scholarship behind them. By bringing in political and policy implications, and emphasising that government action and policy requires popular support and legitimacy, a civic environmentalism breaks out of the academic confines of the debate to seek common agreement on the fundamentals of ecological health. 

There is, in fine, an ineliminable social and political dimension to environmental ethics. The end in view is a nature which is valued and appreciated in common. I therefore define a civic environmentalism that seeks to transcend the dualisms of anthropocentrism-versus-ecocentrism and use-versus-preservation upon which the contemporary debate on environmental ethics has stalled.

Seeking to revalue the connections between environmental thought, ecological sensibility and political culture, I seek to outline the contours of a civic environmentalism as a way of life. This does not amount to a visionless, value-free pragmatism shaped by practical concerns and political interests. Rather, it seeks to deemphasize the concern to define an environmental ethic in abstraction from experience, translating anthropocentric, biocentric or ecocentric positions into an environmental practice to achieve the ecological society as a way of life. We find common ground when we come together, build bridges between theory and practice, and work to resolve practical problems and manage common affairs in a sustainable way. 

I offer an approach that is broad in scope, intertwining ethics and politics on the basis of a critical realism that combines science and history with an imaginative vision of the future ecological society.

Being at One outlines an approach to social and environmental issues that is developed in the intersection of our scientific knowledge, ethical commitments, environmental actions and political obligations with a view to realising a democratically constituted ecological citizenship, highlighting the concerns of social and environmental equality and justice in political action and policy making. The result is a civic-minded democratic environmentalism that sees human beings as a part of nature, not separate from it, acting wisely together in respect of that common ground. 

In fine, rather than attempt to define an ecological ethic – or any ethic – in advance of and abstraction from the world of experience, I adopt a critical realism that sees the world in terms of a creative partnership; human beings are creative change agents at work in a ceaselessly creative universe. (Kauffman 2008). As such, the world we live in is to be understood in terms of the interplay of political norms and obligations and environmental values. 

For Ben Minteer, environmental thought does not develop in isolation as a freestanding ‘ideology of nature’, but in relation to social and philosophical thought more generally. Environmental thought does not represent a fundamental break with the Western philosophical and political tradition. This is an important point. There has been a tendency to devalue the philosophical and cultural resources in the Western intellectual tradition, ignoring much that would greatly aid the cause of environmental thought and practice. Environmental thought is sustained by these deeper moral, political, and social currents. ‘It follows from this that instead of breaking away from these foundations in search of a ‘new environmental ethic’ that is celebrated for its degree of independence of the tradition, we should be probing this philosophical bequest in our efforts to understand our place and obligations within our various surrounding environments: cultural, built, technological, and natural.’ (Minteer 2006 ch 3). I shall ground my argument in a conception of ‘rational freedom’, a conception which has its origins in the ancient Greek search for the good life and which sees the freedom and happiness of each as co-existent with the freedom and happiness of all. It is a conception with obvious affinities to the natural law tradition, seeing nature through the critical, evaluating, eyes of reason.

The book therefore traverses science, political philosophy, democratic theory and environmental ethics in order to shed light on the question of how we can constitute and live the common good on common ground. What emerges is an environmentalism that places political and moral motives alongside the recognition of ecological constraints.

The Ecopolis as an Urban/Ecological Public
The idea of an urban/ecological public sphere can be expressed by the term ‘Ecopolis’. This can be defined in the expansive sense of the ancient Greek politeia, a term that embraces but is broader than the constitution and the whole social, political, economic and legal structure of the state. For Aristotle, politeia is crucial to securing the end of the good life; politeia refers to an association of individuals united in their acceptance of the moral, spiritual and cultural standards prescribed by the constitution within which they live. Citizens learn these standards with a view to living the good and happy life (Aristotle P 1981: 429/30). Aristotle is concerned that the young citizen should develop a sense of ‘belonging to the community’, of ‘being a part of the community’. And this entails establishing the common good as the central purpose of politics. ‘In the state, the good aimed at is justice; and that means what is for the benefit of the whole community’ (Aristotle P 1981: 207).

The conception of the Ecopolis establishes the good life in an expansive sense. In setting the city in the context of an ecological regionalism, the Ecopolis is an integral part of reorienting social life towards a biocentric form of civilization. The Ecopolis, therefore, is constituted as both a public and an ecological community, constituted by civic structures that fit the contours of natural design.

The conception of the Ecopolis recognises that a ‘balanced’ region requires effective institutions that promote the interests and preserve and develop the resources of the community. Urban ecological planning offers the opportunity for using some of the techniques of modern industry — mass production, large-scale planning, a unified conception — whilst at the same time reconfiguring and recontextualizing the forces of the techno-urban industrial system along ecological lines. Our technological potential is best realized in a setting such as that provided by the Ecopolis. As against endlessly producing more of the same, only in bigger, taller and faster forms, the Ecopolis is organised around a spatial arrangement that promises to achieve balance in the urban environment: a ‘functional balance’ of industry, civic structure, residence, and nature’s life support systems, encompassing all this by scaling urban life to human dimensions and proportions. The Ecopolis thus establishes the city in a larger ecological context, restoring and revitalising the region in light of environing natural and cultural relations. The Ecopolis has the potential to be an ecological regional city, a new kind of city, one which sees the urban and the rural engaged in a creative interaction with each other. The country would therefore be drawn into direct relation with the city, as the city would be set in the context of the natural world.

By developing a conception of the Ecopolis as a regional public embracing place, social life, and the natural environment, I outline the contours of a civic environmentalism which mediates between nature and culture and which is capable of facilitating human and planetary flourishing. 

The emphasis in this conception is upon political renewal and ecological restoration through a lived experience that bridges the social and natural worlds, developing an alternative to the dominant antisocial and anti-ecological form of contemporary individualism. The idea of the Ecopolis thus stands in contradistinction to the overscaled, exploitative, parasitic polities of the modern age. The alternative presented by the Ecopolis connects person, place and purpose through establishing our pragmatic and intuitive relation to the commonwealth of life. 
The intention in this argument is to link this understanding of ecology to the public sphere and in turn contribute to the development of an ecological regionalism that expresses a concern with the health and of both natural ecosystems and human communities. By conceiving the human role within nature’s community of life as a commonwealth of virtue, we may define the world as a federated republic of ecological regions whose geographic vitality and diversity is consonant with the civic ideal of decentralized participatory democracy. 

I write later on the idea of life as an ‘experiment’ in relation to a conception of citizen science. A better term than this, however, is ‘exploration’. I see the urban/ecological regionalism contained in the Ecopolis as an ‘exploration’ which combines science and ethics and connects fact and value at the level of lived experience. Such an approach brings objective fact and subjective experience together at the level of practice, presenting a vision of an organic order that is capable of endlessly revitalising culture.

The Ecopolis is, therefore, an alternative to the dominant modern worldview that has turned nature into dead, meaningless matter and advanced technological ‘solutions’ that override the complexities of both social and natural communities. The mechanistic worldview has proceeded in symbiotic relation with the world as a political and economic machine, endlessly accumulating quantities and enlarging power through the direction of physical force against organic natural and human communities. The Ecopolis, as an urban/ecological regionalism and multi-layered public sphere of federated regions, checks this threat by invoking the organic order that emerges out of the observed and experienced qualities of place. The holist-organic principle does more than counter a mechanistic modernity: it establishes the healthy relation to nature in terms of a civic environmentalism based upon active democratic participation, lived experience and a moral sense of place.
 
The realization of ecological health calls for politics, organisation and planning, adapting technology to ecological principles and patterns so as to respect natural boundaries and diversity as a matter of conscious purpose and effort. Given the extent to which the destruction of nature has proceeded in tandem with the deterioration of urban life, there is a need to develop an integrated approach that enables human beings to determine their lives by being sensitive to the influences and constraints of the ecosystems to which life must continually adapt. The integrated approach of civic environmentalism, therefore, seeks to recontextualize urban life in relation to natural life-support systems, thereby reorienting our way of life to address the twin crises of overdevelopment and overurbanization. 

A civic environmentalism is neither urban nor rural but establishes the city as the Ecopolis, defined in relation to the organic complexities of the environing ecosystem. As against the economies of scale associated with mass production and industrial development, the Ecopolis takes advantage of natural economies, finding both efficiency and sufficiency in renewable sources of energy, appropriate technology, ecological design, biomimetics or biomimicry, ecological restoration, small scale economic units, economic regionalism and a green industrialism that focuses on satisfying basic needs, an ecological economics that takes the place of a system of commodification that requires the continuous stimulation of wants to absorb ever expanding levels of production.

The Ecopolis presents a powerful alternative to the prevailing social and cultural pattern of development, re-envisioning the relation of the built environment to the natural region. Presenting the Ecopolis in terms of a civic environmentalism, I am seeking to re-focus ecology on a pragmatic concern with a way of life, coming to define a democratic alternative to the over-developed, over-scaled, unsustainable existence that now prevails. The Ecopolis requires a managed environmentalism and a planned decentralization that applies techniques and technologies, specialist knowledge and professional expertise whilst emphasising civic participation and citizen knowledges, remedying both the ecological degradation and the social inequities which are the result of capitalist industrialization and the endless, expansionary dynamic of accumulation. This approach establishes the health and preservation of ecosystems in the context of new urban/ecological forms, sustaining a commitment to a moral sense of place and reconceiving the forms of common living in order to achieve a sense of subjectivity, common identity and ownership in relation to place. 

A civic environmentalism therefore recognises that an ecologically sound and sustainable policy towards ecosystems must address the health of the human ecology. Ecological destruction is often associated with the breakdown of social communities, so that ecological restoration is often a case of reinvigorating urban/rural forms. 

The idea of the Ecopolis as an urban/ecological regional public responds to the problems created by mass industrialisation and urbanisation. Such an idea will not succeed on account of its moral and intellectual persuasiveness alone, but requires a mode of implementation and construction that is capable of connecting theory and practice. It requires planning and politics, knowledge and technology, and extensive public spaces enabling both democratic participation in its achievement and civic involvement in its maintenance. 

Such transformations will not be achieved by the evolution of technology or economic integration alone, nor by planning and regulation through governmental agencies alone. A civic environmentalism sees human beings as change agents epistemologically and structurally equipped to bring about the Ecopolis. Transformations can be guided toward social and ecological ends through internal relation to the means of realisation. Without that actively democratic content, the ideal is powerless when confronted with the intransigence of political and business elites with vested material and psychological interests in the status quo. Without the participation of human agents in the process of constituting themselves as eco-citizens, the Ecopolis as an eco-regionalist public sphere cannot be considered a viable alternative to the prevailing social order. It will lack popular support and with fail on account of the absence of a living democratic content.

The Ecopolis conceives a new public life which is capable of exercising public power – the collective force of the sovereign people - in such a way as to realise the potentialities that are immanent in technological modernization, but which are repressed by vested interests and institutional inertia. These potentials can only be realised through a democratic self-socialization that is able to put the collective good ahead of the self-destructive motives of individual and sectional self-interest and private gain. Based upon popular forms of common life and control, I will show how socialisation so conceived is the solution to the game-theoretic problem of how to reconcile individual and collective rationality and freedom. In the absence of collective mechanisms of control, individual rationality and freedom will continue to generate a collective irrationality and unfreedom. The problem demands urgent solution. The crisis in the climate system is an unrestrained and irresponsible collective force that positively demands that we develop a collective power of our own, a form of internal social regulation that allows us to assume collective responsibility for our actions. I shall, therefore, make the case for innovating collective mechanisms of control, placing these at the heart of a new public life.

In developing an awareness of power relations, we come to appreciate the nature of the social and economic forces that stand in the way of the realisation of any ecopolitical ideal. Such an ideal will not succeed as a result of its intellectual and moral cogency alone, it requires means of translation and transition that connect theory and practice. This can involve planning agencies and governmental bodies. Substantial programmes of reconstruction will require a planning framework. But they also require a social agency possessing the structural capacity to effect substantial change as well as the will, motivation and character to act. Reconstruction requires the creation of appropriate institutions that are capable of taking effective action, of commanding popular support and of involving people as citizens. The civic environmentalism I develop conceives social transformation to be a self-transformation. 

Developing a public discourse and generating a civic consciousness through democratic participation are a means not of dissolving expert knowledge but of redirecting its professionalization away from the political and economic elites and interests responsible for the destruction of human and natural communities and toward meeting the social and ecological concerns of these communities. This is also a way of opening a space for citizen knowledges generated from within those communities.

This view points to the need to democratize and rescale economic and political power as an integral part of the attempt to reconfigure the built environment in light of ecological constraints. I therefore present civic environmentalism as a pragmatic and democratic response to the social and ecological conditions of modernity. 

Person, Place and ‘the Political’
In light of the environmental crisis we are learning not only about natural limits but about the limits of reason and technology. We are having to address the social, moral and aesthetic implications of science and technology. We need a way of restoring the unity of reason and emotion, understanding that hard and soft culture are complementary, that tool making and symbol making, the practical and creative arts, go together.

The idea of the Ecopolis expands the boundaries of the ‘political’. By bringing science, ethics, planning and the creative arts into relation with everyday life, we not only achieve an integral approach, we underscore the conditions of democracy as a cultural experience. The fundamental assumption and value of the concern to unite aesthetics and ethics is the awareness that a meaningful and enduring social transformation requires imaginative vision and courage. If we are to succeed in resolving the twin crises of social decay and ecological destruction, we will require the ‘ecological imagination.’ (Worster 1993: 209 210). 

The positive resolution of our ecological as well as social and economic ills requires the revitalisation of public life. Political and social transformation cannot take place without a cultural transformation which makes meaning and purpose explicit. The ecological vision thus develops a political sophistication and popular legitimacy by being articulated through a democratic culture within the public sphere.

This incorporation of a cultural dimension is fundamental in giving subjective content and meaning to civic environmentalism, mediating pragmatically between state planning, expert knowledge and members of the general public, thus giving expression to an urban, local or regional public sphere. The merit of civic environmentalism is to grasp transformation as a holistic and integrative process. Fundamental transformation is not a technical question in which ecological, economic, political and cultural changes can be kept apart from each other, each the province of experts and elites.

Affirming the creative role of culture within geographic place sets an aesthetic appreciation of the environment alongside scientific understanding. This approach gives due attention to culture and consciousness in an imaginative aesthetic and ethical reconstruction of place. Achieving a democratic culture, involving ethics and aesthetics, is crucial in establishing the unity of person and place. In 1929, Wittgenstein declared that aesthetics and ethics are ‘one and the same’. Restoring the unity between ethics and aesthetics has the effect of making cultural criticism a moral criticism; and both are integral to politics as something more than a technology of acquiring and retaining power. Establishing the relationships which link up the diverse aspects of behaviour and contexts is an attempt to give form to a cultural vision.

Civic environmentalism is distinguished by the way it restores the unity between politics and ethics and integrates culture, geography and biology within a transformed and expansive sense of ‘the political’. The ecological public sphere that emerges reflects the dynamics of social relations, ecological constraints and the human exchange with nature. The approach sets public life in the context of its environing relations. Hence the need for an expansive sense of ‘the political.’ Enduring political change is accompanied by a transformation of values. Any genuinely ecological transformation of ‘the political’ requires a simultaneous change in the cultural, moral, even spiritual, dimensions. In light of encroaching environmental threats and an increasing awareness of ecological constraints, such a transformation involves changing the whole basis of our parasitic, exploitative and destructive industrial civilization.

Against the abstracting tendencies of an exploitative and authoritarian technics transgressing planetary boundaries, a democratic technics is in tune with organic realities. From this perspective, the capital system, for all of its much vaunted progress in expanding economic production, stands condemned as an economic, ecological, social and moral failure. It fails because it inverts the true relations between things and exalts abstractions – capital, commodities, money, prices, profit margins, shares – over realities – human relations, communities, ecosystems. The inversion and destruction of the real in favour of the fetish systems of state politics and capitalist production points to the violence and tyranny of abstraction at work in the modern world, the suppression of the insurgency of life under the regularities of a mechanistic order. We need to recover the cardinal virtues as natural-moral virtues and in the process make the holist-organic principle the cardinal measure of human activity.

The holistic approach is timely. We need to set technologies and techniques within an ethico-social matrix that encompasses political and social institutions, networks and relations, the creative arts and culture. The problems we face are, like reality, multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. It follows that we require an integrated approach, one that draws on all disciplines as well as being interdisciplinary. Such an approach has breadth whilst being able to apply specialist knowledge in depth. The integral framework we establish understands the relationship between technology and culture within the patterns of social life, and seeks to give expression to the underlying norms, values and beliefs, the mores, which give meaning at the level of the everyday life world. Such an approach seeks to bring our moral capacities up to our level of technological development, thereby orienting society away from the destructive tendencies associated with uneven development and balance, orienting our powers towards life. Emphasising the importance of a standpoint in defining a civilised way of life, an overarching framework taps into and brings to the surface the underlying norms, values, and beliefs that bond a society together.

The environmental crisis is a civilisation crisis, characterised by an increase in destructive (as well as creative) powers. The positive resolution of this crisis requires a holistic approach. In addition to institutional recommendations, planning policies, applications of technology and creation of energy infrastructures, a positive resolution of our environmental problems requires a fundamental change in the way we think and act, it requires a change at the most profound level of character. Such a change begins in the psyche and proceeds outwards so that personal identity gains expression in social relation to others in place. The approach adumbrated in these pages thus seeks to address our social and ecological predicament with appropriate moral psychological depth.

The abstracting forces and destructive tendencies unleashed by our techno-industrial system are not only unravelling communities and ways of life, they are undermining nature’s life support systems. This external violence is the outer expression of the narrow and minimal notion of self expressed by modern systems, the idea of the human being as a self-maximising atom in competition with other atoms for scarce resources. This produces a subjectivity conceived in antagonistic relation to nature, destructive of the human nature within as well as the nature without. 

In addition to the regulatory measures we may take at the level of institutions and codes to restrain such destructive behaviours, then, any changes we propose, to be effective, require altering the boundaries of self through transformations at the level of culture, social practices and relations, values, and ethical standpoint. The approach I develop here seeks to connect inner transformations in the self to transformations in the wider world within a public life broadly conceived, so that through civic participation, one’s subjectivity can be given an outer expression, generating an objectivity of experience in which all can share. 

One appreciates, then, the extent to which community is crucial in giving ideals and solutions permanent form and living expression. The idea of an ecological society thus becomes practicable in an actively democratic society which is scaled to human dimensions and proportions, makes extensive participatory structures available, and thereby fosters a sense of ownership of, and commitment to, place. Such a society learns to fit itself to natural boundaries and reorganise economic activity and technological use and innovation along ecological contours. 

The recovery of the self and of place therefore go together. A civic environmentalism seeks to integrate place and person, intertwining the social, political, cultural, aesthetic and ecological aspects of life in a seamless whole. The approach combines institutions of governance, policy frameworks, planning and technologies within a moral and social ecology that is committed to place and person. The result is an integration of social and natural ecology through a public sphere that cultivates a moral sense of place. 

The Ecopolis is therefore a cultural vision that moves and motivates individuals within place as a lived experience. And this vision is connected to both the democratic participation required to support an urban/ecological public sphere, and the respect for natural boundaries required to sustain this public life. This is to define a civic environmentalism that sees human beings as both social and natural beings.  


A common ethic and practice and the need for a social identity

We need a common ethic and the practice that goes with it to counter global stress and turn human actions in a positive direction. An ethic in itself does not and will not resolve the social, economic, political and ecological problems of the world, and that is not what is being proposed here. My argument recognises the futility of moral exhortation. Appeals to the common good are heard all the more in its absence and denial in the practical affairs of human beings. Such appeals are declarations of impotence. If the common good was morally, socially and institutionally available and within reach, it would be naturally achieve by men and women of good will. A common ethic does, however, supply the moral framework which is capable of giving direction and guiding individuals away from despair, inspiring them into the concerted actions required for the realisation of the good society. It is a necessary ingredient for the attainment of the common good. At the same time, the spaces and opportunities for such effective action must also be available at the level of social practices and relations. In other words, to appeal to the common good presupposes the existence of a social identity which enables individuals to respond practically to such an appeal, an identity that connects individual self-interest and social interest. Failure to create such a social identity through appropriate social relations means that we remain paralysed within the old dualism of egoism and altruism, the former dominant, working to dissolve collective bonds, the latter abstract and irrelevant. Everyone believes in the common good; the problem is that we are incapable of practising it given the arrangement of society around the pursuit of individual self-interest. It may be moral to respond to calls for the common good, but it simply isn’t rational for an individual to act for the common good when the distribution of rewards and opportunities in society depends upon putting immediate self-interest first and foremost.

Achieving a broad consensus on a common ethic is easy enough if we remain at the level of broad principles. Beyond this, where an ethic matters and becomes practically relevant, universally accepted ethical standards have to be connected to loyalties, practices, identities, and an organised system of purposes and functions, otherwise the universal is abstract and empty, without critical purchase and capable of inspiring only weak loyalty. Such a universal is merely an expression of pious wishes, or, even worse, a rationalisation of particular interests masquerading as the general interest, a common enough experience in the history of human institutions. Political leaders and policy makers need an ethic that has social appeal and relevance in order to justify action and intervention for the public good. A blank assertion of the long term common good alone will not suffice – that ethic has to have institutional relevance and significance in terms of relations, practices and identities.

The kind of identity presupposed by the market society of modernity is that of the self-interested individual whose own good may well be achieved in ways which detract from the overall social good. Any overall good that results from such self-interested behaviour is indirect. ‘To demand virtue of such an individual is to ask for a quite inexplicable altruism: a sacrifice of everything to which his life is devoted. But worse, such altruism will in crucial cases be, not just mysterious, but irrational.’ (Poole 1991 ch 1).

An identity of this kind is not available within the market. Here, individual identity is constituted by abstraction, and well-being has to do with acquisition and private enjoyment. One's identity is not given by participation in the politics and culture of the polis. Land is not a secure bulwark of personal identity, but an exchangeable item with the same external relationship to its owner as any other commodity. In the absence of these or other comparable sources of social identity, to call for virtue is to ask for an altruism which from the point of view of the market individual is, not just inexplicable, but irrational. 

Poole 1991 ch 1

Once we relate an ethic to social identity in this way, it becomes clear why moral exhortation is futile and even self-defeating, raising hopes that cannot be satisfied and thereby causing despair. 

I argue not only for a recovery of virtue ethics, but for its extension as a conception of ecological virtue. This alone is insufficient, however, creating just another socially impotent and irrelevant ethic to join the club of warring gods in the modern world. We are not short of competing moralities, value judgements with no claim on society other than personal preference. The attempt to rework an ethic of virtue can only succeed if the context has been created to enable the social identity required by that ethic, a social identity which connects individual self-interest and the social interest. Only such a social identity serves to check the problem of the free rider. Without that identity, there is no connection between individual action and overall good, something which inhibits the individual from engaging in action for the greater good.

The rational altruist (the man of virtue) will know that his contribution to maintaining the institution will make very little difference to whether others contribute, and that it is highly unlikely to make a difference to whether the institution is maintained or not. It may make a small contribution, though if it is additional to what is required, it may also be wasted surplus. In any event, the contribution will be small compared with the individual well-being lost. Thus, even the altruist will not contribute to maintaining those institutions which only marginally depend on his contribution, and instead devotes his energies to more immediate causes where his contribution will make a difference.

Poole 1991 ch 1

Moral exhortation extolling the virtues of altruism provides insufficient motive to inspire altruistic actions. That is, whilst many individuals will agree that altruistic behaviour is good, they will, within a market society of instrumental relations, lack good reason to act altruistically. Working for the social good will entail a sacrifice of self-interest which will be deemed irrational by rational individuals. The social identity connecting self- and social interest is not available and stands in need of creation. Only then will appeals to altruism and the common good become effective. Only with the creation of such a social identity can we rework the ethic of virtue in a way that avoids the nostalgic frame. A virtuous social identity conceives well-being, what Aristotle calls eudaimonia, in interpersonal terms, the individual good being directly related to the contribution that the individual makes to the social good. The appeal to altruism and the common good is effective only in the context of such a social identity. The antithesis between egoism and altruism is overcome so that to pursue the one entails no sacrifice of the other. Rousseau writes well on the need to establish reciprocal relations between each individual and all individuals: ‘The undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for ourselves.’ (Rousseau SC 1973: II.iv). 

In the context of a society organised around such a social identity, the appropriate morality is one concerned with the excellence of character or virtue. Individuals learn how to live well in everyday reciprocal relation to others, and in doing what they need to do to live well as individuals, they work also for others, sustaining the social fabric and political order to which they belong.

With a social identity that connects individual and social good, the commitment to the precepts and practices of a common moral and institutional framework become effective. The individual can see how his or her individual actions impact on the wider environment and generate results. I argue that the moral foundation for such a social identity exists in a conception of human beings as social and natural beings possessing potentialities for healthy growth, a conception which implies certain irrevocable standards or self-evident truths concerning what it is to be truly human. 

A common ethic as binding
A common ethic binds each individual and all individuals within a commitment to the view that the good of each is conditional upon and co-existent with the good of all. The view that no one person is free unless all are free is a view which enjoins us to create the form or forms of common life which enables universal freedom. This common ethic holds that we all have a responsibility for bringing about the common good. And that good embraces the social and natural environment, social justice implying environmental justice, peace within and between nations implying peace on and with the earth. Our particular differences do not preclude our shared involvement in, responsibility for and ownership of schemes that contribute to the common good, as defined in terms of the well-being of humanity and the planet upon which all life depends.

In the modern world, all things are pregnant with their opposites, creative potentials being repressed and/or diverted into destructive actualities. The modern world has experienced an unparalleled scientific, technological and economic advance, yet we are confronted by such hard facts as world-wide poverty, hunger, disease, unemployment and underemployment, destruction of social fabrics and ecological degradation as to contradict all notions of progress. In seemingly every nation, people are threatened with economic instability, social confusion, political uncertainty and national decline. But this is not so much a general decline or end of progress as such, as the end of a particular civilisation. The positive resolution of these problems is not beyond us. Humanity possesses the technical, economic, cultural and social resources to create a socially just and ecologically benign global order. The problem is that the central paradox of modernity, the enlargement of means and the displacement of ends and the way that this entails 'the transformation of human agency into human bondage' (Dawe 1971:47), remains unaddressed and unresolved.

We need new modalities and mentalities to resolve the problems that now beset us. The old ways are dying, the old mechanisms on which ‘progress’ rested no longer work as they once did. The capitalist mode of production is in global crisis, but the transition to a new mode requires more than an arbitrary will or exhortation detached from social and psychic realities. The long term common good requires more than an act of faith, but must be based in motives, actions and practices. We need to avoid an unattached voluntarism in ethics and politics and instead identify specific conjunctures and contexts that would enable a common ethic to be practised.

The need to create context for the common good
Humanity possesses many visions of living well together, in harmony with each and with the planet. We suffer from no shortage of visionaries. Lack of vision is not the problem. There is no shortage of strategies and strategists either. I am tired of being asked for my strategy. Take your pick, I say. Lack of contexts and forms of common living enabling individuals to live up to the vision of social and ecological harmony is the main problem. In such a critical situation, we stand in need of a common ethic that commits us to a peaceful living together with each other which respects our planetary and which is buttressed by, and in turn guides, political programmes and social actions. But that common ethic lives only by being grounded in the form and the forms of the common life.

Ideals to live up to, hope for the future as something feasibly better than the present, goals to strive for, purposes to unfold have slipped from our hands through years of ineffective government and politics, on the part of both the defenders of the status quo and its critics. We need to eschew moral exhortation and appeals to the common good which simply beg the question. To call for the common good presupposes that such a thing exists and is available to choose. It isn’t; it stands in need of creation. We need to demonstrate the conditions of its creation and extend communal structures enabling individuals to participate in its creation, grounding, generating, defending and extending and living our hopes, ideals and values.

The integration of reason and emotion
The creation of a just, free and equal world society cannot be the work of a common moral and institutional framework alone, and not even principally. The codification and proclamation of justice through laws, prescriptions and conventions establishes a framework for justice rather than a guarantee of justice. The realization of justice depends on the capacity and the willingness on the part of individuals to act justly. Justice is a personal quality that is socially embodied. Knowledge in itself is not a virtue; to be a virtue it would need to be appetitive. Action on the part of individuals in favour of justice presumes a consciousness of justice as a moral duty, and a willingness and a capacity to act on that awareness. It involves personal moral effort on the part of the individual, and cannot be simply legislated and enacted. For this reason, both reason and emotion must be addressed, and the cognitive and the affective aspects of human action integrated. If morality without effective action is impotent, so action without purpose and meaning cannot endure. 

A common ethic entails a consensus on fundamental values, a basic minimum capable of uniting every community. To affirm a common ethic is to declare that there is no ‘beyond good and evil.’ No person, no institution, no organisation, no class of people, no group, no nation stands outside morality and the bounds of moral behaviour. All men and women, as beings endowed with reason and conscience, are obligated to do good and avoid evil.

To say this is to recognize why the shedding of moral standards could be considered liberatory. Morality has functioned as a rationalisation of class rule and elite control and has been and can easily become a repressive constraint on human fulfilment. Whilst a common ethic is a shared bond, something that unites individuals, it should not be a repressive chain, an inhibiting constraint. Instead, a common ethic should be viewed as an aid, a guide, an enabler and a support for human beings as they set out to find their life's direction, realize their purposes and constantly renew their values, adjust their orientations and find meaning.

2 ONE EARTH, MANY WORLDS
We are One
Calls for unity are many but difficult to achieve. I shall, therefore, be concerned with the question of how to forge the common identity that makes collective action for the good of each and all possible. In September 2014, I gave a talk at California State University entitled ‘We are One.’ It was not my choice of title. So I proceeded to unpack the terms. What, exactly, I asked, is entailed by human beings coming to be ‘at one’ with the world? What, exactly, are we being enjoined to be ‘at one’ with? What world? There is, indeed, no external human world, in that we are active parts of our world and, indeed, are co-creators of that world. The social and natural environments are joined in this sense. That gives us a degree of moral freedom, reason, consciousness, will, and choice. How far does the elimination of the self in favour of mutual dependence entail an entirely passive relation to ecological processes? Human beings are much more than slaves to biological imperatives, however much we may have abused our powers, overdeveloped to become overmighty and overbearing. 

The first questions we need to ask are ‘who are “we”’ and ‘what is this “one.”’ We are one species, but not one people. We are one earth, but not one world. Politically, there is no human ‘we’, we lack a universal identity in this sense. Human beings are divided by politics, nation, class, race. This point is hugely important to grasp, given the tendency of those demanding environmental action to address humanity as a whole. Since, politically, there is no ‘humanity’ except in the most abstract of senses – declarations of universal human rights, for instance – such appeals fall on deaf ears. They are untargeted, lack specificity, and will therefore provoke only the weakest of responses, followed by long and pointless laments on how nobody cares. Referring to the threat to planetary health, the environmentalist Donella Meadows and her co-authors write: 'The world will decide which direction to take.' (Meadows, Meadows and Randers 1992).  In like manner, Jeremy Rifkin writes: 'The choice of whether we live or die is in our hands. Mankind must make up its mind what kind of future it wants.' (Rifkin 1992). I could give countless other examples of the same demands.

As an appeal to choose environmental health over environmental destruction, we can, in general, agree. The problem is that in politics we do not and cannot think and act as this general ‘we’, for the reason that the universal identity making general appeals effective does not exist. The appeals are made to a collective agency that does not exist, with the result that they will not be acted upon. All the frustration at years of environmental appeals falling on deaf ears finds its explanation here. Such appeals make no sense at the crucial level of social identity and political action. ‘The world’ as such does not and cannot decide anything. To ask for ‘the world’ to decide is to appeal to a political entity that does not exist. The same applies to what Rifkin calls ‘mankind’. Who or what is this ‘mankind’? ‘Mankind’ is a biological entity, and on that level we are indeed united. But the social interests of different classes, groups and nations are quite distinct, breaking up that biological unity at the level of organised social existence. There is no ‘mankind’ as a political entity. Appeals for ‘mankind’ to act are well meaning but designed to fail. Yes, we can point to the power of vested interests and institutional inertia standing in the way of concerted action, but at the same time there is a need for greater political clarity in environmental ethics and politics. Don’t ever expect a ruling or dominant class to act against its own interests in order to realize the demands of a subaltern class, and do your political job for you. And don’t be surprised if they choose to be obstructive. It’s your job to become politically effective, reject general and abstract appeals and concentrate force politically. ‘The world’ has no mind to make up, and ‘mankind’ has no collective will to choose between life or death. If those are the alternatives before us, and the profundity of the climate crisis indicates that they are, then we had better find a way of replacing impotent, abstract moral and rational appeals with a theory and practice that has social relevance and a real critical purchase at the level of social reality. 

What matters with any appeal is that it is relevant to an agency that possesses material futurity through the structural capacity to act. And this requires politics:





‘In other words, politics.’ Those words bear repetition, given the tendency in some environmental circles to emphasise purity of principle over practice. I have lost count of the times I have heard well-intentioned people declare that their first love is nature and that they loathe politics. We are natural beings, they say. We are political beings, too, I reply, and we are political beings by nature. The first bit is easy, we live every day as natural beings. The last bit, where we engage with others to determine the terms on which we live together, is the more complicated bit. There is no evading politics. The failure to embrace and develop a conception of politics that is integral to our self-realisation within natural boundaries will effectively concede responsibility to the very forces which lie behind environmental destruction. To be able to choose life, we need to be politically constituted, equipped, and engaged as eco-citizens capable of apprehending the supra-individual forces ranged against us and which, uncontrolled, are unravelling the planetary boundaries upon which civilised life depends. Without the appropriate social identity and mechanisms of collective control and action, the decisions that we need to make in favour of health and life will be taken from our hands and cast in favour of destruction and death. In short, what ‘we’ do is very much a question of how we form our social identities and relationships and organise our common affairs.

And this begs the question of our relations to other species, living organisms, our environment.

Oneness and Ethics
[becoming one with the metaphysical unity of the universe]
The spirituality at the core of green politics refers to the oneness and connectedness of human beings with nature and with each other. Jeremy Rifkin writes of the values and institutions of an entropic society:

The traditional wisdom, as embodied in all the great world religions, has long taught that the ultimate purpose of human life is not the satisfaction of all material desires, but rather the experience of liberation that comes from becoming one with the metaphysical unity of the universe. 

The goal is to find out who we are, to find 'the truth that will set us free'. Becoming one with the metaphysical unity of the universe is to identify with the Absolute Principle that binds together all of existence; to know that That art Thou. 

To know this in the very ground of our being and to conduct our life in accordance with this transcendent reality: this is the human development that comes from an adherence to traditional wisdom. 

Rifkin Entropy: A New World View 1980: ch 6 Values and Institutions in an Entropic Society

Oneness and connectedness
Green spirituality emphasises the interrelatedness of all things within the greater whole, with the spiritual needs of humanity expressed in terms of the need for balance and fulfilment (Schumacher, 1973; Capra, 1983). As Charlene Spretnak argues the point:

My own working definition of spirituality is that it is the aspect of human existence that explores the subtle forces of energy in and around us and reveals to us profound interconnectedness.

Charlene Spretnak 1985: 240

[to live in harmony]
We still tend to write about nature as if it is something apart from us. To argue that we must protect or preserve nature, or that we should get outdoors and ‘be in nature’ belongs to the same mindset that sees nature as an object to be exploited. In both cases, nature is seen as separate from us, something ‘out there’. We forget that nature is ‘in here’ too. Our reason does not raise us above nature. As ‘dependent rational animals’ (MacIntyre 1999), we are an intrinsic part of nature and share in what Patrick Geddes called the insurgency of life. The same elements that animate the natural world drive our own instinct for life. We are not separate from nature but are at one with it. However, being at one with nature, and with ourselves, is something that is not given; oneness is something we need to achieve. We have a degree of independence from natural processes, and that means we possess a moral freedom, a will, a choice, a consciousness when it comes to determining how we live our lives. To be at war with nature is to be at war with ourselves. To destroy nature is to destroy ourselves. The exploitation of nature is inextricably bound up with exploitative relations within society. To be in harmony with nature is to be in harmony with others and with ourselves. But there is a degree of moral choice which determines whether we see ourselves as a part of or apart from nature. But these things we know, and have been repeating to ourselves for a long time. The harder questions lie elsewhere.

The need to find common ground
The sense that all things are connected defines an ecological politics as holistic. And it raises some difficult political problems. For if we are indeed all connected, then we are connected to the people with whom we are often in conflict with socially and politically, people with whom we disagree with respect to the way we conduct our business on the planet. Moreover, even people who agree concerning the need to move to an ecological order can be in disagreement with respect to strategies, politics, values, means and even ends. We live on the one Earth, this one Earth is what we have in common. But we lack the common ground to stand upon at the political level. Beyond oneness in a biological and ecological sense, therefore, there is the fundamental problem of politics, the problem of how to achieve unity out of diversity, the ancient problem of the One and the Many. (Halper 1989).

Two worlds
We live in two worlds. On the one hand, there is the natural world of green plants, animals and living organisms, the oceans, the pedosphere, the lithosphere and the atmosphere. The primacy of this world as a whole points to what Jeremy Rifkin calls a biosphere politics (Rifkin 1992). On the other hand, there is the world we have created out of our practical interchange with this nature, the world of social institutions, artefacts, culture and art. 

Which world is more important? If priorities have to be established, then try living without fresh air and water, without the soils and green plants, and you will have the answer. Of course, human beings need both natural and social environments in order to thrive. It is not an either/or question, and we should not beat ourselves up with respect to choosing one over the other. To force such a choice is to invite a reduction to primitivism against civilisation. That’s not a true representation of human nature. The problem is that we have developed a social system which encourages us to place a greater value upon the things we make than upon the things of nature which we take as given. These are also things that are easy to place a monetary value against, and come to value more than the natural things we truly need as biological beings. 

There is a distinction to be made here between use value and exchange value. The free market economist Adam Smith noted the paradoxical implications of this distinction, showing how things of great value can be considered almost worthless in monetary terms, and how ephemeral things can appear to be immensely valuable. Smith gave the examples of diamonds and water. Diamonds are unnecessary but expensive. Water is a vital need and yet is cheap. Smith explained the paradox with reference to the inverted values of the modern market economy:

The word value . . . has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. The one may be called ‘value in use’; the other, ‘value in exchange.’ The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange; and, on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water; but it will scarce purchase anything; scarce anything can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it.

Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. 1, p. 13.

Here we see an early example of the clash between different ways of valuing the world. It isn’t a clash between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric values. And it isn’t a clash between those who argue for intrinsic value and those who do not. As I shall show later, the argument for intrinsic value in nature can just as easily refer to the monetary worth of natural resources as it can to the moral worth of natural things. Smith’s argument points to the use value of water and other such natural resources. Whilst this is not intrinsic value as such – water is not valued for its own sake – it shows how we can value resources in more than monetary terms. That is, we can appreciate our dependence on the natural world and value water, land, air etc. in terms of their importance to us in terms of sustenance rather than exploitation. 

Appreciating our dependency is the key to our successful adaptation in face of the environmental problems we face. The world we live in is characterised by a number of features: the intensity of change and the pivotal role of human activity in driving that change; the unintended consequences of incremental actions generating an external constraint in social, political and economic life; systems of production and consumption which presume the possibility of endless growth through an abundance of energy and natural resources; wants, preferences and patterns of behaviour that are ill-adapted to living within planetary boundaries. 

[The experiment
These propositions imply that the human species has embarked, unwittingly, on an extremely risky evolutionary gambit. ’One planet, one experiment’, says Edward O. Wilson. To a large extent, much of what we do is based on a certain faith. As Oliver Wendell Holmes writes: ‘All life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation on some prophecy based on imperfect knowledge.’ 

But there are great differences between experiments, in which results are monitored and behaviours adjusted, and a massive gamble in which everything is placed on just the one thing. As John McNeill argues, the preferences and patterns of our dominant way of life ‘are not easily adaptable should our circumstances change.’ (McNeill 2000 1). And those circumstances are rapidly changing, whilst we and our behaviours are not. 

I shall return to this question of living in a condition of imperfect knowledge, living into a world as if we knew, even though we do not. Here, my point is that adaptability is very different from gambits.

We are so in thrall to our technical powers and their products that we have staked everything on the continuation of a highly unsustainable lifestyle, pursuing the infinite accumulation of material quantities on a planet of finite resources. 
In the very long view of biological evolution, the best survival strategy is to be adaptable, to pursue diverse sources of subsistence — and to maximize resilience… But what if we have adapted ourselves too well to our endlessly expanding economic system? What if we remain self-maximising individuals hard-wired to choose immediate selfish interest over the long term ecological well-being of the species? Then, when circumstances change, when resources run out and the free lunch is over, all bets are off. 

James Lovelock permits himself a ‘gentle alarmism’ when examining our prospects. ‘The year 2040 is when the IPCC is estimating that Europe, America, and China become uninhabitable for the growth of food. They're grossly underestimating the rate of temperature rise, so that 2040 may be 2025. People don't realize how little time we've got. The planet really is on the move.’ ‘I don't think there's much doubt at all now amongst those few of us that have worked on the problem, that the system is in the course of moving to its stable hot state, which is about 5 degrees Celsius globally higher than now.’ (Lovelock quoted by Stewart Brand 2010). The planet is on the move and it seems there is little we can do about it, except come to terms with continents becoming uninhabitable for the growth of food.

We have, by dint of our intelligence, inventiveness and acquisitiveness, created a social world which has delivered, for significant numbers, a degree of security from natural necessity, a degree of material freedom, and this has encouraged an inflated sense of our own independence from nature. But the temptation to equate the endless accumulation of quantities with ‘progress’ should be resisted. By our technical genius, we have separated ourselves from our biological and ecological grounds in the community of life. And that abstraction from the sources of life will prove fatal.

As Lewis Mumford wrote:

An age that worships the machine and seeks only those goods that the machine provides, in ever larger amounts, at ever rising profits, actually has lost contact with reality; and in the next moment or the next generation may translate its general denial of life into one last savage gesture of nuclear extermination. Within the context of organic order and human purpose, our whole technology has still potentially a large part to play; but much of the riches of modern technics will remain unusable until organic functions and human purposes, rather than the mechanical process, dominate.

Mumford 1962 in Miller ed. 1986: 82

This is not a sustainable way of living, and for spiritual reasons as much as material. Our estrangement from nature comes with a personal loss as well as a physical loss.

I have a book by anthropologist Jonathan Kingdon called Self-Made Man and his Undoing which shows that there is something badly wrong in the relations between the natural world and the social world we have created. Kingdon refers particularly the way that the technosphere is encroaching upon the natural systems upon which our biological survival depends:





We have ignored our dependence upon nature and become over-reliant on our technical powers. Kingdon is worth quoting at length on this point:





The separation of the social world from the natural world
And there it is. We are not one. We have a social world separated from a natural world, and we have divisions between rich and poor (and other divisions too) in that social world. As Lewis Mumford notes, the humanising feats of civilisation have come with a heavy price tag. From the very beginning, a dominant minority took command of the agents of civilisation and appropriated its goods, at the expense of the mass of mankind. (Mumford 1957: 49). To build a new sense of family, we need to heal the divisions within the social world and heal the division between the social and the natural worlds. Since the exploitation of nature is implicated the exploitation which characterises the relations of human society, this healing is a singular process. (Bookchin 1982).

Marx, in his Letter to the Labour Parliament, optimistically stated that ‘the labouring classes have conquered nature; they have now to conquer man’ (Marx AB SE 1973). In truth, the conquest of nature has been associated with the conquest of humanity, the exploitation of nature implying exploitative relations within human society. 

We will wait a long time for any liberation which is based on the conquest of nature. To ensure health and well-being in both physical and psychological senses, we need to restore our connections to the ecological web of life. Our task, then, is to see how we can bring the ways of nature and the ways of humanity to a common point, appreciating the extent to which everything on the planet is interconnected. Our challenge is to become aware of these connections and so ensure that our political and economic system, our culture and education, is integrated within environing nature, but in such a way as to avoid swallowing nature into civilised society or collapsing society back into nature. It is a two-way, dialectical process by which separation and loss are redeemed as a higher unity. Ultimately, we become aware of our nature as natural and social beings.

Worlds in collision – human and biotic
Human beings have used their intelligence, inventiveness and acquisitiveness to separate themselves from their biological, ecological and social need to be active members of the commonwealth of life. As a result of this estrangement, we have overwhelmed the adaptive responses of our thoughts and actions to the environment. Seemingly armed with the powers of gods, we risk becoming disinherited in mind and body. For all of our technological advances, our social structures remain ambiguously placed between first nature and the full expression of our human potential, as evidenced by conflict, war and inequity, all of which threaten everyone. ‘We are … in the process of severing our links to the ecological web of life and this will have global consequences for our future health and well-being.’ Shearman’s message is clear enough: ‘to remain healthy we have to remain part of the web of life.’ (Shearman 1997).

‘It requires us to go with the flow. And to do it before the rivers finally run dry.’ (Pierce 2006: 351). In this way, going with the flow, the natural and the social worlds go together. Or at least they ought to. 

The difficult part is achieving the requisite change in behaviour. Before we can gain control over the forces that now threaten our existence, we must take possession of ourselves. The problem is us. Technology is a faithful mirror, as greedy, as destructive and as stupid as we are; or as wise. The problem is not some general human nature but specific human practice. The task before us, then, is to develop an environmental praxis within a civic environmentalism that is designed to make us at home with our deeper selves as well as with the larger world. These questions and their resolution are all about practice as a productive engagement with the world around us.

The problem we face is that the world of business and politics turns its face against the standpoint of democratic community and environmental stewardship and instead favours the totalising standpoint of instrumental power and profit. It opposes the world of exchange value to the world of use value, whether we refer to natural or social use. We need to envisage a transition from the power economy to the life economy in order to achieve a nature via nurture. And we need to do it quickly:





Shearman argues that we can harness our intelligence and inventiveness ‘to examine our predicament and to evolve new structures to lead us away from the inevitable destruction that will result from everlasting “growth.”’ However, he speculates that ‘these ideas and solutions will not evolve from more science and technology, but perhaps from the philosophers, the religious, the humanists or the environmentalists.’ (Shearman 1997: 267). 

I am in broad agreement, but would just balance this view up and say that these ideas and solutions will express an integral approach that values the role that all ways of knowing and understanding play in shedding light on the world and our place in it. This view is consistent with my emphasis upon ethics, character and ecological virtue throughout this book, rendering knowledge affective in the motivational economy. 

Making the one world
Resuming possession of ourselves is a condition of coming to control the forces that threaten our existence. For Lewis Mumford, this established the chief mission for the city of the future: ‘that of creating a visible regional and civic structure, designed to make man at home with his deeper self and his larger world, attached to images of human nurture and love.’ (Mumford 1966: 652). For Mumford, we should cease conceiving the city as primarily a place of business or government, and instead see it as an essential organ for expressing and actualizing the new human personality - that of 'One World Man'. The global unity making for such a character is now possible:





As Mumford notes, the conditions for the transition from a power economy to a life economy have been long in the making; ‘and once the reorientation of basic ideas and purposes takes place, the necessary political and physical transformations may swiftly follow.’ (Mumford 1966: 653). The transformations may follow, but not inevitably so. Potentialities contained in necessary lines of development are frustratable. The development of the moral, intellectual, political and organisational capacities of the subjective factor in history – human agents – is also a condition of transformation. There is nothing inevitable about this, hence the emphasis I place on the creative role of politics and ethics in the context of the acquisition of the virtues as qualities for right living.

Purposeless materialism and the recovery of purpose
Lewis Mumford points to the paradox at the heart of civilisation: the effort to expand the physical shell of civilisation, misidentified as the source of values and progress, causes a thickening of its walls to produce a steadily diminishing amount of space for the living creature within. ‘Civilisation begins by a magnificent materialisation of human purpose: it ends in a purposeless materialism. An empty triumph, which revolts even the self that created it.’ (Mumford 1957 ch 3). At some point, the will to order ceases to be self-sustaining and inherently purposeful. When life becomes empty, the sacrifices we make and the burdens we carry become greater than the tangible rewards. Civilisation then turns in and against itself. 

For Mumford, this sudden evaporation of meaning and value, often coming at the time a civilisation seems to be at its height, is one of the enigmas of history: ‘we face it again in our own time,’ he writes:

If the values of civilisation were in fact a sufficient fulfilment of man's nature, it would be impossible to explain this inner emptiness and purposelessness. Military defeats, economic crises, political dissensions, do not account for this inner collapse: at best they are symptomatic, for the victor is equally the victim and he who becomes rich feels impoverished. The deeper cause seems to be man's self-alienation from the sources of life. 

Mumford 1957 ch 3

Mumford describes purposeless materialism as ‘the vice that now threatens to overwhelm our own civilization in the very midst of its technological advancement.’ Our mistake is to have treated materialization as an end in itself. (Mumford 1966 ch 4). 

Mumford’s criticism of purposeless materialism implies the need to revalue and recover purpose. Maybe the time will come again when we appreciate that ‘purpose’ is immanent in all natural processes, rather than something we superimpose upon the world via an abstract moral system, or just plain discard altogether, as in mechanistic science:

Time out of mind it has been by the way of the ‘final cause,’ by the teleological concept of end, of purpose or of ‘design,’ in one of its many forms .. . that men have been chiefly wont to explain the phenomena of the living world: and it will be so while men have eyes to see and ears to hear withal. With Galen as with Aristotle, it was the physician's way; with John Ray as with Aristotle it was the naturalist's way; with Kant as with Aristotle it was the philosopher's way. ... It is a common way, and a great way; for it brings with it a glimpse of a great vision, and it lies deep as the love of nature in the hearts of men.

D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson, On Growth and Form, 1942

…. as with Aristotle … I shall return to ‘the Philosopher’ throughout. In my writings I attempt to apply rather than restate Aristotle. It’s sufficient here to point out that Aristotelian essentialism permeates my work. As against ideal, fixed and static forms that are outside of history and nature, Aristotle emphasises a world that is alive and unfolding in its concrete particulars. The ideal is not some rationally abstract form to be externally imposed on the community but a form which inheres as potential in the very nature of the species, needing only to be actualised in a progressive unfolding. This sees the world as a field of materialist immanence consisting of necessary, if frustratable, lines of development. The ideal lies within the real as a vision of the immanent society.

My point is that purpose is the way of the living world. We may proceed together, with a value system we create together, our chosen universal planetary ethic which is grounded in lived realities of place, co-creating the sacred with respect to the Earth, for life and for ourselves. A transformation of this scale is not the result of political intervention from above but is the cumulative outcome of the many smaller everyday decisions and actions, arising from a new set of values, a new philosophy which emerges in the process of responding to the problems we face. In the end, these decisions and actions converge in a new way of life, whose contours have already been outlined and confirmed by practical commitment, ‘a new plan of life which a multitude of people have already partly outlined and confirmed by practical experiment.’





This begs the question just as to who this ‘human person’ is. All of us? Yes. For all humankind? Certainly. But the unity of ‘all humankind’ has been an elusive goal in politics. In biological nature we are one, and in morality we ought to be one. Yet politically we have always had problems in attaining this universality in the world. That points to the human predicament of being both in and apart from the world, that degree of autonomy from nature and natural processes and imperatives that culture achieves.

We have withdrawn from first nature and have created a second nature around us. The problem is not so much disconnection as the extent to which this disconnection is associated with a destruction of the natural processes upon which we depend. We have become forgetful of our dependency upon nature and neglectful of the need to ensure the healthy functioning of nature’s life support systems. Our degree of moral and rational autonomy, as expressed in culture, has encouraged us to believe we are all powerful agents, the creators of our own world, that only the products of our own hands have value and worth. It is disconnection in that radical sense that is the problem. We have failed to appreciate the extent to which our cultural independence is always relative to a greater natural dependency, with the result that disconnection risks becoming absolute. In destroying natural processes, we destroy ourselves.

At the same time, if human beings are the problem, they are also the solution. It’s a contentious subject, but some natural processes, arguably, need to be ‘destroyed.’ To take one example, the problem of overpopulation. Here, it is culture that will save us, not service to our biological impulse to procreate. Birth control thus represents a justified cultural manipulation and control of a natural process. My point here is that the limits we need to recognize are not merely natural, as is so often stated, but limits that we give ourselves morally and culturally. Nature delivers limits externally, as a check against natural expansion and aggrandizement. It is the self-supply of limit through internal moral and social constraint that we require, accepting voluntarily, by conscious choice and design, what nature can impose only involuntarily as external force.

Our independence of thought, action and will is integral to our moral freedom, it denotes that quality of raising our existence to conscious deliberation and choice. Whist breaking our intimate bond with nature, this moral autonomy also promises a more mindful appreciation of our dependency within a culture that affords us a degree of conscious self-determination. It also entails a danger of disconnection, a human diminution. Instead of reaching out to embrace an expansive oneness or togetherness, there is a process of withdrawal and retreat, beginning with our separation from nature and continuing with our separation from others and from society, a shrinking of natural and public and associational space which ends in the confinement of the self into discrete and isolated ‘little boxes’ (in the title of the Pete Seeger song). Little boxes on the hillside, and they all look just the same. Instead of a genuine universality, we have a dreary sameness, the great bourgeois nothing: 'Sexless, classless, nationless he/she is the all-important nothing of middle class wisdom' (Royden Harrison quoted in Young 1988: 83).

The challenge before us is to use our moral and rational autonomy, that capacity for culture, to reconnect with nature at a higher level of consciousness, and supply an internal moral, social and democratic restraint upon our actions in recognition of social and natural limits.

For Theodore Roszak, (in Ecopsychology and The Voice of the Earth), the physical, mental, and spiritual disconnection of the modern world from nature is responsible for a whole range of personal and cultural mental illnesses. I would agree, to the extent that disconnection also involves a loss of community and of the warm, affective ties to others that generates a sense of belonging, a love of home and a moral sense of place. Here, disconnection is associated with a human diminution, a retreat into the ego. From this perspective, it is no coincidence that the intensification of the exploitation of nature in the modern world should come to be associated with the atomisation of society. 

In this respect, reconnecting with nature is a powerful therapeutic process both for the individual and for society, restoring both natural and social health. However, a radical disconnection from nature is at the core of our techno-industrial civilization. Far from redeeming the promise of reconnection at a higher level of consciousness, our use of technology has increased our distance from nature. The reason for this is that we continue to see ‘the environmental crisis’ as a problem calling for the mastery of nature by tools and techniques, instead of seeing it as a demand that we come to assume control of our social powers and practices and take responsibility for our actions. The scientific and industrial revolutions conceived nature to be a machine, with levers, buttons and switches we could locate and manipulate to our own ends. That mechanistic mentality continues to live on in our political and social systems, within the second nature we have built around us, in our economic activities and organisations, our forms of government, our cities and towns. 

Social evolution - the interrelatedness of people and all other life-forms
When we forget that our cultural independence is relative to a natural dependency, we forget that whatever we do to our surroundings we do to ourselves. The reason for our forgetfulness is the cultural capacity that comes with rational thought and moral sensibility. We are embedded in the natural world, but not submerged in it. We are not unconscious, unthinking beings submerged in some homogeneous nature. We are thinking, reflective beings with moral minds that enable us to act at a remove from biological imperatives and natural necessities. To a degree. How we manage that degree of autonomy determines whether, and the extent to which, we separate from nature in a destructive sense, undermining the natural life processes upon which we depend, and thereby destroying ourselves – the dominant trend – or come to reconnect with nature, returning from exile by making a place for ourselves in our planetary home. Such reconnection is a conscious, deliberate process. That is, it is as much an exercise of will, design and purpose as is the destruction of nature, in fact, even more so. Reconnection doesn’t mean that we abandon our culture and reason and technical power, repudiate them on account of their being implicated in the ecological damage that threatens our survival. It means that we learn to see our power and autonomy within an ecological context, appreciating who we are and what we are. There are no other options. There is no going back. We are out of Eden. It is our responsibility to re-create it.

‘Into my heart an air that kills...’
By A. E. Housman (​http:​/​​/​www3.amherst.edu​/​~rjyanco94​/​literature​/​alfrededwardhousman​/​menu.html​) (1859-1936)

Into my heart an air that kill
From yon far country blows:
What are those blue remembered hills,
What spires, what farms are those?
That is the land of lost content,
I see it shining plain,
The happy highways where I went
And cannot come again.

Albert Camus remarks, ‘In a universe divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy, since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land.’ To give the full quote:

There are many causes for a suicide, and generally the most obvious ones were not the most powerful. Rarely is suicide committed (yet the hypothesis is not excluded) through reflection. What sets off the crisis is almost always unverifiable. Newspapers often speak of "personal sorrows" or of "incurable illness." These explanations are plausible. But one would have to know whether a friend of the desperate man had not that very day addressed him indifferently. He is the guilty one. For that is enough to precipitate all the rancors and all the boredom still in suspension. But if it is hard to fix the precise instant, the subtle step when the mind opted for death, it is easier to deduce from the act itself the consequences it implies. In a sense, and as in melodrama, killing yourself amounts to confessing. It is confessing that life is too much for you or that you do not understand it. Let's not go too far in such analogies, however, but rather return to everyday words. It is merely confessing that that "is not worth the trouble." Living, naturally, is never easy. You continue making the gestures commanded by existence for many reasons, the first of which is habit. Dying voluntarily implies that you have recognized, even instinctively, the ridiculous character of that habit, the absence of any profound reason for living, the insane character of that daily agitation, and the uselessness of suffering. What, then, is that incalculable feeling that deprives the mind of the sleep necessary to life? A world that can be explained even with bad reasons is a familiar world. But, on the other hand, in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity.

Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus

The apparent profundity of that statement soon dissolves under close examination. Mary Midgley sees only the superficial self-indulgence of those who are ever without meaning and hope in an objectively valueless world:





The gates are closed. We can never no going back. 
If we want to go home, we are going to have to build a home for ourselves, one that houses our sacred nature rather than imprisons it. These are questions that were put a very long time ago: 

This is what the LORD says: 
"Heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool. 




As conservationist David Western wrote in his book In the Dust of Kilimanjaro: by becoming separated from nature, respect, knowledge and caring for the land has died in the hearts of modern men and women. He goes on to say that our view has become a limited one and that our connection with nature has been replaced with materialism and technology. But of course humanity is nature, and nature is humanity, and if we think and act otherwise, we become unnatural, and unnaturally we will seal our own fate - and that of nature. We must now again embrace a holistic and organic worldview, and rediscover the art of coexistence. With coexistence, there is more space for wilderness, wilderness without and wilderness within. 

Pointing out that the damage we do to our surroundings is a damage that we do to ourselves is the easy part. And to point out that such damage is caused by our separation from nature doesn’t take us much further. Separate in what way and to what extent? We live in a social order which we have created out of our natural environment as a second nature. We remain ‘in’ nature but, at the same time, our unmastered practice and tools set us ‘against’ nature. Yet it is that same cultural capacity which will be required to put us ‘with’ nature. How else will we reconnect with nature? How many times have we quoted the words falsely attributed to Chief Seattle about the interconnectedness of all things? It reassures us, allows us to prove our ecological sensibility and altruism, and there are sound evolutionary reasons for public statements of such goodness. Unaccompanied by changes in practices and behaviour, however, such declarations are futile, dispiriting even. So, by all means, let us affirm the interconnectedness of life and the interrelatedness of people, but the creation of a commonwealth of virtue requires more from us. That human independence from nature and natural necessity may be independence to a degree, but it is a significant degree and it makes all the difference in deciding whether we live in a healthy, creative civilisation respectful of nature and planful for the future, or a destructive civilisation that dissipates natural and also cultural resources. We can lament the tendency to destruction evinced by the advance of human civilisation, but abandoning human creativity and culture is not only an expression of futile despair, it is a refusal to meet the challenge of responsibility, the only hope we have for a positive resolution of the crises which beset us. The human species is the Faustian species. Fail to recognise that fact, and you have nothing to offer but pointless despair, gloom and/or escape.

And on this fairly cantankerous note, I will turn to Alan Sokal’s critique of radical environmentalism.

The critique of Radical Environmentalism
[critique of environmental harmony and denigration of reason and science]









The premodern world was not benign
The trouble, Lewis goes on to note, is that ‘more careful consideration of the same lines of argument has since discredited the principle concepts of ecoradical philosophy. The roots of modern society are far ‘more entangled and multistranded’, and the premodern world is now known to have been ‘far less ecologically and socially benign’ than ecoradicals would have it (Lewis 1996: 217-218). For instance, 





Lewis concludes by arguing that the science of ecology, upon which hopes were placed for a common ethic and political ideology, has failed the Greens, ‘for it now emphasises continuous flux and patchy distribution patterns, rather than the stability of coherent ecosystems that once underwrote the vision of harmonious relations between people and nature.’ (Lewis 1996: 218). If we want those harmonious relations, we need a common ethic that amounts to more than the principles of ecology as a science.

Such discrepancies between theory and evidence have do not shake those who hold their ecoradical beliefs with a religious zeal, but for those environmentalist thinkers of a more scholarly bent, such potential difficulties cannot simply be ignored; some rejoinder is required. It is here that Lewis argues that, in response these discrepancies, some exponents of radical environmentalism have turned to postmodernism in order to rescue positions whose empirical grounds have become shaky. Postmodernism can come to the rescue by ‘annul[ling] the inconvenient requirement of empirical confirmation.’ Indeed, the very notion of empirical evidence can be regarded





At this point, the case against ecoradicalism bases its intellectual force on the critique of postmodernism. Alan Sokal gives the example of feminist ecophilosopher Carolyn Merchant here. She claims that





The rejection of foundational authority
There is a serious issue here, concerning truth, objective reality and foundational authority. Geographer David Demeritt goes so far as to urge that ‘environmental historians and other Green critics should end their search for foundational authority, be it in science or elsewhere, and appeal instead to diverse moral, political, and aesthetic criteria to arbitrate between particular representations of nature in particular situations.’ Demeritt ‘does not rule out appropriations from ecological science or other fields of knowledge where they prove useful and convincing,’ but stresses that ‘ultimately, environmental narratives are not legitimated in the lofty heights of foundational epistemology but in the more approachable and more contested realm of public discourse.’ (Demeritt 1994: 22). The net result, as Paul Gross and Norman Levitt point out, is that ‘in practical terms, this leaves the radical theorists free to accept what flatters his worldview and to reject what does not’ (Gross and Levitt 1994: 165). The result leaves everyone, both reactionary and radical, free to equate truth with a social or political worldview. In making that point, we see why reason and its loss matters. Reason is a critical tool which allows us to hold power to account. Lose reason, and we enter a world of power struggles, where victory goes with the power to spread and enforce their version of the truth. 

This is not a case against eco-radicalism, it is a case for a radicalism based upon reason, science, objectivity and evidence. It is a demand for environmentalism to base its case on more than wishful thinking and pious hopes.

Ecology as religion
In The Origins of Virtue, Matt Ridley titles a chapter ‘Ecology as Religion’: ‘In which living in harmony with nature proves harder than expected.’ It is essential reading for anyone embracing a green spirituality. He begins by quoting the speech falsely attributed to Chief Seattle: ‘What befalls the earth befalls all the sons of earth. This we know: the earth does not belong to man, man belongs to the earth. All things are connected like the blood that unites us all. Man does not weave the web of life, he is merely a strand in it. Whatever he does to the web, he does to himself.’ For Al Gore, this shows 'the rich tapestry of ideas about our relationship to the earth' contained in native American religions. For Matt Ridley, it shows just how deluded people embracing a green spirituality can be.

For Al Gore, respect for the earth is not just good sense, but a sort of moral virtue: 'We each need to assess our own relationship to the natural world and renew, at the deepest level of personal integrity, a connection to it ... The place to start is with faith, which for me is akin to a kind of spiritual gyroscope that spins in its own circumference in a stabilizing harmony with what is inside and what is out' (Al Gore 1992).
‘He preaches’, adds Ridley, just so that we get the message that he thinks that environmentalism has become a new religion, with environmental vices as mortal sins, no doubt. I agree with the sentiment expressed by Gore, but the hard question is what grounds we have for such an environmental ethic. Ridley sets out to dismantle the eco-radical case. Chief Seattle never spoke the words attributed to him, and even if he had, it doesn’t make them right. Ridley quotes other advocates of spiritual ecology. 'Building an environmentally sustainable future depends on restructuring the global economy, major shifts in human reproductive behavior, and dramatic changes in values and lifestyles,' says Lester Brown, a leading American environmentalist. (Brown 1992).  'I very much doubt that we can heal the human spirit without discovering and learning to live by a new sense of purpose appropriate to the age and the ecological challenges we now face,' writes Jonathon Porritt, an equally prominent British environmentalist. (Porritt 1991). 'Modern society will find no solution to the ecological problem unless it takes a serious look at its lifestyle . . . The seriousness of the ecological issue lays bare the depth of man's moral crisis,' opines the Pope. (quoted in Gore 1992). 'It is my own personal belief that we need to combine technological ability with, for want of a better description, spiritual readjustment and a realisation that certain truths are eternal,' urges the Prince of Wales. (foreword to Porritt).

Ridley comments that ‘these are not modest aims. They are calls to change human nature.’ 
I would agree that these are claims that need to be backed with something more substantial than pious hopes (and knowing the work of Lester Brown, I know that they are), but Ridley overstates. I re-read those lines closely. They may call for substantial changes, but they require changes not in human nature as such but in human behaviour, something which involves a change in social relations, institutions and structures. Throughout this book, I argue for the ecological transformation of the political in terms of the realisation of healthy human potentialities. And that’s how read these statements, as demands for a human and planetary flourishing that involves not a change of human nature but its realisation.

Ridley’s main point, however, is a substantial one, and merits careful consideration. He argues against an eco-optimism that thinks that a moral or spiritual conversion is enough to deliver substantial changes. Admittedly, when Ridley describes human beings as ‘calculating machines intricately designed to find cooperative strategies only when they assist enlightened self-interest’, I feel the need for spiritual rescue, but his words are a caution against believing in the existence of ecologically noble savages participating in a universal brotherhood with nature. If we are to achieve a universal ethic, we will need something more solid than green spirituality stated in those terms, as emotionally rewarding as it may be.

There is, as Kauffman’s aptly titled book has it, ‘no turning back’. (Kauffman 1995). The full title of Kauffman’s book reveals its intent: No Turning Back: Dismantling the Fantasies of Environmental Thinking. Ridley gives the impression that he is not so much dismantling the fantasies of environmentalism as exposing environmentalism as such to be a fantasy. For Ridley, ‘the entire notion of living in harmony with nature is built on wishful thinking’ (Ridley 1996: 214-215). He goes from specific examples to denounce the ‘entire’ idea. His words are useful reminders of nature’s amoralism:





These are the kind of facts that sociobiologists back in the 1970s used to emphasise when drawing conclusions that human society is naturally competitive and that ruthless conflict is an ineliminable feature of human relations. Such natural facts, however, come without moral implication. Human beings possess a moral autonomy from such biological facts and necessities. These facts in themselves do not deny the possibility of living in harmony with nature, only that such harmony is given by nature. The criticism that ecology cannot supply an ethic for living in harmony with nature also applies to sociobiologists. 

Ridley’s argument is that environmentalists sentimentalize nature:





Point taken, I hope. An argument for ecological virtue has to rest on something more substantial than a sentimentalised reading of natural facts and processes. But Ridley’s criticisms equating the social and ecological virtues with a natural goodness as such cannot go unchallenged, since they leave us with the impression that any argument for the social and ecological virtues is set up in this way. This is not so. The virtues are something we acquire and form through habit, and the idea of social and ecological virtue is perfectly possible and defensible in these terms. This is precisely how I argue virtue in this piece.

Rather than expressing a genuine ethic, environmentalism is, for Ridley, a moralism: ‘the human race is addicted to moralizing (though not necessarily acting) in favour of the greater good, for evolutionarily sound reasons’, so it should come as no surprise that people can take the opportunity to express this instinct in politics whenever they can. Environmentalism, on this reading, is merely a form of public moralizing, people taking the opportunity to demonstrate to others how good they are. ‘One of the most powerful ways to do so is to express the conservation ethic, to lament the fate of whales and rain forests, to disapprove of development, industry and growth — and to paint a rosy picture of how our ancestors (and our more tribal contemporaries) were morally better in this regard than we are.’ (Ridley 1996: 216). 

An obvious rejoinder is that Ridley’s view can make no sense of those many individuals who engage in environmental actions and commit time, effort, skill and energy to environmental causes, at great personal sacrifice. But Ridley has identified a real dilemma at the heart of environmentalism:





He states the argument at extremes, of course, but the point is pertinent. Ridley calls this ‘hypocrisy’ on the part of those expressing an environmental ethic, but his reasoning reveals something else, a gap between belief and action, a lack of a social identity connecting preaching with practising. Ridley is referring to the logic of collective action here, specifically the contradiction between individual rationality and collective rationality. The question is how we may reconcile the two in a mutually enhancing way. The key to resolving the problem of collective action lies in creating a social identity that connects the morality we urge with the things we do. And that involves more than a green spirituality, certainly much more than an assertion of natural goodness and benevolence. But Ridley’s accusation of hypocrisy is unwarranted. The problem is that, given the way that society is arranged, people cannot practise what they preach, or find practising it the least easy option. Ecological virtue is about strengthening the will to act, of course, but that still requires the appropriate social identity.

Ridley is pithy when it comes to attacking ‘comforting myths’ of ecology as religion:





Ridley argues that there is no evidence that native North Americans conserved big game. If there were spiritual and religious injunctions to conserve, they were remarkably ineffective. Indeed, Ridley quotes ecologist Charles Kay to suggest, religious and shamanistic rituals may even have made things worse: ‘Since native Americans saw no connection between their hunting and game numbers, the system of religious beliefs actually fostered the overexploitation of ungulate populations. Religious respect for animals does not equal conservation.'

Ridley comes next to the great Stone Age extinctions, pointing to the ‘devastation wrought by our indigenous and traditional ancestors as they extinguished their way across the planet during and after the last ice age’. ‘Coincident with the first certain arrival of people in North America, 1,500 years ago, seventy-three per cent of the large mammal genera quickly died out. Gone were giant bison, wild horse, short-faced bear, mammoth, mastodon, sabre-toothed cat, giant ground sloth and wild camel. By 8,000 years ago, eighty per cent of the large mammal genera in South America were also extinct - giant sloths, giant armadillos, giant guanacos, giant capybaras, anteaters the size of horses.’ (Ridley 1996: 217).

This is known as the Pleistocene overkill. ‘It is noticeable that the large North American mammals that did not go extinct in the Pleistocene overkill were mostly the ones that had crossed the land bridge from Asia together with people: the moose, elk, caribou, musk ox and brown bear. ‘Did the animals simply fade away, or did we kill them?’ asks Colin Tudge in The Day Before Yesterday; he answers his own question: ‘Of course we killed them.’ (Tudge 1996; Stringer and McKie 1996).

Ridley points to the devastating ecological impact of human arrival all over the world. ‘The guilt of the human species is not in doubt. Take Madagascar, where at least seventeen species of lemurs (all the diurnal ones larger than ten kilograms in weight, one as big as a gorilla), and the remarkable elephant birds - the biggest of which weighed 1,000 pounds — were dead within a few centuries of the island's first colonization by people in about 500 ad. It was a process repeated throughout the Pacific by the Polynesians and most spectacularly of all just six hundred years ago on New Zealand, where the first Maoris sat down and ate their way through all twelve species of the giant moa birds (the biggest weighing a quarter of a ton) before turning cannibal in desperation. At one moa butchering site near Otago at least 30,000 were killed in a short time - and on average a third of the meat was left to rot, only the best haunches being taken. Entire ovens, with the roast haunches still in them, were left unopened, so abundant was the supply of meat. It was not just moas. Half of all New Zealand's indigenous land birds are extinct.

On Hawaii, we now know that there were about 100 species of unique Hawaiian birds, many of them large and flightless. Then, about 300 ad, a large mammal called humankind arrived. Within a short time no fewer than half of the Hawaiian birds were extinct. When this was first realized, after the excavation of an archaeological site in 1981, it was considered by native Hawaiians a major embarrassment for they had been arguing for many years that it was the arrival of Captain Cook that had upset a harmonious relationship between people and nature in the islands. In all, as the Polynesians colonized the Pacific, they extinguished twenty per cent of all the bird species on Earth.’

It was the same in Australia, where marsupial rhinos, giant diprotodons, tree fellers, marsupial lions, five kinds of giant wombat, seven kinds of short-faced kangaroos, eight kinds of giant kangaroo, a two-hundred-kilogram flightless bird were wiped out following the arrival of the first people.

Ridley finds evidence for such ecological short-sightedness all over the past world. ‘In 1,000 years the Polynesians converted Easter Island, in the eastern Pacific, from a lush forest that provided wood for fishing canoes, food for many land birds and breeding sites for thirty kinds of seabirds, into a treeless, infertile and largely birdless grassland where famine, warfare and cannibalism thrived, and where vast stone statues lay abandoned in their quarries for want of logs to roll them into place. Petra, in Jordan, was once a thriving city in a thickly forested area, until the pressure of people turned it into a desert. The Mayan empire reduced the Yucatan peninsula to scrub and so fatally wounded itself.’ 

Ridley’s point is that it was the limitations of technology or demand that prevented tribal people from overexploiting their environment, not a culture of self-restraint or a tribal harmony with nature. Ridley rejects the view that modern indigenous people are careful to respect limits and careful to practise restraint, mediating these goals through religious and ritual observance, living in spiritual harmony with nature:

There have now been four studies of American Indians that have directly tested their conservation ethic, by trying to find evidence that they practise systematic restraint in their hunting patterns to prevent the overexploitation of game. All four rejected the hypothesis. Ray Hames found that Yanomamo and Ye'kwana hunters spend more time in areas where there is more game. Since these areas are generally farther from the village, the hunters usually have to pass through depleted areas to reach these hunting grounds. If they were practising conservation, they would ignore any game they encountered on the way through the depleted area. But they do not. They always - without exception — pursue an animal they happen upon when in the depleted area, so long as it is big enough to be worth wasting effort and ammunition on.
Michael Alvard found the same pattern in the Piro of Peru. With their shotguns (provided by the local priest) and bows and arrows, these Indians kill tapirs, peccaries, deer, capybara, spider monkeys, howler monkeys, agoutis and curassows. They too show a total lack of any systematic restraint in the depleted areas near the village, though they do ignore small game on the way out rather than waste their precious ammunition. (Alvard 1994).

William Vickers studied the Siona-Secoya of Ecuador for fifteen years, collecting records of 1,300 animal kills — the largest database on Amazon hunters ever collated. He recently reanalysed the data to look for evidence of a conservation ethic. He concluded that they did not practise conservation because they did not need to. Their population density was too low and their technology too limited to cause more than very local extinction. In that sense their practice was sustainable, but no thanks to their religious and ritual beliefs. A good shaman is supposed to remedy a shortage of game with spells, not tell the hunters to kill fewer animals. Only in recent years, under the pressure of white colonists and development, have they begun to think about the need to conserve the game in their shrinking forests. But they have done so rationally, not religiously. Conservation, says Vickers, is not a state of being but a rational response to new circumstances.' (Vickers 1994).

Allyn MacLean Stearman found that the Yuqui of Bolivia are pure opportunists. They actually prefer to kill pregnant monkeys, or monkeys carrying young — because they are easier to catch and the foetus is considered a delicacy. They are casually cruel to wounded or captured animals. They fish with barbasco poison, which indiscriminately kills all the fish in a small pond or oxbow lake. And they are quite prepared to chop down whole trees to get ripe fruit (they used in days past to employ captured slaves to climb trees) with the result that fruiting trees are now scarce in some areas.’ (Stearman 1994).

Ridley’s views could be dismissed as a selective presentation from a prominent right wing environmental sceptic. But they repeat criticisms of eco-mysticism that had been made from the left in politics long before Ridley published The Origins of Virtue. For Murray Bookchin, the fact that ‘mystical ecologies are becoming popular today is not a mere intellectual aberration .. their popularity expresses the inability of millions of people to cope with a harsh and demoralizing reality, to control the increasingly oppressive direction in which society is moving. Hence myths, pagan deities, and ‘Pleistocene’ and ‘“Neolithic’ belief systems together with their priests and priestesses provide a surrogate ‘reality’ into which the naïve acolyte can escape. Indeed, when this preening emphasis on the subjective is clothed in the mystical vapors and inchoate vagaries of fevered imaginations, any recognition of reality is dissolved by beliefs in the mythic. The rational is replaced by the intuitional, and palpable social opponents are replaced by their shadows, to be exorcised by rituals, incantations, and magical gymnastics’ (Bookchin 1991).

I wouldn’t state the point in such emphatic terms. As the example of Lewis Mumford shows, it is perfectly possible to draw upon Neolithic values whilst retaining a commitment to ‘a rational political life’, to use Mumford’s own words, combining reason and intuition, intellect and imagination. But I do argue for a rational freedom that seeks to address the hard facts of social reality, engaging in a rational reconstruction of the institutions necessary for the actualisation of freedom as something that entails a certain kind of social and ecological interrelationism.

Bookchin is outspoken in his dismissal of an ‘earth wisdom’ environmentalism, calling it a surrogate reality to which people retreat as a compensation for their inability to exercise real control over the forces that control the world. Such earth wisdom is no solution to our problems, but is as ‘ineffectual as we are in our everyday lives’. And he notes that the mass media and publishing industry are only too eager ‘to nourish, even celebrate the proliferation of wiccan covens, Goddess-worshipping congregations, assorted pantheistic and animistic cults, “wilderness” devotees, and ecofeminist acolytes – to which I can add a new ‘deep ecology’ professoriat that is increasingly prepared to feed a gullible public with “biocentric” pablum ….’ (Bookchin 1991).

These are strong words. Knowing plenty of intelligent people who share these views, I should add that there are ways to express scepticism without recourse to such extreme language. That said, Bookchin’s comments here are consistent with Marx’s identification in the Grundrisse of a ‘nature-idolatry’ and ‘nature-worship’ in the romantic turn of the bourgeois mind. If people are mistaken in having recourse to surrogates in this way, we need to ask what is so inadequate and unappealing about the rational view of freedom in the first place. Marx sees it in terms of the bourgeois viewpoint split between seeing capital as the end of history and a nostalgic yearning for paradise lost. (Marx Gr 1973: 162 409-411).

My own view represents an attempt to put reason and intuition together. Rather than set different aspects of our being in opposition to each other, seeing reason as something that restrains or even suppresses something ‘dark’ in our nature, I argue that we need both mythos and logos for a true wholeness. A rational freedom that is just a half-reality is no reality at all, and invites a backlash against the repression of our instincts.

But the broad thrust of Bookchin’s critique is one I agree with – some ecologism appears radical in its rejection of civilisation, but it is the plainest reaction and misanthropy:

It has become all too fashionable among many mystical ecologists to condemn human intervention into first nature, except to meet the minimal needs of life and survival. We are enjoined to ‘let nature take its course,’ to avoid any alteration of first nature except for what is ‘necessary’ - a word that often remains ill-defined - to keep human beings alive and well. Such noninterventionist attitudes are commonly imputed to prehistoric and aboriginal peoples, who presumably lived in total ‘Oneness’ with first nature and the wildlife around them. Taking Aldo Leopold's phrase ‘not man apart’ to its most extreme conclusion, mystical ecologists call for a complete integration to first nature - by ‘returning to the Pleistocene,’ as many ‘biocentrists’ demand. 

Murray Bookchin Romanticizing Organic Society from ‘Twenty Years Later …’ 1991 in The Murray Bookchin Reader 1999: 66

If we are to return to the sensibility of these epochs, we would want to know if they really viewed the animals they killed ‘reverentially,’ as so many mystical ecologists claim, or if they had a more pragmatic attitude toward them, using magic to propitiate a ‘bison spirit’ or ‘bear spirit’ in rituals before and after kills. We would want to know if they really did feel themselves to be absorbed into an all-encompassing ‘Oneness’ with the animals around them, or whether they had any sense of human self-identity that involved feelings of ‘apartness’ from those animals. We would want to know if they really chose not to intervene in first nature any more than was absolutely necessary, as mystical ecologists believe, or if they significantly altered their surroundings. We would want to know if they really did behave toward wildlife as ‘tender carnivores’ in pursuit of ‘sacred game,’ as Paul Shepard's evocative book on hunter-gatherer sensibility is titled, or if they held a more mundane attitude toward animals as means for satisfying their very material as well as subjective needs.

Murray Bookchin Romanticizing Organic Society from ‘Twenty Years Later …’ 1991 in The Murray Bookchin Reader Janet Biehl ed 1999: 67

Like Matt Ridley, Bookchin argues that the outlook that today's mystical ecologists cultivate toward the Pleistocene, the Palaeolithic, and the Neolithic is often highly romanticized and certainly does not correspond to many of the things that we do know about those eras. ‘This much is clear: much of the archaeological evidence does not support the ecological-romantic view of early peoples, however unpleasant the data may be. Researchers have argued with good reason, for example, that effective human hunters in the Pleistocene may have played a major role in killing off some, if not most, of the great Pleistocene and Palaeolithic mammals.’ ‘[Much] evidence throws factual weight on the side of the ‘overkill,’ as distinguished from the primarily climatic approach, and supports the view that early hunter-gatherers contributed to exterminating or may have exterminated many Pleistocene animals.’ 

Bookchin says that such facts shock us only in light of what romantics of the last century and mystical ecologists today about the ‘Oneness’ that preliterate peoples felt for the game they hunted:

Indeed, that early hunters - whose ‘ecological sensibility’ is so revered by mystical ecologists - would try to satisfy their needs in any way they could should not surprise us. In fact, these hunters were predatory opportunists, no less than wolves or coyotes, precisely because they were very much part of ‘Nature’ (to invoke that much-abused word), just as were all the life-forms around them. Early hunters did not live in Disneyland, where sociable ‘mice’ and gleeful ‘rabbits’ jostle with human visitors in a pseudo-animistic, cartoonlike world.

Bookchin 1991 1999: 68

It is not my intention to defame aboriginal hunters or to place their behavior on a par with that of lumber companies or the meat-packing industry. No Paleo-Indian and Indian overkills and deforestation compares even remotely to the terrifying ecological devastation and the genocide practiced by Euro-American settlers on the New World and its native people. The greed and exploitation that has destroyed Indian cultures over the past five centuries can in no way be justified morally or culturally.

Bookchin 1991 1999: 69

Today, in fact, the danger that confronts ecological thinking is less a matter of a dualistic sensibility - a dualism that mystical ecologists have criticized to the point of pulverization - than of reductionism, an intellectual dissolution of all difference into an undefinable ‘Oneness’ that excludes the possibility of creativity and turns a concept like ‘interconnectedness’ into the bonds of a mental and emotional straitjacket. Without otherness, duality, and differentiation, ‘interconnectedness’ dissolves psychological and personal heterogeneity into a ‘night in which all cows are black.’ Without ‘otherness,’ duality, and differentiation, all heterogeneity of life-forms would have been limited to a deadening homogeneity, and organic evolution would not have occurred. In terms of natural history, the biosphere would indeed still be a ‘Gaia’ covered by Lynn Margulis's soup of prokaryotic cells.
Today, to follow a mystical path to ‘Oneness’ is to sink back into the timeless, ahistorical, misty island of the Lotus Eaters, who in Homer's Odyssey have no recollection of a past and no vision of a future but vegetate in an unperturbable existence that consists of eating, digesting, and defecating, like animals that live on a strictly day-by-day basis. This is a world that has no sense of ‘otherness,’ no sense of self, no sense of consciousness — indeed, no sensibility at all beyond the mere maintenance of life, presumably in the bosom of an equally vacuous ‘cosmic Self.’

Bookchin 1991 1999: 65-74

Provocatively stated, Bookchin’s argument makes it clear that there is no going backwards if we are to resolve our current difficulties and move at all, only forwards. Rather than indulge in a nostalgic yearning for a oneness that never was, seduced by a distorted memory of a benign and bountiful nature, it is time to recover the idea of oneness as a task we need to accomplish using all of our capabilities. 

Environmental romanticism makes for a dubious politics, making Indian land rights contingent on their passing some test of ecological virtue. 'We aren't nature lovers,' says Nicanor Gonzalez, a leader of the indigenous peoples movement. 'At no time have indigenous groups included the concepts of conservation and ecology in their traditional vocabulary.’ As Marx wrote in the Grundrisse, ‘nature-idolatry’ and ‘nature worship’ is very much a romanticism expressing the nostalgia of bourgeois mind. Unwilling to go beyond the capital system through a commitment to the socialist alternative, such a mind looks backwards and projects its nature fantasies onto the past.





I have to step in here and clear Rousseau of this charge. Nature utopias were all over the eighteenth century. Rousseau’s view was hard headed and unsentimental in comparison to the indulgent views of others, emphasising as he did the transition from a natural freedom on the part of separate individuals to a freedom they share together in a civil state.

The moral of Ridley’s account is that indigenous people leave a smaller and more natural imprint on the planet by virtue of their economic and technological limitations, not on account of some inherent ecological virtue, still less the possession of a greater spiritual awareness of the oneness of nature. Given the means to destroy the environment, Ridley states, and indigenous peoples would wield them as unthinkingly as we do. How do we know this? Because we were all of us such indigenous people once.

This litany of environmentalist delusion makes the point that ecological enlightenment is something to be achieved through our values, systems and institutions. Romantic and nostalgic notions of the wise environmental practices of indigenous peoples are misplaced and draw attention away from what is required to achieve a system of rational restraint:

I regard it as a form of ahistorical arrogance, so characteristic of recent times, to look back at preliterate peoples' behavior and cast it in forms that suit modern standards of ecological morality, or respond with pious disappointment to their cruelty or indifference to other living beings. It is a form of modern ahistorical arrogance to expect that they would not use their environments up to the hilt or change them as they needed to. What we should properly ask, if we are not to sink into the fatuities of romanticism and mysticism, is not whether humans should intervene into nature - for nothing will stop them from trying to fulfill their most basic ‘natural’ potentialities - but how they should intervene and toward what ends. These are really the profoundly ethical questions that we must ask, and they can only be answered in a thinking way - by unscrambling the virtues and vices of humanity's social development, by determining if evolution has any meaningful thrust toward increased subjectivity and consciousness in the great evolutionary parade of life-forms, and by bringing greater mind to bear on the pivotal role of social development in all of these issues.

Bookchin 1991 1999: 72-73

Attempting to go backwards, even if such a thing could be possible, is undesirable. We should be cautious of narratives which tell of a fall from an earlier state of grace. Idealising the past in this way can just be a way of evading the problems of the present. Stories of decline are of the same character as stories of progress, they tell the same story, only in reverse. A fall tells the tale as one of loss, a rise tells the tale of gain, and both beg all the important questions.

Environmental destruction is the result of individual actions putting immediate self-interest before long range collective interest. Environmentalism is an attempt to resolve the problem of self-interested individuals producing pollution, waste and exhausted resources at the expense of ecologically virtuous citizens. The egoistic take advantage of those who exercise restraint for the common good. It’s the prisoner’s dilemma writ large:





Let’s accept the repudiation of a natural ecological virtue as a foundation for an environmental ethic of restraint, along with the nostalgic view that reads the rise of capitalism and technology as a fall from a state of natural innocence. Let’s accept, too, the idea that capitalism is not going to be dissolved through the assertion of a spiritual harmony with nature. Any relation we have with nature has to come through the practices, structures and relations within the social metabolic order by which we organise our lives (economic mechanisms and institutions, ownership and control of property, legal rights, division of labour – simply, a viable, functioning economic system). But this requires more than a question of technique and organisation, it requires values.

Ridley calls the demand for a new set of better values to live our lives by a ‘millennial cry’. What matters, however, is how this demand is formulated. Ridley asserts that there is ‘no instinctive environmental ethic in our species’ and ‘no innate tendency to develop and teach restrained practice. Environmental ethics are therefore to be taught in spite of human nature, not in concert with it. They do not come naturally.’ 

I agree very much with this and see it as the key lesson to absorb from Ridley’s critical assault on environmentalism. Hence I define my position as a moral ecology, something that is quite distinct from a naturalism. I argue that the virtues are taught and acquired in a way that brings out certain healthy aspects of human nature. Here, I think Ridley’s concern to repudiate environmentalism as a radical political movement aimed against capitalism leads him to contradict his central thesis in The Origins of Virtue. Throughout the book, Ridley argues for an innate human nature as against culturalists who hold that human nature is a blank sheet. I agree with that view and define it in terms of an essentialist anthropology. Yet here he is, arguing explicitly that environmental ethics do not come naturally and therefore have to be taught, as though there is a split between nature and reason. As a virtue theorist, I certainly argue the need to teach the qualities for right living. But I also recognise that this education is a drawing out of innate potentialities rather than their cultural and political creation ex nihilo. A nature via nurture argument affirms an instinctive environmental ethic, an innate tendency to right living, which nevertheless has to be developed and taught via the appropriate habitus, including the acquisition of the virtues and their exercise in social practices. This is a practical education in environmental restraint which proceeds in concert with human nature, not ‘in spite of human nature.’ This restraint does not come spontaneously but requires an appropriate social context; but it is something which corresponds to our nature rather than something which contradicts it. ‘Little wonder that environmentalists repeatedly and reflexively call for a change in human nature (or human values, as they prefer to call it)’, states Ridley. This is disingenuous, and requires some specific names to be put to these views. Change in the essentialist viewpoint of Marx involves the creative unfolding of healthy human potentials, and I argue for that view against leftists who can be found arguing for the social construction of human nature. Here, I want to remain with Ridley’s view. A change in values does not require a change in human nature at all, these are two different things, although related in the sense that a change in values is involved in expressing desirable traits in human nature, inhibiting undesirable traits. Environmentalists call for a change in behaviour as well as a change in values, that is, for changes in human nature rather than a change in human nature as such. Such changes should be conceived as a nature via nurture, enabling us to express those aspects of our nature which make for healthy growth.

Human behaviour is the product of both nature and nurture. A complete rejection of the idea of an essential human nature, innate qualities and potentialities, entails a cultural manipulation that invites a political totalitarianism. Through culture, we could create a society with or without the characteristics we like or dislike. If humankind is infinitely malleable, then any Utopia is possible. Except that, in a human society that falls short of a genuine common interest and identity, there is no ‘we’. The power of manipulation would be in the hands of dominant groups. An assertion of our innate qualities is the best defence against such totalitarian potential. 





'We have no truck,' says Frazier, the founder of Walden Two, 'with philosophies of innate goodness - or evil either for that matter. But we do have faith in our power to change human nature.’ (quoted in Passmore 1969). Frazier’s key principle is that ‘men are made good or bad and wise or foolish by the environment in which they grow.’ He concedes that experiment is still needed in order to determine exactly how the environment can be so modified as to ensure that they will be good rather than bad, wise rather than foolish. 

I argue for the creation of a habitus in which virtues are acquired and exercised. I also argue for society and living as an ‘experiment’. But an experiment conceived as an exploration on the part of creative, reflexive human agents. My argument is very different from behaviouralist notions of changing human nature through engineering changes in the environment. I argue for both innate and acquired qualities, nature via nurture.

Lenin and Stalin expressed an extreme Lockean faith in blank sheet possibilities in their belief that the ‘new man’ could be created just by education, propaganda and force. Such a view makes individuals mere clay in the hands of cultural and political manipulators, coming to be shaped in accordance with ends which are external to them. As Herbert Simon has put it, 'In our century we have watched two great nations, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, strive to create a ‘new man,’ only to end up by acknowledging that the ‘old man’ - perhaps we should say the ‘old person’ — self-interested and concerned with his or her economic welfare, or the welfare of the family, clan, ethnic group, or province, was still alive and well.'

The idea that human beings are ‘wired for culture’ (Pagel 2012) seems liberatory in the way that it opens up the future as a radically undetermined cultural product. Culture as a creative capacity opens up a future of endless possibilities ‘beyond human nature’ (Prinze 2012). With that capacity comes responsibility. Some of the biggest mass murderers in history have thought they were using power for the human betterment. The conception of human nature is our best check against arbitrary power.

‘I would rather hope [that man has some innate nature] than be stuck with a human tabula rasa on which any tyrants or do-gooders can write their (always benign) messages at will. And I think man has such a nature, that it is intensely social, and that it gives the lie to all sanctimonious manipulators from Mill through Stalin,' argues Robin Fox. And what is open to ‘do-gooders’ is open to the ‘do-badders’ too. The idea of an innate or essential nature is humanity’s best defence against all kinds of external manipulation, whatever its motivations. Without a residue of human quality beyond cultural control, (as Lionel Trilling put it), we would be infinitely corruptible beings, clay forever in the hands of political and cultural elites. In my work on Marx, I emphasize Marx’s essentialist anthropology for precisely this reason, to guard against extraneous authorities managing and manipulating human beings from the outside in some top-down political and cultural tyranny.

The first thing people wanting to create a good society do, according to Ridley, ‘is to conceal the truth about humankind's propensity for self-interest, the better to delude our fellows into thinking that they are noble savages inside.’ Propagandists always exaggerate the niceness of people, ‘partly to flatter them and partly because the message is more palatable. People wish to believe in noble savages.’ As Robert Wright has argued:





We are charged with the task of avoiding a dualism of selfishness and selflessness. And that means working with, rather than against, human self-interestedness. In denying egoism there is a danger of turning altruism into an abstract moral ideal, projecting a genuine call for the common good upwards to ‘higher’ agencies, only to discover the truth that the state and its bureaucracy is composed of individuals and groups pursuing their own self-interest in the name of the universal interest. This was Marx’s point when he referred to the state as the ‘illusory general interest.’

Ridley argues that ‘the human mind contains numerous instincts for building social cooperation and seeking a reputation for niceness.’ I agree. It’s just that this view implies the existence of an instinctive environmental ethic, something which Ridley is concerned to deny. And yet much that Ridley writes makes sense only in terms of some such ethic, as a natural affinity fostered within forms of the communal life:

Where authority replaces reciprocity, the sense of community fades. In Britain, the welfare state and the mixed-economy 'corpocracy' replaced thousands of effective community institutions — friendly societies, mutuals, hospital trusts and more, all based on reciprocity and gradually nurtured virtuous circles of trust - with giant, centralized Leviathans like the National Health Service, nationalized industries and government quangos, all based on condescension. Because more money was made available through higher taxes, something was gained at first. But soon the destruction wrought to Britain’s sense of community was palpable. Because of its mandatory nature the welfare state encouraged in its donors a reluctance and resentment, and in its clients not gratitude but apathy, anger or an entrepreneurial drive to exploit the system. Heavy government makes people more selfish, not less.

To make good that vision requires an innate environmental ethic, something that proceeds from within the hearts of people in close proximity and expands outwards from there. I suspect that Ridley considers his argument to be a conservative argument against socialism, on the assumption that socialism is statist, regulatory and bureaucratic. I consider such ‘state socialism’ to be an expression of a collectivist liberalism seeking to restrain the competitive anarchy and selfishness of capitalist society. I agree with much of what Ridley argues here, but do so from a socialist standpoint that sees the state as the counterpart of capital, both as alienated social powers draining vitality and power from the community. I would compare what Ridley writes here to what Marx writes on the abstraction of the state as severing every common purpose from the community and turning it into the bureaucratic purpose of the top-down state:

The task of the first French revolution was to destroy all separate local, territorial, urban and provincial powers in order to create the civil unity of the nation. It had to carry further the centralization that the absolute monarchy had begun, but at the same time it had to develop the extent, the attributes and the number of underlings of the governmental power. Napoleon perfected this state machinery. The Legitimist and July monarchies only added a greater division of labour, which grew in proportion to the creation of new interest groups, and therefore new material for state administration, by the division of labour within bourgeois society. Every common interest was immediately detached from society, opposed to it as a higher, general interest, torn away from the self-activity of the individual members of society and made a subject for governmental activity, whether it was a bridge, a schoolhouse, the communal property of a village community, or the railways, the national wealth and the national university of France. Finally, the parliamentary republic was compelled in its struggle against the revolution to strengthen by means of repressive measures the resources and centralization of governmental power. All political upheavals perfected this machine instead of smashing it. The parties that strove in turn for mastery regarded possession of this immense state edifice as the main booty for the victor.

Marx EB SE 1973: 239

I once presented this passage to a conservative friend of mine, as he laid forth on the virtues of small government against the state socialism of Marx. He didn’t respond, and found such a critique from Marx plainly incomprehensible. Politics, it’s a funny old world.

To return to Ridley:

For St Augustine the source of social order lay in the teachings of Christ. For Hobbes it lay in the sovereign. For Rousseau it lay in solitude. For Lenin it lay in the party. They were all wrong. The roots of social order are in our heads, where we possess the instinctive capacities for creating not a perfectly harmonious and virtuous society, but a better one than we have at present. We must build our institutions in such a way that they draw out those instincts. Pre-eminently this means the encouragement of exchange between equals. Just as trade between countries is the best recipe for friendship between them, so exchange between enfranchised and empowered individuals is the best recipe for cooperation. We must encourage social and material exchange between equals for that is the raw material of trust, and trust is the foundation of virtue.

Creating the harmonious and virtuous society requires that we create a habitus involving social relations, institutions, laws, codes and practices which not only draws out the instinctive capacities we are born with but also enables the acquisition of the virtues, the qualities for right living, and the creation of capabilities enabling the exercise of human powers. What matters is the quality of human interactions and reciprocity, fostering cooperation between individuals as against free riding. I shall develop all these points at length in a later chapter. 

3 AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCY
Dependent rational animals – whether reason can rule 

[whether reason can rule]
My work is organized around the concept of ‘rational freedom.’ I shall develop this concept at greater length in a later chapter. Here it is sufficient to note that the notion of ‘rational freedom’ affirms the connection between reason and freedom, and begs the question of the extent to which human life ought to be self-sufficient, and can be made self-sufficient through the exercise of reason. The rational tradition of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle held that the good life for human beings must be self-sufficient in the sense of being immune to the incursions of luck. ‘How far a life can and how far it should be made self-sufficient, what role reason plays in the search for self-sufficiency, what the appropriate kind of self-sufficiency is for a rational human life - these questions elicited and became a part of the general question: who do we think we are, and where (under what sky) do we want to live?’ (Nussbaum 1986: 3). The question of what is the appropriate way of living a rational human life is subsumed under the bigger question: who are we and where do we live? It’s a question of being and place.

When it came to the human good, the question which most concerned the ancient Greeks was that of whether the rational element in us is capable of ruling and guiding the rest, thus saving us from having to live life at the mercy of luck. A horror and anger at the passivity of human beings and their humanity in the world of nature ‘lived side by side with and nourished the belief that reason's activity could make safe, and thereby save, our human lives’ (Nussbaum 1986: 3). Indeed, reason must perform this role of salvation if life was to be worth living in a human sense. This search for the good human life drove the founders of moral philosophy to look further than ordinary beliefs, practices and customs to identify the essential qualities of human beings and the social and political order which would facilitate the fulfilment and flourishing of those qualities. This pursuit of the good life in those terms was therefore central to the Greek philosophical tradition.

The purpose of rational self-sufficiency was to banish contingency from human life. Complicating and constraining this pursuit, however, was ‘a vivid sense of the special beauty of the contingent and the mutable, that love for the riskiness and openness of empirical humanity which finds its expression in recurrent stories about gods who fall in love with mortals.’ (Nussbaum 1986: 3).

The question of life-saving and the human good, then, involves more than self-sufficient reason and rational control and instead requires that we come to terms with contingency and dependency. The question is not just whether reason can rule alone but whether it is desirable that reason should rule alone, even if some such thing was possible. 

The ideal of rational self-sufficiency and the facts of natural dependency

Martha Nussbaum describes her book The Fragility of Goodness as ‘an examination of the aspiration to rational self-sufficiency in Greek ethical thought: the aspiration to make the goodness of a good human life safe from luck through the controlling power of reason.’ (Nussbaum 1986: 3). That attempt to constrain and even conquer luck through the power of reason is an attempt to define a free humanity against the facts of contingency and dependency. Nussbaum begins her argument with lines from a poem by Pindar. In this poem, Pindar presents an emergent vision of human flourishing as something that is set within, and made possible by, a community of friends ‘wise and just.’ I shall give the full poem:

Zeus father, may such never be my way;
let me, walking always in the path
of simplicity, make my life, and die thus, leaving
to my children honor without reproach. 
Some pray for gold, some for lands
without limit, but I pray to lay my limbs in the ground
as one who gladdened his fellow-citizens,
praising that which deserves it, scattering blame on the workers of evil.
 
But human excellence grows like a vine tree,
fed by the green grass,  among men wise and just, raised up to
the liquid sky. Many are the uses of friends, beyond all else
in difficulty, but joy also looks for proof
to set before friends’ eyes. O Megas, bring back your soul to life.

Pindar, Nemea Ode 8

Pindar here identifies the problem that most concerned the ancient Greeks, that of determining what is required for the good life of a human being. Writing in praise of human excellence, the presumption is that the excellence of a good person is something of that person's own. (Nussbaum 1986: 1). Pindar compares the excellence of the good person to a young plant: something growing in the world, slender, fragile, in constant need of food from without:





We are born with certain capacities which need nurturing. We require nourishing relations with the natural world and confirming associations with other human beings. To achieve our positive goals, we require relations to others and to the world around us. Among the basic requirements to attain human excellence (Arete) identified by Pindar are a good heritage, fostering the right natural and social circumstances, the avoidance of catastrophe and/or good luck, and the development of ‘confirming associations’ that join the individual with other human beings. As Pindar writes: ‘We have all kinds of needs for those we love: most of all in hardships, but joy, too, strains to track down eyes that it can trust.’ (cited in Nussbaum 1986: 1). 
Freedom, as Nussbaum makes clear, is not just about being ‘negatively free’ as an individual separated from others, but a positive freedom that grows with the assistance of others. (Nussbaum 1988: 183). We work together to promote human excellence and assist each other to flourish as best we can. To do so requires that we come to understand and provide the conditions and circumstances enabling human beings to flourish well together, as well as avoiding and remedying the conditions and circumstances that inhibit such flourishing.

We are therefore involved in relations of dependence so as to draw on resources which are outside of us. Our hardships and joys are dependent upon relations to others. This need for others exposes us to the world outside. Even the poet's joy is incomplete without the tenuous luck of seeing it confirmed by eyes on whose understanding, good will, and truthfulness he can rely. Dependence on others is something we recognise as something that we need in order to achieve our positive goals. (MacIntyre 1999: 3). As Nussbaum argues, our openness to fortune and our sense of value render us dependent on what is outside of us: ‘our openness to fortune, because we encounter hardships and can come to need something that only another can provide; our sense of value, because even when we do not need the help of friends and loved ones, love and friendship still matter to us for their own sake.’ (Nussbaum 1986: 1). These are all needs for things that are outside of our control. 

The external nourishes feelings of contentment or happiness and, even more, is partially constitutive of, and continues to nourish, human excellence or human worth. The question is where, if at all, we can draw the line between our inner world and the world outside us. This is where our capacity for reason gives us a sense of moral autonomy with respect to the things of the world. Our reason seeks to reduce our dependency by placing the things most important to us under our control, things such as personal achievement, politics, and love. However, Pindar’s poem implies that the peculiar beauty of human excellence and moral worth is the vulnerability that dependence brings. This is what Martha Nussbaum calls ‘the fragility of the good.’ 

If we are natural beings, we are rational beings too. And if we are rational animals, we are also dependent rational animals. We resemble forms of life, but have reason. We are able to deliberate and decide which things have value and how much, choose between plans for living, rank ends. We feel that this rational element in us is able to rule and guide the rest, and rescue us from living at the mercy of contingent nature. But we stand in need of resources that are outside of us. The very nature of human being, in the sense of excellence and worth, is to be a growing thing that stands in need of natural and human others in order to develop its own unique fineness. To appreciate this essential dependency is to abandon aspirations to complete rational control.

For Nussbaum, the things that Pindar identifies as important will never cease to be problems in human life:





And it is with the everyday facts of lived practical reason that I am concerned. We have aimed at a world totally controlled by reason and learned the hard way that it is not possible. We need to learn that such a world is not desirable either. The liveable life cannot be achieved by reason alone. Any view which is in accord with the everyday facts of lived practical reason must recognise the emptiness of the self-sufficient rational life. The pursuit of rational self-sufficiency defines the goodness of a human life in terms of a security from dependency and contingency through the controlling power of reason. Reason has been implicated in the attempt to extinguish contingency from human life in order to achieve freedom and happiness. Alone, it can achieve neither. The idea that we could achieve such security, let alone identify it with goodness, is a delusion. Against this pursuit of rational control, there is a vivid awareness of the special beauty of the contingent, that love for nature as the aliveness and openness of empirical humanity. The real question is how we should live within our dependency in order to live the life that is best and most valuable for a human being?
 
Capabilities and the form of human life
Ethics is not independent of biology, whatever the naturalistic fallacy says. It follows that it is important to understand and attend to the things human beings have in common with members of other animal species, drawing attention to the importance of human dependency and natural contingency in moral philosophy. In describing human beings as ‘dependent rational animals’, Alasdair MacIntyre poses two questions:

Why is it important for us to attend to and to understand what human beings have in common with members of other intelligent animal species?




These questions highlight our animal nature and our dependency upon the natural world. In addition, we need to take account of our social nature and hence our dependency upon others in the social world. In other words, our rational and moral independence needs to be set within the context of a natural and social dependency. We are dependent rational animals, dependent on each other and dependent on the earth and its life support networks. I will therefore develop an account of the virtues that recognises our animal condition, and acknowledges our consequent involvement in and dependence upon nature’s web of relationships.

Animal resemblances and commonality
Whatever degree of autonomy our reason achieves for us, we never separate ourselves entirely from the animal characteristics we share with other species. MacIntyre emphasises our resemblances to and commonality with members of some other intelligent animal species, contending that, despite the importance of our differences from other species, ‘it is also important that both initially in our earliest childhood activities and to some significant extent thereafter we comport ourselves towards the world in much the same way as other intelligent animals.’ Whilst we may transcend some of the limitations of these other animals, we can never separate ourselves entirely from those things we share with them. ‘Indeed our ability to transcend those limitations depends in part upon certain of those animal characteristics, among them the nature of our identity.’ It is not just the fact that human bodies are animal bodies, with the identity and the continuities of animal bodies. ‘Human identity is primarily, even if not only, bodily and therefore animal identity and it is by reference to that identity that the continuities of our relationships to others are partly defined.’ (MacIntyre 1999: 8-9). 
 
Facts of dependence as central to the human condition
[rationality and animality - our animal condition and our dependencies]

The idea that human beings are distinct from other animal species on account of the possession of reason has encouraged the view that nonhuman animals cannot have thoughts, beliefs or reasons for action, and that our dignity as thinking beings is independent of our animality. With our reason, we conceive ourselves to be more than and even other than animal, and come to express a fear of and contempt for the contingent condition of ‘mere’ animality. Call it our animal shadow. As a result, we have become ‘forgetful of our bodies and of how our thinking is the thinking of one species of animal.’ (MacIntyre 1999: 5). We have lost sight of our animality and hence of our bodily involvement in nature. In this life, we do not merely have bodies, but are our bodies. And our bodies are animal bodies, with all the continuities of animal bodies. We are immersed in the facts of dependence. The neglect of human animality prevents us from living in full recognition of the facts of dependence.

There is a fundamental relationship between our animal condition and our dependencies. MacIntyre points to another, perhaps even more fundamental, relationship between our animal condition and our vulnerabilities. His central thesis is that ‘the virtues that we need, if we are to develop from our initial animal condition into that of independent rational agents, and the virtues that we need, if we are to confront and respond to vulnerability and disability both in ourselves and in others, belong to one and the same set of virtues, the distinctive virtues of dependent rational animals, whose dependence, rationality and animality have to be understood in relationship to each other.’ (MacIntyre 1999: 5-6).

Our rationality can only be understood in relation to our animality and natural and social dependency. Any independence we achieve as rational moral agents is always one of degree. The virtues we require to face and respond to needs within ourselves and in others, and to develop and flourish as rational agents on the basis of our animal condition, belong to the same set of virtues. We are dependent rational animals. If we are to live well in full recognition of the facts of dependence, then we need to come to terms with human animality. 

This points to the moral importance of our animal bodies and the dependences which follow from this fact. Modern moral philosophy places a great value upon individual autonomy, the capacity of individuals to make free and independent choices. The problem, however, is that this independence is a relative independence in relation to social and natural facts. MacIntyre therefore argues that, for their adequate exercise, the virtues of independent rational agency need to be accompanied by the virtues of acknowledged dependence, holding that the failure to understand this is ‘apt to obscure some features of rational agency.’ He concludes that both sets of virtues are required if the distinctive potentialities of human beings as rational animals are to be realised. ‘Identifying how and why they are needed is a prerequisite for understanding their essential place in the kind of human life through which human flourishing can be achieved.’ (MacIntyre 1999: 9). 

The virtues of independent rational agency need, therefore, to be buttressed by the virtues of acknowledged natural and social dependence. The failure to recognise this renders the notion of rational agency thin, incoherent even. We need develop this thicker set of virtues in order to actualize the distinctive potentialities that are specific to the human rational animal and do so in such a way as to acknowledge the essential place of nature in the forms of common life conducive to human and planetary flourishing. I call this the Ecopolis, a public life that is constituted in the associative space of everyday life lived in accordance with nature’s web. I will examine this at greater length later. For the moment, it is enough to note that we have learned that we must curb our egoistic calculations and understand that our capacities are dependent upon our cooperation with a multitude of other organisms and forces, whose life-courses and life-needs are similar to ours and must be respected accordingly.

Human animality
[phronesis, the capacity for practical rationality]

MacIntyre argues that if we are to take adequate account of the facts of our dependence, we should proceed from a reassertion of human animality. (MacIntyre 1999: 6). No philosopher has taken human animality more seriously than Aristotle. 

(I refer to Aristotle throughout, so I should make my position clear. Aristotle held views which we would now consider mistaken. We are beyond the stage when we would treat Aristotle as an authority, and can now reclaim him as a thinker possessing an inexhaustible curiosity and an unquenchable thirst for truth and knowledge. I agree with MacIntyre that it is Aristotle himself who supplies the best resources for identifying what is wrong in his own positions, and for correcting those errors. MacIntyre’s claim to turn Aristotle against Aristotle makes perfect sense to me. (MacIntyre 1999: 7-8). This is to affirm Aristotle the thinker and seeker of truth over against Aristotle the authority, a view which has recently been beautifully expressed by Armand Leroi (2014)). 

All nonhuman animals, Aristotle writes, ‘live by perceptions and memories and have little experience; but the human kind live also by art and reasonings’ (Metaphysics A, 980b 25-28). Aristotle's view of human beings as uniquely rational has frequently been misunderstood to mean that rationality is a property that distinguishes humans from their animality and is not, therefore, in itself an animal property. This is not what Aristotle argued at all. Aristotle ascribed phronesis, the capacity for practical rationality (Nicomachean Ethics VI 1140b 4-6, 20-21) to some non-human animals, as well as to human beings, on account of their foresight (1141a 26-28). 

In ignoring this, commentators have failed to ask the relevant questions about the relationship between our rationality and our animality. ‘They have underestimated the importance of the fact that our bodies are animal bodies with the identity and continuities of animal bodies, and they have failed to recognize adequately that in this present life it is true of us that we do not merely have, but are our bodies.’ (MacIntyre 1999: 6).
	
To our neglect of human animality, and hence of the facts of our natural dependency, can be added another neglect, that of our social dependency. Aristotle wrote that ‘on important matters we undertake deliberation in common with others, distrusting ourselves as inadequate to make decisions’ (Nicomachean Ethics III 1112b 10-11). This is true, and establishes a firm foundation for an intersubjective and social conception of freedom. We are reliant upon each other for the realisation of our own freedom. However, who these others are with whom we deliberate matters a great deal. Do we recognise the legitimate claims of the whole human community, or just those sections we deem worthy of inclusion? 

On this question, Aristotle exemplifies the second error noted above: in his ethics and politics, Aristotle fails to give due recognition to the claims of those who had most to say about the facts of social dependency: women, slaves, and servants, those engaged in the productive labour of farmers, fishing crews, and manufacture. (MacIntyre 1999: 7). Aristotle is therefore deficient in social understanding, excluding the experience of those who exhibit the greatest dependence. Aristotle's social and political exclusions in part explain the failures of his polis ideal: he sought to build the future with less than half of the community, rather than with the whole community. In failing to take adequate measure of the full facts of social dependency, Aristotle’s political vision came to be vitiated from within. Aristotle excluded large categories of people from citizenship. He thought dependency prevented the independent judgement required for a public voice. And the same criticism applies to Plato. Excluding substantial sections of city dwellers from citizenship, both Plato and Aristotle lacked a vision of a wider polis and made no provision for the continuous strengthening of vital and creative forces. ‘It needs a whole society to give the symmetry we seek,’ observed Emerson. The error of Plato and of Aristotle was to have sought this symmetry in less than half of the one society, in a class segment frozen in an archaic image. Neither Athens nor Sparta, not Corinth, not Delos, none could flourish alone apart from its neighbours. (Mumford 1966: 219). 

We are indeed one. We need to expand the category of citizen to include all by delineating the conditions of a transition from how human beings are in present society to how they ought to be. This is to define an inclusive ethics and politics based on our shared material nature or species being. 

But there are other exclusions that destroy symmetry. We share our material nature with other animals and organisms, and so need to expand the moral and political circle to acknowledge our involvement in a series of interdependencies.

ETHICS AND THE GOOD LIFE 
The virtues of acknowledged dependence
[living a good life for a human being] 
For Aristotle, eudaimonia refers to ‘living well and doing well,’ and living a good life is defined in terms of flourishing well. This is an active concept in which praiseworthy activities are not merely productive means, but are actual constituent parts of the good life. In this conception, a moral life is a fulfilling life, a life which is proper to human beings. And the attainment of such a life depends upon reclaiming the ancient conception of politics as a public life concerned with creative human self-realisation. Ethics and politics are correlate. At the very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tells us that politics is a ‘science that studies the supreme good for man.’

I should just add here that self-realisation is something we should trace throughout the whole of nature, even if for Aristotle the good is species relative. And it has to take into account the facts of both natural and social dependency. Moral inquiry has to examine all of the factors which go to make up a way of life, not just personal ones. We are involved in relations of dependence and so cannot live well by just looking inside ourselves. Flourishing is a complex idea which involves a whole range of factors. Plenty of the things we need to flourish well are not wholly within our control and require certain social and material conditions. To be good as social beings, we need a good society. But to be good, society needs to recognise its natural foundations.

[the virtues of acknowledged dependence and social relationships and the common good]
MacIntyre poses the crucial question: ‘What type of social relationship and what type of conception of the common good are required, if a social group is to be one in and through which both the virtues of rational independence and the virtues of acknowledged dependence are sustained and transmitted?’ He argues that neither the modern nation-state nor the modern family can supply the kind of political and social association that is needed. (MacIntyre 1999: 9). Which leaves us in search of a new form or forms of the common life capable of housing both our rational independence and our natural and social dependence. The questions we need to ask are what kinds of social relationships, what forms of common life and what conception of the common good are required if we are to be one, participating as equal members of a community in and through which the virtues of independent rational agency and the virtues of acknowledged dependence are nourished and sustained so as to lead to human and planetary flourishing.

[intertwining of ethics and politics]
Questions of good and bad have been falsely abstracted from their social and natural contexts, and the task before us is to restore these contexts to moral significance. I therefore argue for the moral importance of acknowledging and acting in respect of our natural and social dependency. I propose to do this through a reading of virtue theory in the context of environmental ethics. Ethics in the virtue tradition is about excelling at being the human, and this cannot be achieved in separation from the community of others and from environing nature. And it cannot be achieved unless the political community which enable us to do as social beings it are available. With the intertwining of ethics and politics in the acquisition and exercise of the virtues, morality ceases to be about formulating and following rules and instead is constitutive of flourishing as the enjoyment and abundance of life.

4 COMMON GROUND
The Earth and human well-being
Oneness – rootedness and interdependency
My argument draws on insights from biology, psychology, ecology, and ethics to present a view of human beings as knowledgeable and creative moral agents within the self-organizing universe. I emphasise our rootedness and interdependency within nature’s web of life, going on to relate the human quest for meaning to the greater world that enfolds us. I affirm the bond between the living world and the human psyche, connecting the health of the biosphere with our own mental and physical health. Throughout, I seek to overcome the alienating separations and dualisms that have held human beings at a distance from natural processes and even their own powers, developing a worldview that presents nature within and nature without as existing on a continuum. The various environmental threats which confront us are a wake-up call to us, a call to us to look at ourselves, our powers and our impact upon the planet. The demand that we see ourselves as natural beings is a demand that we shift from an obsession with material quantity and instead establish quality of life through an appreciation of the Earth's grammar of harmony. An appreciation of appropriate scale and balance and natural growth will free us from an obsessive pursuit of a narrow material expansion and instead become whole, healthy, integral beings. 

The connection to land, landscapes and associated ecosystems
The natural world is increasingly coming to be appreciated from a psychological perspective, with attention being paid to the range of benefits nature offers with respect to mental and physical health and well-being. One sees, for instance, an increasing emphasis in town and country planning on the importance of access to nature and the value of urban green spaces with respect to quality of life issues. Alongside the dominant tendency to value the natural world in monetary terms, then, there has been a small but significant and growing movement towards valuing the importance of the natural environment for physical, psychological and spiritual health. This movement not only breaks with the economic or instrumental valuation of the natural world, it deepens and enriches the findings of evolutionary psychology and biology to explore the unfolding of our natures in terms of a co-evolution with the complex natural ecosystems of the planet. 

Underlying sense of spiritual connection to the Earth
In their different ways, poets, artists, scientists and philosophers have sought to give expression to the connection we have with the natural world. We are natural beings, born of, dependent upon, parts of and belonging to our one Earthly home. We are constructed of natural matter and have evolved as integral elements of natural ecosystems. It should come as no surprise, then, that the Earth has been imbued with spiritual significance from earliest times, with societies living in close connection to nature coming to worship Mother Nature in the form of the 'Earth Goddess'. (Markale 1999; Neumann 1972; Gimbutas 1982).  We should be careful here. Whilst the worship of myriad deities of the soil, land and its fertility would seem to clearly indicate a pervasive underlying sense of spiritual connection to the Earth (Born 1982), that spirituality was born of a closeness of early societies to nature that involved a high degree of insecurity with respect to our immediate dependence upon nature’s cycles. Earth spirituality, in other words, expressed a very practical concern in the productivity of the natural world, and a real fear that nature, far from being benevolent, may well fail us. 

Finding our place in the natural world satisfies so many aspects of our well-being, giving us meaning and a sense of belonging. But there has to be mediation in which we come to see our active role within nature, not a worship of nature as an external force. A knowledge of and respect for the natural processes which support life provide us with the principles necessary to secure our long-term viability as a species at this crucial point in our evolution. But without a connection to the practical question of mediating our interchange with the environing world, green spirituality involves little more than warm words. What value environmentalism as a bogus religion? It’s bad ecology, bad politics and bad religion, neither fish nor fowl. And it gives defenders of the social system responsible for the destruction of nature an easy target to counter. 

Mediation must take place, moral, social and institutional. Our reason gives us the illusion of complete autonomy but the truth is that we are dependent rational animals, products of nature linked with other animal species and united in complex ecological partnerships, dependent upon even the bacteria. Darwin’s notion of all life on earth as a descent with modification from a common source would seem to imply an ethic which affirms the affinity of all creatures on the planet. Our human nature is continuous with that of animal creation. (Rachels 1990; Jones 2009; Desmond and Moore 1992). We are parts of an interconnected web of life. (Marshall 1992; Capra 1996; Capra 2002).

Yet we are still rational for all that. How we appreciate our oneness in and with the world depends on how we relate our independence to our natural dependence.

Capra makes interdependence central to the conception of sustainable human communities. Based on the understanding of ecosystems as autopoietic networks and dissipative structures, he formulates a set of principles of ecology that may serve as the principles of organization in building and maintaining sustainable human communities. 

The principle of interdependence holds that ‘All members of an ecological community are interconnected in a vast and intricate network of relationships, the web of life. They derive their essential properties and, in fact, their very existence from their relationships to other things.’ (Capra The Web of Life 1996: 298). Interdependence, defined as the mutual dependence of all life processes on one another, is the nature of all ecological relationships:





Emphasizing ecological interdependence requires developing an awareness of the importance of relationships. ‘The fact that the basic pattern of life is a network pattern means that the relationships among the members of an ecological community are nonlinear, involving multiple feedback loops.’ (Capra 1996: 299). It follows from this that a sustainable human community is based on nourishing the multiple relationships among its members. And this requires a new way of thinking and acting. ‘It requires the shifts of perception that are characteristic of systems thinking—from the parts to the whole, from objects to relationships, from contents to patterns.’ (Capra 1996: 298).

Our technological achievements have encouraged the belief that we are not only apart from this web of life, but that our interests take precedence over other life forms. This is an illusion, and a potentially fatal one. We share this planet with billions of life forms. We are nourished by plants. We need oxygen, water, light. Life ceases if these needs are not met.

The problem is this, impressed by the extent to which our technique and organisation have removed us from immediate natural necessity, we act with a basic disregard of the health of our life-support networks. We have become prisoners of a new social necessity, slaves to the imperatives of collective social powers we have unleashed but have yet to control. And these unregulated social powers are generating a collective force in the shape of climate change that threatens to unravel the basis of civilised life on Earth.

The commonwealth of life
The constant cooperation of all the forces of nature and history
Our independence is real but relative. Abstracted from a web of dependencies, it becomes a delusion, and a dangerous one. There is growing recognition that the interdependence between humanity and the ecosystems with which we have co-evolved and in which we continue to grow is not only a condition of satisfying our essential biological needs but crucial to our mental and spiritual health. We survive and thrive only by working in cooperation with all of the forces of nature. That same creativity that flows through us flows through nature; it is a natural endowment that carries us forward, defining the movement of life as a natural growth, as an unfolding of capacities. Patrick Geddes refers to the insurgency in life, an insurgency that raises expectancy in us. We remain creative and ever-resurgent agents only to the extent we work with life’s insurgency.

We have to find a way of putting our originary nature and our socially acquired nature together. This one world is a world of universal kinships and co-operations. Our political principles and ethical considerations may be expressive of our moral independence as thinking, choosing, valuing beings. But our ethics and politics have only a relative autonomy. Our practical reason and existence must be based on the web of life, recognising the interdependence and mutual support of all living creatures, as well as the greater dependence of all life upon the sun. 

Oneness with the natural world
We share various traits and propensities with the entire commonwealth of life. Pointing to the waters, rocks, soil, and solar energy out of which life originally emerged, Lewis Mumford draws attention to ‘the immense fecundity of all living beings, the inexhaustible creativeness of nature herself.’ (Mumford 1952: 27). We are products of nature; our past links us with other animal species, our present condition unites us in complicated ecological partnerships, making us dependent upon even the bacteria and the molds:

Man's work is plainly laid down for him. Breathe or die! Drink or die! Eat or die! Reproduce or die! Work together or die! These alternatives hold as strictly for him as they do for all the rest of the animal kingdom; and so a large part of his existence must be dedicated to carrying out these functions: the physiological cycles of nutrition, growth, and repair, of ovulation, fertilization, and reproduction account for immense areas of human activity, and leave such a profound impression that they even color remoter spheres of his culture.

Mumford 1952 ch 4 92

As animal, human beings share the characteristics of the organic world.  Barbara Grigg’s book Reinventing Eden is a study and a celebration of light, air, earth and water, the elements upon which life depends, showing how they affect our lives and wellbeing. Griggs notes that whilst the human species is unique on earth, in important ways ‘we are no different from the untold billions of teeming life-forms with whom we share this planet.’ We need oxygen. We are 65-70% water and we need water. We are nourished by plants, and by the animals, birds and fish that live off these plants. We need light, the energy that drives all life on earth. ‘These needs are so basic and so elementary that life stops if they are not met.’ (Griggs 2001: 9).

Society, like a house, does not start at ground level, but begins quite literally beneath the surface of our planet, within the soil itself. For out of the soil are we fashioned, and by the products of the soil is our earthly existence maintained. If we destroy our soil - and it is not indestructible - mankind will vanish from the earth as surely as has the dinosaurus.

E. B. Balfour The Living Soil

Soil is the stuff of life. ‘Without those precious centimetres of topsoil, there would be no plants, trees or grasses on our planet, no birds or insects, no animals, and definitely no humanity.’ (Griggs 2001: 16). We are of the Earth. We come from the Earth, and to the Earth we shall return. In the words of S.A. Waksman, humus - the product of decomposition, a mixture of plant and animal remains – is 'the most important source of human wealth on this planet.’

Talk of saving the planet is not an environmental idealism, therefore, but enlightened self-interest. The planet will be here long after we have gone and will certainly survive the worst that we can throw at it. Life will survive too, in a billion different forms. ‘It is the fate of homo sapiens we need to worry about. In poisoning our planet we have first poisoned ourselves. By cleaning up the planet and getting our environmental act together, we shall be the first to benefit.’ (Griggs 2001: 10).

The ecological partnership with the earth
[self-transcendence, purpose and meaning]
Flourishing well concerns more than just physical functioning, and more than just survival. A human life has meaning and purpose, and a fully human life is a flourishing towards ends, ends which we may become conscious of and endeavour to attain. Viktor Frankl writes of Man’s Search for Meaning. Beyond this belonging to the first nature shared with other animals, then, human beings, by the slow accretion of symbols and technical facilities, of customs and ceremonies and rituals, have built ‘a more artful nature’. This is culture. And culture is how we give expression to the meaning of our lives: ‘If habit becomes “second nature,” culture is mainly transmitted habit.’ 

None of this emphasis on creative agency justifies a human arrogance towards nature. On the contrary, agency, meaning and purpose are parts of the natural insurgency of life. However independent our intelligence and creations make us appear, we remain in need of the constant cooperation of all the forces of nature and history in order to survive and thrive. There is, however, an insurgency and an expectancy to life that forms a part of our deepest nature. Mumford calls this ‘the forward movement of life.’ (Mumford 1952: 30-31). The same vital impetus that flows through all of nature flows through us and carries us forward. There is nothing inevitable about this insurgency. Nature gives us the potentialities, but their actualisation is not a given. We turn potential into actual via our social existence. Flourishing well is a matter of creating the appropriate habitus. Lines of necessary development are frustratable. We may overdevelop one aspect of our nature, and underdevelop or even de-develop another. 

We need to ensure balance in the relation and connection of our social existence to the environing nature upon which we depend. Our ecological partnership with the earth and all other living forms sets the human creations of politics, art, culture, technics within a natural background.

The problem is that with industrial expansion and population growth, we have become increasingly careless about the healthy functioning of our life-support systems. We have created a cultural capacity so powerful that it has fed the delusion that we are separate from nature.

Political and economic crises are symptomatic of a deeper malaise, a crisis in our environmental relations deriving from our alienation from the sources of life. This is a self-alienation, denoting an active process in which we have turned our creations into ends in themselves whilst, at the same time, denigrating the richer materialism which forms the essential ground of our being. As a result, our technological progress has taken the form of a purposeless materialism, something that, in the words of Lewis Mumford, now threatens to overwhelm our own civilization in the very midst of its apparent technological triumph. The vitality of urban life has been arrested ‘by the error of treating materialization as an end in itself.’ (Mumford 1966: 135/36 ch 4). 

Lewis Mumford affirms a humane and life-giving alternative to the present process of hopeless mechanization and purposeless materialism. This alternative is embedded in the very nature of human beings, for our nature has many other capacities besides the gift for exploiting scientific curiosity, for performing regular work, and for fabricating machines. The emphasis again is on an innate environmental ethic that is fostered in the forms of the communal life:

Furthermore, I believe that at a critical point we shall make a series of new choices, just as deliberate as those which made the machine itself a dominating factor in our lives; and that if we make these choices in time to ward off disaster we shall bring about a general renewal of life. Collective changes of this nature are not the sudden result of some dictatorial fiat: they are the cumulative outcome of many little day-to-day decisions, arising out of a new method of approach, a new set of values, a new philosophy. In the end they converge on a new plan of life which a multitude of people have already partly outlined and confirmed by practical experiment; and already we can see that many of these choices and commitments are being made. Once more the human person is coming back into the center of the picture.

Mumford 2000 ch 6 154-155

I don’t see philosophy as setting any kind of blueprint or timetable, but, instead, as part of life as a drama, a drama which for the most part must be left to the actors themselves. But we have reached that critical point that Mumford wrote of. In the original Greek krisis, means decision. It was used by the Greeks to describe the turning point in an illness, the point at which one either gets better or dies. We live in an age when turning points are tipping points; and these tipping points need to be turned towards action in order to ensure social and planetary health:





Purchase proceeds to demand that we ‘must make enormous changes in society in order to begin to make the transition from a world dominated by multinational capitalist imperialism and the artificial boundaries of the Nation-State, to a society based upon the ecologically rational concept of a global federation of ecological regions.’ That points to substantial social and institutional transformation, ‘a local and global social-ecological revolution—the success or failure of which will involve every member of our species. It will represent the collective work of the whole of humanity.’ Such an ecological transformation of society ‘will affect and necessitate a change in virtually every aspect of our everyday lives’, all the way up to ‘the way we choose to organize our political and social institutions.’ (Purchase 1997 1).

I agree, but transformation of this depth points to politics and power as concerned with much more than how we divide up our material affairs; it points to a profound change in the way we think and act, a change in our patterns of behaviour and social identities. An ecological revolution in the everyday lives of each person, community or city or region on the planet presupposes a certain kind of character; it presupposes human beings with the qualities for living right and living well. It requires moral and psychological depth. It presupposes that we, as individuals, have the moral, psychological, political and organisational capacity and disposition to join together and engage in the ‘collective work of humanity.’ Identifying and joining together to act for the common good has been a central problem throughout the history of political philosophy. To stand in need of the common good is no guarantee that it will be found. The common good, what it is and how it is constituted will be the subject of a large part of what follows, paying particular reference to virtue theory and the notion of ecological virtue and citizenship.

The community of life





This statement points to the need for a universal planetary ethic, a partnership ethic that recognises the interdependence of the human and the natural community, the importance of biodiversity and cultural diversity. It points to the need for institutional change. However, the most fundamental aspect of this declaration is the demand for changes to our values and to our ways of living. And this demand points to the centrality of moral character, to the need to develop our moral and psychic ability to respond to the warnings of environmental crisis, to strengthen our will to act accordingly, and to build our capability to sustain the society of ecological well-being.

I shall come to the question of character later. At the moment I wish to address the question of this global ethic.

Biospheric politics
The construction of a global ethic is no mere frill, a diversion from more practical tasks. As Peter Brown argues, a global ethic is required to enable us to chart a new direction for the human future, and for the future of the rest of life with which we share this planet. (Brown 2001: 1). And this, in turn, requires a rethinking and regrounding of the institutions of government, the economy and civil society. ‘And this cannot be done without establishing a firm foundation on which to rest advancing the human estate and protecting and reconstructing the commonwealth of life: the biosphere of which we are a citizen.’ (Brown 2001: 1). We need to take stock of our future prospects by developing a greater awareness of our place within the interlocking web of life. The lesson that we are embedded in the natural world needs to be reflected in our forms of governance, economics and civil society. By recovering the sense of our place in the world, rejecting pretensions of control, we come to develop an eco-citizenship that integrates our social and natural worlds. A global ethic is integral to that reconstruction of the ground upon which we stand. Such an ethic affirms certain universal values, i.e., values which are to be accepted anywhere, and which come with corresponding responsibilities and obligations. These values are universal not simply by virtue of a self-legislated reason, but by being grounded in a proper account of our place within the interlocking web of life, what Brown calls ‘the commonwealth of life.’ (Brown 2001: 1).

Interlocking web of life
Re-envisioning our place in the world

[stewardship and commons - new relationship with life – ecology and social institutions]

We are active members of this commonwealth of life, and this has implications with respect to the way we relate to and understand the world. As noted earlier, ‘purposeless materialism’ is the defining characteristic of the age. To overcome this, we need to ask of anything we do or make, ‘what’s it good for?’ Our actions, our products, must have a justified purpose. Here we can see society as learning mechanism, an eco-community teaching what David Orr calls an ‘ecological literacy.’

This is to see our knowledge not as something external or objective, but as something we actively produce as part of the covenant we have with the natural world. Our knowledge is not merely of the world but is in it. This seemingly simple observation has profound implications concerning the way we live and how we order our lives. As subjects of the creative process, our knowledge comes from the inside. We thus need to re-conceive our purposes so that our actions are not at cross-purposes with our life support systems. In the process, we come to re-ground our practices, reinvent our notions of governance and re-direct civil society to functioning within the commonwealth of life.

Capra defines what is entitled by this ecological literacy:

Reconnecting with the web of life means building and nurturing sustainable communities in which we can satisfy our needs and aspirations without diminishing the chances of future generations. For this task we can learn valuable lessons from the study of ecosystems, which are sustainable communities of plants, animals, and microorganisms. To understand these lessons, we need to learn the basic principles of ecology. We need to become, as it were, ecologically literate. Being ecologically literate, or ‘ecoliterate,’ means understanding the principles of organization of ecological communities (ecosystems) and using those principles for creating sustainable human communities. We need to revitalize our communities — including our educational communities, business communities, and political communities — so that the principles of ecology become manifest in them as principles of education, management, and politics.




We should, however, be careful not to model human community too closely on the ecological principles of natural communities. There are many significant differences between ecosystems and human communities. Human beings and their communities possess language, culture, consciousness, self-awareness, ideals and values, elaborate systems of governance. Also greed and dishonesty and an ability to commit violent acts on account of principle. This capacity to distinguish between good and bad is the nature of the moral independence that makes human beings human, and a knowledge of ecosystems cannot yield moral knowledge in this sense.





The commonwealth of virtue

Biospheric politics, earthcare, partnership, commonwealth of life – all of these terms outline the contours of the human future, in unison with the rest of life with which we share this planet. Tim Flannery uses the phrase ‘the commonwealth of virtue’ in a way that implies the idea of self-organisation in nature:





The question is whether such a commonwealth of virtue promotes its own stability and what role human agency plays within the whole. The notion is suggestive of Stuart Kauffman’s idea of self-organisation in nature as order for free, of which more later. And it is certainly in tune with the science of emergent properties. (Goodwin 1994). 

In the argument I present in this book, the idea of a commonwealth of virtue involves more than the ceaseless unfolding of nature: it implies the evolved moral sense of human beings, and raises questions of what it means to live virtuously within nature. It involves, in short, an ethical and a spiritual dimension.

And it involves a political and institutional dimension, too. The idea that we are citizens in the commonwealth of life/virtue implies a biospheric politics. Such a politics requires the regrounding of the institutions of economic life, government and civil society so that public policy and private conduct are set within a framework of earthcare, a framework in which we are partners and citizens, in which we learn and are enabled to care for each other and for the biosphere.

Living organisms constantly co-operate to remake the whole environment for the benefit of life

[the human personality emerges out of the matrix of communal functions and activities]
A biospheric politics proceeds from an awareness of the extent to which all living organisms are inextricably related in remaking the environment for the benefit of life. Lewis Mumford emphasises the way that living organisms engage in a process of continuous cooperation and, in so doing, produce an environment for the benefit of life. He notes a characteristic of organisms that enters into every higher form: ‘the more developed a creature is, the more independent it seems, the more heavily does it rely upon the companionship and support of many other species.’ Mumford’s argument supports Kropotkin’s view of mutual aid as a factor in evolution:





Mumford draws attention to the way that life, through mutual aid and ecological partnership, maintains both an internal dynamic balance and an equally dynamic external balance between all its constituent species, ‘the members of which live by acts of co-operation that, in the higher organisms, are called self-restraint and self-sacrifice.’ Co-operation is at the heart of the way nature functions. ‘This is the fundamental morality of nature. Wherever this morality breaks down and creates an unbalance between the species that need one another or the men that need one another there is disintegration and disorganization.’ (Mumford 1952: 32/3).

The commonwealth of life
There are no clear, absolute distinctions between the human species and other species. We share many characteristics in common with the rest of life, we certainly depend upon the same biospheric resources. We need to see ourselves as part of a continuum with life as a whole. If we don’t, our misidentification of our self-alienation from life sources as independence and progress will likely be fatal.

I propose a notion of the Ecopolis to overcome our alienation from life sources through a biospheric politics. This begs the question of how we could create and sustain such an Ecopolis and come to constitute it through a conception of eco-citizenship. I shall address this question at length later. 

For now, I wish to continue examining our deep connection to the commonwealth of life.

A common ancestry
[all organisms on Earth share a common ancestry]
E.O. Wilson argues that all organisms on Earth share a common ancestry, traced back over more than three billion years. If human beings must have a creation myth – and, emotionally, it seems we must — then none is more solid and unifying for the species than evolutionary history pointing to the genetic unity of all organisms. That, argues Wilson, is a value ‘favoring stewardship of the natural world.’ (Wilson 2002: 134).

Wilson points to a sense of genetic unity, kinship, and deep history as among the values that bond us to the living environment. He identifies these as ‘survival mechanisms for ourselves and our species.’ (Wilson 2002 ch 6). 

For Wilson, conserving biological diversity is an investment in our longevity. Such a view implies that biodiversity is of value only in terms of human interests. Wilson addresses the question as to whether species other than the human species have inalienable rights. He distinguishes three reaches of altruism. The first is anthropocentrism: human interests matter first and foremost. Then comes pathocentrism: intrinsic rights should be extended to chimpanzees, dogs, and other intelligent animals for whom we can legitimately feel empathy. And finally comes biocentrism: all kinds of organisms have an intrinsic right at least to exist. For Wilson, these three levels are not as exclusive as they first seem. ‘In real life they often coincide, and when in life-or-death conflict they can be ordered in priority as follows: first humanity, next intelligent animals, then other forms of life.’ (Wilson 2002: 134-135). Wilson thus settles a highly contentious moral issue in a most matter of fact way. Wilson the biologist, who has argued passionately and intelligently for the preservation of biodiversity, recognises a form of weak anthropocentrism. But the most important thing to take from his view is that the diverse positions are not contradictory, and often coincide. Seeing ourselves as at one with nature is premised on us attaining that coincidence of interests.

Being at one on Earth involves much more than a calculation of relative importance of the species. To the many ways we may value the environment, we may add mystery. Life shrinks without mystery. As Wilson comments, ‘the completely known is a numbing void to all active minds.’ We are therefore drawn to the natural world, ‘aware that it contains structure and complexity and length of history as well, at orders of magnitude greater than anything yet conceived in human imagination. Mysteries solved within it merely uncover more mysteries beyond. For the naturalist every entrance into a wild environment rekindles an excitement that is childlike in spontaneity, often tinged with apprehension—in short, the way life ought to be lived, all the time.’ (Wilson 2002: 147).

Wilson points to the ecological education we need to value and love life:





Human beings long for the return to Eden, we search for the gate to the paradisiacal world. Martin Heidegger considered human beings to be ontologically nostalgic. But the ‘instinctive afterimage that comes to us in daydreams’ that Wilson refers to is something more than nostalgia, it is ‘a wellspring of hope.’ 

For Wilson, this love of nature is truly part of human nature, an instinct, citing evidence of the positive effect the natural world and other organisms have on health from numerous sources:





For both physical and psychological reasons, human beings need nature, particularly wild nature. Nature is the world that gave rise to our species, and the home to which we can safely return, and, as such, ‘offers choices our spirit was designed to enjoy.’ (Wilson 2002: 148).

Biophilia
It should come as no surprise, then, that human beings show a marked preference to be in natural environments. ‘They like a long depth of view across a relatively smooth, grassy ground surface dotted with trees and copses. They want to be near a body of water, whether ocean, lake, river, or stream. They try to place their habitations on a prominence, from which they can safely scan the savanna and watery environment’ (Wilson 2002: 135).

The extent to which people have spiritual experiences when in the natural world is no accident. We may visit the natural world, take a trip outside the city walls to get ‘back to nature’, but nature is part of us. Nature is not something ‘out there’, it is ‘in here’, within all of us. Nature, and with it, the creative universe, is in our very cells, fibres and nerves. We are natural beings, we are nature. And when we participate in that creative universe we become active parts of nature naturing, natura naturans. We instinctively respond to nature, we come alive whenever we experience the natural world, the sight of birds, the feeling of rain, the gust of wind, the shining of the stars. The natural world is built into us, and we respond accordingly: we come alive. Nature is the best therapy. When we reach out to touch nature, we feel nature reaching into us, touching us and moving us in the very depths of our being. And then we feel ourselves to be active parts in a living, moving whole, co-creators within the whole creation. The natural world outside us awakens us to the natural reality that lies within us all.

The biologist Edward O. Wilson gave this instinctive affiliation with and emotional attachment to the natural world the scientific term, ‘biophilia.’ He suggests that the capacity to love nonhuman life may be one of the human instincts. He is so impressed by the human urge to preserve biodiversity as to propose that a fundamental love of nature was forged in the human species some time in our evolutionary past. Wilson describes biophilia as, ‘the connections that human beings subconsciously seek with the rest of life,’ and argues that ‘we all possess an innate tendency to focus upon life and lifelike forms and in some instances to affiliate with them emotionally.’ (Wilson 1984). 

Human beings identify with the animate and esteem novelty and diversity in other organisms. ‘We are thrilled by the prospect of unknown creatures, whether in the deep sea, the unbroken forest, or remote mountains.’ (Wilson 2002: 135).

Biophilia refers to the connections that human beings subconsciously seek with the rest of life; it is the natural inclination to value life and life forms, and to affiliate them at the emotional level. Those emotions programmed into the genes point to an innate ability to survive and thrive on this planet. They live on within us as survival mechanisms for ourselves and our species. (Wilson 2002 ch 6). That does not necessarily mean that we will use that ability: we may continue to neglect that ability and act in complete disregard of our dependence upon nature’s life support systems. Simply stated, biophilia refers to the love of nature, something we are born with, something which children express spontaneously and something which lies dormant and suppressed within us the more we take the bribes – or submit to the bullying – of the civilised world. That innate tendency is an aspect of the innate universal moral grammar that I refer to throughout this work. As such, it is a potential we are all born with, which can be developed as a capacity, and used as part of our successfully coming to engage in sustainable living. If we want to survive and thrive, we need to use these innate mechanisms, activate them, and develop a conscious appreciation of our connections with the world. We need to achieve a unity of all our connections. The question is how we can use this inclination to achieve unity in order to survive and thrive on this planet.

The threats to our existence
Wilson points to the threats to our existence. ‘The sixth great extinction spasm of geological time is upon us, grace of mankind. Earth has at last acquired a force that can break the crucible of biodiversity.’ This is not just a physical threat but also a spiritual loss. ‘Signals abound that the loss of life's diversity endangers not just the body but the spirit. If that much is true, the changes occurring now will visit harm on all generations to come’ (Wilson 1993: ch 15).

For the green prehuman earth is the mystery we were chosen to solve, a guide to the birthplace of our spirit, but it is slipping away. The way back seems harder every year. If there is danger in the human trajectory, it is not so much in the survival of our own species as in the fulfillment of the ultimate irony of organic evolution: that in the instant of achieving self-understanding through the mind of man, life has doomed its most beautiful creations. And thus humanity closes the door to its past. 

Wilson 1993: ch 15

Why should we care about the extinction of species? What difference does it make to us if species we know nothing of are extinguished? So long as we survive? Even in the narrowest terms of human self-interest, the extinction of species matters. With the loss of species comes the loss of new sources of scientific information, the destruction of potential biological wealth, undeveloped medicines, crops, pharmaceuticals, timber, fibers, pulp, soil-restoring vegetation, petroleum substitutes, and other products and amenities will never see the light of day. 

Intoxicated by our technical achievements we have become forgetful of the services that ecosystems provide humanity. They enrich the soil and create the very air we breathe. We have taken these services for granted yet, without them, human life would not last long. We live in a commonwealth of life and we survive and thrive only to the extent that the health of this commonwealth is preserved. Wilson points to a fundamental oneness that connects us to the world in which we live, upon which we depend:

The life-sustaining matrix is built of green plants with legions of microorganisms and mostly small, obscure animals—in other words, weeds and bugs. Such organisms support the world with efficiency because they are so diverse, allowing them to divide labor and swarm over every square meter of the earth's surface. They run the world precisely as we would wish it to be run, because humanity evolved within living communities and our bodily functions are finely adjusted to the idiosyncratic environment already created. Mother Earth, lately called Gaia, is no more than the commonality of organisms and the physical environment they maintain with each passing moment, an environment that will destabilize and turn lethal if the organisms are disturbed too much… To disregard the diversity of life is to risk catapulting ourselves into an alien environment. We will have become like the pilot whales that inexplicably beach themselves on New England shores.

Wilson 1993: ch 15

That a flourishing species should come to learn to value its environment makes perfect evolutionary sense. Humanity co-evolved in unison with the rest of life on this planet. One can also understand how the increasing technological mastery of nature could encourage us to become forgetful, and overlook our evolutionary inheritance. The more we have come to value the products of our own hands, the more we have fallen out of love with nature, and in love with ourselves. Even worse, we do not truly value our own creations and creative powers. Instead, we put a monetary value on them, and flog them on the market. Commercialism cheats us out of our own bodies, and makes us lose our senses. 

Wilson makes short work of the monetary valuation of nature. There is more to nature than its value to human beings and the services it performs for human interests:

These services are important to human welfare. But they cannot form the whole foundation of an enduring environmental ethic. If a price can be put on something, that something can be devalued, sold, and discarded. It is also possible for some to dream that people will go on living comfortably in a biologically impoverished world. They suppose that a prosthetic environment is within the power of technology, that human life can still flourish in a completely humanized world, where medicines would all be synthesized from chemicals off the shelf, food grown from a few dozen domestic crop species, the atmosphere and climate regulated by computer-driven fusion energy, and the earth made over until it becomes a literal spaceship rather than a metaphorical one, with people reading displays and touching buttons on the bridge. Such is the terminus of the philosophy of exemptionalism: do not weep for the past, humanity is a new order of life, let species die if they block progress, scientific and technological genius will find another way. Look up and see the stars awaiting us.

Wilson 1993: ch 15

Such is the vision of planetary engineers, the city planet envisaged by the likes of Stewart Brand in Whole Earth Discipline. But, as Wilson points out, ‘human advance is determined not by reason alone but by emotions peculiar to our species, aided and tempered by reason. What makes us people and not computers is emotion.’ We need to take proper account of our true nature, the fullness of our humanity. ‘Humanity is part of nature, a species that evolved among other species. The more closely we identify ourselves with the rest of life, the more quickly we will be able to discover the sources of human sensibility and acquire the knowledge on which an enduring ethic, a sense of preferred direction, can be built.’ (Wilson 1993: ch 15).

The idea that human beings can flourish apart from the rest of the living world is a delusion, a product of our being in thrall to our technical powers and of believing the promises of untold wealth, power and happiness in the future through the expansion of these powers.

The genetic unity of life
[stewardship – claiming our place in nature, viewed from an ethical perspective, is to think about the creation and to protect the living planet]

In fine, we are bonded to the living environment by the genetic unity of all life, kinship and ancient history. All organisms are descended from the same ancestral life form. As Carl Sagan says, ‘But deep down, at the molecular heart of life, we’re essentially identical to trees.’ This points to unity at the deepest level of life. But we need also to take into account the degree of human independence, and how this has enabled us to create a world at a certain distance from natural origins. To actually be at one with nature and live that bond at a conscious level is not a given but has to be achieved. How to re-connect with our natural foundations is the task we now face. And politics and ethics are crucial in meeting this challenge. That is why I refer to the ‘commonwealth of virtue.’

This re-connection is well within our capabilities. The notion of environmental stewardship resonates as an intensely felt value, as something that arises from emotions programmed in the genetic make-up of human beings. Re-connection is a concept that makes sense at the level of human behaviour. 

This is a moral issue. Science and technology concern facts, means and mechanisms, what we know and what we can do. Morality is what we ought to do or ought not to do, what we agree we should or should not do. Biologist E.O. Wilson acknowledges this, arguing that the ethic from which moral decisions spring is a norm or standard of behaviour in support of a value, and this, in turn, depends on purpose, how we see ourselves and the world we live in. 

In emphasising the importance of each species in its own right as well as the need to maintain the richness of biodiversity for the good of the biosphere and the human community, Wilson stresses the need to develop an appropriate morality for respecting and valuing the earth. And, from an impeccably scientific standpoint, he introduces the word purpose:





This shows the way to overcome the purposeless materialism that characterises the way that the self-made social world has elevated means to the status of ends. Wilson defines a conservation ethic as that which aims to pass on to future generations the best part of the nonhuman world. ‘To know this world is to gain a proprietary attachment to it. To know it well is to love and take responsibility for it.’ (Wilson 2002: 131).

The ethical imperative should therefore be, first of all, prudence. We should judge every scrap of biodiversity as priceless while we learn to use it and come to understand what it means to humanity. We should not knowingly allow any species or race to go extinct. And let us go beyond mere salvage to begin the restoration of natural environments, in order to enlarge wild populations and stanch the hemorrhaging of biological wealth. There can be no purpose more enspiriting than to begin the age of restoration, reweaving the wondrous diversity of life that still surrounds us.

An enduring environmental ethic will aim to preserve not only the health and freedom of our species, but access to the world in which the human spirit was born. 

Wilson 1993: ch 15

Biophilia and ethics
That there is more than biology at work here is indicated by the fact that the term ‘biophilia’ originates not with the biologist Wilson, but with the German social psychologist Erich Fromm, and his book The Heart of Man: 





Notions of human independence and freedom need to be set in the context of our dependence upon natural resources. Hence the strength of a partnership ethic which sees the human community and the natural community as an interdependence in which humanity and nature are co-creators, both are active agents. Biophilia, love for humanity and nature, and independence and interdependence are innate, but achieving a new unity through the convergence of these three orientations requires morality, culture, virtues, capabilities, an environmental ethic.

We need to love life as a whole as well as each other. Love is the very model of a just society. ‘Love means creating for another the kind of space in which he can flourish, at the same time as he does this for you. It is to find one's happiness in being the reason for the happiness of another’. (Moss 2000 I). Love is key to flourishing well:

Take heed of the growth and protection lessons from cells and shift your lives into growth whenever possible. And remember that for human beings the most potent growth promoter is not the fanciest school, the biggest toy, or the highest-paying job. Long before cell biology and studies of children in orphanages, conscious parents and seers like Rumi knew that for human babies and adults the best growth promoter is love.

A lifetime without Love is of no account
Love is the Water of Life




Philia and biophilia go together.

As ecologist Tim Flannery puts it, ‘I am certain of one thing — if we do not strive to love one another, and to love our planet as much as we love ourselves, then no further human progress is possible here on Earth’ (Flannery 2010: 281). 

Bruce Lipton reconfigures the survival of the fittest as the survival of the most loving:

Most human violence is neither necessary nor is it an inherent, genetic, ‘animal’ survival skill. We have the ability, and I believe an evolutionary mandate, to stop violence. The best way to stop it is to realize … that we are spiritual beings who need love as much as we need food. But we won't get to the next evolutionary step by just thinking about it just as we can't change our children's and our lives simply by reading books. Join communities of like-minded people who are working toward advancing human civilization by realizing that Survival of the Most Loving is the only ethic that will ensure not only a healthy personal life but also a healthy planet.




Individuals band together like cells to form communities of like-minded people. Later, with respect to games theory, I shall write about forming clusters of co-operators in order to overcome the threat of defectors and free riders, those who seek a private advantage at the expense of those who serve the social good. That argument is based upon reciprocity and the quality of individual interactions. The argument here points to something more than natural selection, it points to love as an active force.

Without love, we will struggle to survive, let alone flourish. Forget survival of the fittest, as misunderstood to mean the survival of the most ruthless and the most competitive. Love is the only engine of survival, Leonard Cohen sang in The Future. As biologist Stephen Jay Gould said in 1993:

Yet I also appreciate that we cannot win this battle to save species and environments without forging an emotional bond between ourselves and nature as well—for we will not fight to save what we do not love (but only appreciate in some abstract sense). So let them all continue—the films, the books, the television programs, the zoos, the little half acre of ecological preserve in any community, the primary school lessons, the museum demonstrations, even […] the 6:00 A.M. bird walks. Let them continue and expand because we must have visceral contact in order to love. We really must make room for nature in our hearts.

Stephen Jay Gould Eight Little Piggies 1993: 40

We need to love the world we live in and upon which we depend. This is a call for human beings to embrace biophilia as a condition of their own survival. So what does it mean to love the Earth?

Gaia
Belief in God is incapable of empirical verification and logical proof and rational discussion ends there: a question incapable of being answered is a non-question. Belief involves an act of faith, of which some are capable, others not. The questions of source and destiny, however, are not non-questions. And unanswerable questions are not meaningless, either. The quest for meaning is integral to a human life. This is an area where the questions, and the continued questioning, are more valuable than the answers we may obtain.

In like manner, James Lovelock acknowledges that, scientifically, he cannot show that Gaia is alive. He openly states that his belief that Earth is a living organism lacks a rational scientific basis. He notes how his scientific colleagues accuse him of ‘anthropomorphizing the Earth, talking of it as alive.' He responds: 'If it is not alive then how can it die?' And die she will when the sun's heat becomes more than can be withstood. (Lovelock 2009 ch 3). 





Are we in the realm of faith or reason with Gaia? Lovelock’s Gaia is a scientific thesis, yet it draws its strength and attraction from a faith that rings true. Gaia strikes a chord within us, for the reasons given above, bringing nature within and without back into connection. In this sense, Gaia is a holistic conception by which we can see the Earth as a living organism, see ourselves as active participants within this organism, and value our relationships with living things:





I think there is something admirable in the way that James Lovelock affirms his commitment to science and yet is open to, and can see the spiritual dimensions of this question:





There is something reassuring about reading a scientist argue (however tentatively, of course!) that the various arts and sciences are interconnected with each other, and mutually enlarging. And there is hope in the fact that a feeling for the Earth as a superorganism survives within us. Lovelock as a scientist may not be able to support the view that the Earth is alive, but the feeling that it is a living organism is certainly alive within us, bringing us to life in the process.

Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis offers a way for us to re-envision and re-establish our connection to the earth. He emphasises the self-regulating character of the earth system, the way that the critical components of the earth's life support systems have been maintained in perfect balance over eons of time. Until the modern industrial civilization came along and upset that balance.

Lovelock emphasises interconnection: ‘We now see that the air, the ocean and the soil are much more than a mere environment for life; they are a part of life itself. Thus the air is to life just as is the fur to a cat or the nest for a bird. Not living but something made by living things to protect against an otherwise hostile world. For life on earth, the air is our protection against the cold depths and fierce radiations of space.’ Air, oceans and freshwater, land are more than the natural environment for life, they are a part of life. And we are a part of them. We are nature and nature is in us.

On this theme of interconnection, Lovelock quotes Gregory Bateson with approval:

The individual mind is immanent but not only in the body. It is immanent also in pathways and messages outside the body; and there is a larger mind of which the individual mind is only a subsystem. This larger mind is comparable to God and is perhaps what some people mean by God, but it is still immanent in the total interconnected social systems and planetary ecology.

Bateson Steps to an Ecology of Mind 1972: 465

Lovelock reaffirms the scientists’ commitment to objective reality, but he recognises that this reality is a lot stranger and a lot more uncertain than had hitherto been believed:






James Lovelock calls humanity Gaia’s intelligent elite. This begs the question of why, if this is so, are we so callously transgressing planetary boundaries. But Lovelock’s point is valid, pointing to our intelligence, reason and moral responsibility, to that degree of independence I have been drawing attention to:

The most frequent response from my green friends to the grim message in my last book was: 'You can't say things like that. It gives us nothing to hope for.' This was a good criticism, which helped to clear my mind and let me understand why messengers are said to have a short lifespan. I realized that I had said much about the imminent catastrophe but too little about how we could try to ensure our continued presence on the Earth, giving our descendants a chance in the hot world that soon may come. We are the intelligent elite among animal life on Earth and, whatever our mistakes, Gaia needs us. 

Lovelock 2009 ch 1

Gaia ‘needs us’ in order to be known. We are in the philosophical terrain of if a tree falls in the forest and no one being around to hear ….. I’d like to leave philosophical debates about how it is possible for human beings to know or value anything in other than human terms to one side. In truth, Lovelock’s argument sounds much more like the theological argument that God needs us in order to be known, and created the entire universe in order to share goodness. I would refer here to the old Hebrew legend in which Jehovah and Abraham are arguing with each other as to which of them is better able to account for the world as it is. Jehovah tries to assert his authority over Abraham, 'You would not even exist if it were not for me.’ ‘Yes, Lord, that I know,’ Abraham replies, ‘but also you would not be known if it were not for me.’ The question of whether there is a reality apart from human consciousness is a deep one. The view that the planet is independent of any one species, the human species included, is scientifically correct. (Although there is a case for saying that human interference has been so extensive as to bring planetary functioning into a certain dependence upon human activity, at least in the short run). 

The key point that Lovelock identifies here is that human intelligence confers a degree of independence, and it is one that restores a Biblical truth with respect to the moral capacity and responsibility of human beings. I shall later qualify this view sharply with reference to human beings as dependent rational animals. For all of our claims to uniqueness on account of possessing reason, we nevertheless remain dependent on our animality within natural processes. At the same time, we need to take full account of human intelligence and how this this gives us a cultural capacity involving a degree of autonomy. The problems we face are ones of an unmastered practice, not lack of intelligence or knowledge. We are embroiled within social relations that have escaped our control, with the result that our social practices and decisions come to be governed by supra-individual forces. As individuals, we are locked within destructive patterns of behaviour, and an increasing knowledge of environmental destruction alone does nothing alter those patterns in any significant way. Human beings may have the intelligence that Lovelock writes of but, at the moment, that intelligence is locked up within destructive cycles of behaviour.

Lovelock’s reference to human beings as Gaia’s ‘intelligent elite’ identifies the human species as the creative intelligence at the heart of the purposive universe. This savours a little of the thesis that the human species is the God Species, a view which may well offer a way forward, so long as we understand this to mean partnership with God/Nature, a co-evolution and a co-production of the world. As a view of human beings coming to manage and engineer the planet through a deified technological capacity, it has no merit, but is the plainest delusion.
 
We can reject notions of humanity as constituting an elite, it is too close to the ‘men as gods’ thesis, and exhibits too much of the old arrogant humanism. Human beings were made in the image of God, not as gods, and understanding the big difference between the two is the path to sanity. But this notion of being Gaia’s intelligence points the way forwards toward human beings developing an ecological awareness of their place and role within the world. E.O. Wilson argues that we are so bound up with the world around us that the biosphere as a whole began to think when humanity was born. The question of intelligence thus becomes one of humanity assuming responsibility for its actions on the planet. It’s a view that makes proper sense of our moral autonomy.

We need at this point to distinguish this idea of human beings taking responsibility for themselves and their actions from notions of human beings taking control of and managing the planet. Lynn Margulis in The Symbiotic Planet is contemptuous of all such notions of human beings as masters of the universe:

Life is a planetary-level phenomenon and Earth's surface has been alive for at least 3,000 million years. To me, the human move to take responsibility for the living Earth is laughable - the rhetoric of the powerless. The planet takes care of us, not we of it. Our self-inflated moral imperative to guide a wayward Earth or heal our sick planet is evidence of our immense capacity for self-delusion. Rather, we need to protect us from ourselves.

Margulis is worth quoting at length, because she sets the endless debates between anthropocentrism, ecocentrism and biocentrism in a scientific context:

The sum of planetary life, Gaia, displays a physiology that we recognize as environmental regulation. Gaia itself is not an organism directly selected among many. It is an emergent property of interaction among organisms, the spherical planet on which they reside, and an energy source, the sun. Furthermore Gaia is an ancient phenomenon. Trillions of jostling,   feeding, mating,   exuding beings   compose her planetary system. Gaia, a tough bitch, is not at all threatened by humans. Planetary life survived at least three billion years before humanity was even the dream of a lively ape with a yearning for a relatively hairless mate.
We need honesty. We need to be freed from our species-specific arrogance. No evidence exists that we are 'chosen,' the unique species for which all the others were made. Nor are we the most important one because we are so numerous, powerful, and dangerous. Our tenacious illusion of special dispensation belies our true status as upright mammalian weeds. In popular culture the confused idea of Gaia strikes mythological chords. Gaia resonates with our longing for significance in our short Earth-bound lives. Misstated Gaia supports latter-day Puritanism: feminist discourse on the dangers of 'rape' and destruction of the sunlit Earth. We have for centuries personified nature. The takeover of Gaia theory by science-haters and media-mongers is striking. The former blame science, only a way of knowing, for the excesses of technology, and the latter use science to justify their crass television and magazine salesmanship. Although popularized, exaggerated, and maligned, Gaia theory does not just mean nature conservation or a return to the Goddess. Gaia is the regulated surface of the planet incessantly creating new environments and new organisms. But the planet is not human, nor does it belong to humans. No human culture, despite its inventiveness, can kill life on this planet, were it even to try. Less a single live entity than a huge set of interacting ecosystems, the Earth as Gaian regulatory physiology transcends all individual organisms. Humans are not the center of life, nor is any other single species. Humans are not even central to life. We are a recent, rapidly growing part of an enormous ancient whole.
Gaia is neither vicious nor nurturing in relation to humanity; it is a convenient name for an Earthwide phenomenon: the regulation of temperature, acidity/alkalinity, and gas composition. Gaia is the series of interacting ecosystems that compose a single huge ecosystem at the Earth's surface. Period.

Margulis 1998 Ch 8 

Is that all there is? It depends what we are looking at and why. Those looking for an ethic grounded in nature may well be looking in the wrong place, as the Bible says. ‘It is not in us,’ the Earth says in response to the question as to where wisdom is to be found (Job). ‘The Gaia hypothesis is science’, writes Margulis. And the science of Gaia, it seems, could care as little for meaning and purpose as the natural object it examines. That may – or may not be - fine as science, but science doesn’t cover the whole of human life and experience. Margulis refers to ‘our longing for significance’, as if this longing is somehow ephemeral or inconsequential. To the grass, maybe. But not to us. That longing is our quest for meaning, and so much the worse for any science that dismisses something so crucial to human beings. That need for meaning is an ineradicable feature of a truly human life, as essential to us as our physical needs for air and water. Without it, we do not flourish, and any perspective that fails to take proper recognition of that need on our part is deficient. We make sense of the world in our terms, and any view that fails to take account of that need in human beings will fail as an account not just of human life but also of human relations to the natural world. 
Lewis Mumford wrote well here: ‘If human life has no purpose and meaning, then the philosophy that proclaims this fact is even emptier than the situation it describes. If, on the other hand, there is more to man's fate and history than meets the eye, if the process as a whole has significance, then even the humblest life and the most insignificant organic function will participate in that ultimate meaning. (Mumford 1952: 61/62). 

The world and the life in it is more than physical fact. Still, in terms of science, Margulis’ conclusion is worth quoting at length, because a true understanding of the world we live in may cure us of our worst delusions of uniqueness and superiority as we embark on our ceaseless quest for meaning. And it may encourage naturalists to start seeking an ethic for the right conduct in life in the right place:





So indifferent is nature that there would be no snickering at our demise at all, just the humming and singing of nature naturing, as nature does – natura naturans. There would be no conscious awareness of our disappearance, no memory of our ever having existed, no evaluation. And that’s the significant point that needs to be grasped by naturalists who persist in thinking that nature can do the work of ethics and politics – we are Gaia’s consciousness. Gaia needs us to be known. And we need Gaia to be able to know:





It is worth noting that James Lovelock has referred to the human species as a virus, an infection. He argues that ‘we became the Earth's infection a long and uncertain time ago when we first used fire and tools purposefully.’ With the Industrial Revolution, ‘the infection of the Earth became irreversible.’ (Lovelock 2009: 150). Lovelock’s view can, therefore, be bleak:





I don’t think this necessarily contradicts his view that we are Gaia’s intelligent elite. I think it shows the two sides of human nature, our capacity for good and bad, and it points to our relative moral autonomy from nature, an autonomy that, taken too far, can become a fatal self-alienation from the sources of life. And it points to the irreducible moral dimension of human life. There is no beyond good and evil, and there is no possibility of relying upon nature to resolve moral questions. Morality, like God, is the anarchic surplus beyond physical laws and biological imperatives. Systems theorists are discovering that natural processes may well be beyond laws of physics and natural selection, a view that would come as no surprise to anyone who understood what theologians mean by the non-existence of God.

Our moral independence, our capacity to reflect, deliberate and choose at a degree from biological and ecological imperatives is relative to our planetary context, but no less real for that. To be Gaia’s intelligent elite, we need to demonstrate an ecological intelligence. Yet here we are, with a technological power that is certainly capable of destroying natural systems, if not all of life. We have a power that we need to naturalise and a power we need to humanise. For we are a bigger threat to ourselves than we are to nature as a whole.

Our independence therefore needs to be set within the context of our greater dependence upon nature. A partnership ethic recognises the legitimate claims of both humanity and nature and sees the flourishing of both in terms of an interdependence. That notion of interdependence is crucial here. Margulis describes ‘the human move to take responsibility for the living Earth’ as ‘laughable’, ‘the rhetoric of the powerless’, and I agree. We need to ween ourselves from the neurotic need to control. We have seen the supposed technological conquest of the Earth backfire, with all our economic expansion coming with an ecological bill that is beyond our means to pay. And still we fail to learn the necessary humility, refuse to give up our delusions of an all-knowing, all-consuming scientific power, and instead propose to geoengineer the planet to support the unsustainable demands we make on it. Stewart Brand says we have become as gods, and proposes that we geoengineer our way to safety. (Brand 2010). This assertion of power is indeed the rhetoric of the powerless.

James Lovelock, I would argue, differs from the likes of Brand. Lovelock argues that human beings have evolved as Gaia’s ‘intelligent elite’, something that makes us the creative intelligence at the heart of the purposive universe. In the spirit of partnership with the Earth, Lovelock envisages a new Eden through the use of our creative social intelligence. If this sounds suspiciously like Wellsian fantasies of ‘men as gods’, it also savours a great deal of Francis Bacon’s concern that scientific knowledge should come to be used with a moral purpose. He emphasises the extent to which human beings exist as ‘a planetary intelligence’ who have given Gaia her conscious existence. This might sound like the old anthropocentric arrogance, but the basic idea is that we have a future only by working in partnership with living planet. He envisages ‘a future in communion with our living planet,’ countering ‘the disabling impacts that are due’ and making her strong again: ‘we have already shown Gaia her face from space and let her see how truly beautiful she is compared with her dead siblings Mars and Venus.’ This takes us beyond notions of technical conquest of and moral responsibility for the Earth. We are, instead, working with the Earth, modifying our behaviour accordingly.

He asks ‘how could anyone be a pessimist and imagine that the global heating crisis is the end for us or even Gaia?’ 





Identifying human beings as part of the Gaian process of self-regulation, Lovelock argues that 'as the transfer of power to our species proceeds, our responsibility for maintaining planetary homeostasis grows with it, whether we are conscious of the fact or not.’ This implies that human beings play an active rather than a passive role within Gaia, a view which begs a clear and consistent moral and political standpoint. Whilst Lovelock is unclear here, his view that we are 'a part of, or partner in, a very democratic entity' (Lovelock 1989: 131 145) implies a partnership ethic in which we may learn to live within ecological constraints and become a more environmentally wise species. However, we must become conscious of our role in this partnership for it to work. Creative human agency therefore amounts to the recognition of ecological necessity and proceeds within some very narrow parameters. Lovelock warns that Gaia can eliminate any species that disturbs the balance of life on earth: ‘Gaia is not purposefully antihuman but so long as we continue to change the global environment against her preferences, we encourage our replacement with a more environmentally seemly species.' (Lovelock 1989: 236).

Lovelock’s view displaces the human species from centre stage, asserting that ‘the welfare of Gaia is more important than the welfare of humankind.’ ‘To be truly green’, he continues, ‘we have to rid ourselves of the illusion that we are separate from Gaia in any way. We are as much a part of her as anything alive and we should feel tied, as in a good and loving marriage, until death us do part.’ (Lovelock 2009: 147). 

And I think that such a view fits with Margulis’ comments, insofar as it abandons human pretensions to take responsibility for and control of the planet. And it is a view which qualifies what we mean by a Gaian intelligence. Lovelock argues that if we could come to see the world as a superorganism of which we are a part — not the owner, nor the tenant; not even a passenger — then ‘we could have a long time ahead of us and our species might survive for its “allotted span.”’ And we can ask for no more than that.

I would just be careful of adopting a systems view of action. Systems ‘act’ without conscious design or purpose. They have an existential significance denied to the human agents; but they lack moral meaning. Anthropocentrism is displaced, but human beings are made secondary to natural ‘rules’ that they ‘must obey’. The sense of partnership as a co-operation between active subjects is lost. Human beings are rendered subordinate to their environment. The world ceases to be a co-production.

But the world is a co-production. We are not passengers admiring the view, we are participants charged with the responsibility to play our parts:





We need to take responsibility for ourselves and our own actions and abandon our delusions to be planetary managers and engineers. Instead, we need to see ourselves as partners in the Earth’s commonwealth of virtue, the Earth as an actively democratic living entity.

The Partnership Ethic
[responsibility for the planet]
Three decades ago, Ward and Dubos urged that we come to see ourselves as belonging to ‘only one Earth’. They argued that since humankind is in the process of ‘completing the colonization of the planet,’ then ‘learning to manage it intelligently is an urgent imperative. Man must accept responsibility for the stewardship of the earth.’ (Ward and Dubos 1982: 25).

This call for intelligent management could sound comparable to the ‘men as gods’ thesis, especially in relation to the idea of the human colonization of the planet. However, assuming responsibility for the stewardship of the earth is a very different notion to taking responsibility for the planet as such. The emphasis is upon the ecological intelligence of our actions, not our technological mastery of the planet. I would set this stewardship in the context of partnership:





This remains a difficult question. As Ward and Dubos acknowledge, environmentalists have somewhat different views concerning the nature of the party for whom they should act as stewards. These views are shaped by scientific, social, philosophical and religious attitudes. Viewpoints, standpoints, worldviews are important in that they shape our perceptions of the world and our responses to facts and events. There may be an objective reality, and even an objective truth, but perceptions count. And we, as perceivers, are seldom objective in some pure and disinterested sense; we come with values. The human world is ‘humanly objective.’

 [ethics and ecology – partnership ethic of earthcare]
In Earthcare, Carolyn Merchant argues for a partnership ethic which sees the human community and the biotic community in a mutual relationship with each other. This ethic states that ‘the greatest good for the human and the nonhuman community is to be found in their mutual, living interdependence.’ (Merchant 1995: ch 10). The flourishing of the human and the nonhuman community is achieved through their interconnection. This ethic recognises a number of principles.

1.	Equity between the human and nonhuman communities.
2.	Moral consideration for humans and nonhuman nature.
3.	Respect for cultural diversity and biodiversity.
4.	Inclusion of women, minorities, and nonhuman nature in the code of
ethical accountability.

The key precept here is ‘moral consideration.’ In strict materialist terms, that consideration is not inherent in biology and ecology. I agree with Flannery that we belong to and are a part of nature. ‘We actually are Earth’ says Flannery:

there is no doubt that the electrochemical processes that are life are entirely consistent with an origin in Earth's crust—our very chemistry tells us that we are, in all probability, of it. This concept of life as living Earthly crust challenges the dignity of some. It should not. We have long understood, from biblical teaching and practical experience, that we are naught but earth: ashes to ashes, dust to dust, as the English burial service puts it. Indeed, 'dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return' are among the oldest written words we have. 

Flannery 2010 ch 4

We come from dust and return to dust. But what we do in between is not a mere a matter of biological and ecological determinism, the transitory passing of purposeless matter. We are intimately concerned with the coming and going of the natural processes within which we live our lives.

Partnership ethics differs from the forms of environmental ethics that currently dominate human-environment relations and offers a way past entrenched opposition between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric positions. A partnership ethic draws on the principles and advantages of both the homocentric social-interest ethic and the ecocentric environmental ethic, while rejecting the egocentric ethic associated with capitalist exploitation of people and nature. (Merchant 1995: ch 10).

A partnership ethics is grounded in the concept of relation as a mode of connection between people or kin in the same family or community, but goes beyond that to embrace larger communities, human and non-human, other organisms, and inorganic entities, as well as connections between specific places and the rest of the earth. Merchant writes of the mutual relationship between the human community and the biotic community. The relationship is situational and contextual within communities of place that are embedded in and connected to the wider earth, reaching out to regional, national and global entities. Partnership in these terms offers a way of integrating the universality implied by a common ethic and the proximity involved with social living. These are two aspects of our nature.

The cooperation of human and nonhuman nature as active agents
The partnership ethic achieves unity and balance through the cooperation of human and nonhuman nature as active agents. A partnership ethic calls for a new balance in which both human beings and non-human nature are equal partners, cooperating on equal terms with each other. ‘Both humans and nature are active agents.’ (Merchant ch 10). This view takes into consideration both the basic needs of human beings and the needs of nature to continue to exist. As George Perkins Marsh put it in 1864, humanity should ‘become a co-worker with nature in the reconstruction of the damaged fabric,’ by restoring the waters, forests, and bogs ‘laid waste by human improvidence or malice.’ We are co-workers in the world as a co-production. We live in a participatory universe and need to become conscious of our role as its co-creators.

For Herbert Marcuse, nature is more than inorganic matter but is ‘an ally’, a ‘life force in its own right’, appearing as ‘subject-object.’ He advocates a non-exploitative relation as a ‘surrender, “letting-be,” acceptance.’ Whilst nature as subject ‘may well be hostile to man, in which case the relation would be one of struggle; but the struggle may also subside and make room for peace, tranquility, fulfillment.’ (Marcuse 1972: 59, 69, 65).

Here we see a balancing, a merging even, of fact and value. Whilst I agree with the science behind Margulis’ view of the symbiotic planet – Earth was here before us, and will be here long after we are gone, and could care less either way – human beings live in a world of value as well as fact. Of course we are anthropocentric in seeing the world through human eyes. What else could we be? Insects are more important to the health of the planet than the human species is. Yet it is hardly likely that we will, in light of this knowledge, devise a social organisation that places human interests below those of insects. Apart from anything else, that biological knowledge of the importance of insects is human knowledge. 

We need to get past these questions of how do we know and value the world and the things in it and instead find a way a way of living with connections. A partnership ethic sees the world of fact and value as one and, even if this value is a human value, at least it emphasises the use of the creative social and moral intelligence. Which is no bad thing, if this is intelligence in the sense of coming to know our place in the whole of life’s order. This would amount to taking responsibility for ourselves and ensuring that our actions are consistent with planetary flourishing, as a condition of our own flourishing. Social and moral intelligence amounts to a recognition that we have a future only in communion with our living planet. This is to see ourselves as involved in an ecological partnership with the earth and all other living forms. The challenge before us is to ensure balance in the relation and connection of human creations of art, culture, politics, technics to environing nature. 

The need for a standpoint – an ethical framework
University of Toronto research physicist, author and educator Ursula Franklin examines technology within a political and social context. For her, technology is a comprehensive system that includes machines but also methods, procedures, organization, ‘and most of all, a mindset’. (Franklin 1992: 12). She argues that the domination of prescriptive technologies, emphasising large-scale production, over holistic technologies, discourages critical thinking and promotes ‘a culture of compliance’. (Franklin 1992: 24).

Challenging and overturning that culture of compliance requires more than scientific knowledge, technological power and institutional force. For Franklin, the most important social movements in history are those grounded by the presence of a ‘standpoint’, an ethical framework that informs a person’s life and work, and brings a sense of purpose and obligation. The right thing to do is not about meeting external goals set by systems and organisations but concerns the expression of one’s character, an integral part of one’s identity. To be able to effect any substantial and lasting change, a person or a movement has to have conviction, a willingness to commit to a cause, and the moral courage to take a stand. The tragedy of modern government, argues Franklin, is that it has become a prisoner of an economic globalization which has subverted the standpoint of community and environmental stewardship through the promotion of the sole standpoint of profit. Governments and corporations are in symbiotic relation as they prioritise the pursuit of profit – the process of accumulation – at the expense of the care for people and the community, democratic institutions and principles, and the ecology of the planet.

As Franklin argues, what we have now is an ‘economic war’ in which the new ‘enemy’ is people and Nature, and the new territories of occupation are ‘the commons’ (those not-for-profit spaces we ‘hold in common’ in a democratic society). In Franklin’s view, the era of global capitalism in which we now live is characterised by the corporate security state, a military-style occupation with ‘puppet governments’ running the country on behalf of the corporations and their ‘armies of marketeers.’ As resources become ever more scarce, struggles for access and control will intensify, leading to the extension and entrenchment of the corporate security state in our lives. (references to Franklin are contained in Clarke 1997; Barlow and Clarke 2002: 205-06).

If the world's life support systems are to be preserved for future generations, the individuals who compose the global demos are going to have to take a stand based on a set of principles, ethical considerations and obligations which challenge and overcome the prevailing standpoint of the global economy. 

[age of ecology – new ideas and new politics – new paradigm]
We are living in an age crying out for a standpoint based on the recovery of purpose. It’s an ‘age of collapsing assumptions.' (Tuchman 1978: xxx.) Many of the assumptions upon which our civilisation has been based are in the process of dissolution: the ideas that economic growth brings happiness and human well-being; that the human species enjoy a unique moral place in the universe; that scientific and technological advance yields complete knowledge and control of the world. 

What fills the gap? Not another set of unwarranted assumptions and arrogant claims. To provide an adequate account of our relations to each other and to the planet, we must provide an adequate conception of human nature and well-being in relation to non-human organisms and ecological systems; take account of how human activity impacts upon geophysical systems; and redefine what it is to be a citizen within local, national, and global institutions.

Experience and personality
Human nature is not some fixed essence that predetermines action. The human character is formed and shaped by social context and experience, with input from a variety of sources, some healthy, others harmful. The destructive behaviours we manifest with respect to the environment are not hard-wired, but are subject to alteration. Whether we are destructive or creative depends on the extent to which we activate our moral grammar, develop our capabilities and create new capabilities, and thereby come to express a moral capacity within the habitus in which we live. Human beings are capable of a much stronger sense of sympathy, empathy and community than can be expressed in prevailing social systems. These systems appeal to the worst sides of the human character, suppressing our healthier natures. Ideas of self-interest and self-reliance have their place in a balanced human nature, as part of a normal and healthy independence. They have, however, been inflated and hardened into a self-destructive and depressing selfishness that makes sense only in terms of being the personality type required by the prevailing capital system, with its inversion of means and ends and commitment to the endless pursuit of money. This system makes sense only in terms of the imperatives and requirements of an accumulative economic system; it makes no human sense. 

‘Things which matter most must never be at the mercy of things which matter least.’ 
- Goethe

As Max Weber writes with respect to the capitalist rationalisation of the world.

In fact, the summum bonum of this ethic, the earning of more and more money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life, is above all completely devoid of any eudaemonistic, not to say hedonistic, admixture. It is thought of so purely as an end in itself that from the point of view of the happiness of, or utility to, the single individual, it appears entirely transcendental and absolutely irrational. Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of material needs. This reversal of what we should call the natural relationship, so irrational from a naive point of view, is evidently as definitely a leading principle of capitalism as it is foreign to all peoples not under a capitalistic influence.

Weber 1930:54/5 in Seidler 1994:47/8.

Weber points to the pathos of means and ends as a tragedy which involves a dehumanisation, the enslavement of human beings to a world of means. It is a world in which the ends of happiness is displaced by the imperatives of instrumental rationality. Such a world does indeed invert the natural relationship and is indeed unnatural and irrational.

The implication of Weber’s criticism is that we must seek to create forms of social life which correspond to and foster the growth of the human ontology, and repudiate those inverted systems that inhibit the human ontology, directing human beings towards ends which are external to them. And this implies working with rather than against the grain of human nature, in particular, with working those aspects of human nature which permit and enable the expression of sympathy, empathy and compassion within warm, affective ties and social bonds. Achieving universal love via an expanded moral circle which embraces the land and the other members of the ecosystem is not beyond us, it is just that it has been the less well-trodden path in our history, the path so ill-rewarded by the powers of economic expansion and political aggrandisement that it appears impossible and irrational. That goal is both perfectly achievable and eminently rational. (Although I would prefer to avoid references to a moral circle, for reasons I develop in work to come elsewhere). 

5 ETHICS AND POLITICS

Morality - canalising behaviour

In the conception I develop in this book, politics and ethics are about shaping and canalising behaviour in order to attain particular individual and collective ends. Politics does this through a system of external incentives and sanctions, through social, economic and environmental policies; ethics does this through internal incentives and sanctions, through conscience and the internalisation of moral norms. Together, both seek to prevent violence, fraud, and the destruction of ecosystems. Politics and ethics are natural in the sense that they are rooted in human behaviour, needs, and desires; they are not natural in the sense of being spontaneous, but require an organised and mediated approach to the world. Politics and ethics are the conscious, deliberate means by which human beings determine the terms on which their collective life proceeds. The absence of politics and ethics, or their reduction to other things, nature, economics, power, technology, leaves human beings unable to determine their course rationally and collectively. This dissolution of the world of practical reason and value spells trouble not only for democratic society but also for environmental protection. When politics and ethics are separated we lose the integral conception; they both lose their power and legitimacy, and the more technical or instrumental disciplines of science and economics become surrogates, imposing the universal in an impersonal and external way. Naturalism, or a fake naturalization under the auspices of technical disciplines or scientific knowledge, is inimical to nature and the human relation to it. It isn’t true to human beings. Politics and ethics are key to human beings be true to themselves and to their environment, hence Aristotle made these the master science organizing all the other sciences.

Intertwining of ethics and politics
I want to develop further the intertwining of politics and ethics, showing why politics is the master science and why morality matters. Terry Eagleton notes that morality has been treated with a degree of scepticism, as an embarrassment, as unscientific or as merely ‘a fancy name for oppressing other people.’ (Eagleton 2003:140). Morality can be all these of things, as can religion, politics, culture, economics, science and everything else that human beings do. Human beings are never short of reasons as to why what they do has a good reason. Morality, however, is about right reasons. And if there is oppression, domination, or cruelty, then the sense of rightness has been lost, and ethics as a systematic way of looking at human action is about telling us how and why. The repudiation of all morality and all moral claims on account of some alleged repressive or totalising ambition is just plain wrong. The serious work lies in identifying and exposing any illicit power interests behind moral claims whilst at the same time reclaiming morality as an integral part of the truly human life. Eagleton makes the big, eye-catching, claim that ‘morality is all about enjoyment and abundance of life’ (Eagleton 2003: 140), and I am in agreement with him. But it’s a claim that needs some defending. Somewhere along the line, morality has come to be separated from human self-actualisation and flourishing and become identified with a repressive, codified legislation of restraint over against natural inclinations. Kant’s deontological ethic stands as a classic example of this, but the problem is quite general.

In their ancient origins, ethics and politics are inextricably connected. For Aristotle, ethics and politics are intertwined. Ethics concerns the conditions ensuring human excellence. These conditions are necessarily social. Since human beings are social beings, individuals can excel at being human only in relation to others in a social context. Nobody can excel at being human without the social, moral and institutional framework which aids the pursuit of excellence. Modern moral philosophy has abstracted questions of good and bad from their social contexts, with the result that moral theories are deficient with respect to moral concern, character and motivation. Moral philosophy, to be worthy of the name, has to be integral and take account of all of the factors which make up a good human life.

Flourishing
Human flourishing is more than a matter of individual autonomy and personal likes and wants. Flourishing concerns the whole human being, and this requires that a whole range of social and natural factors are acknowledged. 
Eagleton rightly points out that whether we are healthy, happy, at ease with ourselves and others, enjoying life, working creatively, emotionally caring and sensitive, resilient, capable of fulfilling friendships, responsible, self-reliant and the like depends upon things that are not and can never be wholly within our control. Awareness of this targets the central category of modern moral philosophy, the free, independent, autonomous, discrete individual – such a figure does not exist. ‘You cannot be happy or at ease with yourself just by an act of will. It requires among other things certain social and material conditions.’ The attainment of a moral life, as a fulfilling life proper to the condition of being human, ‘depends in the end on politics.’ (Eagleton 2003: 128). 

That claim is likely to be misunderstood if one identifies the political with the sphere of parliamentary debates, party conflicts, elections and the organised management and manipulation of ‘the people.’ I am referring to politics in a much more expansive sense than this, politics as what Aristotle called politikon bion, or public life. This is the public context that human beings as social beings need in order to individuate themselves and complete themselves in relation to others. There is nothing wrong with a private good, argues Aristotle, it’s just that it is incomplete. For completion, the human good requires a public life. Politics thus concerns the social context enabling a creative self-actualization on the part of the human beings.

Social being and virtue
The central argument of this book is premised on a conception of human nature. Human beings are social beings, Aristotle wrote. This apparently simple, even trite, observation contains powerful and wide-ranging implications. We are connected to others through kinship, friendship, companionship, and neighbourliness in our household, community and work environments. We live in villages, towns, and cities, engage in teamwork, we live, think and communicate within increasing webs of connections, geographic and electronic, local and global. As psychologist Anthony Storr confirmed throughout his work, we need each other to be ourselves (he also emphasised the need for periods of solitude as time for the self, to balance that remark up).

This has implications with respect to an understanding of ‘the political’. There is a tendency to identify the political with the institutions of the state and the mechanisms of election and representation. The word ‘politics’ derives from the ancient Greek polites, referring to those interested in public affairs. The ancient polis is not a state in the modern sense, but expresses the unity of the political, social and moral nature of the whole community. The word ‘state’ in Aristotle’s Politics is best understood as referring to the ‘political community’, the supreme association of all other smaller associations. Aristotle’s ‘state’ is thus the supreme community encompassing, complementing and completing all smaller communities:





No individual human life can be self-sufficient; we all need to draw on the skills, talents and abilities of others in order to satisfy even our basic needs. Human beings are socially dependent beings from the first beginnings of life. It is no surprise that we consider, and feel, anti-social behaviour to be a vice. We consider behaviour which contributes to the healthy functioning of society – and ourselves as social beings – to be virtuous. 

The extension of such virtuous behaviour to non-human animals is an anthropomorphic move that cannot be justified. Human beings are distinguished from other species by a degree of moral independence from biological imperatives which, developed in terms of a hyper-social awareness, has brought evolutionary success, at least up to this point. How much further we may go remains to be seen. That relative independence is also the source of our ills, removing us further and further from our biological and ecological matrix. That’s the kind of species we are, and being good at being human is nothing less than hard work. It is easy enough to bemoan our neglect of nature, our own nature within as well as without, and argue for an ethic in which we see ourselves as a part of nature. But that is still an ethic, and living in accordance with it will still require a conscious, organised, deliberate commitment on our part. It will still require ethics and politics. Anyone who thinks otherwise is merely evading the problem with warm words, naturalism as therapy. That’s fine for a handful of people who are able to live on the margins of civilisation. I’m interested in forms of governance, economic systems, and the whole panoply of rules and regulations that come with the mass of humanity determining the conditions which makes it possible for them to live well together. I have no interest in evasion, and refuse to be held to account by people who avoid the hard questions of institutions, systems and structures by nature reveries. 

At the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that there is a 'science that studies the supreme good for man', proceeding to identify politics as this ‘authoritative art’ and ‘master art.’

And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.

Aristotle Ethics Bk 1

Pondering this passage at length, it becomes clear why, for Aristotle, ethics and politics are intertwined and cannot be considered in abstraction from each other. The claims that Aristotle makes for politics as ‘the science of the good for man’ are normative claims and can be no less. For, in analysing the nature and forms of human social life, Aristotle is concerned most of all with the conditions of human flourishing. Scott Meikle outlines the contours of Aristotle’s Politics concisely:

Society is a natural growth, something constituted by nature. Man is by nature a social animal, and society is not an artificial construct imposed on natural man but a manifestation of human nature itself. Society is the natural form of existence for man, and the capacity for social life is what is specific to humans alone among gregarious animals. The capacities that are specifically human can be attained only through the development of society and specifically through the development of a politikon bion (political life) in which citizens genuinely control and run their communal life. Human goods and capacities like eudaimonia, proairesis, and theoria are not possible without this, and they are subsidiary to it: One who can exist separately from society and be self-sufficient is either a lower animal or a god, but not a man. Like other natural entities, society has an object or point, and its point is not to avoid harm and promote trade but to share in a good life.

Meikle in Carver ed 1991: 305

And if you need it to be clearer than that, Terry Eagleton gives it to us direct: ‘If you want to be good, you need a good society.’ (Eagleton 2003: 128). And creating a good society, in terms of social relations, forms, and structures, is a matter of deliberation, organisation, and institution building.

Normative judgements
Biological talk of human beings as a natural species is suspect in philosophical circles. Apart from the risk of falling foul of the naturalistic fallacy, (deriving an ‘ought-to-be’ from an ‘is’), many are uncomfortable with the facts of our natural material origins, and insist instead upon the cultural construction of our reality. This idea of cultural creation flatters the sense of human power, but lacks a sense of our relation to nature within and nature without.

Culture and division
It is easy to understand why people retreat to a benign view of nature in face of the difficulties and divisions of culture. For all of our rational pretensions, it is not nature but culture that persuades us to believe that certain human bodies lack a claim on our compassion, that induces us to consider some of our fellow humans as less than human, as animal, and to consider the animal as somehow unworthy of proper respect. To denigrate some humans as subhuman animals requires a high degree of cultural sophistication. Our reason can be so overdeveloped as to induce us to disbelieve the evidence of our senses. By turning our bodies into commodities, the capital system has denuded us of our sensory capacities. To be brought back to our senses, we need to recover politics as a creative self-realisation that is connected with natural processes of development. We go ‘back to nature,’ then, in the sense of understanding our cultural creation as natural. Denying that creation, on account of the (self-)destructive behaviours it can induce is not true to human nature. Self-realisation is about getting real. ‘Become yourself. Be yourself! Draw Forth the same in others. If in doubt about what to do with your life, feed the hungry - either directly or metaphorically.’ (McIntosh 2008: 102). I call it nature via nurture.

Far from being reactionary or repressive, the intertwining of ethics and politics is crucial to any project concerned with human emancipation. As Eagleton comments, the political left cannot define the political in a purely technical way, ‘since its brand of emancipatory politics inescapably involves questions of value.’





If you want the human good, then you need politics with its ethical component firmly in place. Any notion of an emancipatory politics necessarily involves questions of value. You cannot criticise oppression or exploitation without having some idea of what not being oppressed or exploited looks like, and without some view as to why being oppressed or exploited is bad and not being so is better. Such a politics involves normative judgements and moral commitments. To repeat, politics and ethics are intertwined and are both integral to human self-realisation.

Essentialism
Essentialism has been out of favour for a very long time, on account of being considered to propose fixed, timeless essences. Not in Aristotle, not in Hegel and not in Marx. Plato and his ideal forms seems to be the principal target, but criticism here fails to understand the role of transcendent ideals ad truths in Plato, the difference between universals and particulars. Eagleton is right when he states that much of anti-essentialism is the product of ‘philosophical amateurism and ignorance.’ (Eagleton 2003: 119-122). Sometimes, blunt speaking is the only way to get through. Those inclined to reject any form of essentialism, as entailing a biological determinism, in favour of the liberatory potentials of culture as a free human creation, need to think hard about what, precisely, it is that they are rejecting, and what they are embracing.

Seeking to inform the world of ethics and politics with scientific understanding, establishing the relations between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought to be’, fact and value, is central to the work of Aristotle. Aristotle brought to his examination of organised human life the biologists’ understanding of the never ending creativity of life itself. Lewis Mumford points out that Aristotle applied to human fabrications like the city the important lesson he had learned as a biologist studying the organic world: the lesson of controlled growth. ‘In every biological species, there is a limit to size; and he points out this is equally true of human artifacts.’ (Mumford 1966: 215). For Aristotle, the best limit of the population of a city is the largest number which suffices for the purposes of life, and can be taken in at a single view. ‘At a single view: here is both an aesthetic and a political conception of urban unity.’ (Mumford 1966: 217).

Mumford correctly identified the distinctive flavour of Aristotle’s philosophy as lying in the view of power as something that inheres in things and as something which is proportionate. The ideal for Aristotle is not a rationally abstract form to be arbitrarily imposed on the community from the outside, ‘it was rather a form already potential in the very nature of the species, needing only to be brought out and developed.’ (Mumford 1966 ch 7). Whilst this actualisation is necessary, in order to achieve healthy growth and flourishing, it is not inevitable. Lines of development have to be completed. Aristotle’s work expresses a profound understanding of ‘the teleological, goal-seeking, self-actualizing nature of all organisms, and of the natural limits that define normal growth.’ Aristotle was not handicapped by the restricted conception of causality that seventeenth-century physics imposed upon modern thought, a conception which serves ‘to keep all changes on the plane of the external and the observable.’ Aristotle ‘realized, as a later generation will perhaps again realize, that 'purpose' is engrained in all natural processes, not superimposed by man, though purpose no more admits the ulterior explanation than does causality.’ (Mumford 1966: 215).

In identifying the importance of purpose, growth, self-actualisation, and inherent potential, Mumford had understood the essentialist metaphysics which formed the core of Aristotle’s philosophy. Essentialism has been enormously influential in history. As Scott Meikle argues at length, essentialism lies at the heart of Marx’s theories and forms their strength and explanatory power. (Meikle 1985). Of course, Marx is well aware that essence is no abstract entity but is unfolded in specific historical and social relations. But that creative unfolding is not arbitrary, it is the unfolding of a certain thing becoming what it has the potential to be.

Scott Meikle defines the key essentialist categories concisely:

Essence
‘A specification of the essence of an entity specifies those characteristics that make it the kind of thing it is (or the very thing it is) and without which it could not exist or be what it is.’ 

Teleology
‘Here [in Meikle’s Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx (1985)] it is a theory about how the real nature (essence) of a whole entity is to be identified; how its development from immature, to mature (telos) and declining forms is to be explained; and how its characteristic behaviour (ergon) is to be explained in a law-like fashion.’

Telos




Marx is an essentialist in precisely these terms. I would just add, though, lest these statements be the invitation to another bout of anti-essentialist assertion that has misunderstood essentialism, Marx, following Hegel, recognised that the unfolding of essences had a history within specific social relations, that lines of development are frustratable, necessary but not inevitable, and that agency, culture, will and consciousness are involved in their actualisation as acts of freedom. Marx conceived his project as that of identifying ‘the laws of motion of modern society.’ The essentialist categories of law, form and necessity lie at the heart of Marx’s critique of political economy, enabling him to expose the underlying realities behind the surface level economic categories. He agreed with an early reviewer of volume one of Capital that he sought 'the law of the phenomena ... of their development, i.e. of their transition from one form into another ... the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions' (Afterword to the Second German Edn., Cap. 1, italics added). Marx’s italicisation of these words indicate how central he considered these essentialist categories to his work.

It is significant that Marx subtitled his works the ‘critique’ of political economy. Marx’s conceptions of value, wealth, exchange, and money are critical because they cannot be assimilated to contemporary ‘economics’. Marx’s essentialist metaphysical foundation is incompatible with the Humean metaphysics of modern economics. Beyond subjective preference and surface level phenomena, Marx seeks to identify the underlying realities of economics. This is not the current intellectual fashion, and hasn’t been for some time. Given the prevalence of relativism and scepticism in the contemporary world, Marx’s critical remarks on Victor Hugo possess a contemporary relevance: ‘He is a sceptic as regards the necessary essence of things, so as to be a courtier as regards their accidental appearance.’ (Marx MECW I 1975  204). We have many sceptics who servants of the status quo, whether they know it or not. 

This is to draw attention to the Aristotelian underpinning of Marx's metaphysical theory. Marx's analysis of exchange value proceeds on the basis of Aristotelian metaphysics. The criticisms considered most damaging to Marx are based on Humean metaphysics, which means ‘that it is fair to say that the case against Marx's theory largely depends on a decision to favour Humean rather than Aristotelian metaphysics.’ (Meikle 1995).

Essentialism establishes the connections between economics and ecology, ethics and politics. The ancient Greeks thought in terms politike and ethike, with ethics as the source of reasons for public decision-making. The modern world, subject to the demands of the capital economy, has seen decisions concerning important issues removed from the public arena of ethics altogether and handed over to the private realm of economics. We stand in need of recovering the connection between economics and ethics, as well as politics and ethics. The orthodox view that economics is an independent science is no more than a rationalisation of prevailing economic relations and cannot be sustained.

The analysis of exchange value, or economic value, tends to be regarded as properly belonging to economics as an independent science. For Scott Meikle, this view is mistaken, for ‘such an analysis must of its nature be metaphysical.’ (Meikle 1995: 199). The mistake, however, concerns more than the issue of disciplinary rights. It concerns the capacity of philosophy to fulfil its traditional responsibility of enabling us to understand the world and our place in it. Plato and Aristotle made understanding human social existence an integral part of the task of philosophy. The task of understanding social existence has, however, become more complicated. Plato and Aristotle lived in a world of use value, meaning that they could, in the words of Lowry, deal directly with ‘the open book of nature.’ The modern world, in contrast, is organised around an economic system that has become independent of ethics and politics and is, in consequence, dominated by exchange value. ‘Our social world is first and foremost a vast conglomeration of interdependent markets, and we deal with the realm of real natures indirectly through exchange value and markets.’ (Meikle 1995: 199).





Recovering a sense of the reality of use value over the artificiality of exchange value involves a change of emphasis from money (chrematistics) to resource management (oikonomia). This entails a revised measure of sustainable economic welfare, a rejection of both individualism and global mobility in favour of community commitments, and a new attention to the physical realities of the planet. (Daly and Cobb 1990: xiii). This switch of emphasis has practical implications across a wide range of areas: trade, industry, land use and others.

In the very least, those inclined to affirm democracy as a liberation from limits and culture as a liberation from nature, human nature included, should think again. For if we are indeed one, then we are one by nature, and not by culture. Eagleton sheds some light on the ongoing battle between innatists and culturalists:





If nature is our primary source of unity, then culture is the main source of division. As Robert Musil sardonically comments in his novel The Man Without Qualities: ‘Admittedly they hit each other over the head and spat at each other, but they did this only because of higher cultural considerations . . .’ Those who unequivocally celebrate cultural difference ‘should recall how much more peaceable human history would almost certainly have been if cultural differences had never sprung on the scene.’ (Eagleton 2003: 158). But spring they did, and quite naturally, since culture and creation is what human beings do and what they are. Ethics and politics is the field of practical reason that enables us to deal with the implications, and resolve differences in as reasonable a manner as we can manage. Regrets, like fine words, butter no parsnips, should we be in need of any buttering.

As psychologist Rollo May argues in Power and Innocence:





Down with principles then? The world suffers from too much morality, argues Stephen Pinker. The problem is that such critics target not morality but moralism as a rationalization of acts committed for reasons other than principle. It is morality that allows us to condemn such acts as contrary to reason. Human beings are symbol-making creatures, and symbol making is an advanced art that allows individuals to contend with each other and indeed kill for principles:

Man is the Reasoning Animal. Such is the claim. I think it is open to dispute. Indeed, my experiments have proven to me that he is the Unreasoning Animal. Note his history, as sketched above. It seems plain to me that whatever he is he is not a reasoning animal. His record is the fantastic record of a maniac. I consider that the strongest count against his intelligence is the fact that with that record back of him he blandly sets himself up as the head animal of the lot: whereas by his own standards he is the bottom one.
In truth, man is incurably foolish. Simple things which the other animals easily learn, he is incapable of learning. Among my experiments was this. In an hour I taught a cat and a dog to be friends. I put them in a cage. In another hour I taught them to be friends with a rabbit. In the course of two days I was able to add a fox, a goose, a squirrel and some doves. Finally a monkey. They lived together in peace; even affectionately.
Next, in another cage I confined an Irish Catholic from Tipperary, and as soon as he seemed tame I added a Scotch Presbyterian from Aberdeen. Next a Turk from Constantinople; a Greek Christian from Crete; an Armenian; a Methodist from the wilds of Arkansas; a Buddhist from China; a Brahman from Benares. Finally, a Salvation Army Colonel from Wapping. Then I stayed away two whole days. When I came back to note results, the cage of Higher Animals was all right, but in the other there was but a chaos of gory odds and ends of turbans and fezzes and plaids and bones and flesh — not a specimen left alive. These Reasoning Animals had disagreed on a theological detail and carried the matter to a Higher Court.’ 

Mark Twain, Letters From the Earth, ed. Bernard Devoto (1938), 227-8.

I have an uncle who is from Tipperary. He’s a reasonable chap, I’d say.

Aside from the question as to who has the biggest God of all, the point is of general significance: we are still searching for this Higher Court by which to settle our truth claims. We have sought it in religion, we have sought it in the various sciences, in biology, neuroscience, ecology, physics, chemistry. However, beyond such foundations and truth claims, always, there is the ambivalence of the human condition. Human beings are forever faced with choices between good and bad. Which is why, as moral beings, we need culture. The human nature we have in common may make for division, but it also engenders unity. Human beings can engage in murderous contention with each other, and for the highest principles; they can also express solidarity with each other, and again, for principled reasons. Culture comes naturally to human beings, and is an expression of our creative human nature. ‘Human bodies are of the kind that can survive and flourish only through culture,’ argues Eagleton. Without culture, human beings would not survive for long. Culture is as necessary to us as are the natural life support systems upon which our existence depends. Our bodies are materially geared to culture: meaning, symbolism, interpretation and such like are essential to what we are. In consequence we can get on terms with human beings from other cultures in a way that we cannot with non-human animals. (Eagleton 2003: 158-59). 

Our participation in culture
It is through culture that our humanity is expressed. Human beings are social beings, which comes with the corollary that ‘one cannot be human by oneself.' (James P. Carse, Finite and Infinite Games, p. 37). Our human nature is not a given, pointing to some predetermined development. Rather, the human essence is manifested in social and historical relations. Humanity becomes manifest through culture that our humanity becomes manifest. 

Each of us is on a journey of self-discovery, but this journey is not inwards but outwards, embracing the world of others in society and nature. Our humanity is rooted in our nature and expressed in our culture; we achieve self-understanding through our experience. It is living in and through our cultural context that we discover who we are, and it is through participation in our culture that we engender meaning. A key principle is that of challenge and exploration in conjunction with service. The activities undertaken in this process serve to generate self-respect in the participants whilst fostering a sense of value in them with respect to the world around. It is therefore a journey of self-discovery that points outwards, with individuals identifying themselves as citizens and developing a concern for the common good.

Individuation is not a condition of living well but an activity proper to our species being, something that we do in coming to flourish. It is not, however, an inevitable condition, something that is given by nature; it is a practice and it has to be attained through our efforts. Individuation is something that we do, developing a unique identity that is distinctively ours in the very media that we share in common with other human beings:





For those concerned to emphasise culture as a liberation from nature, culture as constitutive of human freedom and identity, conceptions of human beings as a natural species possessing a species essence are deeply suspect, hinting at a biological determinism. Culture, from this perspective, is constitutive of human freedom. Biology is destiny, a denial of freedom.

The rejection of biological determinism and the assertion of the claims of culture against biological imperatives is right. But emphasising the importance of nature should be distinguished from a naturalism. Nature, human nature included, contains a range of potentialities for actualisation, giving wide scope for, indeed inviting, creative human agency in their realisation. Lines of development are not inevitable, but require active participation in the process of their realisation. Not all natural potentials should be realized, since there is plenty that human beings are capable of doing that is harmful, to themselves and to their environment. There is an evaluation involved in development. There is nothing inevitable or given about flourishing in these terms. It is a project we have to undertake and bring to completion. Lines of development are frustratable. We may fail to act, and fail to actualise inhering potentialities. This autonomy is a function of our social and natural dependency, not a triumph over it.

I have defended essentialism at length elsewhere. Here, I want to challenge the assumption that culture is in itself liberatory. ‘Culturalism,’ in the sense of seeing everything in cultural terms, is a reductionism, in the same way that economism sees everything in economic terms and scientism sees everything in scientific terms. Culturalism therefore struggles to recognise ‘the truth that we are, among other things, natural material objects or animals, and insists instead that our material nature is culturally constructed.’ (Eagleton 2003: 162). Even as cultural beings, 'we remain animal selves with animal identities'. (Maclntyre 1999: 50). Between the two there is a transformative continuity. Morality constituted by the ecological virtues is the link between the natural and the human, the material and the meaningful, so that our rational animal nature is where material fact converges with value.

Aristotle and flourishing - an active, positive form of co-operation
The fact that we are naturally social-political animals, at home only in community with others, entails a value too. Human sociality is both fact and value. Eagleton draws attention to the connection between Aristotle and Marx in this respect:





Equality emerges as a key concept alongside freedom, since this process of reciprocal self-realization is possible only amongst a community of equals. And equality is necessary for what Aristotle calls philia, or friendship; ‘there cannot be full friendship between non-equals.’ Further, ‘only a relationship of equality can create individual autonomy.’ (Eagleton 2003: 170). Full friendship as a process of reciprocal self-realization creating autonomy is possible only between equals.

It is a biological fact that the human species must co-operate in order to survive. But, as Eagleton points out, ‘sociality can also mean an active, positive form of co-operation, something which is desirable rather than just biologically inevitable.’ (Eagleton 2003: 172). And that involves values. There are many different kinds of co-operation in social and political life, the full range from democratic to authoritarian. Human beings could not survive without co-operation, co-operation with each other and with the world around us. We could not survive without co-operation, but co-operation comes in many forms. Crucially, we have the ability to evaluate forms of co-operation and distinguish between them according to the extent that they further our developmental aims. Which form we choose depends on ethics and politics.

Workers of all lands, unite!, urged Marx. That’s an ethical injunction that implies that material self-interest alone doesn’t suffice to bring unity. Marx’s urges unity and co-operation, but knows fine well that it matters a great deal with whom we co-operate and to what end. Co-operation is not a virtue in itself. The members of the capitalist class have demonstrated, and continue to demonstrate, at least as much class unity and solidarity as the workers of all lands that Marx addressed, and have succeeded in institutionalising their own sociality in a de facto international authority in the form of the IMF, G8 and G7 and the World Bank. If the Socialist International died a death in its various forms, the Capitalist International is alive, although not exactly well.

There is no virtue in solidarity, sociality and co-operation as such. It all depends on who is associating with whom and to what end. Powerful groups in history have continually hijacked the social capacities of others and employed them to their own selfish ends. ‘In class society, even those powers and capabilities which belong to us as a species - labour, for example, or communication - are degraded into means to an end. They become instrumentalized for the advantage of others.’ (Eagleton 2003: 171-72). In advocating co-operation, we need to examine the nature and purpose of that co-operation, ensuring that our social forces are not being appropriated and used as means to the personal advantage of others.

When co-operation becomes 'fully' a fact - existing as an activity in itself, not simply as a means to an end that is external to it - it also becomes a source of value. ‘A socialist society co-operates for certain material purposes, just like any other; but it also regards human solidarity as an estimable end in itself. As such, it is beyond the comprehension of a good deal of contemporary cultural theory, for which solidarity means tepid consensus or baleful conformism rather than a source of value and fulfilment.’ (Eagleton 2003: 172).

I want to develop these ideas with respect to ecology, ethics and politics. Like any society, an ecological society co-operates for certain material purposes; but it also regards human solidarity in society and between humans and environing nature as a worthy end in itself.

When the ethics of flourishing are set in an ecological context, we come up with the concept of the Ecopolis. The eco-public is a society in which each attains his or her freedom in and through the self-realization of others, those others including other species and organisms. The Ecopolis is just whatever set of practices, relations and institutions required for human and planetary flourishing to happen.

6 THE COMMON GOOD

Rational Freedom
My work is centred on a conception of ‘rational freedom’, drawing on the work of such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx, to affirm the principle that the freedom of each individual is conditional upon and co-existent with the freedom of all individuals. Stated briefly, the concept of ‘rational freedom’ affirms a socio-relational and ethical conception of freedom which holds that individual liberty constituted by the quality of relations with other individuals. The concept of rational freedom affirms the fundamental unity of humanity, the equality of all human beings, and the necessary solidarity of each individual with all individuals. Recognizing the intrinsic dignity of the human person, it entails a commitment to the free and full realization of the healthy potentialities of all human beings, the inalienable freedom of each and all. (Critchley CSRF 2001). The human individual, as Aristotle argues, is a zoon politikon, a social animal, requiring a politikon bion, or political/public life to realise purposes of individuation.

In this view, freedom is achievable only through a network of reciprocal relationships so that the freedom of some is conditional upon and co-existent with the freedom of others. Freedom is therefore conceived to be relational and communal, something that emerges through the interactions between individuals. The most important representative of this view in the contemporary world is Jurgen Habermas, and he states the ‘rational’ unity of the freedom of each and all concisely. Freedom, even personal freedom, is conceivable only in 'internal connection with a network of interpersonal relationships', in the context of the structures and forms of community, so that 'the freedom of some is not achieved at the cost of the freedom of others'. There is a need, then, to ‘analyse the conditions of collective freedom' so as to remove the 'potential for Social-Darwinist menace' inherent in individualist conceptions of freedom. 'The individual cannot be free unless all are free, and all cannot be free unless all are free in community. It is this last proposition which one misses in the empiricist and individualist traditions' (Habermas 1992:146).

The problem is that 'rational’ philosophers have never quite been able to locate or embed this ethic in the empirical world, with the result that they have had to invest it in a 'higher' universal realm abstracted from individuals and regulating them from the outside via the state and the law. The key to achieving a grounded universality is to incorporate morality in everyday human relations and interactions. Whereas, traditionally, this rational unity has been articulated at, and handed downwards from, the legal and institutional level, and currently takes the form of a rights-based freedom, I seek to establish the relation between reason and freedom at the level of social relationships before proceeding upwards to the institutional level. This conception holds that freedom is achieved through establishing the unity of individuals as against their separation, hence my concern to extract the public significance from a rights based conception, emphasising the rights individuals share with each other in a public realm that is self-constituted, rather than hold against others and against the public realm.

Historically, the democratic potential of 'rational freedom' to unite each and all has been undermined by three dualisms. The reason-nature dualism involved the devaluation of the real nature of human beings in favour of their 'higher' rational selves. The public-private dualism institutionalised reason as this 'higher' morality in the state in abstraction from the reality of civil society, from the world of experience. These antinomies and dualisms were left unresolved by the best efforts of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel and were to manifest themselves as an autonomy impairing and even life-denying rationalisation as theorised by Max Weber. In addition to these, there is a third dualism pertaining to the separation of civilisation as a second nature from first nature, the life support systems upon which human social existence depends. Our increasing abstraction from the sources of freedom, happiness and fulfilment will prove fatal if left unchecked. Any meaningful conception of freedom requires that these dualisms be overcome and unity restored. 

There is a need, then, to analyse the conditions of freedom in forms of the common life. And these conditions are not just conditions of social justice in the way that we relate to each other, but also the health of ecosystems and the way that we relate to them. In reinstating the centrality of nature within everyday material life processes, and recovering the sources of life as the basis for the reunification of ethics and politics, we achieve a rationality that integrates universality and particularity to overcome the hierarchical separation of reason from nature. As a result, there is no need to humanise nature and denature human beings in some totalising sense in order to realise freedom; we can therefore dispense with the 'higher' institutional framework which has been designed to connect individuals with their 'higher' selves and constrain them to do good. Since an integrated framework grounded in social relationships enables individuals to be good, inner orientation thus replaces external constraint.

Rational Freedom vs Libertarian Freedom

None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free.
Goethe

The rational concept of freedom is defined in contradistinction to the individualist liberal or libertarian concept. In terms of a conception of civic democracy and public life, the liberal notion of rights has been and remains problematic. As pertaining to individuals, it fits the atomism of modern ‘bourgeois’ society perfectly, emphasising claims and entitlements that individuals have against rather than with the society of others. There is a split here between the public character of citizenship, the view that individuals are members of a political community, and the private character of rights, the view that individuals should be free to do what they like within the law, and that the state is merely a neutral arbiter as individuals pursue the good as they see fit. (see Critchley, P. 2001., Reason, Freedom and Modernity: The Radical Transfiguration of the Greco-Germanic Concept of Rational Freedom vol 4 The Good Life [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books.)

Whilst individualist liberal rights have been effective in freeing individuals from overbearing authority and tyranny in the past, ‘negative liberty’ as ‘freedom from’ is incapable of being converted into a theory and practice of civic participation within a public life. Hence the ongoing struggle to ground justice and incite and sustain democratic involvement in societies whose ‘freedom’ in the formal legal sense is denied in the substantive social sense. This is the fundamental contradiction at the heart of liberal democratic politics. Foglesong refers to the ‘“capitalist democracy” contradiction’ that arises out of the conflict between formally democratic institutions in the political realm and the private ownership/control of productive means in the economic realm. (Foglesong in Campbell and Fainstein 1996:173/4; Dear and Scott 1981:3/18). The property contradiction is internal to capitalism, arising out of capitalist relations of production. 

The problem is that instead of resolving this tension between individualist rights pertaining to a negative, private freedom and the public implications of citizen conception of rights, contemporary politics has given up on democracy. Indeed, the advocates of negative liberty – ‘freedom from’ – over positive liberty – ‘freedom to’, have identified ‘the state’ as such as the enemy of liberty, insisting that government is to be diminished in scope as inherently inimical to individual freedom. (Kay 2004; Patel 2009). That the size and scope of the state has increased beyond all previous dimensions is not the least of the ironies of this ‘libertarian’ turn. In the name of privatisation, neoliberalism has presided over the corporatisation of public business, building up the strong state in the process. (McDermott 1991; Haworth 1994). 

And it has done this by having recourse to a negative definition of liberty that once had a rationale when opposing tyrannous and unrepresentative government, but is now part and parcel of extending and entrenching unrepresentative and irresponsible power against democracy, against the idea that government is the collective power and organised sovereignty of the demos. Against the idea of an active, informed citizenship assuming a central role in democratic governance through the principle of self-assumed obligation, libertarian freedom presents the view that there are only private individuals and their personal choices. The citizen body has been dissolved into an atomistic mass of individual voters and consumers pursuing self-interest. Any attempt by individuals as citizens to join together and extend public control and associative space – essential conditions by which human beings as social beings govern themselves in common and confer legitimacy upon forms of governance – is deemed by libertarians to be illegitimate power, an infringement on individual liberty. Where once the doctrine of negative liberty was part of the political challenge to corrupt, tyrannical power, it is now an ideological cover for the capture of the public realm by private interests and irresponsible power. (McCarthy 2014). 

The idea of ‘rational freedom,’ as stated above, is an effective check against the way in which negative liberty has ceased to be a guard against corrupt power and has instead become a tool for its extension within the public realm, against the democratic and moral will of the citizen body. In fact, rational freedom offers much more than a check upon external power – a liberal protective conception (the negative ‘freedom from’) - it is an integral component of a public conception of freedom – a developmental conception (the positive ‘freedom to’). Karl Marx went beyond abstraction and separation to identify the public significance of individual rights, arguing for the citoyen over the bourgeois, combining both direct and representative forms of representation in the political investment of civil society as a condition of a genuinely universal political realm. ‘Only when civil society has achieved unrestricted active and passive suffrage has it really raised itself to the point of abstraction from itself, to the political existence which constitutes its true, universal, essential existence.’ However, ‘the perfection of this abstraction is also its transcendence [Aufhebung].’ That is, ‘by really establishing its political existence as its authentic existence, civil society ensures that its civil existence, in so far as it is distinct from its political existence, is inessential.’ Civil society thus constitutes itself as political society, a view which implies extensive public spaces and the demise of the abstraction of the political state from social affairs, something which in turn ‘implies the dissolution of civil society.’  (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 191-192). That is, the dissolution of the abstract political sphere of the state and the realisation of a political society grounded in social practices and processes requires also the dissolution of a civil society structured on the basis of asymmetrical relations of power and control.

My argument is that to realise and embed democracy as an active sovereignty, we need to recover and establish the values of ‘rational freedom’ on the social terrain, overcoming the dualism of public and private life. And this means making the conversion from a freedom narrowed down to the private realm to a freedom that is expressed and exercised in extensive public spaces. In other words, genuine, substantive freedom can only be a public freedom which affirms the unity of each and all in a common moral life that is defined by purposes that are social in character and expression. The only secure liberty is one that is grounded in substantive freedom and civic participation. As Cicero put it, ‘freedom is participation in power.’ And that power is our own power organised and exercised as social power, as against the external force of state and capital. It is precisely this freedom as active, participatory power exercised by the demos that the contemporary ‘libertarian’ exponents of negative liberty have sought to constrain, subvert and extinguish. 

To be anything more than a claim against power and against others, liberty requires positive forms of political expression, as things that are constitutive of a collective power with others. Advocates of ‘consumer democracy’ have been attempting to have their civic cake by eating the public realm whole. The shift from public to private happiness has been associated with the shift from an active and productive orientation to the world to a passive and consumptive approach. Whatever else this is, it isn’t citizenship and it isn’t democracy. The idea of a ‘consumers republic’ (Cohen 2003) is an oxymoron. Worse, the mere fact that such a notion could even be entertained indicates the extent to which we have fallen in our political ambitions and lost our political compass. A mass of individual consumers is not the same thing as a citizen body. Consumers cannot be understood as citizens, for the reason that individual choice and desire cannot in themselves constitute the common good. A public good requires more than the aggregation of private wants. 

It seems that we have become so forgetful that we need to go all the way back to Plato and re-learn some very ancient lessons. The term ‘republic’ is derived from res publica, meaning ‘the things of the public’. By definition, what is public amounts to much more than adding the sum of private wants and desires. (Surowiecki 2004: xix). And public good amounts to more than rational choice. That a society of self-maximising rational choosers could ever exist is a doubtful proposition, in that the choices of such individuals could never constitute a public life. Any general interest or common good that would emerge from such individual choice could only be indirect, an unintended consequence of private actions. The idea that the private choices and wants of discrete individuals pursuing self-interest could, in the absence of relations of trust, communal ties and moral codes, issue in the public good represents the triumph of faith and dogma over historical experience. But as an ideological project rationalising the private power of some over the social power of others, the notion of an illusory general interest formed out of individual liberty is a perfect political cover for private power.

Remaining with the theoretical critique, Barry Schwartz points to the phenomenon of ‘choice overload’, with the result that we live in a world where more comes to feel like less. (Schwartz 2004: 6). And those reminders of the things that matter most to us in life remain powerful statements of what should be obvious: ‘most of what people really want in life — love, friendship, respect, family, standing, fun ... does not pass through the market’. (Easterbrook 2003).

Which is to recognise that since human beings are social beings, what matters most is not the pursuit and satisfaction of wants and desires as private individuals, but of a richer range of needs that can only be attained and enjoyed in communion with others. This recognises that freedom, health and happiness proceed in a public context, a context constituted by active civic participation. It is through such participation in governmental structures, constituted by our actions as a citizen body, that we exercise political and moral freedom, determining the rules by which we agree to be governed in relation to each other. By constituting public order in this manner, we come to regulate private choices and interests so as to check their negative and destructive impacts on the public realm (as well as upon social life and the natural environment). More positively, we join together as citizens to take care of the ‘the things of the public,’ those things that really matter to us. In this way, we express our character as social beings capable of becoming active citizen members of a political community in which we determine the terms upon which we govern our collective affairs. 

Privatisation as the corporatisation of public life

Privatization has been a deliberate political strategy aiming at the corporatisation of public business. In this sense, the debate between private and public conceptions of freedom has been a phoney war. The justification of privatisation strategies in terms of extending the liberty of private individuals has been ideological from the first. The whole project has been about atomising the citizen body and preventing the individuals composing the demos from engaging in political action, from extending public associational space, and hence from creating a collective social power capable of checking, even subverting, the collective power of vested economic interests. The whole strategy has been about the expropriation of public resources and the colonisation of social affairs by the corporate form and, in that sense, privatisation has been the ideological cover for the destruction of both public life and private property. (McDermott 1991). 

So, when Margaret Kohn writes of the privatisation of public space, I can agree with her critical comments, only to add that targeting privatisation alone misses what the real agenda has been and remains – it is about extending and entrenching the corporate form. I can certainly agree that the privatisation of public goods, whether education, housing, or social security, makes us much less of a public. As Kohn writes, ‘public space plays an important role in fostering democracy by preserving opportunities for political speech and dissent and providing a shared world where we can potentially recognize one another as citizens.’ (Kohn 2004: 19). I would just make it clear that the problem is not simply ‘privatisation,’ but the corporate form that is emerging in the global economy, threatening to overturn all that we know about government, law, democracy, legitimacy, obligation and, indeed, private property too.

The privatisation of public space is not only unleashing the Social Darwinist menace that Jurgen Habermas warned to be implicit in individualist conceptions of freedom, it is doing so in order to undermine social and collective resistance against the encroachment of corporate power upon the public realm. The world is being taken to the market for a flogging, but this market is not a ‘free’ market, but is under the control of the corporate form. Citizenship is being subverted and social justice, which affirms the unity of the freedom of each and all, is being replaced by a rigged game miscalled ‘the free market.’ For behind this anonymous market are some very powerful players. 

We are being beguiled by notions of market citizenship, of a property owning democracy, and a consumer republic. Such things destroy the real conditions of citizenship whilst pretending that consumers and citizens are one and the same. They are not. And, for all of the justification of private liberty and choice, atomised individuals shifting for themselves on the market will find themselves powerless against the unrestrained, irresponsible, alien power that puts itself in the place of a genuine public order. This all began when neoliberals succeeded in convincing too many people that the problem is not this or that form of government, but government itself. The reversion to a negative conception of liberty has enabled those behind the privatisation strategies to devalue and delegitimise the ‘we together’ of the citizen body by defining it as an external ‘it’, the ‘them’ of the state, big government, bureaucracy; the privatisers have turned the public realm – the space where we exercise moral freedom in association with each other – into the enemy of freedom, choice and happiness. (Kay 2004).

And, of course, this strategy has not delivered on its promise of market citizenship, only used ‘the market’ as an anonymous, irresponsible, neutral mechanism behind which to secure control over public interests and common resources. A market society, in any case, is undesirable and unattainable. The title of economist David George’s book sums the dehumanisation up succinctly: Preference Pollution: How Markets Create the Desires We Dislike. ‘Preference pollution’ is an apt phrase, in light of both the marginalist revolution, which replaced value in economics with subjective preferences, and the disenchantment of the world, which stripped value from the world and dissolved morality into a cacophony of value judgements. Either way, the result is that we live in a world of irreducible subjective preferences, with no way of determining the general interest other than by money and power. And these things are asymmetrically distributed.

George shows how ‘the market’ satisfies – or, rather, panders to – immediate wants, often stimulated by advertisers, whilst ignoring the more substantial needs, the things that make for a genuinely fulfilled life. Whilst engaging in ‘unrestricted persuasion’ in order to stimulate wants, these manipulators of taste and producers of waste present employ the language of liberty and free will in their justification. (George 2001: 13.) Thomas Jefferson warned of the dangers of ‘manacling the people with their own consent.’ (Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler, 1804). The point applies to economics as well as to government and politics, with individuals as consumers becoming manacled by their own wants. Or, more pointedly, by wants that have been externally stimulated. In The Overspent American, Juliet Schor thus explains ‘why we want what we don't need.’ (Schor 1999).

Schor’s analysis of how we are manipulated into wanting the things which the economic system wants us to want recalls the work of economist J.K. Galbraith. In any number of books, Galbraith argued that our ‘enormously productive economy’ simply has to turn the public into a mass of consumers who are trained to want to buy the goods being offered for sale. (Galbraith 1967 ch. 8 The Unseemly Economics of Opulence; 1975 ch 14 Persuasion and Power; 1970 ch. 10 The Imperatives of Consumer Demand). 

The critique of consumer society is now familiar. (Barber 2007; James 2007). The most interesting question is not ‘why we want what we don’t need’ – the powerful forces behind mass consumption answer that question clearly enough – but ‘why we don’t want what we do need.’ That is, why is it such a struggle to provide the infrastructure of a healthy and flourishing social life, and why are public goods and common resources always under such pressure, even retreat? And why is the case for freedom and happiness as public goods so much more difficult to make politically than the case for the private liberty of individuals? And why is the public realm identified as inimical to individual liberty?

It all depends on what we mean by freedom. My case for ‘rational freedom’ is conceived in opposition to individualist notions of freedom. For Harry Frankfurt, ‘to have a free will is to be moved by desires that one wishes to be moved by.’ (Frankfurt 1971: 5-20). From this perspective, then, the manipulation and formation of wants, the advertisement strategies which employ psychologists to incite desires, the hidden persuasion that Vance Packard spoke of (Packard 1957), are the very antithesis of freedom. At best, it targets the basic psychic needs of human beings, not to satisfy them, but to exploit them and even thwart and deny them in order to keep people needy, manipulable and manacled. What we need is a habitus which allows the free expression and mutual satisfaction of those needs. We need to recover common ground in the process of constituting the common good.

Rational freedom and the common good
Early in January 1997, Noam Chomsky gave a talk at a conference in Washington DC entitled The Common Good. His argument began with Aristotle's Politics. Chomsky cuts to the essentials, noting that Aristotle took it for granted that a democracy should be fully participatory and that it should aim for the common good. This, in turn, requires relative equality, ‘moderate and sufficient property’ and ‘lasting prosperity’ for everyone. ‘In other words, Aristotle felt that if you have extremes of poor and rich, you can't talk seriously about democracy.’ Chomsky recalls that when he pointed this out at a press conference in Majorca, the headlines in the Spanish papers read something like, ‘If Aristotle were alive today, he'd be denounced as a dangerous radical.’ ‘That's probably true’, he adds. 

Of course, there are some notable exclusions in Aristotle’s conception of citizen politics, like women, slaves and workers … the bulk of the population in other words. As I have argued, Aristotle sought to build his ideal polis with less than half a society, missing out those who did most of the work, the people of experience. His political ideal was therefore hollow in that sense, a remembrance of a polis that was already passing into history when Aristotle wrote his Politics.

Aristotle’s view of the political is pertinent, nonetheless. ‘Aristotle also made the point that if you have, in a perfect democracy, a small number of very rich people and a large number of very poor people, the poor will use their democratic rights to take property away from the rich. Aristotle regarded that as unjust, and proposed two possible solutions: reducing poverty (which is what he recommended) or reducing democracy.’ (Chomsky 2012: 208-09).

Reducing democracy is the favoured strategy of the rich and the propertied. Chomsky notes that the idea that great wealth and democracy can’t exist side by side runs right up through the Enlightenment and classical liberalism, including major figures like Adam Smith, Jefferson, de Tocqueville, and others. (Chomsky 2012: 208). It’s there at the beginning of political philosophy with Plato and Aristotle too. In the nineteenth century, the struggle to extend the franchise was equated with communism. The connection between democracy and communism was a basic assumption of the propertied classes, and they fought against extending the suffrage for that very reason. 

Aristotle, the good city and the community of all
Aristotle himself sought to make democracy safe from the people, favouring the ‘middling sort’ over against the fractiousness of the rich and poor. The rich would be too conceited to care for the public good, and the poor too resentful. Aristotle was dealing with the problem of politics as the attempt to secure unity in conditions of disunity. As Mumford points out, the idea that the whole community must share the active life of the city, for the polis to be whole and to thrive in its wholeness, occurred to neither Plato nor Aristotle. ‘The good life could be found only in noble leisure; and noble leisure meant that someone else must do the work.’ This gives their conceptions of the polis a nostalgic character, harking back to the glory days of the polis from the days of its present decline. To arrest this decline there was a need to look forwards with an expansive and inclusive conception. Instead, both Plato and Aristotle excluded large numbers of people from their vision. That exclusion from the obligations of citizenships entailed an irresponsibility that proved fatal to the polis. ‘This exclusion of a large portion of city dwellers from citizenship partly accounts for the debacle of the Greek city. By keeping the majority of its inhabitants outside politics, the area of full citizenship, the polis gave them a licence to be irresponsible.’ (Mumford 1966: 217).

The polis thus suffered from an internal weakness that ultimately brought it down from within: the inability to value the full humanity of women, slaves, industrial workers, and foreigners, and recognise the contributions they made to the good of the whole. ‘The goods that the Greeks had imagined and created were human goods, not limited in their origin or their destination to the Greeks alone.’ (Mumford 1966 220). Yet the bulk of humankind was absent from the polis ideal.

The ideal cities of Plato and Aristotle made no provision for continuing and strengthening the creative forces within the polis, ‘they had no vision of a wider polis, incorporating the ideal principles of Cos, Delphi, and Olympia and working them into the generous complexities of an open society.’ (Mumford 1966: 219). Their ideal city lacked dynamism, lacked a principle of growth, and was just a small static container. And, as such, it ossified and faded into history. 

City, scale and symmetry
When Benedict created his monastic Utopia, he had the insight to turn Plato's precepts on their head, ‘replacing war by peace and non-resistance, and tempering the austere wisdom and daily sanctification of the monastery with the discipline of daily work, thus uniting, in each according to his capacity, all the functions of life Plato had so carefully set apart.’ Most importantly, the Benedictine system grew in strength by eschewing isolation to form a chain of similar communities, interchanging their products, across Europe. (Mumford 1966: ch 6). Creating that chain of communities across the world is the task before us today.

The notion of commonwealth of life and virtue recognises that no society can flourish on the basis of exclusion and separation. As Emerson wrote, 'It needs a whole society to give the symmetry we seek.' We are indeed one. We need to recognise the unity of each and all in order to achieve symmetry. We become one by forming a chain of similar communities across boundaries, expanding the moral circle by extensive networks of proximity. The eco-community/good life depends upon scale and intimacy, it achieves universality through valuing and preserving particularity. But the symmetry of the whole society now embraces the global community. No society can flourish alone, however united within it may be. We flourish with, and not apart from, our neighbours. This begs the question of how we may relate the particular and the universal, how we may constitute a common ethic and institutional framework that embraces each and all whilst recognising concrete particulars.

Ethics, universality and proximity
In The Method of Ethics, a work written over a century ago, the philosopher Henry Sidgwick gives a graduated list of human loyalties:

We should all agree that each of us is bound to show kindness to his parents and spouse and children, and to other kinsmen in a less degree; and to those who have rendered services to him, and any others whom he may have admitted to his intimacy and called friends; and to neighbours and to fellow-countrymen more than others; and perhaps we may say to those of our own race more than to black or yellow men, and generally to human beings in proportion to their affinity to ourselves.

Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics

Although this setting of priorities breaks the universalist claim that each human being should count equally, it nevertheless makes a great deal of sense in terms of how human beings do in fact relate to others. We think first of our immediate family, then of our friends, neighbours, and more distant relatives, then fellow citizens generally, and last of all of those who have nothing in common with us except that they are human beings. Sidgwick made no mention of our loyalty to the natural world. Establishing unity on the basis of loyalties and their extension is the task before us in constituting oneness politically and socially.

The biological basis - reciprocity
Whilst it is true that geographical distance and social difference have no bearing on morality and moral worth from an ethical standpoint, we do have to recognise that there is a natural tendency to look after ‘our own’ before seeking to help others in the next-largest community with which we identify, whether a local or regional grouping, or an affiliation based on a shared characteristic like ethnic or class background, or religious belief. Our loyalties expand outwards from immediate family to the next-largest community with which we identify, geographically, as with a local or regional grouping, or culturally and socially, as with affiliations based on a shared characteristic like ethnic or class background, or religious belief. We may be one as a species, but we are a species of many loyalties, often conflicting, often overlapping. In terms of identity, none of us are any one thing. There cannot, given this diversity, be any ‘one’ humanity as such, only a one humanity of different loyalties, commitments and identities. 

So we have a real problem here of a universal ethic to which commitment becomes thinner with distance and the weakening of ties and thinning of proximity. We need some way of reconciling universality and particularity, as opposed to setting them apart from each other. 

How can we constitute ‘the one’, then? 
I will argue that we can achieve a universality possessing an active content by strengthening reciprocity and by extending networks of social proximity. I will draw upon the insights generated by games theory, and apply these with respect to holacracy and the biological principles of emergent properties and self-organisation in nature. The strength of this approach is that it works with forces for self-organisation immanent in nature and society and does not require an extraneous moral force or abstract moral ideal or persuasion. 

The work of anthropologists, from Marcel Mauss to Claude Levi-Strauss, indicates that the bond of reciprocity is well-nigh universal. Westermarck drew attention to this in The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (Vol. II, p. 155). In Man in Reciprocity, Howard Becker finds the evidence for reciprocity so compelling he has proposed renaming the human species Homo reciprocus. Sociologist Alvin Gouldner agrees: ‘Contrary to some cultural relativists, it can be hypothesized that a norm of reciprocity is universal.’ (Gouldner 1960: 171). 

The closer the proximity, the stronger the bond of reciprocity. In terms of the biological basis of ethics, the fact that early humans lived in small groups, and that these groups were at least sometimes reproductively isolated from each other by geography or mutual hostility, suggests how we could come to favour ‘our own’ before taking into account the moral claims of others whose ties to us are weaker or more remote. We may regret this. We may disapprove of this. But if we want to achieve a universal ethic as something more than an impossibly high, abstract and ineffectual ideal, then we need to find a way of working with the realities of human ties, loyalties and allegiances. We achieve wholeness and unity by establishing the base upwards and top downwards in continuous mutually supportive relation, avoiding the assertion of the one against the other, a limited incrementalism against a hopeless abstraction. In such a way do we give the universal form an active content. I shall argue that this content is organised around reciprocity, interaction, proximity, and communities of human scale.  

Proximity and eco-patriotism
In this respect, we can see patriotism as a commitment to place and to place based meaning. We just need to define patriotism in an open and expansive way, not as something closed and exclusive. And we need to go further and take the claims of nature into account. In this respect, what Peter Brown defends as a cosmopolitanism or global ethics in a commonwealth of life makes sense as something constituted by an eco-patriotism. (Brown 2001).

We need to expand the moral circle by deepening proximity and widening the circles of association. Individuation and unity go hand in hand so that we see the emergence of a united humanity, not as an abstract universality imposed from above, but as something constituted through expanding the bonds of reciprocity and revaluing the associational activity of human beings to achieve community. Here, we are helped by some powerful evolutionary forces.

E.O. Wilson describes the tendency of human beings to form groups, draw visceral comfort and pride from familiar fellowship, and to defend the group enthusiastically against rival groups as ‘among the absolute universals of human nature and hence of culture.’ (Wilson 2012: 58). However, this does not mean that human beings live within the close confines of tightly defined and demarcated group. Once a group has been established with a defined purpose, its boundaries are malleable. Wilson thus recognises the existence of multiple loyalties within and between groups:





The key point is that modern groups are the psychological equivalents of the tribes of ancient history and prehistory. ‘The instinct that binds them together is the biological product of group selection.’ In arguing for a universal ethic, in recognising the necessity of constituting the common good on a global basis as a condition of our own survival, let alone flourishing, we have to recognise that ‘people must have a tribe.’





Human beings like to be in the company of like-minded friends, and so there is no surprise that human society is characterised by clubs, associations, fraternities, collectivities of every kind. In philosophy, we could introduce Aristotle here and his notion of ‘the state’ as the supreme political community formed from a number of smaller communities. Hegel, too, had a rich sense of the state as universal ethical agency as grounded in, and canalising, the particular interests and groups of civil society. I have written on this social pluralism constituting the universal society in The Coming Ecological Revolution (Critchley 2011: 207-214). Here I want to focus on group loyalty and solidarity. For beneath organised political and sectional interests, there is friendship, the natural tendency of human beings to seek out the company of others. Marx wrote on society as a need, as an end in itself, with respect to the company and companionship of the Paris working people:

When communist workmen gather together, their immediate aim is instruction, propaganda, etc. But at the same time they acquire a new need - the need for society - and what appears as a means has become an end. This practical development can be most strikingly observed in the gatherings of French socialist workers. Smoking, eating and drinking, etc., are no longer means of creating links between people. Company, association, conversation, which in its turn has society as its goal, is enough for them. The brotherhood of man is not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and the nobility of man shines forth upon us from their work-worn figures.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 365/6

Importantly, Marx identifies the ties and the connections which ensure that the old religious ideal of the ‘brotherhood of man’ is more than a hollow phrase - company, association as community, conversation as communication. Avoiding the tendency for the universal interest to be abstract and empty is precisely the task in hand. I want to form this context through the bond of reciprocity, proximity, quantity and quality of human interactions, networks, trust relations and group identity.

Wilson refers to the joining of groups as ‘one of the most powerful human impulses.’ We are ruled by an urge, ‘a compelling necessity’, to join groups. ‘Every person is a compulsive group-seeker, hence an intensely tribal animal.’ The possibilities for satisfying our need for others are vast, family, religion, ideology, work, hobbies, politics, the list of groups we can join are seemingly endless. And whilst many groups involve competition for status, here we can also find ‘trust and virtue, the signature products of group selection.’ And here, Wilson comes to the crucial question in ethics and politics: ‘to whom in this shifting global world of countless overlapping groups should we pledge our loyalty?’ (Wilson 2012: 246).

Regardless of what our intellect may tell us at the level of rational principle, ‘our instincts remain in command and confuse’. However, the solution to our predicament is not to assert reason over instinct, but to work with our innate moral sense. Reason doesn’t create this moral sense, but expresses it at a conscious level. This view is consistent with Wilson’s argument that a few of our instincts may well save us ‘if we obey them wisely’. Wilson gives the example of the empathy we feel for others. He refers to research which is making it possible to see how the impulses of morality might work inside the brain. That we may come to explain the Golden Rule, however, is less important than the fact that this is the only precept found in all organized religions. ‘The rule is fundamental to all moral reasoning’, argues Wilson, and he is correct. (Wilson 2012: 245-246). The Golden Rule, in all its variants, forms the core of any viable common ethic. Challenged to explain the Torah in the time he could stand on one foot, Rabbi Hillel replied, ‘Do not do unto others that which is repugnant to you. All else is commentary.’ 

Wilson describes this as ‘coercive empathy.’ Coercion here must mean something like one’s own inner compulsion or conscience which compels us to feel the pain and suffering of others. It’s a suggestive phrase. My work is an extensive search for the forms and conditions enabling us to replace an external coercion constraining human beings to do good, whether by an ethical code, laws or political institutions, by an internal compulsion by which human beings become capable of generating order from within their social relations to each other. I refer to this in terms of rational self-restraint, an order that is internally given, rather than coercion, an attempt to create a moral and social infrastructure which embodies and articulates concern for others within a common ethic. It is law and order all the same, ensuring that social forms conform to transcendent truths, norms and values.

7 REASON, FREEDOM AND THE COMMONS

Ecological crisis requires collective action
In a world of growing environmental stress, an increase in the number of cross-border conflicts over the control of and access to increasingly scarce resources is entirely predictable. We need to recognise that the common environmental threat we face is greater than any political, social and cultural differences among us, embodying this commonality through inter-governmental coordination and international agreement. 

This refrain is familiar enough. I agree with its logic but would query its political psychology. Those political, social and cultural differences are real and in some cases entrenched. Equal shares might well benefit humanity as a whole, but ‘humanity’ as such is a biological entity and not a political reality. Those interests that benefit from unequal shares, those for whom free riding pays well, are unlikely to respond to appeals to logic, let alone equality and justice.

We must, therefore, find a way of forging a common understanding of the nature and scale of the crisis we face, so that the collective actions we must take are more than bloodless edicts and programmes and more than pious exhortations – they must possess real moral and psychological depth at the level of motivations, attitudes and incentives. In other words, effective action depends upon the extent to which human character is engaged. 

It is true that, in a world increasingly plagued by stress upon the resources essential to life, conflict is inevitable unless we come to understand that the health of the world we share is more important than any differences among us:

If, for instance, scientists could prove that a huge comet with a capacity to destroy the world was hurtling toward earth and that only the concerted collective action of all humanity might deflect it, can we doubt that race, religion, and ethnic and socio-economic differences would suddenly not matter so much?

Barlow and Clarke 2002: 219

The common threat to us is much greater than the differences that separate us. Whilst this is undoubtedly true, such an appeal misses the point at issue. If a huge asteroid with the capacity to destroy life on Earth was hurtling toward us, I suspect that we would put differences of class, gender, race, religion, and ethnicity to one side and through government and politics engage in the concerted collective action that is required to divert the threat. We would see government and politics as a synergy of our collective power. But the problem is not external, it is internal – the problem is us, our relations to each other, to the world, and to our own selves. We still lack the ability to constitute a common force of our own, enabling us to act as one. We continue to see government and politics as external to us, as threats to our individual liberty rather than as expressions of our sovereign power.

In The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History, Elizabeth Kolbert argues that not only is there a new extinction upon us, grace of humankind, but that it will probably be our undoing. The Sixth Extinction begins with a history of the ‘big five’ extinctions of the past, and goes on to explain how human behaviour is driving this sixth one — including the way our use of fossil fuels is generating the destructive effects of climate change. We are the culprit in this sixth extinction, we are the asteroid.
(In The World's 'Sixth Extinction,' Are Humans The Asteroid? http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=275885377 (​http:​/​​/​www.npr.org​/​templates​/​transcript​/​transcript.php?storyId=275885377" \t "_blank​))

The problem, however, is not one of ‘greedy’ human nature but of social systems and relations. We have to pull ourselves together to confront the most destructive, greedy, short-sighted aspects of our nature and the way that these have been institutionalised in political and economic systems. From individuals to whole civilisations, self-destruction results from the incentives placed in front of individuals to behave badly, temptations to enjoy pleasures or gain advantages in the short run, at the expense of long term well-being.

The problem with an appeal to the common good within such asocial relations is not that it is wrong but that it is ineffective. Representatives of the big emitters of greenhouse gases may well agree with the logic, even as they carry on polluting. It is not in their interests to respond to an appeal to the common good. The question, then, is how can we achieve real change at the level of actions and behaviours? A global ecological catastrophe is hurtling toward us, and it will erode the basis of civilised life. We know this, and yet fail to take the actions necessary to avert crisis. Understanding the reasons for this failure is far more important than issuing another warning of the catastrophe to come. One more warning, added to the many thousands already issued, will not make one iota of difference for the better, other than creating an increasing sense of hopelessness. 

The problem of a comet or an asteroid which threatens destruction on earth is easy to identify and easy to mobilise against. But the problem is not external, it is internal – the problem is us. We are being asked to fight against ourselves, and that is much more difficult to do. We are at war with our own natures and societies. What we can identify and mobilise against is the way that our natures have been externalised and taken alien form in the shape of the collective forces that constrain human life from the outside. In this sense, the asteroid we face is an economic system that has escaped social and democratic control and which, unconstrained, is unravelling the social and natural ecology. 

I don't believe that humans are the asteroid. That is what happens when our creative power escapes our control and becomes ossified within destructive relations to each other and to our environment. Our means of production have been turned into means of destruction. We have been 'thingified', reduced to objects, passively determined by imperatives arising from the institutions and systems we have built. But we have the epistemological and cultural capacity to see through and break through that inertia of our social world. We can think and act, we have moral autonomy, scientific knowledge, foresight, insight, in short culture. We can throw off our mechanised petrification and redirect our creative powers and canalise them into productive and healthy channels. We don't have to; there is no evolutionary law that says we must survive. But we can. It’s a choice, and one that we need to make as individuals but also as members of a larger collectivity. It is that intelligence and moral autonomy that makes us different from the asteroid. But we have to use that capacity to prove the point. It would be in our interests to do so. Scientists, in the main, have been excellent in giving us the knowledge and know-how concerning the looming eco-catastrophe. The rest is up to us, as moral and political beings, to exercise judgement and act. The rest, that is, is up to politics and ethics as the field of practical reason. Fail to take that field seriously, continuing to think that scientific knowledge and technological know-how can do the job of politics and ethics, and we will fail to resolve the environmental crisis that is upon us. 
If the threat to human civilisation and life on earth was an asteroid, then there is no doubt that all the governments and peoples of the world would rally round and pool resources to counteract the danger. The problem is that we are trying to mobilise against ourselves and our systems and societies. Since the problem is internal, we require a change in behaviour. And the point to emphasise is that this change is possible. The resources, in terms of money, technological know-how, institutional cooperation and communications, exist. We await the ecological transformation of political and economic structures. And that is a question for us. If politics fails, if we fail, then the gamble of planetary engineering is the only game in town.

The challenge before us is to embed a common understanding of the nature and scale of the crisis we face in political and ethical systems so as to be able to take the collective actions that are required. We will have to come together under a new model, one that is not driven by the imperatives of exchange value, but instead restores the importance of the use value of nature’s life-support networks. 

Nature within and nature without are not ultimately separable. ‘Modern man does not experience himself as part of nature but as an outside force destined to dominate and conquer it. He even talks of a battle with nature, forgetting that, if he won the battle, he would find himself on the losing side.’ (E.F. Schumacher). Our estrangement from nature is leading us to destroy the life support networks upon which we depend. The philosopher and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead developed a process philosophy that affirmed the oneness of humanity with the world. Whitehead stated:





The sooner we realise this, and build a civilisation that fits and works with the contours of the natural world, the better. And the sooner we get to the creation of social forms, institutions and systems having realized this, even better, because the appreciation of fundamental oneness is merely the beginning of a long, hard process of political, ethical and social reconstruction.

Recovering common benefits
We need to marshal our capacities for foresight, innovation and collective action to ensure the health of the Earth's finite supportive capacities as a condition of our own health. Jared Diamond’s Collapse gives examples of societies that have destroyed themselves as a result of disregarding the vitality of the essential resources underpinning human life, soil fertility, forests, water, wildlife. Diamond also notes the novel dangers and opportunities with respect to the threats to our modern civilisation:





Hence the importance of a universal planetary ethic and international cooperation. Hence the importance of institutions, concerted action and global coordination. The great problems we face will only be solved by actions of appropriate scale and range.

The sense that we are all complicit with the system that is driving economic inequality, social dislocation and ecological degradation is based on the knowledge that we are locked into destructive patterns of behaviour that are socially structured beyond individual will and agency. Some bear more responsibility than others for environmental destruction, certainly, but once we understand Marx’s point that we are governed by abstractions and not persons, that capitalists are as systemically constrained as well as proletarians, then we see the problem in terms of the alien imperatives of a system that is divorced from the sources of life. We come back to Jared Diamond’s pointed and poignant question in his book Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, what was the person who cut down the last tree on Easter Island thinking when performing that act? I’d say much the same as we are thinking now as we witness the loss of habitats and extinction of species on a planet mired in ecological degradation and destruction. 





We now see clearly the consequences of the unintentional and the imperceptible, and therefore act in full awareness of the environmental damage caused by our actions. But my point is that there is no ‘we’ and no ‘our’ in the prevailing social and political world to deliver the concerted and comprehensive action for the long-term common good that is needed. Instead of collective mechanisms enabling choice, control and responsibility in an institutional, social, moral and psychological sense, there is a systemic force that embraces all agents, from global finance, the corporations, governments and the individuals composing the citizen body. The damage is ‘perversely wrought’ (Diamond 2005) in full awareness of the consequences, systematically wrong in terms of the long-term consequences for all, but so individually right with respect to the options available to the particular agents in the short-run. Without new social relations bringing an identity that connects the individual and the social good, without an appropriate institutional infrastructure closing the gaps between knowledge, policy, will and action, without appropriate character-construction fostering responsiveness and creating the dispositions and capabilities to act, ‘we’ will cut down the last tree too, and ‘we’ will do so systematically, in fulfilment of the systemic imperatives of the prevailing socio-economic order, in full knowledge of the damaging, eco-suicidal consequences. 

To be genuinely holistic, we need to address the possession of the Earth as such, not just the terms on which the Earth is possessed and its resources distributed. And that takes more than collaboration and cooperation as such, more than changing the title deeds on property. Uprooting the whole social metabolic order of control points to a much deeper transformation. Diamond is correct to call this damage ‘perverse,’ but there is a need to understand that this perversion is inherent in the system, not in human nature. As individual moral agents, we see the perversity clearly. As social actors with identities bound up to the system, we are bound to act perversely. The social system of which we are a part compels actors in the short-run to make the wrong choices for the long-term health of all. To make other and better choices requires the creation of a new social metabolic order. And, at some point in that transformation, the question of enclosure and expropriation of the global commons as such, and not just of the creative labour of human beings creating the social world, comes to be addressed. We thus come to place the human world in respectful, reverential relation to the other beings and bodies of the More-than-Human World that enfolds and nourishes us. Isn’t that wealth enough? Enoughness and sufficiency – (ecologically) virtuous action within right relationships and a sufficiency of material goods. Some people call that an environmental ethic. In truth, I have done no more there than restate St. Thomas Aquinas. If you re-read E.F. Schumacher, and actually read him for what he says, rather than choose the bits you already agree with, you will understand.

Rational constraint and freedom
The challenge before us is to reclaim the common good on the ground of our social being, with our community defined as natural as well as human. We need to devise mechanisms of collective control so as to cumulatively shape an ecologically benign social order. Conceiving rational constraint in terms of sharing the global commons, we are faced with the question of how to challenge assumptions, redirect vested interests and change deeply entrenched habits in favour of the collective good. 

The key to flourishing well in the future lies in our coming to reject the zero-sum game of 'winner takes all,’ the enclosure/annexation of common biospheric resources, in favour of commoning - recognizing, valuing and learning to share land, water and the other vital resources that are our common foundation and inheritance. 

We need a clear understanding of our cumulative pressures upon the capacities of ecosystems, practical methods for recognizing and accounting for the benefits conferred by these systems, common and transparent frameworks for managing natural resources, and mechanisms for respecting ecological constraints and reflecting planetary boundaries in our economic activities and resource use.
The approach taken here develops a participatory and egalitarian process for respecting the rights and responsibilities of all constituencies.

The tragedy of the commons
[motives and incentives]
The question isn't whether we are in environmental hot water — we are very clearly in deep trouble and are well beyond sounding the alarm. The bells have been ringing loud for a long time now. As glaciologist Jason Box argues, this is an ‘all hands on deck’ moment. The question is why, despite advance warning, much too little has been done to avert climate change. And this is a question of the relation of psychology to social arrangements.

The problem of motive can be addressed in terms of incentives. All the moral exhortation in the world is powerless to alter the structure of incentives which leads individuals to put their rational self-interest first, even if this involves them in patterns of behaviour which are destructive of whole resources and societies. The individual actions which are irrational collectively are, individually, eminently rational. 

We need an approach that is able to combine practical and psychological insight with respect to the logical structure of the problem of reconciling individual and collective rationality.  

The tragedy of the commons refers to a situation in which incentives are so arranged that individuals, following rational self-interest, come to destroy a common resource upon which they all depend. In other words, it pays individuals to do the wrong thing collectively, with the result that they are prepared to act against their own better judgment in order to satisfy their selfish natures. Once we understand the logical structure of the problem, it becomes clear why moral exhortation and warnings of dire environmental consequences in the future has such minimal effect. Appeals to our better natures will not work in situations when it is perfectly rational for individuals to override their better judgement. As George Monbiot comments with respect to calls for restraint or sacrifice:





Those who continue to waste words and energies this way are a hindrance to climate action and communication. We are dealing with situations in which the pursuit of immediate individual self-interest pays more clearly than does action motivated by a concern with the long range collective good. We are being asked to act so as to preserve common resources for future generations. Those generations do not exist, their good is intangible. We can most easily grasp our own short range and individual good.

Free rational collective action
[collective action and the public realm beyond incentive structures]
Free rational collective action is difficult to grasp intellectually and institutionally. The way that clashes of self-interest produce the collective destruction of an asset has become familiar under the name ‘tragedy of the commons.’ The conflicts termed ‘the prisoner's dilemma’ and ‘the logic of collective action’ are of the same species.

I shall address the logic of collective action, identifying the problems generated by unconstrained individual actions, and then proceed to the mechanisms and relations involved in resolving these problems. I shall begin with an examination of the tragedy of the commons, proceeding to deal with the prisoner’s dilemma with a view to establishing the conditions of the cooperative society based upon reciprocal relations. 

The term ‘tragedy of the commons’ describes what happens when individuals pursue their own selfish interest in using a shared resource. The moral is that the selfish desires of individuals will destroy the very commons upon which they depend on for survival, unless they are constrained rationally by appropriate regulatory mechanisms. If everybody over-harvests a resource, it will become depleted by overfishing or overgrazing. In time, the resource may even disappear. As a result of some consumers benefitting from over-exploitation in the short run, all the consumers of a resource will suffer in the long run. It is therefore in the common interests of all consumers to exercise restraint and not overharvest. However, in the absence of effective regulation constraining how much resource each consumer can harvest, then each consumer would be correct to reason, ‘If I don't catch that fish or let my sheep graze that grass, some other fisherman or herder will anyway, so it makes no sense for me to refrain from overfishing or overharvesting.’ For each consumer, then, the correct rational behaviour is to harvest before the next consumer does, stealing an advantage. Since each rational consumer reasons the same way, the eventual result is the degradation and even the destruction of the commons, thus harming the interests of all consumers.

There are three basic solutions to the tragedy of the commons. 
	Solution one is for the state or some other collective force to intervene and enforce quotas, over the heads of the consumers. 
	Solution two is to privatize the resource, divide it between privately owned tracts so that each owner has the incentive to manage the resource prudently in his/her own interests. 
	Solution three is for the consumers to recognize their common interests and to design, obey, and enforce prudent quotas themselves. 

Solution three is likely to happen only if a whole series of conditions is met: the consumers form a homogeneous group; they have learned to trust and communicate with each other; they expect to share a common future and to pass on the resource to their heirs; they are capable of and permitted to organize and police themselves; and the boundaries of the resource and of its pool of consumers are well defined. 

Environmental problems are caused by the cumulative demands we make upon the environment as individuals. These problems all require public or collective action and involve organisational and policy requirements that go further than incentive structures at the market level. We need to develop collective and collaborative modes of thought, action, and organisation that enable each one of us to be part of the solution.

Economics as Eudaimonics
Building a new more sustainable future is best done by creating inspiring alternatives, leading by example, and drawing people into a practical idealism rather than criticising the manifest flaws of the old. Bad systems, like bad theories, hang around until they are actively replaced by something better, something that does all that is required without suffering the same flaws. And that, ultimately, is a practical question.

Those of us alive today are the cast for an epic of civilizational transformation. Joanna Macy describes this as ‘The Great Turning.’ As this story continues to unfold, we will see humanity coming together in collaborate efforts concerned with conscious re-design and restructuring of the collective human impact on Earth. This reconstruction is already underway. The transgression of biophysical realities on the part of the prevailing socio-economic system sets the design brief – to transition from degenerative, parasitic and antagonistic modes of thought, action and organisation to regenerative, productive and collaborative modes.

In order to have a future that is worth living, human beings will have to give up the illusions spread by notions of the discrete, autonomous, choosing, atomistic self and see themselves as they are, co-creators who are active agents in the ceaselessly creative universe. To take our rightful and legitimate place in this universe, the whole of humanity will have to learn to work together through collaborative modes in which human activities and desires are ordered to their true ends. We thus achieve oneness through the appreciation of the richness of diversity to meet a common challenge by realising a common purpose – ordering the human presence on Earth in accordance with our true place in the Earth’s commonwealth of all beings and bodies. I call it God, others spell it Nature, what matters is that we just live it and do it and leave the semantics to those with too much time on their hands. We need to move beyond disputes over the terms on which we understand the world, the terms on which we conceptualize and possess the world, to accepting life as the gift it is.

Can we truly own anything?

That’s a question that calls for a new understanding of economics.

Economics as a eudaimonics gives us an economics with its ethical component firmly in place. It is a book for those people searching for a new economics, an economics that emphasises the qualities of living well rather than the endless accumulation of material quantities. In my own work I attempt to restore the connections between economics, ethics and ecology. I work in the field of virtue theory, and go back to the ancient unity of the true, the good and the beautiful. The question of genuine happiness and genuine wealth, then, is a question of restoring the ethical dimensions of economics, seeing economics less as a machine for pumping out material quantities than as a guidance system that shapes and canalises human behaviour in certain directions, the right directions for right living. People are becoming increasingly aware that the continuous expansion of the economy and mass consumption can bring human fulfilment and happiness up to a certain point, beyond which their effects are non-existent or even negative. Beyond a certain level of development, the economics of growth is detrimental to the things that make for human happiness, warm, affective ties and relationships, supportive communities, local interaction and a healthy and productive natural environment. The Economics of Happiness correctly identifies the tendency of the modern economy to undermine its own basis, in particular, the way that uncontrolled self-interestedness erodes the moral context of community and interpersonal relations. Add to this the tendency of exponential economic growth to undermine the ecological basis of civilisation, and it is clear that we need a new approach to economics, one that sets human activity and productivity in a moral ecology. Economics as eudaimonics understands that the problems we face go deep, much deeper than conventional theoretical tools and technologies. The book correctly locates the problem lies in a deficient worldview, in the underlying assumptions and attitudes which guide decision-making, individual choices and public policies. The transformations we require cannot be effected by an institutional tinkering or technological fixing alone, the problems we face go too deep. They cut to the core of our civilisation. To be effective, economics needs to touch the moral and existential depths of people, satisfying their thirst and hunger for meaning, for justice, for well-being and fulfilment. We need an economics that enables human beings to express their deeper qualities in lives lived appropriately to reality. An economics of vision that is at the same time feasible and practical. An economics which is back on good terms with the virtues. 

This approach combines moral depths and theoretical insight with practical intent. In looking at genuine happiness and wealth, it gives us an economics that is concerned with qualities and not just quantities. The end in view is a constructive model for personal, social and economic well-being that embodies and articulates values by which we define our quality of life. But the concern is also practical. This economics is eminently feasible, with implementations and applications concerning qualitative wealth with respect to personal/household, community, business/corporate, county, regional, and national scales. This approach gives us an economics of human dimensions and proportions, an economics that is in touch with the good life.

It is indeed true that philosophy can encompass economics. It’s just that I want to see more work that bridges theoretical reason and practical reason, less dreary, hopeless scepticism as to what can’t be said and can’t be done, less descents into mystical depths where nothing can be said, and more emphasis on how ideas map the world. A greater appreciation of the practical reasonableness that defines the natural law tradition.

Philosophy leaves the world alone, leaves the world unchanged? I’m thinking of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as therapy here. Yes, the best economists have been philosophers. I have a great book by philosopher Scott Meikle entitled Aristotle's Economic Thought, (that Aristotle gets everywhere, and I got him into my own economic writings, emphasising public good and use value), but there’s Adam Smith, a moral philosopher who wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments, David Hume and his Political Discourses, John Stuart Mill, Marx, we can throw in Pareto if we like, many more, Keynes, Treatise on Probability.  

Ideas matter. I’m with Keynes on this, and have quoted his famous passage from the General Theory many times.

the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.

Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 

It’s interesting that whilst just about everybody has spotted the hold that vested interests have on our politics, destabilising our present and potentially ruining our future, the world remains unchanged. The problem, however, is much more than vested interests. Whatever happened to the power of ideas? When will people understand why, in ecological transformation, E.F. Schumacher, advocate of appropriate technology, made ‘metaphysical reconstruction’ the most important thing of all. Schumacher is most famous for the book Small is Beautiful. Properly understood, Schumacher was actually arguing for appropriate scale. Sometimes we need to scale up to meet a problem, and not just scale down. Of course, some of our liveliest intellects have declared the age of the ‘grand narratives’ to be over. Just as the capital system went grand and global, the thinkers started to think small. We seem to lack constructive models of a viable economic order, something which will enable us to send the current moribund economic system into the oblivion it so well and truly deserves. There are some decent books out there, Pat Devine’s Democracy and Economic Planning: the Political Economy of a Self-Governing Society is worth investigating, for all who have a small fortune to invest (a very pricy book, if memory serves me well), David Schweickart’s Against Capitalism or After Capitalism is another. It’s just that having clarified the language, framed the terms and asked the right questions, I’d like to see some constructive models, with direct relevance to actual economic agents.

We need to move to a society where we value people because they ‘are’ much, not because they ‘have’ much. A society where ‘being’ matters more than ‘having.’ We need to get beyond conflictual and possessive relations and the endless haggling over the terms of on which the exploitation – of earth, of others, of ourselves - takes place. We need to learn how to share, and develop the collaborative forms and media that enable us to appreciate the true wealth that lies beyond material possession. Such possession stands in the way of true fulfilment, and is quite distinct from true qualitative wealth. Possessiveness is a miserly delusion, we own nothing in this sense, merely hold on neurotically to things that we seem forever under threat of slipping from our grasp. Materially, we are no more than transient custodians on Earth, where we should be thankful for what we have. It’s an old wisdom that came to be lost in the acquisitive society (Tawney 1982) characterised by possessive individualism (Mcpherson 1962). This is where the faultline is, in the idea that human beings are discrete, autonomous, self-choosing, self-maximising individuals, hence E.F. Schumacher’s insistence that ‘metaphysical reconstruction’ is key to recovery. (Schumacher 1973 1977 1980). 

Such questions are leading to a shift in behaviour which, in turn, is inspiring some ground-breaking new enterprises and ideas. These are termed ‘cathedral projects,’ the modern equivalent of the grand church buildings, constructed as part of humanity’s attempt to bridge heaven and Earth. These ideas are started by one generation with the hope a future generation will take up these challenges. Such projects require a transcendent source and end, otherwise the motivations required for their completion will not exist. The times demand nothing less from us. The environmental crisis, in both its social and natural dimensions, requires that we learn to collaborate, and devise forms and means of such collaboration, within a shared vision of the common good to ensure that humanity can survive in the first instance, and thrive in the long run. And that means challenging and changing some of the assumptions of economics with respect to true wealth, ownership, distinctions between mine and thine, the commons.

I would just add that it matters a great deal with whom we collaborate and to what ends we collaborate. And making the finer distinctions here is a matter of social relations. Neither collaboration nor cooperation as such are virtues in themselves. At present, our cooperative instincts have been hi-jacked by free-riders and diverted to the ends of private gain. To prevent this problem from recurring requires that we devise mechanisms which marginalise or exclude free-riders, or, best of all, encourage them into cooperation for ends of the social good. A circular economy in all respects, with no incentives or opportunities for free-riding, sustaining a productive, regenerative society based on the unity of each and all.

The world needs integrated solutions. And these integrated solutions require a collaborative approach drawing together a range of actors working at a number of levels. The word ‘collaboration’ comes from the Latin laborare, meaning ‘to labour’, and co-, com-, or col-, meaning ‘with’ or ‘together’. To collaborate, then, is to work together with others. We labour together to reclaim our natural, ethical and political commons so as to constitute the relations and practices required to enable us to act for the common good. 

The cooperative solidarity commonwealth, the real circular economy, the commons as a frame beyond growth, exploitation and extraction, regenerative cultures, platform coops, not-for-profit companies producing for social need and use, all of these things are the way to develop informational and material commons, recovering the common ground on which we can attain the common good, commoning as central to the transition to a collaborative, regenerative, solidarity economy of sustainable living, recovering the meaning of the word ‘company’ in a solidarity economics that involves a society of friends or ‘companions’ - joining the Latin ‘cum’ (with) and ‘panis’ (bread) in order to reconceive economics as baking and breaking bread together. This is to be companions in company, a society of friends. ‘Loving our global neighbours’ is something that Katharine Hayhoe has emphasised in her work on climate change. Globalisation has brought us closer together, but we need a cosmo-localisation so that we are not just neighbours, we become brothers and sisters. 

How can we come to share the benefits of collectively produced value equitably and justly? Through economic models and modes of production that prioritise purpose over profit, arranging production according social purpose, need and use - producing goods and services that are truly good in serving a true purpose

POST GROWTH, CIRCULAR BUSINESS MODELS AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT BUSINESS
'A healthy economy thrives on circulation. If our economy has circulation built into its very DNA, we can ensure a fair distribution of our common wealth without dominating each other and nature. The difference between for-profit and not-for-profit business could be the difference between having a linear, extractive economy and having a circular, generative economy.' (Donnie Maclurcan and Jennifer Hinton, Post Growth Institute).

How Relocalising Production With Not-For-Profit Business Models Helps Build Resilient and Prosperous Societies
'This Commons Transition Special Report was written by Sharon Ede, a sustainability ideas transmitter, writer and activist working in Adelaide, Australia. Ede is also a co-founder of the Post-Growth Institute, one of Commons Transition’s most esteemed Partner Projects. We feel that the Post-Growth Institute’s work, specially their exploration of not-for profit business models, aligns with our own work on Open Cooperativism. These projects forge resilient livelihood strategies for commoners, a trend which is explored in this report. Going beyond issues of labor organisation, “The Real Circular Economy” also explores how and why we produce, paying special attention to prosperity, societal resilience, and the possibilities offered by relocalized production and desktop/benchtop manufacturing. This parallels the P2P Foundation and P2P Lab’s work on “Building the Open Source Circular Economy”, where we research and build upon global, open-access design repositories working in conjunction with on-demand, locally grounded and community-oriented micro-factories. This approach, known as “Design Global, Manufacture Local” is also explored in this report, making it one of the most complete, accessible overviews of P2P and Post-Growth economics.'

'The not-for-profit model meets the needs of those who want a market economy, individual choice and reward for effort; those who want a more equitable society, where people’s needs are met; those who champion innovation and technology; and it satisfies those who understand that our wellbeing and safety depend on the health of our environment.
It is not a panacea, but it is a practical approach and realistic bridge from the old economy to the new economy, and most importantly, it is already emerging in the world we live in right now.'
http://commonstransition.org/the-real-circular-economy/ (​http:​/​​/​commonstransition.org​/​the-real-circular-economy​/​​)

'It’s going to take the serious work of finding and re-finding ways of sharing and negotiating this world so that each of us have enough, and it needs practical and tangible ways to demonstrate and enact this. It’ll take compassion and patience and love and openness and solidarity.'
 ~ Dan Musil

Learning from nature and designing as nature: Regenerative cultures create conditions conducive to life.
'We need to collaborate globally, regionally, and locally at an unprecedented scale to create “elegant solutions carefully adapted the the uniqueness of place” (John Todd). To do so, we need to do more than just learn from nature, we need to design as nature, and that means changing the human impact on Earth from being predominantly degenerative to being regenerative.'
https://www.schumachercollege.org.uk/blog/learning-from-nature (​https:​/​​/​www.schumachercollege.org.uk​/​blog​/​learning-from-nature​)

“Here is the good news: It is not extracting more and more raw materials and energy from the environment that makes us happy. It is the quality of our relationships. Our sense of continuity between past and future generations. Our connection with our community – the people around us. That is what makes life worthwhile.
We can have more of those things without degrading the planet that we live upon. Every community already has the elements of a new post-carbon economy. Whether it is the farmers’ market. Or community credit unions that invest locally.”
Richard Heinberg, Senior Fellow, Post Carbon Institute

Collaborate, for the right ends within right relationships, when we get together and constitute ourselves as a "we", something more than a self-interested congeries of competing individuals and groups, we can work together and achieve some amazing things. Our being lies in community, in the respectful unity of each and all, including the other beings and bodies of the More-than-Human Community with whom we share this planet. 

Definitions.
Collaboration is working together to create something new in support of a shared vision. The key points are that it is not through individual effort, something new is created, and that the glue is the shared vision.
Coordination is sharing information and resources so that each party can accomplish their part in support of a mutual objective. It is about teamwork in implementation. Not creating something new.
Cooperation is important in networks where individuals exchange relevant information and resources in support of each other’s goals, rather than a shared goal. Something new may be achieved as a result, but it arises from the individual, not from a collective team effort.





There are pertinent words on guilt and responsibility here - some are much more responsible than others, and there has been a failure of leadership - they should be held accountable for their action/inaction. 'We are not up against some global climate disruption or ‘nature’ going out of control on us, we are up against a small group of our fellow human beings who profit economically from polluting our atmosphere.




Here we might observe that the basic mood of the future might well be one of confidence in the continuing revelation that takes place in and through the Earth. If the dynamics of the universe from the beginning shaped the course of the heavens, lighted the sun, and formed the Earth, if this same dynamism brought forth the continents and seas and atmosphere, if it awakened life in the primordial cell and then brought into being the unnumbered variety of living beings, and finally brought us into being and guided us safely through the turbulent centuries, there is reason to believe that this same guiding process is precisely what has awakened in us our present understanding of ourselves and our relation to this stupendous process. Sensitized to such guidance from the very structure and functioning of the universe, we can have confidence in the future that awaits the human venture.

Thomas Berry, “The New Story,” in The Dream of the Earth, p.137.

The human is neither an addendum nor an intrusion into the universe. We are quintessentially integral with the universe.

Thomas Berry, “The Earth Story,” in The Great Work, p. 32

We are not lacking in the dynamic forces needed to create the future. We live immersed in a sea of energy beyond all comprehension. But this energy, in an ultimate sense, is ours not by domination but by invocation.

Thomas Berry, “The Dynamics of the Future” in The Great Work, p. 175

W.B. Yeats’ closing stanza in his poem ‘Among School Children’ expresses what it means to be in harmonious relationship to oneself, to others, including the other beings and bodies of the more-than-human world, and to the world itself.

Labour is blossoming or dancing where
The body is not bruised to pleasure soul.
Nor beauty born out of its own despair,
Nor blear-eyed wisdom out of midnight oil.
O chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?

Everything is part of a re-generative system, a whole that is inter-connected, inter-dependent, inter-active and inter-communicative. We are co-creators in a ceaselessly creative universe, a universe of co-production and co-intelligence. In a world of emergent properties, we are evolving the capacity to be aware that we are part of the whole and that the whole is a part of us, that we may learn from and respond to the feedback patterns of this whole, that we live in a participatory universe that communicates with us and invites us to participate in the dance, and puts before us the question: what shall I do, with whom and with what, to what end?

In the process of answering, we foster our capacities to practise the resilience, (co)responsiveness, and (co)responsibility required to play our full part in interaction with the whole. And that entails unfolding and developing our abilities to experience the richness of life lived within ecological relationships and to communicate understanding and appreciation of that interrelation, express systemic intelligence in the process of cultivating self-direction and intelligent communal leadership, heightening receptivity and responsiveness and reflective capability, strengthening resilience and fostering creativity in the face of the increasingly apocalyptic experience of social and environmental crisis, deepening our experience and understanding of the psycho-spiritual dimensions of the world, enriching our relation to and practice in the world, engaging with others in cultivating forms of sustainable living so as to put knowledge and eco-consciousness and sensibility into action, embedding understanding in real world experience.

Rethinking our approach to climate change
We should always be prepared to rethink our approach to climate change. The situation is fluid and ever-changing, and so too should be our thoughts and actions. In the summer of 1979, the National Academy of Sciences convened a panel to look into climate change. The group came to a ‘disturbing’ conclusion. ‘If carbon dioxide continues to increase, the study group finds no reason to doubt that climate changes will result and no reason to believe that these changes will be negligible,’ the report stated. ‘A wait-and-see policy may mean waiting until it is too late.’

So, government and politics, concerned with the priorities of ‘economic growth’ – facilitating the process of private capital accumulation – waited. And we have seen. Scientific studies have grown increasingly detailed in backing the case for anthropogenic global warming, and the warnings of the failure to act have grown ever more urgent. But the waiting goes on, even as climate change has become observable fact rather than prediction. The details are familiar: increased average global temperatures, drought, melting ice caps, adverse weather events, coastal storms, rising global sea levels, movement and extinction of species...

It’s not the scientific facts that concern me here, these seem so clear as to be incontrovertible. The most perplexing question is why, despite increasingly urgent warnings backed by the best scientific research, the governments of the world have failed to engage in effective action. The question becomes even more pointed when asked of the world’s most powerful governments, the governments most capable of acting.

The key question to be answered here, then, doesn’t concern the facts of climate change, but the political and institutional response to it, particularly the remarkable inertia that has been exhibited by governments. Whilst the alarm bells have been ringing ever louder, governments have stalled when it comes to taking effective action.

Some think the problem lies in the way that industry-funded groups and climate change deniers have set out to create uncertainty and confusion, claiming the science is far from settled. ‘The single most common myth about climate change among Americans is that there’s a lot of disagreement among the experts,’ says Ed Maibach, director of the Center for Climate Change Communication at George Mason University. ‘And the reason why they think there is a lot of disagreement among the experts is because there was an intentional strategy to sow the seeds of doubt.’ (see also Conway and Oreskes 2012).

In response, there has been an emphasis on the scientific consensus concerning climate change, referring to the 97 percent of climate scientists who agree that human-caused climate change is underway. Emphasising the consensus among scientists has a powerful impact in changing perceptions and ending confusion amongst the public. John Cook at Skeptical Science has done great work in this respect. (http://skepticalscience.com/ (​http:​/​​/​skepticalscience.com​/​​)). So the counter-claim is made that consensus isn’t real science, it’s politics. So the wealth of scientific evidence, the quality behind the quantity contained in countless reports, is cited back, and .. the whole cycle begins again.

The case for AGW is based on good sound science, not consensus. The consensus is based on the fact that the scientific case is clear. However, perceptions count, and these are bound up with social identities. How people see the world depends upon their social lives and beliefs. In other words, it isn’t scientific illiteracy and lack of scientific knowledge and understanding that matters so much as being able to remove the gaps separating theory and practice so as to establish linkages between knowledge, belief, identity and action. Connecting the worlds of knowledge and action through community, culture and identity is a way of overcoming not just political and institutional inertia but also psychological inertia. It involves people in their social practices making the changes required to address climate change.

Kari Marie Norgaard, author of the book Living in Denial: Climate Change, Emotions, and Everyday Life, points to the strong cultural component people’s attitudes to climate change. She also thinks people seek to avoid painful subjects. Climate change provokes feelings of guilt and helplessness, and so people prefer to avoid the subject. ‘It’s difficult for people to feel that climate change is really happening, in part because we’re embedded in a world where no one else around us is talking about it,’ Norgaard says. ‘It becomes a vicious cycle between the political gridlock and the cultural and individual gridlock.’

There is, then, a need to break the cycle in which political/institutional inertia and psychological inertia feed on each other. I argue for a tripartite structure which integrates government at all levels, from international to local, the economy and civil society and its various concentric circles of community. (see, here, Lange 2010). Norgaard emphasises statements and actions from the top levels of government could change the political dynamic. ‘I do believe that large-scale change from the top could be very powerful,’ she says, encouraging people to ‘feel hopeful, to feel like there’s something they can do.’  ‘I think there are probably multiple levels at which we could break this cycle.’ ‘I don’t believe we get to give up,’ Norgaard concludes. 

Action needs to be taken not just at the top level of government, but at all levels, running through the whole of society as a self-socialisation and re-empowerment from below. In the three decades since the alarm was first raised, the problem of climate change has become more daunting. But there are things we can do. We are learning how to take effective, collective action. Here is Kevin Anderson, referring to collectives of individuals as emergent properties:





Exerting that power entails creating mechanisms of collective control. We live in a world in which the incremental action of individuals and groups is generating supra-individual forces and consequences which increasingly impinge on our behaviour, encroach on our communities and threaten our future. These forces are collective forces requiring collective mechanisms of control. In the absence of these mechanisms, our societies fracture into a congeries of independent agents, each pursuing self-interested strategies. Without constraint and coordination between individuals and groups, individual freedom is generating a collective unfreedom. The collective threats that face us, then, are experienced as overwhelming; there seems to be nothing that individuals can do to resolve the problems that beset the world, still less to make the world a better place. The threats grow, the responses are weak and ineffective, and there is a growing frustration, pain, and a growing pessimism and cynicism too. We need an empowering praxis that is able to break the paralysis. Proceeding from the principle of interconnectedness, individuals come to form themselves into collectivities so as to generate the modes of acting, knowing and being within which they can become effective knowledgeable and moral agents of change, capable of assuming responsibility for their actions and thus having a less destructive and more creative influence on the world. By developing collective mechanisms of control and coordination, the transformational power of human agency, which now has such a destructive impact on the environment, will come to be channelled in the direction of human and planetary flourishing.

Rational thinking and collective action – markets, individuals and public goods

The specific problem of climate change refers to the disruption of the planet’s climatic system as a result of the excessive emission of greenhouse gases. The problem can be stated more generally in terms of the logic of collective action. The services that ecosystems perform for the health of the whole are threatened by overuse and overexploitation. Derek Parfit states the problem of collective action concisely:





The free rider problem can be described as form of market failure resulting from the unremunerated positive externalities that public goods provide. Whilst public goods are produced or maintained by individual voluntary contributions, they can be enjoyed by all individuals irrespective of their personal contribution to the good's provision, which creates the opportunity for free riders to get something for nothing. The problem can be formulated in terms of incentives: in terms of rational self-interest, the individual has no incentive to pay for any good that they can be obtained for free. 

The two standard solutions to the problem are to privatize the goods, making them excludable, and public provision, relying on compulsory contributions. (Vanderheiden 2008 ch 3).

Individual and collective action problems
The prevalence of the value of equality amongst the various parties seeking international agreement gives strong political and moral support to the case for equal shares. However, the case for equal shares rests firmly upon a sound analysis of the atmosphere as a commons. As Paul Baer argues with respect to the collective action problems that affect the management of common resources:





As with rational individuals, so with nations, in the absence of collective constraint and agreement, there is a temptation to free ride. As a result, emissions limits need to be binding and enforceable to remove the incentive to free ride. Limits that are only voluntary create incentives for agents to seek an advantage by refusing to respect emissions limits whilst others abide by them. The logic of the problem of free riding, then, establishes the necessity of a collective, cooperative solution with binding and enforceable limits. Why collective? Because the dilemma has a social dimension. The case for cooperation is clear. Since each nation will suffer as a result of the degradation of the atmospheric commons through overuse, all nations have an incentive to cooperate within a global climate regime concerned with maintaining the health of a shared resource. Such a solution comes at a price, each party must be granted a fair share. Environmental and social justice are therefore inseparable. (Vanderheiden 2008: ch 7). 

Managing the global commons
Referring to the tragedy of the commons and the problem of managing the global commons, Tim Flannery see a ‘ray of hope’ in the fact that human surveillance is now pretty much capable of detecting transgressors and monitoring resources globally. ‘The destruction of our global commons thrives on secrecy, and in the twenty-first century, courtesy of globalisation and new technologies, that is becoming a rare commodity.’ But it is what is missing that is crucial: ‘What we still lack are the political aspects — the clear, agreed rules, the penalties and the conflict resolution’. (Flannery 2012 ch 21). And that, it has to be said, is a major absence, a much greater absence than any there may be with respect to technological means. 

Flannery is correct to argue that a treaty for managing the global commons must take a holistic approach to protecting the chemistry and ecology of places. The ecological peace we seek has to be a peace with justice and without retribution. This problem will be solved as a whole or not at all, hence the case I shall make for an overarching ethical and institutional framework. Flannery proposes a treaty administered through a future Gaian Security Council, ‘sufficiently empowered and constituted so that it is the ultimate authority over global commons.’ He considers that it's hard ‘to imagine the nascence of such an organisation today’, speculating that the children of a globalised world, looking back at the abject failures of the current generation, might give it birth. The problem, of course, is that environmental threats do not just continue to grow, they ‘now have the potential to overwhelm us before we achieve such wisdom.’ (Flannery 2010 ch 21). 

I would argue that the ‘nascence of such an organisation’ is discernible in the world today, with many bodies and organisations around the world working to the end of human and planetary flourishing. To take one example, the Global Commons Institute was founded in 1990, committed to climate truth and reconciliation. 

‘In November 1990, the United Nations began to create the Framework on Climate Convention [UNFCCC].
GCI contributed to this and in June 1992 the Convention was agreed at the Earth Summit in Rio.
Its objective is stabilizing the rising greenhouse gas [GHG] concentration in the global atmosphere. Its principles of equity and precaution were established in international law. Climate scientists had showed that a deep overall contraction of GHG emissions from human sources is prerequisite to achieving the objective of the UNFCCC.
It became clear the global majority most damaged by climate changes were already impoverished by the economic structures of those who were also now causing the damaging GHG emissions.
To create a sustainable basis on which to resolve this inequity, GCI also developed the Contraction and Convergence (C&C) model of future emissions.’
(http://www.gci.org.uk/briefings.html (​http:​/​​/​www.gci.org.uk​/​briefings.html​)).

A legal and institutional framework of this kind is about establishing the earth as a common treasury for all. The question is whether such an overarching framework is necessary, and whether it is possible to generate the common interest from below through ensuring sufficient quantity and quality of human interactions within reciprocal relationships. I argue for the complementarity of both. I shall examine recovering the commons, commoning and the common good shortly. I shall set up the argument by a close examination of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in light of the cooperative society.

8 GAMES THEORY AND THE COOPERATIVE SOCIETY
Egoism and altruism – competition and cooperation
The necessity or otherwise of an overarching legal and institutional framework can be argued in terms of an understanding of the nature of the problems we face as well as how we conceive human nature. I have discussed climate change and the environmental crisis above in terms of the tragedy of the commons, and will return to this question. The forces driving our environmental problems take the form of an unrestrained collective force demanding a conscious common control of commensurate power and competence. For this reason, I argue for the necessity, indeed the desirability, of an overarching institutional and ethical framework, not in the sense of a top-down abstract apparatus, but as a moral and social matrix that integrates human life at all levels, giving us a true and embedded universal. This is a developmental conception concerned with the full expression and exercise of human powers and potentialities. It is quite distinct from the protective conception which makes institutional force necessary in order to restrain an intrinsically greedy and competitive human nature. At this point, it is worth examining this point on human nature further.

Thomas Huxley, ‘Darwin’s bulldog’, argued that nature was a ceaseless struggle without pity between self-interested creatures. Huxley’s view belongs to a long tradition in moral and political thought which conceives human beings to be inherently selfish, egoistic and competitive and in need of constraint by the state, laws and culture to ensure the ‘civil peace’. This view can be found in the pre-Socratic philosophers of ancient Greece, St. Augustine, Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Thomas Malthus and many more. 

There is another tradition, one that human beings as born free, good and virtuous, only to be corrupted by social institutions, Plato, Pelagius, Rousseau, William Godwin, Kropotkin. Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution directly challenged the view that nature is inherently and overwhelmingly competitive, giving many examples of inter- and intra-species cooperation. The view of nature as a simple ‘struggle for existence’ contradicted Kropotkin’s own observations as a geographer; it certainly did not fit what he knew of the world of human beings. Far from being ‘a war of each against all’, in Huxley’s paraphrase of Hobbes, life expressed cooperation to at least as great an extent as competition. Kropotkin did not deny competition, but questioned the extent to which it had been overemphasised in the Social Darwinist reading:

No one will deny that there is, within each species, a certain amount of real competition for food - at least, at certain periods. But the question is, whether competition is carried on to the extent admitted by Darwin, or even by Wallace; and whether this competition has played, in the evolution of the animal kingdom, the part assigned to it.

Kropotkin Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution ch 2

Evolution worked to induce individuals to overcome useless and self-destructive competition and instead join and seek mutual benefit. The most successful animals were the most cooperative. Kropotkin rejected the view that selfishness was something inherent in our animal nature and that morality was a product of civilised culture. My criticism here would be that Kropotkin didn’t so much as reject the dualism involved as invert it. That gives us a benign view of nature, but comes with the danger that we may identify civilisation as such as a corrupting force. Rather than being a product of culture, a social invention, Kropotkin viewed cooperation as an animal inheritance, a quality with which human beings are naturally endowed:

Sociability is as much a law of nature as mutual struggle. Of course it would be extremely difficult to estimate, however roughly, the relative numerical importance of both these series of facts. But if we resort to an indirect test, and ask Nature: ‘Who are the fittest: those who are continually at war with each other, or those who support one another?’ we at once see that those animals which acquire habits of mutual aid are undoubtedly the fittest. They have more chances to survive, and they attain, in their respective classes, the highest development of intelligence and bodily organization. If the numberless facts which can be brought forward to support this view are taken into account, we may safely say that mutual aid is as much a law of animal life as mutual struggle, but that, as a factor of evolution, it most probably has a far greater importance, inasmuch as it favours the development of such habits and characters as insure the maintenance and further development of the species, together with the greatest amount of welfare and enjoyment of life for the individual, with the least waste of energy. 

Kropotkin Mutual Aid ch 1

For Kropotkin, life was more than an amoral, pitiless struggle between selfish creatures, and he backed his case for mutual aid up with examples drawn from natural and human society. The parrot, an ‘extremely sociable bird’, stands ‘at the very top of the whole feathered world for the development of its intelligence.’

Cooperation, as a natural endowment, is to be found amongst primitive tribes as well as the most civilised societies. Kropotkin traced cooperative practices and arrangements in the entire history of human beings, in village communities, medieval communes and guilds to the present day. Kropotkin does, therefore, see mutual aid at work in human society. His moral was simple, the more individuals cooperated, the more they and the communities of which they were members thrived:

The communal meadows are mown by the community; and the sight of a Russian commune mowing a meadow -- the men rivalling each other in their advance with the scythe, while the women turn the grass over and throw it up into heaps -- is one of the most inspiring sights; it shows what human work might be and ought to be. The hay, in such case, is divided among the separate households, and it is evident that no one has the right of taking hay from a neighbour's stack without his permission; but the limitation of this last rule among the Caucasian Ossetes is most noteworthy. When the cuckoo cries and announces that spring is coming, and that the meadows will soon be clothed again with grass, every one in need has the right of taking from a neighbour's stack the hay he wants for his cattle. The old communal rights are thus re-asserted, as if to prove how contrary unbridled individualism is to human nature.

Kropotkin Mutual Aid ch 4

Kropotkin’s case for mutual aid as a factor in evolution pointed to the selective survival of the sociable species in competition with less sociable species. Further, cooperative activity in community ‘shows what human work might be and ought to be.’ Kropotkin effectively switched the evolutionary work of competition and natural selection from the individual to the group, something which Richard Dawkins accuses E.O. Wilson of doing in his The Social Conquest of the Earth (2012). Dawkins doubts the group can work in this way. 

The relations between competition and cooperation, egoism and altruism, self-interest and common interest remain central to our biology, economic activity, political arrangements and social life. If human beings are inherently cooperative, then why is there so much competitive struggle in our social lives? If human beings are such competitive individualists, then why does social life demonstrate so much cooperative behaviour?

Such questions are based on a misconception. Egoism and altruism are not rival theories of human nature but two aspects of the same nature. The challenge before us is to so arrange society as to ensure that our legitimate self-interested behaviour chimes with our communal interests, to so canalize the competitive instincts through cooperation as to generate the most optimal outcomes. Human beings are both social and individualistic beings, individuality and sociality are aspects of the same nature. My intention in this book is to identity the roots of a truly human society in human nature, relations, character and patterns of behaviour.

From this perspective, I argue that Kropotkin was correct to challenge the emphasis placed upon competitive struggle and instead to point to the importance of sociability and cooperation. His argument, however, didn’t escape the original dualism between nature and culture, merely inverted it, which renders it vulnerable to those who argue that nature is not as benign and as good as the Edenic naturalists claim it is. That is, whilst cooperation and sociability are natural endowments, they also require development and channelling through social arrangements, moral codes and practices, culture. Nature gives us potentiality, certain endowments and predispositions. Whether and how these develop depends upon culture and society. The way Kropotkin sets his argument up makes it clear that he thinks the institutions, codes and practices of civilisation divert, pervert and suppress our natural instincts, and therefore work against our natural potentialities. That our cooperative instincts can be hijacked and exploited by powerful groups, and have been through successive stages of civilisation, is certainly true. Always, we need to question the purposes and ends of cooperative activity, the nature of the relations and institutions under which cooperation takes place. Kropotkin favours those societies which have emerged organically.

Nature via Nurture
[beyond the culture-nature split]
The view that selfishness is inherent in our animal nature and that morality is a social invention to restrain our base instincts has, as its obverse, the view that human beings are inherently good and cooperative by nature and corrupted only by society and its institutions and codes. The one is a cynical view, the other innocent. I want to avoid the trap of the ‘noble savage’ view of history. Neither cynics nor innocents contribute much to the debate, other than involving us on a see-saw of claim and counter-claim. There is such a thing as human nature; how it is expressed and developed depends upon social arrangements, codes and norms, culture. In other words, a cooperative ethic works not as a rational and cultural invention and imposition, but because it is part of our innate moral grammar, which reason and culture develop creatively. My argument can be described as nature via nurture, turning predispositions for cooperative behaviour into actual behaviours through the teaching of dispositions. In other words, reason, ethics and culture do not create moral behaviour and cooperative behaviour, or any other kind of behaviour ex nihilo, they fashion it from the innate qualities of human nature.

At this point, I’d like to qualify this emphasis on innateness and make it clear that the human essence is no abstraction but is something that is creatively developed in historically specific social relations. Or frustrated by those relations. Marx exposed the logic of action in the capitalist economy, exposing the reality of a social form in which individual self-interest purportedly served the collective interest. Claims of innate human rights were the ideological cloak of a system which converted living human substance (creative labour) into objective material (capital as ‘dead labour’).

The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, let us say of labour-power, are determined only by their own free will. They contract as free persons, who are equal before the law. Their contract is the final result in which their joint will finds a common legal expression. Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to his own advantage. The only force bringing them together, and putting them into relation with each other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interest of each. Each pays heed to himself only, and no one worries about the others. And precisely for that reason, either in accordance with the pre-established harmony of things, or under the auspices of an omniscient providence, they all work together to their mutual advantage, for the common weal, and in the common interest. 
When we leave this sphere of simple circulation or the exchange of commodities, which provides the 'free-trader vulgaris' with his views, his concepts and the standard by which he judges the society of capital and wage-labour, a certain change takes place, or so it appears, in the physiognomy of our dramatis personae. He who was previously the money-owner now strides out in front as a capitalist; the possessor of labour-power follows as his worker. The one smirks self-importantly and is intent on business; the other is timid and holds back, like someone who has brought his own hide to market and now has nothing else to expect but - a tanning. 

Marx CI 1976 ch 6

Marx distinguishes between appearance and reality. Whereas it appears to be the case that the pursuit of self-interest on the part of individuals generates the general interest, in fact some gain private advantage at the expense of others. There is no harmony here, and the assertion of the innate rights of man is an ideological cloak for naked class exploitation. The real outcome of exchange is very different than that asserted by liberal ideologists.

Marx’s comments on the relation between individual self-interest and the collective interest within capitalist social relations are highly pertinent with respect to games theory and the problem of determining the conditions of the cooperative society.

Games theory and the cooperative society
(The following develops the arguments made in Anarchy, socialism and a Darwinian left by Ellen Clarke. Although I am in broad agreement with Clarke’s argument, I do diverge quite significantly. I can agree that, in principle, anarchism best meets the criteria of what constitutes the cooperative society. It’s just that assumptions of ‘niceness’ of the part of individuals in conditions of freedom and equality presuppose the very things we stand in need of creating. My own take on anarchism has to be read in light of how I develop the principle of rational freedom and see its actualisation as proceeding).

In A Darwinian Left, Peter Singer employs game theory in an attempt to establish cooperation as an evolutionarily successful strategy. Singer argues that the left should eschew the idea of perfectibility and the view of human beings as Lockean blank slates, and instead acknowledge the existence of some relatively ﬁxed attributes of human nature. ‘Those seeking to reshape society must understand the tendencies inherent in human beings, and modify their abstract ideals in order to suit them’ (Singer 1999: 40). In other words, there is such a thing as human nature. The solution to the problem of how to engage in collective action and achieve co-operation between individuals is to work with the grain of that nature, not impose abstract ideals or external constraints upon it.

As a left utilitarian, Peter Singer argues for a co-operative society that supports the poor, the weak and the oppressed. Accordingly, Singer’s ideal society would provide ‘a strong safety net for those who are unable to provide for their own needs’ (Singer 1999: 50). To back his idea of a Darwinian left, Singer turns to game theory, and Robert Axelrod’s model in particular (Axelrod 1984), which suggests that cooperation can be an evolutionary successful strategy. Singer’s claim is that ‘the left can learn from Axelrod’s work how to build a more cooperative society’ (Singer, 1999: 51). 

The challenge is to identify the conditions for the realisation and reproduction of that cooperative society. This can be done by identifying the essential features for the operation of Axelrod’s TIT FOR TAT mechanism. 

Game theoretic modelling of cooperation has advanced since Axelrod’s work. Here, I am more concerned with Singer’s case for a cooperative society expressing a commitment to the poor, the weak and the oppressed than with game theory as such. Singer defines this society ‘in terms of meeting people’s basic needs and providing for a certain level of comfort. I think the kind of thing you’re talking about is if you could ensure that there are virtually no people whose basic needs for food, shelter, warmth are not being met.’

The Prisoners’ Dilemma: introduction
The Prisoners’ Dilemma, briefly, goes like this. Two prisoners, A and B, are being questioned by the police. The police have insufficient evidence and so are encouraging each prisoner to inform on the other. The prisoners are held apart from one another and so there can be no communication between them. The options each faces as they make their choices are as follows:

If A informs on B and B remains silent, then A will be released and B will be imprisoned for ten years.

If B informs on A and A remains silent, then B will be released and A will be imprisoned for ten years.

If each prisoner informs on the other, then both will be imprisoned for ﬁve years.

If each prisoner remains silent, then both will be imprisoned for six months.

The most optimal outcome for both prisoners together is for each to remain silent, with each being jailed for just six months (making for 12 months in total, adding the two sentences together). The most optimal outcome for each individual prisoner is to inform on the other and be released, with the other receiving a ten year sentence. 

The prisoner's dilemma has an equilibrium solution in which both parties are worse off than they would have been had they communicated and cooperated. Kept in isolation, with no opportunity for cooperation and communication, neither prisoner has any knowledge of the other’s intentions and choices. Each has to make a choice as an isolated individual. And the most rational choice available to each as an individual is to inform. Since the reasoning is symmetrical, both choose to act out of self-interest and thereby bring about the least optimal outcome. Each prisoner informs on the other and as a result both go to prison. Individual self-interest, in other words, brings about the worst possible outcome. 

This in itself is neither a case against self-interest nor a case for central control. The most important issue concerns the quality of human relationships and the need to ensure that the parties involved are informed enough so as to enable a self-interested choice to be made in an enlightened sense. That is, we need to establish the conditions so that the individual comes to choose in such a way as to see the connection between the individual good and the social good.

The relevance of the dilemma to practical affairs becomes clear when we consider environmental problems like pollution, overfishing, depletion of resources. The resolution of these problems involves inducing individuals to resist temptations to cheat and instead cooperate for a greater good. The problem of the commons is therefore overcome by a form of organisation and control that enables communication and coordination between hitherto dissociated individuals. 

The prisoner’s dilemma involves a one-off encounter between two individuals. In such a scenario, egoism rather than altruism is the rational choice for each individual. However, as Axelrod argues, most real life interactions are repeated and ongoing rather than one-oﬀ, isolated occurrences. We meet many people over and again in a social environment. The Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma describes how the prisoners’ options change when the game is no longer a one-off encounter but is played repeatedly, as in real life.

To show how things change with repeated transactions, Axelrod organised a tournament and invited people to enter a programme based on an iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma. The programmes would face each other one at a time, and points were allocated thus:

	I cooperate, you defect: 0 points. 
	I defect, you cooperate: 5 points. 
	Both defect: 1 point. 
	Both cooperate: 3 points. 

A second round of the tournament was held to reinforce the results. 

The clear winner in both tournaments was ‘TIT FOR TAT’, a programme which has the following strategy: On the ﬁrst interaction with a program — cooperate. On each successive move after that — do whatever the opponent did last time. This simple strategy of reciprocity gathered more points overall than other, more subtle, aggressive and highly designed programmes. 

There were three significant discoveries. Firstly, TIT FOR TAT gained the most points overall without beating any programme in particular. Whilst no program scored fewer points against TIT FOR TAT, they scored much fewer points overall against each other, so that TIT FOR TAT emerged victorious. Secondly, it was discovered that whilst a population of defectors is immune to ‘invasion’ by individual TIT FOR TATs, clusters of TIT FOR TATs could invade such a group so long as they have at least a small proportion of their interactions with each other. At the same time, TIT FOR TAT is immune to invasion, not just from individual defectors but from clusters of defectors. Finally, Axelrod demonstrates that the mechanism of TIT FOR TAT possesses a ‘ratchet’. Once present as a cluster, TIT FOR TAT can proliferate and become dominant. Axelrod gives historical and biological examples to back his argument and closes with this crucial lesson:





TIT-FOR-TAT’s success lies in its being nice, retaliatory, forgiving and clear. Being nice prevents it from getting into unnecessary trouble. Being retaliatory discourages the other side from persisting whenever defection is tried. Being forgiving helps restore mutual co-operation. Being clear makes it intelligible to the other, eliciting long-term co-operation. (Axelrod 1984: 54).

However, TIT FOR TAT is only a successful strategy in mixed groups. A group of players using the strategy between themselves will tend to gain a higher overall pay-oﬀ than other players who are constantly cheating on each other. TIT FOR TAT protects itself by withdrawing cooperation from any player who defects or attempts to free ride. And denied the cooperation of the well-off group, the pay-oﬀ of the free rider or defector will suﬀer, encouraging them to adopt the TIT FOR TAT strategy themselves. 

The players act to maximise their own pay-off, there is no demand that they be altruistic or act out of a consideration of the overall good. The system does, however, require trust, even if it does not actually need to be expressed. The detection and punishment of free riding by the withdrawal of cooperation is the key to success. If free riders go without punishment, then free riding will become the most productive long-term strategy, undermining the whole system. The one-off prisoner’s dilemma is self-destructive precisely because the most rational thing for each player to do is to defect, thus bringing about the least optimal outcome for all. But when the situation is repeated over time, each player stands to beneﬁt by attempting to establish cooperation with other players. As a result of repeated encounters, each partner acquires knowledge of the other's strategy, adjusting the choices they make according to whether the other cooperates or defects, and in time build trust so that the most optimal outcome is ensured. The equilibrium solution to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, then, is 'tit-for-tat' rather than 'always defect': begin by co-operating and then respond in kind to whatever the other does — defect if the other defects, cooperate if the other cooperates. 

The attainment of the cooperative society through TIT FOR TAT has nothing to do with an ethic of altruism changing the values of the players from the outside and everything to do with changing the game so that it is rational for each to seek to cooperate with others on the inside. In an iterated situation, a player’s cooperation is remembered and returned, a virtuous cycle of reciprocity is begun and sustained, generating the cooperative society through individual interaction. 

Axelrod establishes a couple of technical conditions for this outcome: ‘the two key requisites for cooperation to thrive are that the cooperation be based on reciprocity, and that the shadow of the future is important enough to make this reciprocity stable’ (Axelrod, 1984: 173). Connections must be clear and comprehensible, consequences must be identified and owned. These are crucial aspects of our attempts to resolve our social and environmental problems in a positive fashion.

Scale and proximity are important. TIT FOR TAT works best in relatively small groups. To anticipate future actions and build trust between players requires the number of interactions in a given amount of time be maximised, thus building expectations of meeting players again in the near future, giving each player reason to cooperate in expectation of reciprocal action. 

Conversely, the larger the group, the less interactions there will be in a ﬁxed amount of time, the lower the expectations of meeting players again in the near future, the less trust there will be, and hence the less reason there will be to cooperate. Larger groups make the connections thinner, the consequences more opaque. Ultimately, as the greater numbers reduce repeated interactions and dilute transactions, we return to the one off Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the most rational thing to do is to defect. 

From this follows a need to establish appropriate scale and social proximity. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma requires a group of such size and scale as to enable the players to meet each other again and regularly, building trust relations and expectations, thus making it rational for individuals to cooperate. 

The logic is easy to follow. The hard part is providing the appropriate context for the logic to unfold. This has a number of conditions. Establishing the factors and parameters generating an evolutionary stable strategy, we can sketch the contours of a political society which incorporates Axelrodian cooperation into its operation. 

There are four key factors.
1) There must be an equality between the players, so that they have equal power to cooperate or defect, with identical pay-oﬀs for the choices they make. There is no marginal utility diﬀerentiation that would induce the players to value their pay-oﬀs diﬀerently. In a situation in which there is differentiation, a player may be so powerful as to be able to defect against another, even when there is the expectation of meeting again. Since defection from the less powerful will not affect the interests of the powerful player, there is no motivation for the powerful player to establish cooperation. 

The case for equality savours a little of the principle Rousseau lays down in The Social Contract:

I have already defined civil liberty; by equality, we should understand, not that the degrees of power and riches are to be absolutely identical for everybody; but that power shall never be great enough for violence, and shall always be exercised by virtue of rank and law; and that, in respect of riches, no citizen shall ever be wealthy enough to buy another, and none poor enough to be forced to sell himself:  which implies, on the part of the great, moderation in goods and position, and, on the side of the common sort, moderation in avarice and covetousness.

Rousseau The Social Contract Book II ch 2

2) There must be transparency, players having access to knowledge of what was done the last time they met others. Transparency is essential for the detection and punishment of free riders, encouraging players to reciprocate. 

3) The players must be nice. TIT FOR TAT must begin with cooperation so that reciprocation on the part of the players proceeds to generate mass cooperation. Defection the ﬁrst time there is interaction initiates a cycle of reciprocal defection that ends in mass defection. There must, therefore, be cooperation the first time there is interaction.

4) There must be freedom. TIT FOR TAT’s decisions to cooperate or defect require no extraneous rules or motivating inﬂuences, beyond the knowledge of what a partner did last time they met. 

The satisfaction of these four requirements means that all players can be sure that their decisions to cooperate or to defect will always be met in kind, establishing the conditions for an evolutionarily stable strategy.

Peter Singer asks: ‘What structures can overcome the anonymity of the huge, highly mobile societies that have come into existence in this century and show every sign of increasing in size with the globalisation of the world’s economy?’ (Singer, 1999: 52). 

In answering this question, we can insist that there must be appropriate scale. Here we face the problem of complexity and quantity, the fact that modern societies are just too large for TIT FOR TAT interactions to work in favour of the reciprocity that generates cooperation. Consideration for others varies according to the size and scale of the community. The larger the size and the scale, the thinner and less intense the interactions. TIT FOR TAT cannot work in a society whose members never or rarely encounter each other again. For TIT FOR TAT to work, the size and complexity of modern societies needs to be altered.

Axelrodian cooperation ﬂourishes in a society of appropriate scale, implying organic local community with a small discount parameter. To be a stable strategy of cooperation, the group needs to be of appropriate size and scale, there needs to be a rough equality amongst the players, a transparency in all interactions, players who are nice, (meaning they will not defect on the very ﬁrst game), and, ﬁnally, players who have freedom in the sense of having the effective choice whether to cooperate or to defect. 

The challenge before us is to embed TIT FOR TAT in a viable political and institutional order, one characterised by egalitarian structures and relations, and which keeps power within human scale so that it may be directly expressed in the relationships between people. There is a need to protect against the re-alienation of power, to check against those abstracting tendencies that once more remove power beyond the control and comprehension of individuals.

Axelrodian cooperation implies a social self-government constituted by self-mediated forms of social control. This conception favours the egalitarian distribution of power and resources, symmetrical relations between individuals, the breakdown of quantity and complexity in favour of small-scale communities, extensive spaces for face-to-face interaction, and participatory structures enabling the involvement of citizens in affairs of common concern. Such a society achieves a self-centralisation from below, abolishing interests that are extraneous from the people in favour of ascending purposes which proceed from the bottom upwards. This achieves a society which is powered from below, via forms of self-organisation which enable an equal voice for all in political matters and an equal ownership in the productive means.

In such a society, governmental power will be invested in society and distributed equally, with the abolition of all the institutions of extraneous power associated with class rule and domination - army, police force, judicial system, taxes, state-owned currency or administrative bureaucracy. The question is whether a stateless, moneyless communitarian anarchism is possible or even desirable. There is a danger of committing to a principle of reciprocity and interaction so direct as to imply a society of complete unmediated spontaneity. It is as well to recognise here that mediation will always take place in human affairs. The question is what kind of mediation. I argue for a social self-mediation which ascends from below. This is a self-socialisation which contrasts with the alien control of the state and capital.

This social self-mediation can be presented in terms of the key factors established above.

There are a number of paradoxes and critical points that need to be addressed with respect to establishing the social and institutional forms of the self-mediating cooperative society. 

Power and resources:
We need to be aware of the danger of small scale communities becoming insular enclaves of privilege and power in conditions of inequality. Fragmentation can therefore reinforce inequality, thus violating one of the key factors in generating cooperation. The problem is that a redistribution of wealth designed to overcome inequality implies a national coordination through political structures raised above the local level. This raises scale beyond the comprehension of citizens and thus reduces the likelihood that their encounters with each other would be repeated. In these conditions, individuals will have little reason to seek to establish cooperation with others. 

Correcting one imbalance risks thus creating another. A focus on redistributing economic resources via the state risks generating inequalities in power or force at the political level. There must, therefore, be equality between the players if they are to have the ability to cooperate with and defect against each other. Where there is equality of power, strength and money, individuals will have the ability to elicit the cooperation of others. Here, evolutionary game theory supports an egalitarian economics as a precondition of cooperation, but it does more than this by pointing to an equalisation of power. Whilst economic inequality is certainly a barrier to cooperation, the equal distribution of power requires more than the equal distribution of economic resources. The question of power, therefore, has to be addressed holistically.

Transparency. 
Individuals need to know and remember the outcomes of previous interactions with others so that they can reciprocate. This implies a direct social self-mediation as opposed to indirect mediation via agencies removed from individuals. The state and the capital system are forms of alien mediation, intervening in individual relations via a common purpose that is distanced from actual community. Rather than deal directly with each other, individuals come to rely on a mediation that renders social purposes and interests external and anonymous and hence opaque to them. Worse, the state functions as what Marx in The German Ideology called an illusory general interest, claiming a universality where there is none. This reveals the extent to which the state is an ideological project, its claim to serve the common good being no more than a rationalisation of the particular interests of groups within the state as they seek to expand their power and resources. These particular interests entrenched in the state realm thus work to prevent TIT FOR TAT from spreading throughout society. At the same time, the numerous layers of bureaucracy serve to increase complexity and anonymity and thus subvert the condition of transparency of interaction.

Niceness. 
The belief in the inherent goodness of human beings suffers from an obvious objection: if human beings are so good, then why do we keep having to argue for the attainment of the common good? To begin with niceness seems to beg the question: if we start nice, then how do we end up nasty? Where, precisely, does defection and free riding come from? There seems to be a paradox here. The premise of niceness presupposes the very thing we are attempting to achieve. If we presume niceness, why do we need to do anything else with respect to reciprocal relations and interactions?

The answer is that whilst there may be an innate goodness, its expression requires appropriate structures and mechanisms. It’s not a paradox for those who believe in original sin. Or for Richard Dawkins. Dawkins is worth quoting here:

Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish. Let us understand what our own selfish genes are up to, because we may then at least have the chance to upset their designs, something that no other species has ever aspired to. 

Dawkins 2006 ch 1

In the Introduction to the 30th anniversary edition of The Selfish Gene, Dawkins admits that the phrase 'born selfish' is misleading, suggesting instead The Altruistic Vehicle or The Cooperative Gene, expressing ‘a form of cooperation among self-interested genes.’ (Dawkins 2006). And it is that idea of cooperation among self-interested players that is central. We may teach altruism and generosity, but all the lessons in the world cannot compensate for the absence of cooperative structures and mechanisms. As Dawkins states, where there are ‘suckers’ there will also be cheats. (Dawkins 1976: ch. 10.)

This is a call for reciprocity. Dawkins writes of ‘a form of cooperation among self-interested genes’, meaning that we need to teach generosity and altruism and build the cooperative society. Niceness, then, is a potential that can only be actualised through cooperative structures and collective mechanisms. In other words, niceness is not something we are born with ready-made, it is something we achieve.

Freedom. 
People need the effective ability to choose to cooperate or to defect. This is related to the need for equality, but involves something more. It requires political relations which enable players to be autonomous agents. This points to a social self-mediation as against an external mediation via the state and law. With the intervention of external laws and structures raised above direct relations, individuals lose the power to cooperate and defect according to their own strategies. Instead, their actions become part of an overall strategy imposed from the outside. Since any political and legal system is fallible, the greater the abstraction of governmental power, the more opportunities there will be for people to defect without being detected. 

Axelrodian cooperation cannot ﬂourish in conditions of external power, conditions where the social power of human beings has been alienated to the abstract forms of state and capital, rendering interaction opaque, the general interest impersonal and anonymous and reciprocity distant and indirect.

I come now to develop in more detail the social organisation implied by a system of social self-mediation.

Scale. 
Social self-mediation implies commune democracy and cooperative production as proceeding on a scale which enables face-to-face interaction and participation in decision making. Agreements are maintained through personal relationships based on trust between individuals rather than having to rely on contracts based upon legal rights, duties and obligations. Some such legislative framework may well be required, but alone it is insufficient in the absence of right relations and right conduct.

The greatest challenge here is to achieve the practical restitution of power alienated to the state and capital back to the social body and its organisation in such a way as to prevent a realienation in future. The decentralisation of organisation and egalitarian distribution of resources would be so designed as to prevent concentrations of power and increasing size exceeding the scale appropriate for reciprocity to proceed between individuals. Decentralisation and scale in organisation would make it difficult for the concentration and centralisation of power as an overscale. The key is appropriate scale. A confederal structure practising commune democracy would enable groups of interacting individuals to emerge, ‘clusters’ of individuals who know each other by sight and who deal with each other on an ongoing basis, linked together with a ratchet effect to form the greater whole. 

This view envisages community as a public life rooted in the everyday life activities and relations of individuals. Michael Taylor identifies the core attributes of such a community. Identifying community as an ‘open-textured’ concept, Taylor avers that ‘relations between members of a community be direct and many-sided and that they practise certain forms of reciprocity’ (Taylor 1982: 2/3). Reciprocity is central to Taylor’s conception of community:





Taylor identifies friendship as ‘perhaps the central goal’ for the individuals who form or join modern, secular communes. Tracing the notion of friendship back to Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, Taylor quotes Abrams and McCulloch in their study of contemporary communes: 'the defining properties of friendship are intimacy (“a friend is a second self”) and activity - doing something together, not just being together.’ It involves mutual concern. And whilst ‘the reciprocity of friendship means that one gets back what one gives,’ there is no calculation of benefits and costs. This is an important point, expressing a moral concern beyond calculations of self-interest, a point that indicates the limits of game theoretic reasoning, to which I shall return.

Taylor quotes Martin Buber in defining the final condition:





Buber establishes the attainment of real community as an eternal human need:





These principles establish the conditions of a communalist restructuring of society as part of an underlying trend to social renewal, a trend which Buber describes as ‘thoroughly topical and constructive.’ The transformations required by this restructuring are feasible in existing society, Buber argues, given the means that are available. Buber thus argued that the decision between a centralising socialism based upon state power and the spontaneous socialism of genuine social renewal is the most important political choice of the modern age:

The coming state of humanity in the great crisis depends very much on whether another type of socialism can be set up against Moscow, and I venture even today to call it Jerusalem.

Buber, from an address on Israel given by Professor Buber at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York City, April 1 1952





Taylor’s argument makes it clear that it is the quality of the relations between individuals in a community that matters, and which has precedence over the economistic arguments concerning ownership and distribution (Taylor 1982: 2/3). 

Taylor’s anarchic communities are therefore small and stable:





The problem with collectivities controlling and managing material resources is that they come to be mediated by representatives, bureaucrats, leaders, and institutions like the state and by codes, abstractions and reifications (Taylor 1982:27/8). If relations of reciprocity between individuals are not ensured, there is a danger of reifying communal bonds, removing them from human control and comprehension and reconstituting them at an abstract level:





Taylor has identified a serious problem here, one that concerns all attempts to achieve the common good or the universal interest - the problem of political and institutional mediation. Taylor establishes a clear opposition between the abstract institutional level and real community, holding that ‘the state tends to undermine the conditions which make the alternative to it workable’ ‘by weakening or destroying community.’ For Taylor, community is the ‘necessary condition for the maintenance of social order without the state’ (Taylor 1982: 57/8). 

There is, therefore, a need to establish the conditions for an authentic public realm as something distinct from the state and capital as alien spheres of control. 

The conditions of community outlined by Taylor can be envisioned as the public sphere as an internal mode of social order, replacing the impersonal codes and systemic imperatives of the state and capital with a sphere of citizen discourse and interaction. This formulation of community identifies the possibility of a public realm coordinated by citizen-producer discourse, association and interaction, incorporating themes of direct and many-sided relations and reciprocity within a form of social self-mediation and functional representation. By integrating universality into everyday life relations, the communal public sphere emerges as a mode of societal integration that replaces the alien publics of the state and capital with genuine reciprocity. ‘The state and capital exert force systematically from the outside whereas the urban public proceeds through genuine reciprocity and communication between individuals who connect directly at the level of relationships. In being relocated from the state to society, the public is not abolished but becomes coextensive with everyday life activities and relationships. (Critchley 2004: 180). This is to replace the non-interactive mode of external coordination via abstract collectivities and constraints with an interactive mode of internal coordination.

Communities must be of appropriate scale and size in order to give full scope to the practice of reciprocity through shared values and beliefs within direct and many-sided relations. Large societies are characterised by anonymity in the mass and by a constant turnover of people. In these conditions, relations between individuals become thin and attenuated, with direct or many-sided relations coming to be limited to close family and friends. Reciprocity cannot flourish in such a society. Scale is all important, therefore, for the continuation of reciprocal relations. The larger the community, the more thin and attenuated relations become. To flourish on an extensive scale, over an extended period, there needs to be reciprocation as an actual practice, and this implies stable, ongoing relations between individuals who know each other and meet each other regularly. 

Appropriate scale sets human interactions within reciprocal relationships so as to overcome the anonymity which has come to characterise societies subject to the forces of globalisation and urbanisation. TIT FOR TAT is a viable strategy only in society where people know each other and meet each other on a regular basis, where daily and ongoing interactions make reciprocity concentrated rather than diluted. Whereas ‘mass’ society is characterised by a degree of distance and distrust between its individual members, a community of close reciprocity will engender trust between individuals, bringing mediation closer to the ground of the everyday life world. 

The conditions are thus met:

Equality. 
Associative democracy is based upon functional representation and an egalitarian distribution of power and resources. A social self-control replaces the alien control of political bureaucracies and economic systems so as to exclude possibilities of free riding individuals and interests. The members of the community will be active, informed citizens possessing equal political status. Abstracting and appropriating forces will be extinguished so that there will be no tendencies for concentrations of power to build. Indeed, close, reciprocal relations enable the detection of attempts at free riding, so any exploitative behaviour will be identified and ended before it can grow. Any increase in wealth and power that issues from defection will be identified quickly and punished.

Transparency
Mediation through agencies removed from direct reciprocal relations renders reciprocity more opaque, making it more diﬃcult for individuals to see the strategies being played out around them. Face to face interaction enables individuals to see what each are doing and remember what each has done, a directness which encourages reciprocity, builds trust and fosters continuation in cooperation. There will be none of the anonymity of power and transferring of responsibility that characterises a society of alien mediation. 

Freedom.
In reciprocal relations, individuals will have the effective ability to retaliate against those who defect, withdrawing future cooperation until the defector resumes cooperation. Attempts to secure cooperation via an abstracted legal-institutional apparatus – the state - bring distance and opacity that can be exploited by defectors. Indeed, defectors can play their self-interested strategies whilst counting on most other individuals playing by the rules and obeying the laws. The defectors gain a licence to act whilst the co-operators lose their autonomy. Defections may get recognised, but they go unpunished.

In the reciprocal community, the task of retaliation will not be transferred to the abstract and anonymous force of the state and law but will be kept internally. The defector will be checked by a withdrawal of cooperation and increasingly diminished pay-oﬀs until the point is reached when it pays better to return to cooperation. The withdrawal of cooperation within ongoing relationships suffices and there is no need for an immense institutional and legal apparatus raised over the everyday lifeworld. The appropriate scale of the community ensures transparency and thus increases the possibility for detection and punishment. Axelrod comments that ‘no central authority is needed: cooperation based on reciprocity can be self-policing’ (Axelrod 1984: 174). In fact, central authority is not just unnecessary, it works to prevent Axelrodian cooperation. As Taylor argues, ‘the state tends to undermine the conditions which make the alternative to it workable’ ‘by weakening or destroying community’. 

Cooperation ﬂourishes best in a community that is not organised under the direction of a central authority. There may be some such authority, but its cohering principle runs through the whole and is grounded in social roots. Political order is organic rather than abstractly rational, emerging from within real society rather than being deduced from first principles and imposed from the outside. The reciprocal community requires a change in the location of control from outside to inside; responsibility for regulating common affairs and conflicts thus falls to the people involved, who learn through experience how to resolve issues without requiring recourse to an external body. In time, spontaneous cooperation is something that emerges from within a social order that now practises solidarity within reciprocal relationships, a solidarity which activates the deep rooted social and communal instinct amongst human beings. 

Everyday life is full of countless examples of the reciprocity human beings are capable of, demonstrating plenty of cooperation, conditional upon how others respond. The bulk of these activities take place without the need of legal intervention, but express a spontaneity that proceeds without the need of direction and control. The point remains, however, that the existence of a central organised authority that assumes direction of the common good from above serves to drain reciprocity away from the real relations between people and ossifies it at the institutional level. We need to identify the forms of common life that enable the healthy growth of reciprocal relations between individuals, societies in which cooperation could come to ﬂourish; we need to create common forms that are capable of continuous rejuvenation from the base upwards, in relation to the cohering principle established at the top in the form of the state as the supreme community of smaller communities. 

The cooperative society
Life is not a competition between individuals for scarce resources, a race to be first, and devil take the hindmost. Life is about cooperation, individuals furthering their ends together through a shared commitment to a common life. In the modern world, this cooperative ethic and commonality is denied within prevailing social relationships and is therefore projected upwards to the abstract level of the state. 

Marx highlighted how this left us with a bifurcated existence.

The perfected political state is by its nature the species-life of man in opposition to his material life. All the presuppositions of this egoistic life continue to exist outside the sphere of the state in civil society, but as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained its full degree of development man leads a double life, a life in heaven and a life on earth, not only in his mind, in his consciousness, but in reality. He lives in the political community, where he regards himself as a communal being, and in civil society, where he is active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers. The relationship of the political state to civil society is just as spiritual as the relationship of heaven to earth.

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 221

As social beings, we can live in neither the abstract communality of the state nor the egoistic realm of competitive market society. Happiness is a public good. An individual freedom attained through the pursuit of self-interest in the private realm is an incomplete freedom. Its completion requires cooperation with others in a genuine commonality. Otherwise, we remain in an atomistic realm where competition prevails over cooperation, where the individual seeks to maximise self-interest, treats other individuals as means to personal ends, with the result that all individuals become the slaves of alien powers. A collective unfreedom is therefore the systemic consequence of uncontrolled individual striving. 

We have been taught that freedom and happiness will result from the pursuit of self-interest in the private realm, but freedom and happiness are public qualities that are attainable only if we join with others in common endeavour. At the heart of this common endeavour are the virtues, qualities for right living, realising healthy human potentialities and establishing forms of the common life commensurate with those potentialities. Whilst these qualities relate to the natures of human beings, they do not emerge spontaneously but are developed; they require a habitus which permits the acquisition and the exercise of the virtues. There are practices of life within society which enable the qualities of right living to become habits. These qualities are good in themselves, in that they realise the healthy potentials of a person, and are therefore more than the characteristics a prevailing society requires for its efficient functioning. Activities are valued because they are inherently fulfilling.

Marx characterised the capital system in terms of the domination of exchange value over use value, a system in which things were valued only on account of their monetary value, and in which creative labour was reduced to alien labour, something stultifying. In the words of economists, work becomes a ‘disutility,’ something that human beings are forced to do in order to earn money and survive as best they can in an instrumental society. Marx’s emphasis on use value and creative labour entails an ethic which re-establishes the true relation between means and ends. Labour that is intrinsically rewarding in terms of the development of the range of human capacities is better than work as something that is parcelled out within the division of labour and only extrinsically rewarded. Realising a genuine commonality at the level of social relationships allows us to express our social natures through an ongoing commitment to our fellow citizens. We may, in Kantian manner, call it a community of ends, a community in which human beings treat each other as ends in themselves, and never merely as means. 

This civic community is infinitely preferable to the current society in which individuals pursue self-interest and must, given the prevailing social identity, treat others merely as means. A society of atomistic, instrumental relations is characterised by an endless competition, a perpetual striving after a personal aggrandizement and a state of constant anxiety. Individuals, even those who are winners in the competition, live in a constant state of nervous self-defence. The competition never ceases: others remain rivals for scarce resources, and are always trying to run ahead. Others are means to personal ends, rivals, threats. In such conditions, any social contract to ensure the civic peace has the form of a military alliance. 

We require a common ethic which emphasises what we have in common, ethical bonds that are forged not within the abstract community of the state but within social relationships, making possible a richer conception of morality than is present in the modern world. The task before us is to forge public bonds within social relationships so that exchange and interaction between individuals in the everyday social world proceeds in such a way as to bring about the common good of all. Commonality cannot but be illusory when located in a public realm abstracted from real social relationships. Ethical bonds are social bonds and have to be forged in the heart of civil society, requiring a social transformation that puts an end to the competitive, instrumental society in which individuals are compelled to pursue self-interest and reduce others to the status of mere means to personal ends. 

The innate disposition to evolve co-operative strategies
The conclusion is that human beings are rational beings capable of understanding what is in their best interests and acting accordingly. Human beings possess an innate disposition to evolve co-operative strategies in order to deal with situations where conflict may arise. The theory also suggests that ‘altruism’ will be the norm in human beings as social animals, through the natural selection of the genes that produce co-operative dispositions in their phenotypes. The upshot of all this is that with the provision of the appropriate context enabling communication and cooperation, human beings will, through their interaction and mutual information, choose the most rational outcome, and they will do so ‘spontaneously.’

The Prisoner's Dilemma shows that individuals could be better off by being more altruistic and conscientious and less self-interested. Since individual calculations of self-interest generate the least optimal outcome, the prisoner’s communicate and cooperate to their mutual advantage. Paradoxical as it may sound, the pursuit of self-interest on the part of individuals could result in the least optimal outcome for each and all together. Motivated by self-interest alone, two or more individuals may not be able to promote their interests as well as they could if they were more altruistic or more conscientious and cooperated with each other. There may well, then, be an evolutionary advantage in being genuinely altruistic and conscientious in our exchanges with others, as opposed to being calculating. 

In other words, there is more than calculation going on. 
We can spend forever designing perfect systems and strategies on paper. There is no shortage of such things. The problem with game theory, however, is that it assumes the very thing we need to change - the motives of the players. In a card game, this assumption is unproblematic. However, with respect to addressing the economic and ecological crises we face, the whole point is to forge new motives in order to achieve social and environmental justice. And that takes us into character, conduct and the virtues. Without those, the most perfect systems and strategies in the world are devoid of psychic, moral and social content.

As Tocqueville argued, civic virtues are more than the product of self-interested calculations. Enlightened or rational self-interest on the part of individuals generates ‘habits’ that ‘unconsciously’ turn the will toward the virtues. (Bellah 1984: 174). Provide the conditions of rational choice, and individuals will choose rationally. It follows from this that the human good does not have to be legislated and imposed upon individuals from above, and is more effective and more enduring when the conditions for its emergence are provided and it is allowed to emerge from below through solidary ties, transactions and exchanges.

That the practice of reciprocal altruism should be the source of moral approval and disapproval, including our attitudes and ideas of fairness, cheating, gratitude, and retribution, seems reasonable enough. The problem, as Peter Singer notes, is that this explanation seems to put these attitudes and ideas on too self-interested a footing. Although this is often referred to as reciprocal altruism, it is better described as enlightened self-interest, the knowledge that exchanges of assistance are likely to be to the long term interest of both parties. ‘Reciprocal altruism seems not really altruism at all; it could more accurately be described as enlightened self-interest.’ (Singer The Expanding Circle 1981 ch 2). 

So what, one might ask, if it serves to generate the moral outcomes we want? It’s just that, as Singer notes, our moral attitudes demand something more than that self- and social interest are served. In the social world outside of game theoretic calculations, there is such a thing as moral concern. ‘One might be a fully reciprocating partner in this practice without having the slightest concern for the welfare of the person one helps. Concern for one's own interests, plus the knowledge that exchanges of assistance are likely to be in the long-term interests of both partners, is all that is needed. Our moral attitudes, however, demand something very different.’ (Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle 1981 ch 2).

Altruistic behaviour as behaviour which benefits others
To express this moral concern, Singer argues that we should define altruistic behaviour as behaviour which benefits others at some initial cost to oneself, and is motivated by the desire to benefit others. (Singer 1981 ch 2).

That more than semantics is involved is suggested by the fact that psychologists have done tests which purport to show that we are more ready to act altruistically toward those we regard as genuinely altruistic than to those we think have ulterior motives for their apparently altruistic acts. Singer cites another experiment as proving something we know from our own attitudes: ‘we find genuine altruism a more attractive character trait than a pretense of altruism covering self-interested motives.’ (Singer 1981 ch 2). And since we find a genuine concern for others a more attractive character trait than a self-interested motivation, there are good reasons for thinking that this character trait could have been selected in evolution. Beyond the mere possession of an innate moral grammar, we may develop this capacity and come to give ourselves a moral norm in an explicit sense. Through the internalisation of this norm, individuals come to regard it as morally wrong to pursue self-interest at the expense of others, and morally right to make an agreement with others and keep their promises.

I would like now to develop the insights drawn from game theory showing how we may create the cooperative society by examining possibilities for radicalising the central principle of liberal democratic political theory, the principle of self-assumed obligation. In doing this I seek to show how it is possible to constitute democratic social authority in such a way as to unite, motivate and obligate individuals in a participatory public order based on active sovereignty, (co)responsibility, agency and active, continuous consent. This is to envisage a social order in which a self-determined reason from replaces a coercion which enforces control and unity from the outside.

The Parable of the Tribes 

Andrew Schmookler devised an interesting thought experiment that is pertinent here. The experiment is known as the parable of the tribes. (Schmookler 1984). The experiment imagines a group of tribes living in close proximity. Each tribe but one chooses to live in peace. The existence of one tribe that is willing to use violence to achieve its ends is enough to end the way of peace. Despite being the majority, the peaceful tribes find they can no longer live in peace. One is defeated and destroyed by the aggressive tribe, a second is conquered and subjugated. To escape the aggressor, a third tribe flees to some remote and inaccessible place. If the fourth wishes to survive, it will have to defend itself against the aggressor by likewise having recourse to violence. ‘The irony is that successful defence against a power-maximising aggressor requires a society to become more like the society that threatens it. Power can be stopped only by power.’ (Schmookler 1984: 21).

There are, then, four possible outcomes: [1] destruction, [2] subjugation, [3] withdrawal, and [4] imitation. ‘In every one of these outcomes the ways of power are spread throughout the system. This is the parable of the tribes.’ 

All but one of the tribes seeks peace and has no desire to exercise power over its neighbours, yet the existence of a single aggressive tribe willing to use violence to obtain its ends is sufficient to ensure that violence will eventually prevail, no matter the different responses of the other tribes. The parable of the tribes expresses the tragedy of the human condition. The parable suggests that the best intentions of the vast majority of people will always be undermined by the self-maximising, self-centred violence of the few. The existence of a single non-cooperator will result in situations in which there is no right course of action with respect to maintaining a peaceful way of living. Every option available to the tribes involves the loss of moral principle.

Schmookler thus concludes that ‘power is like a contaminant, a disease, which once introduced will gradually but inexorably become universal in the system of competing societies.’ (Schmookler 1984: 22). A single act of violence by one tribe is sufficient to begin a destructive cycle of reprisal and counter-reprisal until all tribes are dead, subjugated, lost or contaminated or dead. Power as self-seeking violence or coercion, as an influence that forces people to act against their will and against principle, corrupts us all. In the context of games theory, we need to discover ways of extending and entrenching cooperation, identifying and eliminating free riders, encouraging the will to cooperate and deterring defection. 

The experiment suggests the view that only power arrests power:

It is well known that no question played a greater role in these debates than did the problem of the separation or the balance of powers, and it is perfectly true that the notion of such a separation was by no means Montesquieu's exclusive discovery. As a matter of fact, the idea itself - far from being the outgrowth of a mechanical, Newtonian world view, as has recently been suggested - is very old; it occurs, at least implicitly, in the traditional discussion of mixed forms of government and thus can be traced back to Aristotle, or at least to Polybius, who was perhaps the first to be aware of some of the advantages inherent in mutual checks and balances. Montesquieu seems to have been unaware of this historical background; he had taken his bearings by what he believed to be the unique structure of the English constitution, and whether or not he interpreted this constitution correctly is of no relevance today and was of no great importance even in the eighteenth century. For Montesquieu's discovery actually  concerned the nature of power, and this discovery stands in so flagrant a contradiction to all conventional notions on this matter that it has almost been forgotten, despite the fact that the foundation of the republic in America was largely inspired by it. The discovery, contained in one sentence, spells out the forgotten principle underlying the whole structure of separated powers: that only 'power arrests power', that is, we must add, without destroying it, without putting impotence in the place of power. For power can of course be destroyed by violence; this is what happens in tyrannies, where the violence of one destroys the power of the many, and which therefore, according to Montesquieu, are destroyed from within: they perish because they, engender impotence instead of power. But power, contrary to what we are inclined to think, cannot be checked, at least not reliably, by laws, for the so-called power of the ruler which is checked in constitutional, limited, lawful government is in fact not power but violence, it is the multiplied strength of the one who has monopolized the power of the many. Laws, on the other hand, are always in danger of being abolished by the power of the many, and in a conflict between law and power it is seldom the law which will emerge as victor. Yet even if we assume that law is capable of checking power - and on this assumption all truly democratic forms of government must rest if they are not to degenerate into the worst and most arbitrary tyranny - the limitation which laws set upon power can only result in a decrease of its potency. Power can be stopped and still be kept intact only by power, so that the principle of the separation of power not only provides a guarantee against the monopolization of power by one part of the government, but actually provides a kind of mechanism, built into the very heart of government, through which new power is constantly generated, without, however, being able to overgrow and expand to the detriment of other centres or sources of power. Montesquieu's famous insight that even virtue stands in need of limitation and that even an excess of reason is undesirable occurs in his discussion of the nature of power; to him, virtue and reason were powers rather than mere faculties, so that their preservation and increase had to be subject to the same conditions which rule over the preservation and increase of power. Certainly it was not because he wanted less virtue and less reason that Montesquieu demanded their limitation….





I want to examine the idea of freedom as based upon will, conviction, commitment and identification in relation to the principle of self-assumed obligation. This is the idea, central to democratic political theory, that human beings are obligated – and motivated – only by those laws that they have themselves had a hand in making. 

I distinguish this principle from political subjectivism and juridical illusions of free will. To explain what I mean by ‘voluntarism’ here and why I place such emphasis upon it, I’d like to introduce the argument of philosopher and neurobiologist Owen Flanagan:

Accept that (as best we can tell) everything that happens has a set of causes that make it as it is; then proceed to distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary, the free and the unfree, in terms of the kinds of causation or causes that distinguish them.
Aristotle championed the voluntary-involuntary distinction long before there was a conflict between the Cartesian image of mind and agency and the scientific image. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle drew the involuntary-voluntary distinction this way: ‘What is involuntary is what is forced or is caused by ignorance. What is voluntary seems to be what has its origins in the agent himself when he knows the particulars that the action consists in.’ What Aristotle had in mind was something like this: An action is involuntary if it results from some sort of compulsion against which effort and thinking are impotent, or if the agent in no way knows or grasps what he is doing.

The distinction between voluntary and involuntary, then, relates to causality and action and distinguishes the free from the unfree. Freedom denotes a situation in which an action is voluntary, to the extent that it originates in an agent who knows and grasps what s/he is doing. Unfreedom denotes a situation in which an action is involuntary, in that it follows some form of compulsion, the agent does not know what s/he is doing. A voluntary act, then, is based on an intelligent or moral involvement on the part of the agent. Flanagan notes here:





‘Voluntary action involves the agent’s knowing what action he is performing, and acting from reasons and desires that are his own.’ This is possible if an agent is conscious and if consciousness has some causal efficacy. And it does. 





I develop the idea of freedom in terms of agency, the expression of power, and the assumption of responsibility. Human beings may be considered free to the extent that they can identify and be in control of their actions and their consequences. Achieving a repersonalisation which brings freedom and responsibility requires that we build social and political structures which are based upon the principle of self-assumed obligation as opposed to obedience. The ‘dull compulsion’ (Marx) at the heart of the modern rationalised, bureaucratised world is based upon social structures and organisations which proceed ‘without regard for persons’. (Weber) We need to make that regard for persons central to our social and political life.

The principle of self-assumed obligation is central to determining the nature of the relationship of the citizen to political authority, usually the state. Carole Pateman notes that there is an increasing tendency for theorists to argue that political obligation is owed primarily not to the state but to fellow citizens. Whilst many of these theorists continue to assume that the state does have a justified claim on its citizens, the argument that obligation is something citizens owe to each other undermines this assumption. This does not undermine the case for political authority as such, but it does force us to question the nature of any political institution or organisation which claims to represent the citizen body. As Pateman states, ‘the question cannot be avoided of why and on what grounds, if obligation is owed to fellow citizens, it must also be assumed that it is justifiably owed to the state.’ (Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory 1989: 68). 

The idea that citizens owe obligation to each other entails that, in pooling and giving effective expression to their sovereign power, citizens are capable of constituting their own political forms. This approach allows us to make a distinction between government, as an expression of popular sovereignty, and the state, as an instrument of coercion. The former expresses the principle of political obligation, the latter expresses the fact of political obedience.

For Pateman, it not surprising that theorists have begun to argue in this way. ‘The logic of the voluntarist arguments that look to everyday interactions of citizens, and to benefits and participation, is that, if obligations are assumed in this way, they are owed to fellow members of institutions and fellow participants in social practices.’ (Pateman 1989: 68). Pateman points out that this raises an important question about what counts as ‘political’ obligation. Even more than this, though, it raises an important question as to the nature and locus of political authority. Following Pateman’s reasoning, we can reappropriate ‘the political’ and public life and distinguish government from the abstraction of the modern centralized state:





Arguing that we should organize political life on the basis of self-assumed obligation, Pateman doesn’t hesitate to spell out the radical implications of the voluntarist principle as a source of political obligation:





A partial realization is no realization at all, it is the sacrifice of the principle to prevailing institutions and structures. Pateman is therefore concerned to expose the pretence of a liberal-democratic practice that is content to restrict principle far short of its realization:





The principle is capable of an extension beyond political life. If self-assumed obligation is crucial to freedom and legitimacy, then it ought to be extended to all areas of the common life, into our social and economic lives rather than being restricted to the political level. The principle contains a demand for a substantive freedom and equality, going beyond their formal expression at the political level. If self-assumed obligation is crucial to legitimate forms of power and authority, binding, motivating and obligating individuals in common purposes, then it should be extended throughout the whole of social life, replacing the ‘dull compulsion’ of social and economic processes and restoring responsibility and personality to the world.

Marx well understood that the force of everyday necessity within capitalist social relations not only rendered freedom merely formal at the political level, and free will a juridical illusion, it made the need for explicit coercion unnecessary. ‘The dull compulsion of economic relations completes the subjection of the labourer to the capitalist. Direct force, outside economic conditions, is of course still used, but only exceptionally ...’ (Marx 1974: 688-9). 

My argument is concerned to challenge the coercion that prevails at the level of everyday material life processes by demanding the realisation of the principle upon which the legitimacy of the liberal democratic state is based. If human beings are legitimately bound only by those laws in which they participate in making, then this implies a participatory social order based upon active consent. I would look to develop that implication against the institutions which form the basis of the liberal democratic social order, namely representative political forms and private property. This would force liberalism to confront the fact that its key institutions stand in contradiction of its central principle.

Pateman notes that theorists of the liberal state have only one convincing response to this challenge. ‘They can argue that participatory democracy is not empirically feasible; the liberal democratic state is the best we can do.’ But that response comes with implications that are fatal to the liberal position. ‘The answer implies that voluntarism is irrelevant to political life. Although we are capable of assuming obligations in our everyday life, the activity has no place outside the private sphere. It is, in short, to admit that the noble liberal ideal of individual freedom and equality and its corollaries of self-assumed obligation and the vision of social life as a ‘voluntary scheme’ can only be very partially realized.’ Frankly, the situation is even worse than that. For, far from assuming obligations according to the voluntary principle in our everyday life, human beings are subject to what Marx referred to as ‘dull compulsion’, a situation which Weber characterised as a bureaucratisation and instrumentalisation that proceeds without regard for persons. However formal it may be, the liberal state is the only place where the principle of self-assumed obligation exists, upon which the legitimacy of the state rests. 

Pateman’s challenge is for liberal democracy to live up to its ideals, or to recognise their hollowness. ‘If political theorists dismiss the possibility of participatory or self-managing democracy, they should stop pretending that the freely created relationship of political obligation is involved, because this relationship is an integral part of a political ideal now admitted to be out of reach. Instead, they should argue directly that, given the empirical necessity of the liberal democratic state and the advantages that it has over other existing forms of political system, there are good, but non-voluntarist, reasons for political obedience.’ This means explicitly repudiating notions of obligation in favour of a stark recognition of the reality of obedience. It means abandoning notions of freedom based upon notions of choice, reason, will, and responsibility to instead embrace a contemporary version of Plato’s hierarchical organic functionalism, knowing one’s station and its attendant duties, a natural duty of political obedience. If we find this unpalatable, we may have recourse to something like Plato’s ‘noble lie’. But maybe that is how the principle of self-assumed obligation functions now, as a claim to democratic self-representation that is denied by the facts of political life. In short, we have both social and political obedience, but we legitimate the coercive social order by reference to the representative state as an ideological project. 

So there it is, explaining why I make a big thing of voluntarism. It is key to repersonalisation and remoralisation in a disenchanted Weberian world that proceeds without regard for persons. And it establishes a key distinction between obligation and obedience. If theorists want to argue for the superiority of political obedience over the idea that human beings, as citizens and moral agents, are obligated only by laws they themselves have had a hand in making, then let them do so. And let them abandon any pretence at freedom and democracy in the process. If we retain the principle, then let us realize it in full. 

Pateman refers to those political theorists who present a utilitarian account of the relationship between citizens and the liberal-democratic state:





In effect, Pateman confronts the liberal democratic social order with the ideal of self-government and participation that is contained in its own principles, but denied by its practices. Liberal democracy either realises its principles, and in the process transcends its key institutions, or it sacrifices its principles in order to retain these institutions, and thereby loses legitimacy. I argue for the realisation of the principle of self-assumed obligation. And I argue for its extension throughout the social order as a condition of achieving freedom and assuming responsibility, as a condition of repersonalising and remoralising the world. And I challenge liberalism to give up its pretence to affirm the principle of self-assumed obligation, and the claims to freedom and voluntarism and democracy that are its corollary, and make an explicit assertion of obedience in face of liberal institutions.









The ‘objective’ discharge of business denotes business proceeding according to calculable rules and ‘without regard for persons’. As Weber argues:





There is something emancipatory about exchanging ties of personal dependence for an objective dependency of all equally. But it remains a dependency. And, on the basis of bureaucratisation as theorised by Weber, that dependency appears irrevocable. Marx criticised the distinction between the formal freedom and equality of citizens at the abstract level of the state and the substantive unfreedom and inequality at the level of civil society. That contradiction between abstract and concrete serves as a critical tool in Marx. But to confirm universal objective dependency at the level of the state, replacing an obligation which citizens choose and give consent to with obedience is to extinguish the critical potential of the principle of self-assumed obligation. Relations based on rational universal law are an advance on personal relations based on birth and privilege. Weber thus accents the key metaphor of the level playing field. The characteristic principle of bureaucracy, he argues, is





Marx wrote of the need for law 'to hold good for everybody’ (Marx and Engels 1846a: 329-30). This is a case for 'rational' law, law as universal. Except that Marx is under no illusions as to the autonomy of the law here. He condemns ‘the illusion that law is based on the will, and indeed on the will divorced from its real basis — on free will.’ (Marx GI 1999: 80-81).

This juridical illusion, which reduces law to the mere will, necessarily leads, in the further development of property relationships, to the position that a man may have a legal title to a thing without really having the thing.

Marx GI 1999: 81-82

Marx, in short, did more than demand the realisation of some rational ideal contained in political or juridical principle. He related any such principle to wider social relations. The same with respect to voluntarism. And here is where the bigger problems lie.

Max Weber made Marx's separation of the workers from their means of production a general category in the modern rationalised world. Weber extended the range of separations within the social order to theorise a general alienation, human beings being separated from their means of control throughout the whole of their social life. Weber argued that it is only in 'the complete depersonalisation of administrative management by bureaucracy' that ‘the separation of public and private' spheres fundamental to the capitalist economy comes to be realised 'fully and in principle' (Weber B 1991: 239). This 'general' separation 'is the common basis of the modern state, in its political, cultural and military sphere, and of the private capitalist economy' (Weber ES2 1978: 1394), generating bureaucratisation and centralisation in place of self-assumed control and responsibility. The result is a depersonalised world that deprives human beings of their freedom. Human beings becomes passive functionaries of processes that operate outside of their conscious, creative agency and will. This general separation is therefore an anti-democratic force which us inherent in rationalised modernity, confirming Marx's identification of the state and capital as alienated social powers blocking democratisation.

That the principle of self-assumed obligation at the heart of the liberal democratic state should come to have a formal, even fictional, character should come as no surprise. For Weber, the development of the modern state 'is a complete parallel to the development of the capitalist enterprise through the gradual expropriation of independent producers' (Gerth and Mills ed 1991: 50). It should come as no surprise, then, that the dull compulsion that Marx noted as operating within the capitalist economy should come to be expressed as a political obedience at the state level. The separation of the producers from their means of production is one of a series of 'separations' within modern social organisation (Weber 1968: 39). That this includes the expropriation of 'the means of politics' and the material means of administration from people (Weber P 1994:314 315) exposes the hollowness of the principle of self-assumed obligation at the core of the liberal democratic state. Weber refers also to the separations of officials from the means of administration, of workers from the means of production, of intellectual workers from the means of mental production, of soldiers from the means of violence in the army (Weber S P 1994:279 281 314 315/6; Turner 1993:177; Sayer 1991:135; Turner in Gerth and Mills ed 1991:xxiv). The 'means of operation' in all spheres are 'concentrated by means of a bureaucratically structured human apparatus' (Weber S 1994:281). It follows from this that we live in a social order that is fundamentally lacking in responsibility in the sense of will, moral purpose and commitment. It is a world in which function has replaced purpose. Such an order proceeds ‘without regard for persons;’ it is an order in which conformist bureaucrats are capable of following rules and routines to produce great evil and destruction. To avoid this, we need to recover responsibility throughout social life; we need to recover will, purpose and consciousness, a sense of owning our actions and their consequences.

Weber notes the extent to which the separation at the heart of rationalisation effectively denies democracy. For Weber the 'concentration of the material means of operation' entails an increasing 'socialisation' which 'inevitably means increasing bureaucratisation' (Weber PG 1994:147). On the basis of depersonalisation, democratisation entails the 'levelling of the governed in opposition to the ruling and bureaucratically articulated group, which in turn may occupy a quite autocratic position, both in fact and in form' (Weber B 1991:224/6 231). The principle of self-assumed obligation contains the ideal of the governed coming to take an active share in the act of governing. In contrast, political obedience is based on the separation of the government from the governed, both in fact and form. This confirms the lack of initiative and responsibility that individuals have in their social existence. In alienating their creative labour, workers becomes objects of the production process; in alienating their political subjectivity, the demos become objects of political administration. Their sovereign power is revealed to be illusory. In these circumstances, political obligation as something we voluntarily assume in recognition of our collective interests is an ideal contradicted by the real. Political obedience is concomitant with economic compulsion.

Weber rejects the idea of subjecting relations of authority to the elective principle as Utopian (Weber B 1991:229). Once it exists, the bureaucratic apparatus of authority cannot be overthrown. The bureaucratic 'machine' 'makes “revolution,” in the sense of a forcible creation of entirely new formations of authority, increasingly impossible, especially when the apparatus controls the modern means of communication .. and also by virtue of its internal rationalised structure' (Weber B 1991:230). Bureaucracy is the most effective form of organisation for complex industrial societies (Wright 1978: 184), it is an instrument of power (Wright 1978:185). Those in control of the bureaucracy have effective power. The principle of self-assumed obligation is merely an ideological cover for elite control in these circumstances. We have obligation in principle, but obedience in fact.

Far from being a solution, Weber makes democratisation itself a force for further bureaucratisation: ‘the great state and the mass party are the classical soil for bureaucratisation' (Weber B 1991:209). In his essay on socialism, Weber that 'it is the dictatorship of the official, not that of the worker, which ... is on the advance', and ends with the question: 'Who would then take control of and direct this new economy? On this point the Communist Manifesto is silent' (Weber 1978: 260, 262; R S 1994:70 292). Weber concludes that a ra​tional socialism would be a 'house of servitude', the perfection of the 'severance' which characterises capitalist modernity, not at all its negation. The argument ‘so much worse, the better,’ will succeed in generalising the worse, extinguishing the better for good. The universal democratic community promised by the principle of self-assumed obligation is thus realised as an 'inescapable universal bureaucratisation' (Weber S 1994: 279). Weber argues that 'in large states everywhere modern democracy is becoming a bureaucratised democracy’ governed by 'paid officials' (Weber S 1994: 279). Unable to identify any way of seeing how voluntarism and personality could be preserved, Weber saw the descent into a monocratic bureaucratised society as inexorable, predicting that the 'bureaucratisation of society will encompass capitalism too, just as it did in Antiquity' (Weber 1983: 159).

Weber places a heavy emphasis upon bureaucracy as irrevocable, 'indestructible' and 'inescapable' (Weber 1968:987; PG 1994:146 156 159), subjecting individuals irrevocably to 'the objective force of an apparatus operating autonomously above their heads' (Habermas 1989:307). Fitting the contours of a repressive modern rationalisation, Weber’s realism explicitly abandons the 'rational' concern to put human affairs on a moral footing. Instead of a view of human beings joining together to assume conscious control of their common affairs, there is a bureaucratic regulation which exercises an external, coercive control. 

The state is thus thrown back into the arbitrary exercise of power from which the principle of self-assumed obligation had offered an alternative. As the characteristic institution of the liberal social order, the bureaucratic institution cannot resolve the problem of coercion and cannot find a moral standard to justify the exercise of power (Unger 1984:172). We remain confined within the constraints of a coercive social order. Even worse, social coercion is extended to political life, with obedience replacing obligation, resulting in a new form of dependency in which the bureaucratic interest replaces a public interest formed by popular consent. With respect to the normative concern with human ontology and its realisation, a central concern of the tradition of ‘rational freedom’ I defend, bureaucratic forms stand condemned for denying opportunities for human growth and self-development, subordinating persons to things, and failing to satisfy the essential need to be human (Unger 1984:174; Ehrlich 1996:63; Bottomore 1985:27). Instead of radicalising the principle of self-assumed obligation to create a self-governing social order, the denial of personality, responsibility and agency is confirmed in a thoroughly rationalised social order. An externally imposed rationally regulated action replaces communal social action (Habermas 1991:341/2), systematically eliminating subjectivity, autonomy and agency from everyday life. Instead of a cooperation engendered by freely choosing individuals in their relations, there is a standardisation and uniformisation expressed through the refinement of discipline, surveillance and regulation, the domination of administrative personnel and the increasing instrumentalisation of the individual in an increasingly formalised life (Weber P 1994:314; Sayer 1991:144; Turner 1993:207; Stauth and Turner 1988:49/50; Schroeder 1992:114/5). Instead of self-government there is 'a strictly regulated, reserved self-control' on the part of individual subjects (Weber 1974:173). 

To ensure that the principle of self-assumed obligation has living, active content, we need to create new solidarities at the level of social relations, repersonalise our material life processes and rid them of that ‘dull compulsion’ that ensures our everyday life world proceeds ‘without regard for persons’. That means enriching and extending the scope of participating in the terms by which we agree to be governed across all of the affairs of our common life. Forging universality and commonality within social relationships to revalue the public significance of the associative space of civil society depends upon coming to reclaim the commons. 
 
9 COMMONING – RECLAIMING THE COMMONS

I shall start this chapter with a seventeenth century folk poem, one of the pithiest condemnations of the English enclosure movement — the process of fencing off common land and turning it into private property. In a few lines, the poem manages to criticize double standards, expose the artificial and controversial nature of property rights, and take a slap at the legitimacy of state power. And it does it all with humor, without jargon, and in rhyming couplets. (James Boyle, Duke Law School Professor).

The law locks up the man or woman
Who steals the goose from off the common
But leaves the greater villain loose
Who steals the common from off the goose.
The law demands that we atone
When we take things we do not own
But leaves the lords and ladies fine
Who take things that are yours and mine.
The poor and wretched don’t escape
If they conspire the law to break;
This must be so but they endure
Those who conspire to make the law.
The law locks up the man or woman
Who steals the goose from off the common
And geese will still a common lack




The simple truth is that the Earth does not belong to us; we belong to the Earth. The difficult part is embedding that truth socially and institutionally.  

I have addressed interpersonal relations with respect to reciprocity, quality and quantity of human interactions and cooperation. I shall later develop the idea of a partnership between human and biotic communities with reference to environmental ethics as an eco-praxis. Throughout, I argue for a common ethic. I shall later examine the idea of a green spirituality. At this point, I will examine the interrelated themes of the commons, collective action, commoning and community.


Community and commoning – the recovery of close interpersonal relations

In For the Common Good, Herman Daly and John Cobb refer to humanity's imminent confrontation with the 'wild facts' of environmental destruction and social disintegration. The dominant worldview and the activities associated with it have brought about an impending ecological catastrophe. In offering solutions I am not going to pretend that the situation is anything but grave. Like Daly and Cobb, I argue ‘for the common good’. My case for an overarching ethical and institutional framework is based upon the need to ensure that individuals make choices and take actions together for the long term common good. I recognise that we may well ourselves have run out of the long term. We lost the common good a long time ago, and there are no guarantees we can get it back.

In the Foreword to the Daly and Cobb book, Paul Ekins writes that ‘these latter day Furies will not be appeased by technical, economic or technological sophistication.’ We will need these things, but alone they will not suffice to address the magnitude of the problem we face. ‘Only a recovery of close interpersonal relations in the context of community and of close human-nature relations in the context of a biocentric ethic would be sufficient to lay these Furies to rest. And such a twin recovery implies a revolution in values that can only stem from spiritual transformation.’ (Ekins Foreword to Daly and Cobb 1990).

Community action – policies that can draw communities together

Let us identify some obvious fallacies and get them out of the way. To point to a problem and say ‘something should be done’ and it’s ‘time for action’ is plainly inadequate. That shouldn’t need saying, but even at this late stage I see this far too often, soon followed by laments about a passive, inert and uncaring public. To say that we need to take action and, therefore, this particular action is worthy of support because it is better than doing nothing seems to say more, but is guilty of fallacious reasoning. Doing the wrong thing may make a situation worse and cost a lot of time and money in the process. To say that it is ‘time for action’ and that ‘something should be done’ is the easy part. The difficult part lies in creating the conditions of and the frameworks for effective action. From the need for action it does not follow that any action will do. It has to be the right action, deploying resources effectively, and being worthy of the time, energy and commitment of people. There is a need for effectiveness. Stern wrote clearly and well on this. Since the environmental crisis is global in its origins and its impacts, it requires a global deal concluded at the supra-national level. Stern sets out the terms of this deal. ‘That global deal must be effective, in that it cuts back emissions on the scale required; it must be efficient, in keeping costs down; and it must be equitable in relation to abilities and responsibilities, taking into account both the origins and impact of climate change’ (Stern 2010). 

Effective, efficient and equitable – these set the terms of collective action that is comprehensive and coordinated, across and between all sectors, a common ethic that applies to, obligates and inspires all equally.

And we may as well identify and reject scare tactics while we are at it: ‘here is a looming crisis that promises catastrophe, act now!’ Actually, the approach is more likely to paralyse than inspire. By now, most people have got the message and don’t need to be unduly alarmed with the message ‘act or else’. People will act if structures making for effective action are in place. That is where we should be concentrating our energies. We need to ensure that we and our societies are fit for purpose. We need to live well, wherever it will be we will live. 

Words of wisdom here from Andrew Boyd:

Compassion hurts. When you feel connected to everything, you also feel responsible for everything. And you cannot turn away. Your destiny is bound with the destinies of others. You must either learn to carry the Universe or be crushed by it. You must grow strong enough to love the world, yet empty enough to sit down at the same table with its worst horrors.

Resources such as time, money, skill and expertise, energy and effort, good will are always limited and therefore need to be used wisely. What can be said is that the actions we need to take in order to address climate change and adapt are so extensive and intensive that all individuals must be involved, their efforts organised and canalised through the whole community. For that to happen, we need to create this whole community. We need to develop policies and practices that are capable of drawing individuals together in communities, and which are capable of drawing these communities together, ultimately constituting a global civil society, united by a global ethic. 

Managing the commons
A holistic approach seeks to protect the chemistry and ecology of places. Tim Flannery envisages a future Gaian Security Council, sufficiently empowered and constituted so that it is the ultimate authority over global commons. Surveillance systems are capable of monitoring resources globally and detecting transgressors. The political aspects — clear, agreed rules, penalties and conflict resolution — are, however, still lacking. What is needed is a frame of reference which draws together and strengthens all those forces which have sprung up to protect human and natural communities from the encroachment of commercial forces, and fosters the stewardship of the commonwealth of life. 

The recovery of close interpersonal relations
Environmental destruction and social disintegration can be checked only if we develop close interpersonal relations in the context of community and foster close human and nature relations in the context of a partnership ethic. A genuine democracy is emerging through different ways in which we are coming to value the world around us, moving beyond possession and ownership to stewardship and to commoning. The evidence of a steady 're-commoning' of essential resources underway across the world points in the direction of a common stewardship, something which involves a renewed recognition of the public benefits that are derived from the ecological systems within which we live and upon which we depend. This responds to the need for the safeguarding and equitable sharing of ecosystem resources.

Toward a Culture of Solidarity and a Just Economic Order

Human beings strive to live a fulfilling life according to their talents and proclivities and in solidarity with each other. Standing in the way of the democracy of place, person and purpose that would achieve this goal are the exploitative, unjust and autonomy-impairing structures of the prevailing socio-economic system. The gap between rich and poor is widening, fracturing society between the powerful, who come to command and control a disproportionate share of resources, and the powerless, who command nothing, least of all respect. Clearly, democracy, as the rule of the demos, is impossible when the individuals composing the demos have been rendered subaltern and unimportant. 

In a world in which civil society has been hollowed out, stripped of its communal power, political significance and moral meaning, societies have lost their ability to control their affairs and are instead dependent upon external forces. Communal values and goals denied within society have been projected outwards and upwards upon governmental agencies, which in turn can do little more than attempt to regulate and constrain the real collective force, the systemic imperatives which follow the dynamic of endless accumulation and profit. 

Instead of the external constraint of society by the imperatives of private accumulation, the process of accumulation needs to be constrained in the interests of serving the end of social use. Where power and wealth is endlessly accumulated ruthlessly, society will fracture between rich and poor, generating a destructive cycle of reprisal and counter-reprisal. There will be no peace on earth without social and environmental justice. Economics should be restored to its original concern with the household, the oikos, so that the emphasis comes to be placed upon the use of resources for the good of society. The accent is thus placed upon a socially useful and ecologically wise economics. 

The social and moral matrix
[motives and incentives – social and moral matrix or infrastructure to constrain and canalise - flourishing in a social context – a vision of human nature]
The solution to the problem of collective action lies in devising a set of social arrangements that alters the balance of incentives towards cooperative behaviour, constraining the acquisitive impulses and appetites that set the individual good against the common good, and create motivations for altruistic behaviour. Such a view presupposes a philosophical anthropology which contains a notion of the ‘good,’ the human good and the good life for human beings. This conception has clear affinities with Aristotle, for whom human beings are social beings whose potentialities can be realised and exercised only in a social environment, what Aristotle called a politikon bion or public life. My argument expresses a politics of value that is grounded in this tradition of eudaimonistic happiness, a virtue theory which identifies human beings as social beings requiring a public life for their self-realisation. This tradition sees happiness in terms of flourishing. I emphasise the social context of flourishing well. (Critchley 1995; Critchley 2013: 418-426). 

Here, I want to develop this concept in relation to commoning. Flourishing is something that occurs in a social environment, and engaging with that social infrastructure is crucial to restraining the urges of material self-interest.  ‘Flourishing happens in a social context, and engaging with that social context is a central feature of putting the genie of pecuniary values back into the bottle, and of developing a politics of value that comes from a particular vision of human nature.’ (Patel 2009: 175).

This approach recognises the need to set markets in a social and moral matrix in order to check the endless and overriding hunger for accumulation and profit which has brought about ecological crisis. And it recognises the need for new ways of valuing the world as an alternative to economic values. These may be understood as reembedded markets, markets driven by need, not profit. (Kay 2004: ch 28). Acknowledging the embeddedness of the market in society, and of society in ecology, inverts the modern mechanics of value, affirming use value over exchange value. To take one example, ‘the free software movement has been practicing communing —the hacking of market society, putting its power in everyone's hands.’ (Patel).

Commoning integrates individuals within a web of social relations that serve to restrain the acquisitive appetites by generating new ways of relating to others, fostering more respectful ways of valuing the world we share in common. 

Socially embedded markets
Understanding how the sociology and the psychology of the commons works, a genuine solution to the problem of collective action involves changing the way individuals interact with each other and relate to the world and its resources. For Raj Patel, this involves moving beyond ownership to stewardship and to commoning. ‘Commoning involves other people putting limits on what resources you can exploit, how much you can accumulate, how things will be shared.’ The free market lacks these constraints. ‘Within it, you're free to buy, sell, consume or produce whatever you like.’ (Patel 2009: 112). ‘Commoning involves a web of social relations designed to keep our baser urges in check, fostering different ways of valuing our world, and of relating to others.’ (Patel 2009: 98). 

Patel denies that this entails the end of all property. He thus affirms the value of personal property. One can go further here and refer to Aristotle’s justification of private property as giving people a stake in society. Patel justifies private property ‘within reason’. What matters, according to Aristotle, is social use. 

And this isn’t a demand for the abolition of markets, either. Markets are good ways to decentralize decision making, and for that reason seem integral to a functioning democracy where people are indeed free to choose, ‘within reason.’ Diane Elson argues in favour of socialized markets as against market socialism. (Elson 2000). Exchange with democratically constrained and socially embedded markets is much easier than is the case with systems of barter, and also avoids the rigidities associated with central planning and coordination. ‘What needs to be plucked out of markets is the perpetual and overriding hunger for expansion and profit that has brought us to the brink of ecological catastrophe; what needs to be plucked out of us is the belief that markets are the only way to value our world.’ (Patel 2009: 189). 

Raj Patel identifies commoning as playing a central role in this new way of valuing the world. The commons can be a resource, asset or place. Commoning is a process concerning how we value these things as we come to share the world around us. Commoning thus involves the mutual agreement of limits on the sharing and use of resources. This involves building collectivities that embody respect, rights and responsibilities, helping us to value the world differently. This entails a solution to the tragedy of the commons.

The term ‘the tragedy of the commons’ was coined by the microbiologist Garrett Hardin. In a 1968 Science article, Hardin argued that unconstrained individuals will be overrun by their own selfish desires to consume a shared resource, even if they know that their behaviour is destroying that resource in the process. As a result of pursuing rational self-interest, individuals will act in such a way as to destroy the very resource they depend on for survival. 

As a piece of reasoning, Hardin stated the problem of collective action clearly and cogently. As a piece of history, however, Hardin's views contradicted the known facts of human behaviour with respect to how people managed the commons in the past. Indeed, Hardin’s reasoning applies most of all to how self-interested individuals come to view a common resource in the aftermath of enclosure, and not how people actually did and do manage the commons.

The problem is that commons systems which have proven their worth in managing a common resource have been and still are being dismantled with the enclosure of the global commons. The result is the destruction of millennia of accumulated knowledge about how to manage scarce resources collectively and sustainably, both in terms of the technology needed to keep the resources plentiful and also the social intelligence which ensures that no one takes more than a fair share.

The problem is not one of greedy human nature but of systems, motives and incentives. The tragedy of the commons is produced by a set of arrangements which permits and even encourages individuals to override their own better judgment to satisfy their selfish natures. 

Elinor Ostrom, the 2009 Nobel Laureate in economics, has sought to identify the conditions under which human beings could come to manage 'common pool resources' from below. There is no single and no simple solution. As she writes in Governing the Commons:





To value something as a common resource involves setting up the rules through which it can be used by society. Favourable conditions include the ability to exclude outsiders; mutually agreed rules which make it clear who is entitled to do what; promise-keeping; appropriate penalties for transgressors; an ability to monitor the resource; and mechanisms to resolve conflict. (Ostrom 2009). 

In truth, what needs to be uprooted is the central dynamic of capital accumulation, for it is this that drives the perpetual and overriding hunger for expansion and profit, and it is this endless pursuit of growth that has brought us face to face with social disruption and ecological destruction. This accumulative dynamic needs to be plucked out of our social metabolic order and the way it determines our exchange with nature. All the appeals to the common social and ecological good in the world are to no avail unless we address this problem as a problem of the entire social metabolic order – uprooting capital as a social relationship, abolishing the hierarchical division of labour, altering the whole system of incentives and rewards, setting ownership and control within a social context and, in the process, altering structured patterns of behaviour so as to change the choices available to self-interested individuals. Only then can we have what Patel calls ‘reembedded markets, markets driven by need, not profit.’ (Patel 2009: 189). 

The rules of commoning are fundamentally incompatible with the overarching imperatives of exchange value.  Commoning therefore requires the renegotiation of the boundaries between state, civil society and the economy as we come to embed the market in the social world (Lange 2010). In the process, we may experiment with new ways of sharing the world. In addition to being more efficient, these initiatives will make our communities healthier and safer places to live, and will also foster a more participatory and equitable culture. 
 
Socially embedded markets are about putting economics back into its true place as the means in the service of the end of the good life. As Robert Skidelsky makes clear, John Maynard Keynes never made the mistake of equating economics with the good life. Economists are custodians of the good life, not its creators:





And in establishing the right relation between means and ends, we become able to reclaim the qualities that the abstracting forces of capitalist economics have taken from us, our social powers, our capacities for self-government, our bodies and senses, our psychological and emotional faculties. And those faculties grow stronger the more they are exercised. Raj Patel identifies ‘discussion, regulation, trust, generosity and forbearance’ as ‘ways to reclaim what the market has taken from us psychologically.’ (Patel 2009: 193). I will argue the same point with respect to the acquisition and exercise of the virtues as qualities we need for right living. Patel asks how we may come ‘to body-build our political selves.’ Following Marx, I argue for the practical reappropriation of the social power alienated to the state and capital and for its reorganisation and exercise in a federated system of social self-government. 

All emancipation is reduction of the human world and of relationships to man himself.

Only when real, individual man resumes the abstract citizen into himself and as an individual man has become a species-being in his empirical life, his individual work and his individual relationships, only when man has recognized and organized his forces propres as social forces so that social force is no longer separated from him in the form of political force, only then will human emancipation be completed.

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 234-235 

This describes the political investment of civil society, society acquiring a governmental significance when it comes to the control and management of common affairs.

In addition to body-building our political selves, however, we need to strengthen our mental, moral, psychological and emotional selves. Here, I conceive the virtues as the qualities we need to live well, proceeding to argue for the creation of the habitus in which these qualities can be acquired and exercised, qualities which grow stronger through their exercise. I come later to examine Martha Nussbaum’s ‘creating capabilities,’ character formation, and the acquisition and exercise of the virtues.

Sharing and managing common resources

Creating capabilities is about creating and/or strengthening the epistemological and structural capacity to see through and break through the fetish systems of production and politics which prevail in the modern world. In seeing through the illusions and rationalisations of power, we need also to transcend the limitations of existing social arrangements in a practical way; ‘we will need to experiment with ways of sharing the world, and of figuring out the boundaries of how we pool resources.’ (Patel 2009: 193).

This involves organising self-interested individuals within forms of collective action and common life so as to ensure a pattern of interactions that are conducive to the long term common good, forming collectivities that connect individual self-interest and the general interest, and building communities that respect equal human dignity, while enabling us to properly value the world around us.

In this sense, democracy concerns more than the act of voting in periodic elections, or membership of political parties. More important than these are the conditions which make for a democratic way of life. Raj Patel argues ‘that democracy's triumphs come not from the ballot box but from the circumstances that make democracy possible: equality, accountability, and the possibility of politics.’ (Patel 2009: 193).

The key words here are the ‘possibility of politics’. In light of what I argue throughout, the ‘possibility of politics’ amounts to much more than ensuring the conditions for democratic elections, rights, opportunities for alternative viewpoints, as important as all these undoubtedly are. I argue for ‘the political’ in the expansive sense of creative human self-realisation, the conditions, social forms, virtues and capabilities required for the turning of healthy potentialities into actualities – politics as politikon bion, the social or public life required for human flourishing. And that includes the conditions for planetary flourishing:





The institutions of government and property
The institutions of government and property are subject to challenge and alteration to a far greater extent than we have realised, something which allows us to envisage and develop new ways to value and steward the world. Paul Hirst uses the concept of ‘associative democracy’ here (Hirst 1994). Developing new modalities will be a collective enterprise, more difficult than changing individual incentives through prices and taxes on the market but infinitely more rewarding. Happiness cannot be achieved through its solitary pursuit, but from the experience of living together and engaging in the kind of associative and communitarian politics that will help us value our common resources and common future together.

In fine, human beings are social beings and are not and have never been a mere collection of private individuals who have nothing in common, united by nothing more than a contract to create a minimal government. I develop these points later with respect to virtue theory, the concept of ecological virtue and citizenship, and participatory democracy.

I turn now to democracy and the ecological transformation of ‘the political’.

10 DEMOCRACY AND RESTRAINT
Being in the environment – politics and the claims of nature

We need to recognise the claims of nature within politics. In a democracy, citizens are governed by laws they have a hand in making. Citizens bind themselves within the polity by the principle of self-assumed obligation. But citizens are also governed by nature. Any rational constraint effected through politics must recognise this greater natural constraint. Our political obligations to each other must find a way of recognising our ethical obligation to nature.

In attempting to define a conception of internal democratic restraint, we need to recognise not only that we are in nature but that we are of it. Nature as all-pervasive indicates not just a distinct human place within the whole, but also an active role and responsibility on our part within that whole. Democracy proclaims that all citizens are equal by nature, equal within nature. In this respect, the environmental crisis we face could become the occasion for transforming our understanding of ‘the political’, moving towards the Ecopolis constituted by a conception of an active and emancipatory democratic citizenship. (Minteer and Taylor 2002). 

The Ecopolis and Ecological Regionalism
Environmental stakeholding
['democracy' as stakeholding in a society that is equitable and sustainable]
I want now to outline the contours of a ‘civic environmentalism’ which values the contribution of local, community-based movements to democratic politics and identifies the citizen members of the ecopolis as environmental stakeholders. This places the emphasis upon an active citizenship and points in the direction of a democratic society furnished with extensive public spaces and participatory structures. Set in the context of natural relations, this produces a concept of the eco-public or Ecopolis. This is to define democracy in terms of a genuine representation of the views and interests of all members of the ecological society, a society that is equitable, just and sustainable in its practices, social relations, decisions and policies. Defining democracy in terms of the Ecopolis responds to the ‘overriding need to reflect the views and needs of all stakeholders in decisions pertaining to the far-sighted stewardship and sharing of the natural resources essential to their continuing well-being and opportunity.’ (Everard 2011: 162). 

I therefore set my argument within a conception of the Ecopolis as establishing a new framework for civilisation. This framework combines a recognition of ecological constraints and a commitment to public life within an ecological regionalism. Despite a name which draws upon the ancient polis, the approach is forward-looking rather than nostalgic. The intention is not to turn the clock back to some lost community. The old solidarities have gone; our task is to create new solidarities. The need to create such solidarities is an eternal human need. How we express that need is historical. 
And the intention is not to repudiate technology either, but to reorient our technological capacities away from the endless extension of exploitative power over nature to the service of life in accordance with ecological principles. Instead of an antagonistic relation between nature and culture, there is an interaction.

At the heart of this conception of the Ecopolis is a civic environmentalism defined by the way that ecology, scientific knowledge, technological capacity, culture, ideas, the creative arts, government and politics are integrated. This approach sees technologies as being adapted to the end of ecological restoration, with ecological principles coming to be recognised in social practices, and community being scaled to human proportions and dimensions so as to enable democratic participation and civic-mindedness. Such a view envisages democracy as a developmental rather than a protective conception, conceiving the principle of self-assumed obligation in terms of democratic self-government so as to furnish the conditions for an active civic democracy.
  
Understood in these terms, civic environmentalism entails an eco-pragmatism that steers a path between the twin reefs of a deep ecology that has a tendency to undervalue politics on the one hand and a political environmentalism that focuses upon existing institutions to the neglect of wider social and ecological concerns on the other hand. As a political idea, civic environmentalism involves the creation of an urban/ecological public sphere based upon closely integrated human and natural communities. As against the centralisation and concentration of power which characterises modern systems of control, a civic environmentalism sees urban public spheres and regions connected through cooperative, localist institutions that unify politics, economics, ethics and ecology seamlessly. The idea of the Ecopolis as an ecological regionalism projects the possibility of an alternative, feasible, viable and better social and political life based upon cooperative institutions and practices. This envisages a public life grounded in a moral and meaningful sense of sense of place gained by exploration and experience, a conscious appropriation, owning and valuing of place on the part of those who dwell in it. 

The idea of place, then, is not ideal or abstract. Instead, it is fundamental to the Ecopolis as a public sphere grounded firmly in ecological realities, establishing the conditions of existence. This is to appreciate how human activities stand in functional relation to the ecological reality of regional structures, making for an informed and nuanced approach to planning, one that draws upon the latest techniques and social science in appreciating how natural and built structures interlace. This approach respects and incorporates ecological principles, understands the region in terms of environmental relationships extending throughout an entire area, and recognises the importance of the geographical factors of terrain, climate, and soil in establishing the conditions of ecosystem health.

Despite the globalisation of economic relations, subsuming geographical particularities within a system of economic specialization, place remains significant as a geographic influence in the lives of human beings. Economic globalization has proceeded in a way that overrides the potential for working with natural geographies. The expansionary dynamics of the global capital system are dead set against ecological realities. The universalizing tendencies of this economy are threats to the world’s regions, undermining both human and natural structures. The capital system is a mass production system which generates an expansionary commercial and consumptive culture that is neglectful of the importance of climate, soil, fresh and sea water, and flora in sustaining human communities. Indeed, this commercial culture considers its ability to overcome time and space to be the hallmark of economic efficiency, a technological conquest that enables rational human control of contingency. The dissipation of resources and degradation of natural ecologies follows this obliviousness to consequences of actions as a matter of course. Both human and natural ecologies are threatened by the globalisation of economic relations in this manner. 

In this respect, unregulated trade and uncontrolled urbanization are twin processes that threaten to unravel ecological, local and regional systems. Human activity needs to be brought within the constraints of planetary boundaries in recognition of the fact that there are limits to nature's capacity to sustain human activity. An increasing carbon footprint, for instance, indicates an imbalance between human demands and ecological realities. These realities are also the realities of social and geographic place. Excessive demands generate problems with respect to necessities such as land, food, and water which come to encroach upon surrounding areas. Against this, civic environmentalism redefines globalisation as the attainment of a global civil society, affirming both the symbolic and ecological significance of local and regional particularities whilst making connections between them. The technological fix is an evasion that postpones but cannot avoid the real problem: the imbalance between human demands and ecological realities that calls for the establishment of proper relations within and between human and natural communities. At some point, we need to bring our technical brilliance back down to earth through a recognition of ecological and social realities. And that would be to bring human activities back within nature’s capacity to absorb pressures and demands. 

A civic environmentalism sees ethics and politics as intertwined in a field of practical reason that mediates between nature and society. The approach combines science and ethics and sees human beings as agents in a world of both fact and value. The ethic here is not simply read off from biological imperatives, geographic facts or ecological realities, but emphasises the choices human beings must make in determining the relation of the social to the natural world. How we decide between arrangements that foster cooperation or allow free riding is, ultimately, a matter of moral choice expressed in a way of life. This view emphasises responsibility, human beings as moral agents capable of assuming responsibility for actions and consequences, capable of deciding whether to nurture or exploit, create or destroy. This is not a fixed and static moralism but a set of principles which emerge from our practical engagement with nature, guiding choice and action. And the view recognises that this responsibility has to be given a social form to be effective. The problem we face today is that uncoordinated human activities have generated a collective, supra-individual external force that is beyond the competence and control of individuals, communities and governments even. To be meaningful and effective, moral choice and responsibility have to be more than individual. An individual can reduce his or her carbon footprint, but such individual actions alone will not resolve the crisis in the climate system. A common, coordinated approach that unites the power of individuals through collective mechanisms is required. In this way, moral choice gains social and institutional force. We need to create those appropriate, effective collectivities of individuals, enabling conscious democratic control and responsibility. 

The conception of the Ecopolis affirms the view that the balancing of human activities and ecological realities through the public sphere is a real possibility. This public sphere is constituted by a civic mindedness that is attentive to ecological constraints and responsibilities as well as to relations to others. This internal balance and sensibility checks the problems of overdevelopment, not by a return to pre-modern solidarities, but by the creation of new solidarities capable of embracing the full range of human activities in light of ecological principles. Civic environmentalism therefore conceives the virtues integral to living well as ecological virtues.  

Civic environmentalism works with natural design, not in the sense of deriving human purpose from nature, but in seeing creative purpose at work in all living organisms. The approach therefore encompasses both social and ecological realities. In this way, human activities and natural ecologies are considered in their interaction. That interactive element in creatively unfolding the purpose within is critical in underscoring will, choice and agency, thus avoiding a bad teleology which sees a single, fixed and transparent design contained in a given reality, discerned by some totalising science or morality, and legislated and handed down by an authoritarian and elitist ethics and politics. That kind of essentialism and teleology is rightly criticised and rejected, and is not being proposed here. 

One appreciates here the degree of moral independence that human beings have alongside their natural dependency. Human ends cannot be simply and directly derived from nature. We must wrestle with and reflect upon the complexities of the social and natural realities which set the context of our lives. The extent of the human impact on the natural environment is now abundantly clear. Whether this human engagement with nature is creative or destructive depends on the power of human beings as moral and ecological agents. To survive, let alone thrive, we need to develop an ecological sensibility that pays attention to ecological constraints. Politics, expressed in the public sphere, is the mediating term, the expression and embodiment and orientation of that creative agency.

Demonstrating an awareness of the human impact on the environment, a civic environmentalism envisages a time when human activities can come to make a positive contribution to, and play a participatory role in, the restoration of the living community. The Earth’s community of life is thus envisioned as a commonwealth of virtue, a conception which gives due recognition to both the moral autonomy and the natural dependency of human beings. This amounts to more than recognising ecological limits. Restoration sees human activity as being undertaken with a view to aiding natural processes, as a realisation of creative powers and not just a conservation of an already achieved state.

Place, as the field of human interaction with the environment, is crucial to this restorative process. The emphasis on regional ecologies established around a field of functional relationships offers a grounding in which it becomes possible to identify and control the causes and consequences of human actions. This grounding is organised around a dynamic and interactive human-nature nexus. Rather than being bound to natural limits in some direct physical sense, there is a reciprocal relationship based upon the human engagement with the natural world. The Ecopolis is therefore both a ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ form, based on an interactive relation human beings and the natural world. The more socially and ecologically aware we become within that relationship, the more we will learn to live within ecological boundaries and value the natural influences upon social life. 

Politically, addressing climate change – abandoning ambitions to halt it, and actually coming to deal with its aftermath - is a challenge which requires the skills, knowledges and active involvement of all sectors of society, not just the governmental level, from which we have traditionally sought leadership and foresight in the resolution of our problems. This can be characterised in terms of a shift from monological modes of thought, control and action to dialogical modes grounded in the self-governing society. This conception is based on a notion of active citizenship, recognising that, through their character, behaviour and actions, members of society are continuously shaping the future through their actions.








MODES OF ACTION		centralising and bureaucratising	decentralising and democratising




This schema is useful in distinguishing genuinely participatory modes of thought, organisation and action from those top-down modes created by and sustaining the alienated institutional order to be abolished. (Critchley 2001 RFM vol 8). At the same time, as with all models, I’d be cautious of simplification – setting centralisation and decentralisation against each other is not the best way of arguing for an appropriate scale in which bottom-up and top-down exist in a mutually enhancing, mutually informing relationship. Connecting the local and the global scales ensures that there is an ongoing interaction that overcomes the dualism of top and bottom. The idea of a self-governing society recognises that human beings are not just the cause of social and environmental problems, but the active, knowledgeable agents of their solutions. Constituting the common good from the base up, through real social ties and bonds, affirms our membership of society and, indeed, of the wider community of life. 

This returns to the concept of ‘rational freedom’ in that it recognises that freedom is a collective endeavour and affirms the unity of each and all in the common life. Each individual and all individuals together stand on the common ground of this one earth and its ecosystems. We are all members of Earth’s community of life, stakeholders in this community possessing a vested interest in ensuring the health and preservation of the common resources upon which life depends. In this sense, we are members of an ecological democracy as active, stakeholding eco-citizens, with the power to effect changes in our living environment, and a responsibility to ensure that our thoughts and actions lead us in the direction of sustainable living. Our character and conduct matters as we come to express our values in deeds. Supporting our words by actions, we demonstrate the respect we have for ourselves, for others, for the living and non-living world, and for our common future.

The active involvement of people in the practices and decisions which shape social life and the extension of public spaces and participatory structures to acknowledge the living needs of all members of the community are fundamental requirements which need to be articulated in a form of governance that integrates top and bottom through the principle of subsidiarity. In other words, the question is not one of opposing decentralisation to centralisation but one of appropriate scale. Simply devolving power to an untransformed civil society can result in decisions that entrench and extend existing inequalities in power and resources. In addition to these deleterious social consequences, there is also the potential for environmental damage, as local decision making may be incapable of respecting the integrity and functioning of high-level ecosystems. 

What I call Ecopolis is a conception of democracy which respects the natural world which bounds human creation, and generates a public life in which citizens learn a humility about human power and rest authority upon an awareness of ecological boundaries:





The Ecopolis is an ecological democracy based on a mutuality which engenders a feeling of joint or co-ownership with respect to decisions and effects of actions. Spiritual and material concerns go together. Reverence for the Earth is buttressed by recognition of the value of ecosystem services, safeguarding the benefits accruing from natural processes within a conception of sustainable governance. 

[ecosystem services - appropriate sustainable lifestyles - pure form of democracy that respects the rights and potential of all of humanity and the well-being of the Earth upon which it depends]

Mark Everard argues that an emphasis upon the value of ecosystem services offers a deeply interconnected world-view that enables us to identify precisely what constitutes appropriate sustainable lifestyles, ‘taking account of the needs of all stakeholders, including future generations, and the functional, beautiful and cherished ecosystems that they require to allow them to fulfil their potential.’ (Everard 2011: 169; Everard et al. (2009), 'Integrated catchment value systems'.)

We, the stakeholders, are citizens, charged with playing an active role and taking responsibility within our environment. Everard outlines a conception of what may be called ecological democracy, setting notions of participatory democracy in the context of ecosystem services and their valuing. A recognition of the importance of ecosystem services ‘opens the door to a pure form of democracy that respects the rights and potential of all of humanity and the well-being of the Earth upon which it depends.’





Everard comments that if democracy is ultimately about 'one person, one vote,’ then it is implicitly about not only having a voice but also about listening to all other voices. An ecological democracy recognises our interdependence, relating our own voices to those of others. Ecological democracy is a dialogic democracy, interactive and communicative; it is about recognising all that unites us as we come together to shape a just and sustainable future society. That society, as Everard emphasises, ultimately depends upon coming to share fundamental ecosystem resources, ranging in scale from local habitat to landscapes, water and catchments, regions, nations and the whole biosphere. ‘It is our land, our heritage. We win together or we suffer together; the choice is that simple as we struggle to find a workable democratic model.’ (Everard 2011: 169).

Ecological democracy is ‘down to earth’. It is about recognising, valuing and sharing the 'common ground' upon which we stand:

Land and landscapes are far from remote academic concepts, merely bearing our weight and growing our crops and to be cared for in some vague altruistic way. They are instead what we eat, the places where the food is grown and which yield fresh water and purify air, which maintain our physical structure, and which constitute the matter that forms our homes and computers. The wider environment is no diffuse thing but is what we breathe deeply into our lungs and which percolates into our bloodstreams to nourish all the cells of our body, and is the water that we drink, cleansing, supporting, dissolving and conveying the substances that make us what we are. It is something irreplaceable that we depend upon in our use of energy, our recreational, spiritual, educational and cultural pursuits, and our enjoyment and expectation of living fulfilled and useful lives. The environment's inherent properties regulate the risk of our homes being flooded and provide the raw materials ultimately underpinning all of our economic activities from primary resources through to waste assimilation. The ripples of our actions and decisions, all of them inescapably affecting the ecosystems of which we are indivisible parts and which support our needs and aspirations, inevitably roll out to influence the interests of all who share this single world. One Earth, one people, one interdependent whole; one chance to realize our collective future.





[pragmatism – politics and rational foresight] 
The environmental crisis issues a political challenge, posing the question as to whether democracies are capable of foresight, detecting dangers and taking effective action before they become overwhelming. 

[disciplining wants and impulses]

Problem of liberal democracy
[individualism and rational thinking]
It goes without saying that the task is difficult. In the very least, it requires that we redirect powerful vested interests. That challenge is difficult enough, but the creation of a new social metabolic order that uproots the systemic dynamic of accumulation driving ecologically destructive growth demands that these interests be overturned. In addition to this, though, there is what may be called the problem of liberal democracy. Our atomistic, hedonistic democracy is powerless to make the changes we require to deal with climate change. These changes begin within each one of us but can only become effective when they become part of a collective endeavour. The problem is that in the atomistic conception of democracy, individuals do not form a citizen body working in concert but are instead self-interested choosers. As individual voters and consumers, human beings are reluctant to step much further than the immediate. This problem of comprehension and control becomes ever more intractable as the world grows in scale and complexity, encouraging citizens to withdraw even further into private life. As a result, an awareness of environmental dangers does not necessarily translate into the public action and policy required to stop them. Instead, small actions continue to build incrementally toward an inevitable catastrophe.

A constrained freedom
The ecological crisis asks questions about the ability of democracy to (morally) control the will and desires of individuals, subject as they are to the promises of seemingly endless economic riches. We have created an economic system that has turned vices into virtues, and has exchanged a concern with needs, which are capable of satisfaction, into wants, which can be endlessly stimulated and inflated to excess. In this outwardly apparent sense, the environmental crisis is a crisis driven by an economic system whose central expansionary dynamic is sustained by an appeal to particular human desires (an appeal which neglects other desires), particularly the stimulation of greed through the creation of false needs, which are not needs at all, but wants.

[controlling the passions]
As social beings, human beings arrange their affairs and organise their lives in relation to each other. We control and/or channel the passions, impulses and urgings within us by institutions, laws, codes, restraining some, canalising others, giving pattern and direction to our behaviour. Hence my concern to avoid pitching decentralisation against centralisation, demonising central authority. A cohering and orienting principle establishing unity among the parts is required. The rationalisation of the modern world has been accompanied by a weakening of the overarching moral framework which once served to constrain and canalise the passions, replacing it instead with another set of ‘values’ deriving from  the new idols of money, capital, commodities and administrative power. Such values serve the new religion of endless economic expansion and progress and lack the power to constrain the passions. On the contrary, they encourage the worst aspects of our behaviour and inhibit the best.

Can democratic publics recognise limits and exercise constraint in response to the environmental crisis? Can the rational restraint we need in light of ecological constraints be supplied internally from within the self-governing society? Or is the authoritarian state an inevitability to avoid or deal with chaos?

Democracy and limits
The ecological crisis raises the ancient question of limits. It’s Plato’s old question as to whether democracy is capable of recognising limits and controlling its tendency to excess, or whether limits must be set externally so as to avoid excess, chaos and collapse.

Many would – and do - condemn Plato’s hierarchical organic functionalism for its authoritarian and reactionary nature. It would, however, be a grave mistake to ignore the serious question that Plato identified as lying at the heart of political life – the question of limits, excess and control. In an age of growing ecological pressures, we need to answer this very question. The question is how democracy can realise the ideal of self-governance, either through constitutional mechanisms or civic education or ecological virtue or a combination of all three. 

Some ecologists have argued for instituting a rational restraint from above, expressing the view that only authoritarian forms of government would be able to contend with the severe pressures falling upon resources. Notions of a ‘benevolent tyranny’ or dictatorship can be found expressed by the likes of Hardin, Lovelock and many others. In Requiem for a Species, Clive Hamilton cites French sociologist Bertrand Guillaume, who notes that a high awareness of the dangers of global warming does not necessarily translate into the action required to stop it. As a result, catastrophe becomes inevitable. Cutting emissions to anything like the extent required to avoid this catastrophe may require a 'benevolent tyranny,’ if it becomes apparent that a large proportion of citizens refuse to do what is necessary. (Hamilton 2010: 207), 

Guillaume poses the question that has haunted political philosophy since Plato: Can we continue to gamble with democracy?

The Problem Defined
In Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity, William Ophuls argues that only a government possessing great powers to constrain individual behaviour in the ecological common interest can deal effectively with the tragedy of the commons, overcoming the short-term calculations of utility that lead individuals to destroy their environment. Ophuls argues that ethical change is not only insufficient, it may well be irrelevant when it comes to resolving the environmental problems we face. Since I am arguing for the importance of ethics, allied to politics, in the context of changes in behaviour and character formation, Ophuls’ critical perspective is worth examining at length:





I concur with the view that individual conscience, altruism and moral concern are not enough ‘by themselves’ to overcome the short-term calculations of utility that lie behind environmental degradation. However, Ophuls jumps too far and too quickly from this awareness of the inadequacy of moral change alone to the case for authoritarian government. Frankly, such a government, ruling in the common interest, is the political counterpart of a vacuous morality of the common good, in that both are abstracted from real individuals and their actual practices and relations. The notion of a government powerful enough to govern in the common interest, ecological or otherwise, solves none of the big questions in political philosophy, it merely begs the biggest question of all – how can government identify, constitute and articulate the common good? No matter how powerful the government, the identity and constitution of the common good remains the key issue. Ophuls merely invites the entrenchment of the state as an ideological project, claiming to rule in the common interest whilst serving powerful particular interests, in all probability the very interests that have brought us to this predicament.

Here, we are back to Plato’s philosopher-king and the imposition of the collective interest from above. Plato and Ophuls have identified a real problem here, the problem of how we can achieve a general interest that serves us all. This question, as Barber notes, revives the ancient tension between the special languages of philosophy and the deliberations of a democratic political community. For Barber, the problem of limits lies at the heart of democratic political theory. ‘This problem has always been understood to be raised by the possible asymmetry between democratic willing and moral principle.’ Plato criticised democracy for being incapable of self-governance, and it has fallen to democratic theorists since to meet Plato’s criticisms of democracy as possessing an inherent tendency to excess. Plato defined democracy as a form of society which 'treats all men as equal, whether they are equal or not' and ensures that 'every individual is free to do as he likes' (Plato, The Republic, pp. 375, 376).

The failings of democracy can be discerned in the two famous metaphors contained in The Republic of the ship's captain (p. 282) and the keeper of a 'large and powerful animal' (p. 288). 

Suppose the following to be the state of affairs on board a ship or ships. The captain [or ship-owner] is larger and stronger than any of the crew, but a bit deaf and short-sighted, and similarly limited in seamanship. The crew are all quarrelling with each other about how to navigate the ship, each thinking he ought to be at the helm; they have never learned the art [or the skill or technique] of navigation and cannot say that anyone ever taught it them, or that they spent any time studying it; indeed they say it can't be taught and are ready to murder anyone who says it tan. They spend all their time milling round the captain and doing all they can to get him to give them the helm. If one faction is more successful than another, their rivals may kill them and throw them overboard, lay out the honest captain with drugs or drink or in some other way, take control of the ship, help themselves to what's on board, and turn the voyage into the sort of drunken pleasure-cruise you would expect. Finally, they reserve their admiration for the man who knows how to lend a hand in controlling (he captain by force or fraud; they praise his seamanship and navi​gation and knowledge of the sea and condemn everyone else as useless. They have no idea that the true navigator must study the seasons of the year, the sky, the stars, the winds and all the other subjects appropriate to his profession if he is to be really fit to control the ship; and they think that it's quite impossible to acquire the professional skill needed for such control (whether or not they want it exercised) and that there's no such thing as an art of navigation. With all this going on aboard aren't the sailors on any such ship bound to regard the true navigator as a word-spinner and a star-gazer, of no use to them at all?

Plato, The Republic, p. 282

The 'true navigator' refers to the minority who, possessing the necessary skill and expertise, have the strongest claim to rule legitimately. In contrast, the people (the crew) conduct their affairs on the basis of impulse, sentiment and prejudice; they lack both the experience and the knowledge that make for sound navigation (political judgement.) The only leaders that the people admire are sycophants: 'politicians ... are duly honoured ... [if] they profess themselves the people's friends' (The Republic, p. 376). All who 'mix with the crowd and want to be popular with it' can be directly 'compared ... to the sailors' (p. 283).

Democracy, in fine, is charged with being incapable of developing proper leadership. Leadership in a democracy depends upon currying favour with the people, and leaders will be more concerned with cultivating their own popularity in order to retain their positions than with governing well. Political leadership is progressively weakened by having to accede to popular demands, with political strategy coming to be based on what can be 'sold' to the people. 

In the metaphor of the people as a 'large and powerful animal,’ Plato argues that, more than knowing the moods, wants and habits of the animal, ensuring that it is properly cared for and trained, there is a need to know which of its tastes and desires are ‘admirable or shameful, good or bad, right or wrong' (The Republic, p. 288). Plato concludes that the problems of politics will only be resolved when philosophers come to rule. 

Plato’s case for philosophical leadership reads as an argument for enlightened self-interest in that his concern is not with the rulers as such but with the principles which they serve. Plato is arguing for ‘the rule of wisdom.’ The case for the philosophers is that they, in being fully educated and trained, possess the capacity to harmonize all the elements of human life. Following Socrates, Plato argued that 'virtue is knowledge', meaning that 'the good life' is an objective phenomenon that exists independently of both individuals and collectivities and can only be grasped through systematic study. It is the philosopher, and not the people, who is equipped for such study and capable of arranging things in the most appropriate way.

Plato’s ghost of the philosopher-king continues to haunt us. The world of ideal forms beyond time and place give us a notion of a reality that is more true than the world accessible by our immediate senses. We crave the objective truth and certainty this notion promises. In a democratic politics, however, truth is something that emerges through human relations and practices. Plato was right to argue for temperateness and moderation in a well-governed people, but he erred in thinking that these qualities can only be expressed in the form of deference to objective truth and to its reputed possessors, the philosophers. (Barber 1984: 311). 

In his haste to resolve a real problem, Plato sold people, politics, power and philosophy short. Plato was right to highlight the tendency of an atomistic conception of democracy and liberty to transgress limits. However, he lacks a process by which philosophy could come to rule as a form of self-rule, by educating desire from within. We need to open up public space to greater political participation and a reactivated citizenship, so that truth becomes something that is a co-creation from below rather than an imposition from above. Or, better still, a co-creation that partners above and below, orders the parts to their true end by a central cohering principle – which is Plato’s central argument concerning a well-tempered political order. Plato was right. What I’m interested in in that the true and the good not be given as a passive elitism but actively willed by the individuals composing the demos. 

The notion of generating the common good as a creative act, as opposed to discovering the good as something that already objectively exists, gives us the clue. In light of the sanguinary historical experiences of authoritarianism in politics, we may be better served to avoid an ethics and politics that depends upon apodictic truth claims with respect to right conduct and the good life. That statement is controversial in that it implies that we abandon notions of objectivity, objective truth, scientific and moral truth. But this need not be the case, and is not what I am arguing. Without scientific truth and moral truth, the game is up and we are in a world where anyone can believe what they like, so long as they have the power and money to get away with it. That’s the kind of sophism I am concerned to reject. But I am interested in the relation of truth and reason to politics. Aristotle could reject Plato’s general truth with respect to the ideal forms and yet still hold to the truth that emerges through concrete particulars. The view I am defending rejects the notion of truth as claims which are clearly established and beyond dispute, as opposed to dialectic and probable reasoning, in so far as they relate to the practical reason of politics and ethics. My view leaves plenty over for individuals to do as creative moral agents, seeing individuals as citizens capable of constituting their own political and moral life through their relations and practices. Participating in the continuous unfolding of the creative universe, we are party to the creation of truth, and to the living of truth. The cognitive and the affective go together.

Ophuls’ Platonic point is well taken, though, in that we do indeed stand in need of the common good in politics. The question, however, is not how long can we continue to gamble with democracy but how long can we continue to suffer the effects of the atomistic conception of democracy? The charge is that democratic government is too unwieldy and too cumbersome to be able to respond quickly and effectively to the nature of the crisis unfolding. Its perspectives are too immediate, its decision making processes are too closely connected to vested interests, its voters are not a citizen body deciding together but an atomistic mass acting out of immediate self-interest. Individual self-interest is self-destructive. In light of this, it is easy to predict a recourse to emergency government in circumstances of sustained environmental threat:





And, given the entrenched nature of environmental degradation and atmospheric pollution, the duration of ‘benevolent tyranny’ may amount to a very, very long time in politics. So long, in fact, that its benevolence gives way to plain tyranny. The failure to formulate this question properly in the first instance, and answer it democratically – with democracy coming to supply the self-limiting principle in practice - will make the authoritarian option more likely as the environmental consequences of immediate short term self-interest strike home.

Who guards the guardians? Once democratic government has been suspended, it tends not to come back. That’s the problem with tyrannies, they are rarely benevolent or transitory. The military departments of governments are already preparing for a future of conflict over scarce resources, their plans and expenditure taking the form of a defence budget for the vested interests that have brought us to the brink of ecological catastrophe.

Mary Mellor writes well on this kind of authoritarianism in politics:





I agree very much with this statement. I agreed with it a quarter of a century ago, too. Do we have another quarter of a century to resolve this problem? To avoid the authoritarian solution, we need to forge the ecological common interest within the bonds of civil society, embedding and articulating the good in and through social relations and practices. The more radical option, therefore, is not to turn away from democracy but to deepen and enrich it by bringing individuals together within genuinely common structures, forging the common ecological good in the affective ties and bonds of civil society, in terms of lived relations and practices. 









I agree very much with both statements. But radicalizing democracy is what I take Rousseau and Marx to have been attempting a long while ago now. I examined Carole Pateman on this very thing earlier. How long do we have?

Individual freedom requires much more than the protection offered by institutionally guaranteed rights. But, in light of Plato’s criticisms, the democrat has to explain how a democratic polity could come to control any tendency to excess, recognise limits, and become capable of self-governance. 

Cooperating with the future
The key question is how individuals can come to cooperate with each other in order to make altruistic decisions that give up immediate self-interest for a greater long term good.

In Cooperating With The Future, Oliver Hauser, David G. Rand, Alexander Peysakhovich and Martin A. Nowak examine this question in terms of the willingness or otherwise of individuals to make present day sacrifices for future generations. ‘There has been a great deal of work on how people cooperate with those they see every day — their colleagues or friends’, argues Martin Nowak, director of the Program for Evolutionary Dynamics at Harvard. ‘But an open question is how people cooperate with future generations. How do you make altruistic decisions today that benefit people tomorrow?’

Overexploitation of renewable resources today has a high cost on the welfare of future generations. Unlike in other public goods games, however, future generations cannot reciprocate actions made today. What mechanisms can maintain cooperation with the future?’ To answer this question, the authors devised a new experimental paradigm, the ‘Intergenerational Goods Game’. ‘A line-up of successive groups (generations) can each either extract a resource to exhaustion or leave something for the next group. Exhausting the resource maximizes the payoff for the present generation, but leaves all future generations empty-handed.

In this study, the authors show that a resource is ‘almost always destroyed if extraction decisions are made individually.’ This destruction of a resource is a failure to cooperate with the future: 

This failure to cooperate with the future is driven primarily by a minority of individuals who extract far more than what is sustainable. In contrast, when extractions are democratically decided by vote, the resource is consistently sustained.

This is the problem we need to crack with respect to the crisis in the climate system. The problem is one of a minority of individuals who extract far more than what is sustainable. 

The authors affirm the capacity of democracy to recognise and impose limits, arguing that when extractions are democratically decided by vote, the resource is consistently sustained. 

The authors offer two reasons for the effectiveness of voting: 

1.	it allows a majority of cooperators to restrain defectors; 
2.	it reassures conditional co-operators that their efforts are not futile. 

Importantly, voting only promotes sustainability if it is binding for all involved. Here we see a reworking of the principle of self-assumed obligation as a condition of legitimate government – individuals are bound only by those law they have had a hand in making.

(Oliver P. Hauser, David G. Rand, Alexander Peysakhovich & Martin A. Nowak, Cooperating with the future, Nature volume 511, pages 220–223 (10 July 2014)

The research conclusions have practical implications with respect to devising policies with a view to curtailing greenhouse gas emissions. Global efforts since the Kyoto Protocol have failed to achieve the substantial reductions required, causing many to become sceptical of the whole approach. The fact remains, however, that without concerted action at the global level, it will be difficult to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. The challenge is to combine local actions and individual decisions with comprehensive measures at a higher level in a mutually enhancing way.

Cooperating With The Future attempts to unravel the behavioural reasons behind our individual and collective actions. The constant refrain that we should look to put the common good before selfish interest implies that moral appeal has proven insufficient to produce the necessary change in behaviour, hence the need to keep repeating the message. I believe that most people would agree with the statement that we should serve the common good. And I suspect that general agreement here is gained on account of no clear view of the common good being proposed. What, exactly, is ‘the common good’ and how can we actually serve it at the level of individual decision making and collective action? The moral appeal is the easy part, giving an expression to a need most people feel. Most people agree that good things are good. The hard part is identifying the good and acting upon the injunction to aim at the good. Even if an individual wants to cooperate with others in order to serve the common good, he or she may not do so since the social identity enabling them to do so, without harming his or her own interests, does not exist. Without appropriate relations, serving the common good renders the individual vulnerable to being exploited by free riding others. This illustrates why the free market fails to solve problems like climate change, Nowak points out. ‘Even if you want to cooperate with the future, you may not do so because you are afraid of being exploited by the present.’ David Rand, assistant professor of psychology and economics at Yale, claims that that even if most people care about the future, it’s unlikely that we will achieve sustainability regulation within free market arrangements. ‘The selfish minority will over-exploit and ruin things for the future. So some kind of regulation is really essential — you can’t just leave things to the free market and hope that it will work out.’

This is true, but it leaves the nature of rational restraint or regulation undetermined. The findings of Cooperating With The Future indicate that a substantial majority of people are willing to bear costs to benefit future generations. That being the case, moral exhortation in favour of the common good is not so much redundant as repeating a value most people will agree with. There may be value in reinforcing the commitment to the greater good. But acting upon that agreement is what matters. And the provision of the institutional means and mechanisms enabling such action is key. Identifying and delivering those means and mechanisms is therefore where practical energies need to be concentrated. 

The authors of Cooperating With The Future argue that, in a situation where reducing consumption will benefit others, the cooperative majority can restrain the selfish minority through democratic voting. The argument in favour of voting is really a reworking of the principle of self-assumed obligation, the idea that human beings are only bound by the laws that they themselves have had a hand in making. I have written at length on the conditions of a democratic social contract that unites individuals without reifying bonds above them elsewhere. (Critchley 1997: 18-23; Critchley 2001 vol 2 17-26). Here, I want to focus on the provision of the democratic institutional and socio-relational framework which is a condition of being able as well as willing to act for the common good. Without this framework, a minority of free riders will always emerge to undermine the other-regarding efforts of the rest of society. 

For the authors of Cooperating with the Future, sustainability can be achieved by individuals binding themselves to a common behaviour through voting in a democratic process. Without such obligation, a selfish minority can always emerge to exploit the collective efforts of the cooperative majority to their own private advantage. For Nowak, this explains why non-binding international agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol, are prone to failure. Individuals would be willing to pay higher taxes or change their lifestyles if they could be sure that all are bound by the same commitment, ruling out the possibility that some are exploiting the good intentions of others. Without regulation, the selfish few can continue to over-consume and therefore enjoy private advantages at the expense of the rest. In those conditions, commitments to serve the common good weaken and become ineffective.

This point makes it clear that the case for democratic voting has to refer to more than a restatement of the democratic ideal. Each vote has to be effective and the whole vote has to be binding. As Rand argues, when the behaviour of some people is regulated by the vote but others are still free to do as they want, the situation is only marginally better than a totally unregulated situation. Asymmetries in power and resources matter; any differentials in this respect have the power to undermine the effectiveness of democratic voting. Even if complete regulation through the democratic process is achieved, inequality can threaten to unravel common bonds. In conditions of only partial regulation, the fractures inviting free riding and subverting the common commitment have already opened up. The problem is less one of greed than of the invitation to greed through institutional failure (and moral failure, in the sense of lacking the right character, which I address later in this piece). A failure to ensure adequate regulation allows a selfish minority to emerge seeking a private advantage by over-consuming at the expense of others. As soon as people see that others are free to exploit a resource, their willingness to vote for sustainability diminishes. The authors write:

An implication of this is that voting can likely be much more successful at implementing sustainable policies at the local and national level where outcomes are binding than at the international level where it’s much harder to generate binding agreements. When agreements aren’t binding, there’s little hope that they will make much difference.

To study the cooperation of future generations, the researchers used participants from across the U.S. and divided them into groups of five that were told there was a common pool of 100 units of an unnamed material that they could each take up to 20 units from. As long as at least 50 were left in the pool, the resource would be fully replenished and the next group — or generation — of five people could play.
When left to their own devices most people took the sustainable amount of 10 or less, but someone always took more and within a few generations the resource was depleted. However once a democratic voting system was established in the next stage of the experiment, allowing the players to vote for each group member’s allocation, the resource was sustainable over at least 12 generations (the end of the game). The value each member got in this version was established by taking the average of the five votes on what share each group member felt was fair.

Oliver P. Hauser, one of the authors of the study, believes that the findings are relevant for the mitigation of climate change. The successful resolution of our problems lies in identifying the mechanisms enabling individuals to harness and canalise their cooperative tendencies, and Hauser is correct to argue that institutions are an essential component of this process. 

As Marx insisted in the Grundrisse, ‘mediation must, of course, take place’ (Marx 1973:171/2 87). Democracy has to be embedded and social power given a permanent expression in relations and institutions. Freedom is achieved not as some unmediated action but, rather, is an ever changing balance of spontaneity and organisation. And it is in this sense that I argue for the radicalisation, extension and entrenchment of democracy.

‘Most important … is that we should not be pessimistic about the future’, says Hauser. Cooperating with the Future gives grounds for optimism, showing a clear majority of people willing to vote altruistically and bringing the common good within our institutional reach if we can succeed in restraining the minority of people who would prefer to free ride rather to cooperate. 

As Nowak concludes with respect to the findings of the study:

Democracy is a powerful institution. When we implemented this system, virtually every resource was saved. The surprising observation is that while there is a minority of people who don’t want to cooperate, the majority of people vote altruistically. They are not voting to maximize their own benefit, and that’s what allows for cooperation with the future.

‘There is a huge literature on the evolution of cooperation, but this is the first step toward asking what we can do to cooperate with future generations.’ 
‘The largest problems we face today are occurring on a global scale — how can we behave altruistically such that something is left for future generations?’ 

Cooperating with the Future gives one answer – the binding of individuals to common commitments through democratic voting. It’s all about establishing the mechanisms of common constraint which serve to harness, coordinate and channel individual actions and decisions towards common ends. And this requires setting individuals within a specific institutional and socio-relational framework.

The strong state and strong democracy
[eco-education against coercive power]
One can certainly envisage governments, paralyzed in face of the environmental crisis, slowly but surely curtailing democracy whilst building up the institutions of an ecological dictatorship. Except that some such thing will more likely be more concerned with protecting the power and privileges of the dominant class that wrought this ecological destruction in the first place, keeping control of resources, and people. Instead of what Benjamin Barber calls ‘strong democracy’, we get the strong state. It is entirely predictable that those with power in this already overorganized world will continue to use all of the old techniques for manipulating human beings and exploiting the planet, inventing many new ones as they go, and reducing all to the lowest common level. The rise of the ‘strong state’ is less a prediction than a continuation of trends and tendencies already underway. There should be no doubt that those in power would be prepared to back these measures of non-rational persuasion by means of economic coercion, and by threats of outright political force:

If we want to prevent the sort of tyranny that, independent of every political orientation, develops when the size of a nation-state reaches specific dimensions, we must begin at once to make our children immune to manipulations of their emotional and intellectual development. This immunization can only be achieved when every maturing human has been taught thoroughly to see through the techniques of propaganda. 




Lorenz calls for an ecological literacy as a defence against such manipulative and coercive power. I would agree, but at the same time connect this to the need for political literacy. We need to pay close attention to civic education and constitutional mechanisms. 

Alexis de Tocqueville noted how democratic equality and liberty served to make citizens preoccupied with themselves. ‘I am convinced that in the long term democracy turns the imagination away from all that is external to man to fix it only on man.’ (Tocqueville 2000: 460).

Tocqueville expressed a concern with the way that the radical individualism and materialism associated with democratic equality tends to erode the social authorities and hierarchies that had served to bond individuals together in community. Democratic equality therefore ‘tends to isolate them [citizens] from one another and to bring each of them to be occupied with himself alone’. (Tocqueville 2000: 419). The moral vision narrows until nothing remains but the individual: ‘In democratic societies each citizen is habitually occupied with contemplating a very small object, which is himself.’ (Tocqueville 2000: 464). This radical individualism leads to a materialism of the most shallow and myopic kind, that of self-obsessed individuals preoccupied with material wealth. As a result, the moral world of democracy diminishes in scope. Democracy makes ‘each man forget his ancestors’ and ‘hides his descendants from him and separates him from his contemporaries; it constantly leads him back toward himself alone and threatens finally to confine him wholly in the solitude of his own heart.’ (Tocqueville 2000: 484). We lose the connection to both past and future, that idea of a pact between past and future generations.

As Barber argues, this turning of democratic citizens from all knowledge and concerns beyond individual interests and wills ‘is the inclination that distinguishes much democratic theory and practice from classical conceptions and practices of politics.’ This, however, ignores the extent to which Tocqueville’s critique chimes with Plato’s criticisms of democracy. Which is to say that the problems of modern democracy were also identified in its ancient practice. Barber is right to argue that ancient political theory conventionally relies upon a conception of nature to provide the normative limits for political life. He points to Aristotle’s argument that man is a creature who by nature lives in a polis. (Aristotle Politics, Book 1, chapter 2.) But both Plato and Aristotle present the earliest, and most trenchant and enduring, criticisms of the limitations of democratic theory and practice ever committed to paper. That is, there is more than a contrast between ancient and modern at work here. It’s worth stressing this point in order to avoid a nostalgic frame. The solutions to our current predicament lie in the future, not in the past.

Barber identifies what is truly at issue here – the conception of human nature at the heart of politics:





Barber himself is an adherent of politics in this sense. His case for ‘strong democracy’ is made in terms of what it is to be a human being: ‘without participation in the common life that defines them and in the decision-making that shapes their social habitat, women and men cannot become individuals’ (Barber 1984: xv).

Barber argues that Rousseau, the greatest of all the modern democratic theorists, cut the cord between a just political order and nature, making ethics entirely conventional. Rather than ensure that political life conform to the natural order, democratic legitimacy rests upon an equal respect for the individual wills of citizens. Rousseau thus severed the connection between natural liberty on the one hand and moral (and political) liberty on the other. That separation reappears in Kant’s ethics, in the way that Kant held moral duty to be something apart from and against natural inclinations. It is a view which is contrary to Aristotle. But Barber’s point here doesn’t do justice to Rousseau’s connection with Plato in the affirmation of transcendent norms. David Lay Williams establishes Rousseau’s ‘Platonic Enlightenment’ as very much based on this statement of transcendent standards against conventionalism and sophism. (Williams 2007). Having made that qualification with respect to Rousseau, I can certainly agree with Barber’s criticisms of the conventionalism of the modern world.

This taking of moral and political affairs into our own hands is liberatory, and can be read as humanity assuming responsibility for the world it has created as a further stage in the maturation of the species. In this vein, Richard Rorty emphasises that democracy seeks to overthrow all external constraints and instead construct a world in which there is nothing more divine than individuals and the world that is a human creation. (Rorty 1998: chapter 1). Whilst such a view appears liberatory in the importance it gives to human wills and interests, this assertion of freedom from all external constraints feeds delusion and encourages an overweening belief in human power to change and control the world. As Leon Wieseltier puts the point: ‘People who think they have created themselves are dangerous people, because they have an exaggerated sense of the malleability of things. They think they can begin again.’ (Wieseltier 1998: 381). Such people, as I argued earlier, are guilty of the reverse naturalist fallacy, the culturalist fallacy in which they turn a made-up ‘ought’ into an ‘is.’

In this understanding, the world is an eternal blank sheet, always available for individuals to write their wants, dreams and desires on. The problem is that this assertion of freedom as a liberation from all constraint threatens to create a world based on nothing more than arbitrary wills and interests, a world without moral restraint, a world which is incapable of recognising limits, responsibilities to others, natural boundaries. This is the reality that goes with the atomistic and hedonistic conception of democracy, the democracy of self-absorbed individuals that Tocqueville criticised as a diminution of public life. This is the world we live in, hence the problem of having to find principles of rational restraint and the institutions capable of embodying and articulating that restraint.

Conceived as a pure creativity liberated from all constraint, democracy is self-validating and self-legitimating, seeing no higher authority or judge than individual wills and interests. Democracy so conceived is blind to any normative criteria outside of the democratic will of the people. It’s an invitation to delusion. Independent human will and choice may be liberatory, but is not in itself liberation. To be a genuine, complete freedom, human will must be in conformity with something other than its own self-assertion. Human choice alone is not enough. Choosing well is better than choosing badly, but that notion implies a normative evaluation which sets human will in a context greater than a self-acting humanity. As Tocqueville commented, ‘those who regard universal suffrage as a guarantee of the goodness of choices make a complete illusion for themselves. Universal suffrage has other advantages, but not that one.’ (Tocqueville 2000: 190). 

Being ‘free to choose’, to use the phrase of free market economist Milton Friedman, is not in itself freedom. A choice freely made is no guarantee of coming to make the right choice, and the rightness or goodness of a choice presupposes a standard of evaluation which is more than individual human will and interest. And this is my point with respect to highlighting the extent to which the ancient conception of politics was based on a conception of natural order and human nature. Once that connection to nature is lost – accepting the complexity of defining what ‘nature’ is - we lose a sense of limits and begin to pursue a delusional conception of freedom as something that is incapable of recognising moral and social restraint.

At the same time we need to recognise that difficulties in identifying what ‘nature’ is, our own nature as much as anything. There is no simple, clear and discrete objective reality which we can identify as forming the basis of our politics and ethics. 

Politics and Practical Reasoning
Theorists in the liberal tradition are sceptical of mixing ethics and politics, especially in the context of definitions of nature and human nature. To avoid tendencies to political and religious conflict and violence arising from uncompromising value positions, liberal theorists think it best to practise a politics within a neutral framework and thus eschew apodictic truth claims with respect to right conduct and the good life. (Bowersox in Minteer and Taylor 2002: 72). 
 
An apodictic truth claim is one that is clearly established. Such a claim is not only beyond dispute, it is beyond political discussion, debate and compromise. Apodictic judgments are judgments which are clearly provable and logically certain. In Aristotelian (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Aristotelianism" \o "Aristotelianism​) logic, ‘apodictic’ is contrasted with ‘dialectic’ as scientific proof is contrasted with (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Scientific_proof" \o "Scientific proof​) probable reasoning (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Reasoning" \o "Reasoning​). Kant (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Immanuel_Kant" \o "Immanuel Kant​) contrasts ‘apodictic’ with ‘problematic’ and ‘assertoric’ in the Critique of Pure Reason (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Critique_of_Pure_Reason" \o "Critique of Pure Reason​) (A70/B95).

Truth and the need to be practical
Pragmatists are critical of the metaphysicians of the political, questioning the relevance of notions of truth or justice or origins in the world of politics. Pragmatism shares with Graham Greene the belief that in practical human affairs, the pursuit of ‘truth’ is some abstract metaphysical conceit: ‘Truth . . . has never been of any real value to any human being — it is a symbol for mathematicians and philosophers to pursue.’ (Greene 1948: 58). 

This quote comes from Greene’s The Heart of the Matter, an apposite title. I connect this concern with practical truth with what Aristotle writes on prudence and practical reasoning, with what biologists call an innate moral grammar, with the natural law idea of moral truths as inscribed on the human heart, with Tocqueville’s ‘habits of the heart’, and with the idea of the community as a habitus in which we acquire and practise the virtues. Morality is thus something we do, an ethos, a practice, a way of life. Marx set out this approach in Thesis II on Feuerbach:

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

Marx Thesis II on Feuerbach

The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.

Marx Thesis XI on Feuerbach

I understand Marx in the Theses on Feuerbach not to be repudiating notions of objective reality and objective truth but to be emphasising the always mediated character of the world and the human relation to it. That doesn’t make truth relative, conventional or sophist for Marx, for he clearly has some decided, and decidedly normative views about the truth of things. Marx is concerned most of all to overcome the impasse in an endless philosophical interpretation that proceeds in abstraction from a world conceived as an external objective datum. For Marx, knowledge is yielded from the inside, from practical and internal relation to the world, hence his emphasis on the changing of the world as against interpreting it. It is in this sense that I will later write positively on notions of an eco-pragmatism, on the understanding that such practical action is principled rather than valueless and visionless, and on the understanding that it is clear that scientific truth and moral truth do indeed exist, and that it is possible to know these truths.

Truth has to be more than a practical question if we are to avoid a social or historical relativism. Marx himself would not be happy with a philosophical position which held the capital system to be true on account of it coming to prevail over socialism in practical struggle. Marx’s critique of the capital system as a dehumanisation is predicated upon a normative philosophical anthropology which holds that human beings possess certain potentialities for growth and fulfilment, potentialities which are repressed and constrained under the domination of capital and are liberated and realised under a socialist system. To that extent, Marx adheres to a concept of nature as something that is creatively unfolded through practice; there is a normative dimension to Marx’s notion of praxis, one grounded in creative human fulfilment. That is the ‘truth’ at the core of Marx’s insistence on the practical engagement with the world.

Benjamin Barber states that ‘democratic politics is a form of human relations, and does not answer to the requirements of truth.’ He therefore seeks an approach to democracy that is ‘suitable to human relations rather than to truth.’ (Barber 1984: xii). That is ‘the political’ as grounded in a conception of human nature and natural order. And it is still a form of truth, as in the sense Marx meant when identifying democracy as the ‘truth of the constitution.’

Moreover, it goes without saying that all forms of the state have democracy for their truth and that they are untrue to the extent that they are not democracy.

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 89

Democracy is judicious
[reasoning rather than truth
Here we are confronted by the difficulties arising as a result of the separation between the worlds of theory and practice. The practical world, the realm of human social behaviour, the place of action, is a world where people are impatient and want to get things done quickly. Ethical debate and clarification is seen as unnecessary and irrelevant. At the same time, ethics, as the systematic philosophical study of right conduct and the good life, proceeds as though the world of practical social interests and effects is also irrelevant. (Bowersox in Minteer and Taylor 2002: 71).

We return to Plato’s problem of the relation between truth and politics. Plato argued for the figure of the philosopher-ruler to overcome political turmoil and ensure the prevalence of the common good. To many critics, though, this is not so much a solution as an evasion by putting politics on ice. Neither truth nor the reality it applies to possess an independence of the individuals composing the demos. Here we have to make a choice between the one and the many, the philosopher-ruler and the rule of philosophy through popular agency. As Barber comments:





Democracy, truth and judicious reasoning
The tension between an apodictic notion of truth and a judicious notion of truth is a tension between the claims of expert knowledge and the deliberations and decisions of a political community. Democracy does its best work when truth and certainty give way to our reasoned and practical attempts to deal with the uncertainties of the human condition. Aristotle understood well that the temper of politics and ethics is necessarily judicious, and I shall make great use of his emphasis on practical reasoning.

The case for democracy rests on the recognition of the facts of human fallibility and natural and social dependence, pointing to the shifting sands upon which claims to certain knowledge rest. Beyond whatever foundations we seek in Nature/God and find in scientific reports and sacred texts, we must take ethics and politics into our own hands and govern ourselves, for there is no one else and nothing else who can govern for us. But we do not govern alone. It’s the responsibility for our practices that we have in our own hands, not reality and the truth about it.

For Lynn Margulis, Gaia is completely indifferent to us and our purposes. And this indifference is at the heart of Einstein’s view: 'I believe in Spinoza's God, who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who concerns himself with fates and actions of human beings.’ That orderly harmony savours a great deal of emergence and self-organisation in nature. But if Nature or Gaia is unconcerned with the fates and actions of the human species, human beings most certainly are concerned and can never be indifferent. And naturally so. My argument in favour of practical reasoning needs to be set in the context of our place in that God/Nature of Spinoza and Einstein so that the voice of democracy is one that acknowledges the need to continue to act within limits so as to ensure orderly harmony in its unfolding. That recognition of limits is a practical recognition of nature and natural order. At the same time, that God/Nature needs to be supplemented with a notion of human beings as creative moral agents, whose lives possess intrinsic value. The realisation of our potentials is itself part of that orderly harmony of emergent nature. That God/Nature can never be as impersonal and indifferent as Spinoza and Einstein argue, for the very reason that we are active members of it; agency, value, meaning, will, purpose are parts of the ceaselessly creative universe. As co-creators in the endlessly creative universe, (Kauffman 2008), we have a role in bringing about the orderly harmony that Einstein and Spinoza wrote about.





Green spirituality and ecological virtues
The call for a 'Green spirituality' is based upon an affirmation of the sacredness of the living world and, as such, is ethical to the core. The notion of a Green spirituality points to the importance of morality in human affairs. Right living, conduct and behaviour imply certain standards and judgements about what is valuable, what is good, what we should respect. Controversies concerning an ecological modus vivendi are more than scientific; they involve arguments about values. There are clear attempts to displace the human species from the top of the ethical hierarchy and replace the anthropocentric concern with a biocentric or ecocentric conception. But the basic questions remain moral – where does value lie? What does value consist of? What is the nature of the good? And here is the most paradoxical question of all, how can we avoid anthropocentrism when human beings are the only valuers on the planet? Given human involvement in relations of mutual dependence within eco-systems, it is in the human self-interest to be disinterested and respect other living organisms for their own sakes … 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
Environmental ethics, from a human perspective, is about putting our lives and practices into a context, about challenging unsustainable behaviours, and about making the world we live in a better place in light of our knowledge of ecological constraints. Put this way, environmental ethics is essentially the realm of practical reason and concerns how theory, knowledge, and information is translated into action in the environmental in which we live. It is about seeing a situation or an issue clearly, evaluating and acting accordingly.

In the ‘practical’ perspective taken in this book, environmental ethics is about human beings as creative change agents, about reflexive action, behaviours, social practices and institutions. The emphasis is upon social interactions and social structures in the context of natural constraints and systems. A praxis view, however, is distinct from pragmatism in that it incorporates an ‘ideal’ and normative dimension into its practice and is concerned with the interpenetration of 'what is', and 'what ought to be.’ 

It is worth introducing this chapter by affirming the value of ideas, values and philosophy in relation to the ‘real’ world. Philosophy is not some dry academic exercise; truth matters, and morality too. Callicott endorses the way that Bowersox presents his view of the role that environmental philosophers, philosophy, and ethics can play in a democratic polity. It’s a view worth stating at length, because it emphasises the positive role of ideas and ethics in shaping the world around us. Callicott quotes what Bowersox writes on his philosophy:

Callicott . . . argues that ‘in thinking, talking, and writing about environmental ethics, environmental philosophers already have their shoulders to the wheel, helping to reconfigure the prevailing cultural worldview.’ (Callicott 1999: 43). . . Callicott quite rightly maintains that the world of ideas — of normative claims about the way the world works, of questions of duty and the good life — does shape the way we view and act within the world of pocketbooks, mortgages, and video games. Callicott draws attention to two cogent examples of such — the role the Enlightenment conceptions of humanism and rights doctrine, as ‘articulated by Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, and Kant, among others’ played in the abolition of slavery over the last four hundred years. (Callicott 1999: 33).

Callicott in Minteer and Taylor 2002

My conception of eco-praxis does not entail a rejection of philosophy in favour of a visionless, valueless, groundless pragmatism. On the contrary, praxis, as the unity of theory and practice, incorporates the norms, ideals and truths of philosophy in a practical engagement with the world, seeking their realisation, whilst at the same time seeing this practical transformation of the world as generative of knowledge. That very much reads ‘rational freedom’ in Marx in the manner of Rousseau’s affirmation of transcendent truths, norms and values against modern conventionalism, sophism and relativism. That may well be an unorthodox view of Marx, but I’m sticking with it. This view is expressed in Horkheimer's conception:





Environmental ethics and politics – against anthropocentrism
From the first, the field of environmental ethics developed a non-anthropocentric moral discourse which valued wilderness, natural communities, plants, non-human animals and so on as ends in themselves, regardless of the extent to which they serve human interests. The non-anthropocentric ethic regards the things of nature as valuable in themselves, independent of any contribution they may or may not make to human welfare or well-being. Nature should be preserved for its own sake, not for any benefits it may have with respect to human beings. Anthropocentrism stands condemned as an ‘arrogant humanism’ which is the main force behind the destruction of the natural world.

The nature-centred ethic has been set out well in a number of substantial works: Paul Taylor (1986), Rolston (1986,1988,1994), Laura Westra (1994), Eric Katz (1997), and J. Baird Callicott (1989, 1999a). Within this non-anthropocentric ethic, there is a dispute between biocentrism, which holds that we should focus on individual organisms, and ecocentrism, which holds that we should focus on ecological communities. And there are unresolved – unresolvable? – debates as to whether intrinsic value in nature is independent of or dependent upon human consciousness and valuation. 

I think the debate is misconceived and that we need a new orientation, one focused upon living with and within nature. I would argue that it is possible to identify and reject an exploitative anthropocentrism and embrace a more ecologically and socially enlightened ‘human-centeredness’ in promoting pro-environmental policies and practices. 

Environmentalism and moral monism
The conception of eco-praxis is an attempt to avoid the impasse of an ethics forever suspended between ideals and reality. The idea of an objective reality entails that there must be an objective truth about this reality. The problem is translating this bedrock objectivity into principles according to which we may act and live our lives.

Environmentalists must, it seems, be monists in some ultimate sense, placing a high value on interconnectedness and seeing nature as a single, rock-bottom principle which is capable of guiding moral and political action. Moral monism is the belief that there is a single coherent and complete set of principles capable of governing all moral quandaries, with a clear and correct answer for each quandary. (Stone 1988: 116). The claim is that nature will teach moral truths beyond the individualism and hedonistic materialism that characterises ‘capitalist democracy’. This idea is philosophically suspect and risks violating the convention that it is inadmissible to derive a value from a fact. However, I do agree with Dan Dennett here, if you cannot derive a value from a fact, from where does a value come? Nature may well be a slippery term, but we are natural beings who live in a world that combines nature and culture, a world of fact and value. But more than nature is involved in any moral monism, and what Dennett goes on to defend as a naturalism is not a naturalism at all.

Interests, values and priorities
The problem is that monism is shared by both those who think that nature has a moral worth and those who think nature has only a monetary value. Both sides share a view that environmental policy can and ought to be based on a single overriding value. And both sides seek to rest environmental decision making on rigid methods, with it being possible to reach correct decisions on the basis of correct knowledge. The result is an impasse in environmental ethics, involving a dichotomous choice at the level of policy between two competing holistic theories. (Norton 1991: 187).

The impasse points to the need to reconceive environmental ethics as a dynamic and adaptive process of problem solving. Both philosophically and politically, there are problems with moral monism. We need to find a way of valuing nature that is reducible neither to monetary or intrinsic value. 

In light of this impasse my argument centres on civic environmentalism, eco-praxis and practical reasoning involving a conception of ecological virtue. This is not a repudiation of the idea of objective reality and it most certainly is not a view that truth is either ‘made up’ – a culturalism, social constructivism, relativism, and sophism that I will happily damn to Hades - or is a mere matter of ‘what works’ or is useful. It is a concern with the ‘this-sidedness’ of truth in a world that is in part a human co-creation. If, as is endlessly repeated, human beings are natural beings, parts of nature, then we are active parts of this co-evolving nature, and creative human agency is a legitimate natural part of this co-production.

Monism and ethical pluralism and political pragmatism
That an ethical attitude based on respect for nature is better in the long run for humans is easy enough to understand and accept. However, we need to find a way of establishing this claim politically, because, in that very anthropocentric world of politics, reference to human interests has a greater chance of winning public support than do assertions of the intrinsic value and long term health of other beings and bodies. 

To those proposing a biocentric ethic, such thoughts are politically and impure. For Roderick Nash, any reference to human interests in preservation, even in the public realm, is something of a cheat since they replace moral with political goals, and for that reason stand condemned as not ‘pure.’ (Nash 1989: 76).

That Nash would define his biocentrism as a ‘purism’ reveals an innocence that is politically disabling. Paradise has been lost; its recovery, or any kind of recovery, depends upon our actions, our intervention. 

Nash expresses a moral monism when he argues that the history of environmental ethics is the history of the single idea that nonhuman elements of nature have rights. The clear implication is that all environmental goals must rest on a biocentric principle. (Nash 1989). This view is as reductionist as the claims from those who see nature only in terms of a monetary cost/benefit analysis.

Such purism holds ethics and politics apart in a way that would have made no sense to Aristotle. The purist stance invites irrelevance and ineffectiveness. It fails to make that necessary transition from theory to practice and hobbles itself with the a priori view that politics is irredeemably an impure realm. Frankly, with the belief in the purity of a Paradise beyond recall, it seems to hold the mere presence of the human species as a corruption. Tony Brenton’s book The Greening of Machiavelli by (1994) could easily be re-written as The Machiavellianing of the Greens, because we need a Machiavellianising of environmentalism too, to overcome a purism that is little more than a politics of permanent protest, endlessly rehearsing the defeats of principle that are sure to come and which continually follow. We should understand that the forces which are destroying ecosystems and communities are not going to go away through assertions of principle, and that calls to live lightly on the earth have to be backed by an effective politics. Political naivety results in a failure to check destruction.

If this seems more than a little Machiavellian in the worst sense, defeating the whole point of environmental ethics – the idea that nature and living forms have value - it is nevertheless clear that the environmental movement has been pluralistic in its value commitments, and has been given to political compromise. I am not establishing a point of philosophical principle but attempting to see real movement in the world. Monism in this sense has served and will continue to serve as a background value to environmental activism, a self-evident truth needing neither elaboration nor proof. In which case, the philosophical problem of monism is more a problem of philosophy and its quest for certainty with respect to foundations than it is of environmentalism as politics.

I think there are ways by which natural facts can and do inform values and, more than that, I think that at the level of practical living, fact and value merge. Nevertheless, relating fact and value is treacherous philosophical ground, to say the least. In all of that, I am encouraged by the fact that people almost entirely innocent of philosophical learning manage to relate fact and value every day of their lives. Every day, we evaluate and make decisions in light of facts. As part of our intuitive practical reasoning, we combine fact and value every day of our lives, in seeking information, processing and evaluating it and in acting on it. That’s revealing.

As Marc Hauser points out, there are many situations in which it is ‘reasonable’ to move from fact to value judgment, ‘requiring little more than an ability to understand the consequences of carrying out an action as opposed to refraining from the action.’(Hauser 2006 ch 1). If one considers any number of our actions during the day, there are many instances when it is entirely reasonable to use is to derive ought. Indeed, we do so routinely, without giving it any thought. Resources are scarce, we work with limited time, and so it makes sense to exercise judgement, resort to habit, trust, custom, rule of thumb, rather than reason things through in order to ensure philosophical correctness. 

‘Facts alone don't motivate us into action. But when we learn about a fact and are motivated by its details, we often alight upon an evaluative decision that something should be done. What motivates us to conclude that the doctor should give anesthesia is that the girl shouldn't experience pain, if pain can be avoided. Our attitude toward pain, that we should avoid it whenever we can, motivates us to convert the facts of this case to an evaluative judgment. This won't always be the right move. We need to understand what drives the motivations and attitudes we have.’ (Hauser 2006 ch 1). 

The conclusion to be drawn is quite straightforward, sometimes fact and value intermesh in such a way as to generate a logical conclusion as to what we ought to do, but not always. There will always be a need for judgement, and there will always be a reliance on habit, tradition, trust, authority, rule of thumb – cultural resources which embody experience. The point to stress, however, is practical reasoning in light of nature, nature without but also our own ‘natural piety’.

We need to take the facts of each case, and judge them accordingly. Whilst nature doesn’t define this relationship, or decide these cases, it may limit what is morally possible, and suggest ways in which humans, and possibly other animals, are motivated into action. When Katharine Hepburn turned to Humphrey Bogart in the African Queen and said, ‘Nature, Mr. Allnut, is what we are put in this world to rise above,’ Hauser claims she got one word wrong: 

We must not rise above nature, but rise with nature, looking her in the eye and watching our backs. The only way to develop stable prescriptive principles, through either formal law or religion, is to understand how they will break down in the face of biases that Mother Nature equipped us with.

Hauser 2006: ch 1

I would just pause here and say two words – natural law. The natural law tradition in ethics doesn’t read ethics from any physical law of nature but sees nature through the eyes of reason. We use our reason to rise with nature, to ascend to the best of our potentials, not above or against nature. Nature, reason and culture proceed together. The biases that Mother Nature has equipped us with refer to that innate cognitive and affective capacity to survive and thrive in our environment. We can be so impressed with our equipment as to overdevelop it, and in the process become lost in a world of our own making. We must be ever-vigilant and check any abstracting tendencies and forces on our part. We must, in fine, rise with nature, not above nature: nature via nurture is the motto of the moral ecological enlightenment.

Epistemology and ethics – one earth and a plurality of values
The epistemological question of discerning a correct environmental worldview based on a scientific understanding of nature needs to be distinguished from the strategic question of how politically useful it is for environmentalists to have a single worldview. And having made the distinction, we need to face one of the toughest questions of all in philosophy – the transition from theory to practice. This is the relation of philosophy to politics that so concerned Plato.

For all of his pursuit of purity and clarity in the world of ideas, there is no doubting Plato’s commitment to public life and the everyday world of human beings. Yet Plato clearly held the realm of action to be inferior to contemplation. His view that our troubles will not end until philosophers came to govern rests on an assumption that the world of politics was a decidedly lesser way of relating to reality than was the world of ideas. In other words, Plato was keenly aware of the wrenching gap that separated the ideal and the real from each other. With his view of the world of the ideal forms as the true reality, Plato could not see that a superior understanding of reality lay in bridging that gap through praxis. To have seen the world beyond the divide was Marx’s great insight, hence Thesis II on Feuerbach where Marx declared human thought with respect to objective truth to be a ‘practical question.’ ‘Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.’ Also relevant is Thesis V: ‘Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants contemplation; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensous activity.’ 

‘Scholasticism’ has its place. I seem to have spent a lifetime demanding action as a result of philosophical contemplation. And I have to say that the scholastic tradition was eminently practical, as well as visionary and ambitious with regard to ideals. Who do you think built the cathedrals?! My concern is with bridging the gap between theoretical reason and practical reason so that truth becomes a vital force in the quest to live well and live with meaning. Marx wrote of there being a ‘world to win.’ In light of a converging social and ecological crisis, winning this world is also a condition of saving ourselves. And that is most certainly of more than scholastic significance.

Anthropocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism? I agree we need a grounding in objective reality, something which sees us and our flourishing within a whole. I also hold that human beings are unique in being the only ones capable of reflecting upon the interactions and interconnections in that whole, and of valuing. That certainly can invite a strong anthropocentrism which sees nature and its resources as subordinate to human interests. Some, for instance, object to biodiversity being valued for its past and future benefits to human beings, arguing that species should be valued for their own sakes. Is it an either/or? The implication is that if a species is of no benefit to the human species, it can be allowed to go into extinction. Objections to this point to a valuation of species for their own sakes. And then come the arguments about human impact and development having to be minimised in order to protect habitats and species. 

I’m afraid such a view is unappealing to human beings. Regrettable maybe, but the argument for valuing all species as ends in themselves is not persuasive and probably not even true to the science of ecology. There is plenty of take as well as give in nature, and plenty of waste and destruction, too. And human involvement is now so extensive as to have upset any internal balance beyond recall. I take a view that self-interest is ineradicable, natural and is part of a healthy and flourishing ecosystem, pointing to an aliveness within the whole. It just needs to be related to the claims of the rest of the system, not asserted over and against it. If this is a weak anthropocentrism, then it is an anthropocentrism that attempts to balance the claims of nature with a realistic awareness of human nature. We meddle, we intervene, we create culture, we change our environment to fit our evolving needs – and there is no indication that the human species will ever stop doing these things. The expectation that, by some spiritual awareness, we will come to see our true place within the cosmic universe and settle is fanciful in the extreme, flies in the face of all we know of evolutionary biology, psychology and history, and is a counsel of despair – it asks for the impossible and prepares the ground for the inevitable defeat of hope, the dwindling of expectations, and the retreat into passive indifference, apathy and gloom. Many are there already, in the ranks of the defeated. It is self-defeating and unnecessary. The challenge is to take responsibility for our powers and actions and engage in wise living, being true to our natures as well as to external nature.

This may amount ‘weak anthropocentrism,’ a position that is able to account for the intrinsic value or inherent worth of nature whilst recognising both human interests and values within, rather than against or apart from, a biologically or ecologically defined metaphysical system. In truth, it is an attempt to avoid any kind of ‘centrism’ and go beyond ‘scholastic’ debates as to where true worth lies.

For Marx, without the unity of theory and practice, the world could not fail to appear fetishistically, as an objective external datum apart from human beings and imposed on us from the outside. In this alienated world, human creations achieve an independence from their human creators; human beings, the true subjects, are reduced to being passive appendages of objects; we become ‘things’ as objects acquire the existential significance that is properly ours. This alienated world appears to move according to its own logic, quite independently of human choice and will.

Seeing the alienated world as a human creation, Marx sought to abolish the fetish systems of politics (the state) and production (capital) by recovering the human social labour from behind the finished world. Marx developed a critical and emancipatory project which was to comprehend and change society from the standpoint of real individuals. This project relates the alien objectivity to the real individuals whose praxis creates this world. Marx’s conception of social versus alien control seeks to recover, both in theory and in practice, the constitutive power of human subjectivity behind the immediacy of reified and constraining social relations within which social identity confronts individuals in the form of an alien power (Clarke 1991:ix; Critchley 2001 RFM vol 6)

In contradistinction to Plato’s conception, which holds philosophical contemplation and political action at a wrenching distance, Marx demonstrates a concern with the practical, sensuous and affirmative materialism operating in the everyday world and with the social bonds which form the content of public life. This demand for the unity of theory and practice, what Marx called ‘revolutionary’ ‘practical-critical’ activity is as important today as it ever was. Facing a convergence of social and ecological crises, Marx’s demand for revolutionary critical praxis is essential to our attempts to grasp this reality. 

The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.

Marx, Thesis XI on Feuerbach

The world has grown so threateningly beyond human comprehension and control that only an active, critical, political mode of apprehending it can reveal its origins in creative human labour and how this is expressed in the interchange between human beings and nature. Only then can we see the world as fluid rather than fixed, as something unfinished, as something we play a creative part in finishing. As creative agents, human beings are capable of throwing off external imperatives and determining future directions. The human origins of the alien world remain concealed until we come to apprehend the levers for change. Fetishism implies a failure on the part of human agents to apprehend the social world as their own creation, to recognise that social reality is, in Gramsci's words, 'humanly objective' and hence is subject to human intervention, alteration and control. Marx’s 'active' materialism elaborated a conception of an 'objectivity' which is founded upon and transformed by praxis, of a humanised objectivity. The question of the nature of objectivity can only be posed in the context of human praxis as the practical relation of subject and object. Fetishism, as objectivity coming to acquire an existential significance of its own, independent of human beings, is to be penetrated by Marx's stress on the central role of practical, transformative activity in every human relation. (Critchley 1997 BMP vol 2).

Today, as our own powers in alien form continue to shape the world as some external force, and as a self-made ecological catastrophe moves ever closer, the full meaning of the world as ‘humanly objective’ can be revealed only through the political action which sees through and breaks through the inhuman facade boxing us in on all sides and suffocating the life out of the world.

Pragmatism – rejection of foundationalism
The view I am exploring here rejects the search for foundations as a chimera. Foundationalism is the idea that knowledge and belief must be grounded in a class of certain, fixed, and basic beliefs, and seems perfectly suited to the environmental cause. One can understand how Nature as such could be considered something that is self-evident and self-justifying in some way. In a sense, the human race has been acting as if Nature requires no proof; its existence has been assumed. And its health has been disregarded at the same time. Nature has not been valued, it has been taken for granted. So, we do indeed need to start valuing nature, rather than just assume it as a background. Nature underpins life on Earth. It’s just that when it comes to defining precisely what this value is, philosophically, things get complicated. The natural knowledge of science comes, according to philosophical convention, without moral implication. I have my own view when it comes to foundations, and it is a very ancient one. Pythagoras and the Harmony in All Things https://www.academia.edu/705399/Pythagoras_and_the_Harmony_in_All_Things (​https:​/​​/​www.academia.edu​/​705399​/​Pythagoras_and_the_Harmony_in_All_Things​)

Pythagoras seems always to be with us, the perennial philosopher (Kitty Ferguson 2008). And truth is beauty and beauty is truth. Why Beauty is Truth by Ian Stewart (2007) is simple enough for an old dyscalculic like my good self. I’m interested in Margaret Wertheim’s critical appreciation in Pythagoras’ Trousers (1997), as well as the fact that she declared her favourite book to be Dante’s Comedy. That’s work to come from me, indicating where I find my beginning and end. The Golden Ratio? I loved Kenneth Clark’s Civilisation (1969), that kind of sceptical tone that let the art, architecture and music speak for itself and incline us to a true appreciation of reality:





It seems to be obligatory to dismiss Clark as old-fashioned, stuffy, conservative, patrician, elitist. As a young boy, he was my introduction to culture and civilisation and he performed that role perfectly, bringing the great works within reach. And I like that he shared his expertise with a mass audience, hardly elitist at all, very democratic I’d say, much more so than those who present art, architecture and music through a filter. As for old-fashioned, his conclusion was spot on, and we have still to address the predicament he stated so perfectly:

I said at the beginning that it is lack of confidence, more than anything else, that kills a civilisation. We can destroy ourselves by cynicism and disillusion, just as effectively as by bombs. Fifty years ago W. B. Yeats, who was more like a man of genius than anyone I have ever known, wrote a famous prophetic poem.

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.





Heroic materialism is capitalism. Liberals celebrate capitalism as the end of history. I’d say that those who think their view supersedes Clark’s are nowhere near as left as either they or their cheerleaders think. They are liberals wallowing in the end of history, just making sure that everyone is in on the party. Clark knew better. If you want a foundation from me, you will find it here. Clark refers to ‘a man who is unequalled — the greatest philosophic poet that has ever lived, Dante.’ ‘Of course there is humanity in Dante — there's everything in Dante. But he also had certain qualities that Giotto lacked: philosophic power, a grasp of abstract ideas, moral indignation, that heroic contempt for baseness that was to come again in Michelangelo; and, above all, a sense of the unearthly, a vision of heavenly radiance.’ (Clark 1969: 84-85).

So if you insist on forcing me to give my view of objective foundations … 
I remain wholly persuaded by Dante’s vision of the sweet symphony of Paradise. And I remain committed to truth, beauty and goodness as the three transcendentals. They are all connected. Turn on to beauty and you will find your way to truth and goodness. I reaffirm Plato’s old insight in making beauty the supreme political category for the way that it lights the path to truth and goodness and invites the heart to follow. In The Symposium Plato wrote of the divine beauty which is beheld by the eye. That’s a very different notion from the subjectivist assertion that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Plato integrates reason with all the human faculties. Remember, too, that Rousseau pointed to the truths 'engraved on the human heart.' Give it a go. You can do it. We are all appropriately equipped for the life of reason. Clark called Rousseau a man of genius, too. Civilisation cemented in my mind the idea that beauty was a noble pursuit, playing an essential place role in our lives, and that, in responding to its allure, we become turned on to truth and goodness as well. The true, the good and the beautiful are the three great transcendentals. Seek beauty and you with find truth and goodness, they are all connected and you will never find them apart. The three are as integral to each other as the sides of the Pythagorean triangle.

But there it is. The ‘heroic materialism’ of the capital system, what Lewis Mumford describes as ‘purposeless materialism,’ has taken us a world away from these transcendent norms, truths and values, and if you want to get back in touch with them, you are going to have to find the imagination and the courage to engage in practical social transformation, however reluctant a revolutionary you may be. Such is politics, opening up areas that seem natural and eternal to political controversy, challenge, intervention and alteration, all those false fixities that an established order seeks to erect around key questions of power, control, resources, and authority. All the ethical appeals to the common good in the world won’t work within an antagonistically structured, subjectless, uncontrollable, anarchic and uncontrollable system organised around an accumulative dynamic that proceeds without regard to people or planet. 

I enjoyed this book too, S Conway Morris Life's Solution 2003. Sam Harris didn’t. Capra is good. Dawkins can’t stand psychic physics and doesn’t want to hear the music of the spheres. I enjoyed the book The Purposeful Universe by Carl Johan Calleman (2009). Others loathe teleology. I like Rupert Sheldrake (1981 1988 1990 2012), others dismiss him as a crank. Some of the views I appreciate in the new science are dismissed by scientists as anti-scientific nonsense. Rupert Sheldrake is fine by me. So is Dana Zohar (1990 1993 2001 2003). Anne Baring too, (2013) described by Andrew Harvey as one of the planet's greatest visionaries of the Sacred Feminine. Starhawk is well worth reading. (1988 1989 2002 2004). I like Wholeness and the Implicate Order by David Bohm (1983). I have lots of favourite books in this vain. I’ve always been intrigued by Teilhard de Chardin, insofar as I understand him:

There is an almost sensual longing for communion with others with a larger vision. The immense fulfilment of the friendship between those engaged in furthering the evolution of consciousness, has a quality impossible to describe.

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin

I hope one day to get round to reading the many books I have by and on Teilhard (1965 1967 1973 1978 1982 1984). I love the work of Steve Jones, who tells me not to bother:

Anyone who came up with a planetary or cardiac philosophy of life would today be laughed out of court. Evolution has joined those sciences in the dock. Walter Bagehot, in his Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of Natural Selection and Inheritance to Political Society, proposed that 'what was put forward for mere animal history may, with a change of form, but an identical essence, be applied to human history'. Most of what his many successors claim about the same thing does no more than restate the obvious in biological terms. The rest — whatever it might be — is not science.
The Olympian vagueness of their notions is illustrated by the writings of Teilhard de Chardin. He linked biology to the Spirit of Christmas in a gaseous envelope called the noosphere: 'Life physically culminates in man, just as energy culminates in life . . . The phenomenon of Man was essentially pre-ordained from the beginning'. The Origin does not have much sarcasm, but the 'Historical Sketch' that begins its later editions mentions a Dr Freke who had, in a paper of wonderful obscurity, claimed precedence for its ideas. As Darwin says: 'As Dr Freke has now (1861) published his Essay . . . the difficult attempt to give any idea of his views would be superfluous on my part'. That does for Teilhard and his heirs too.

Jones 1999 An Historical Sketch of the Progress of Opinion on the Origin of Species

Whatever it is I like … ‘whatever it might be — is not science.’ With respect to Teilhard, there were more than a few theologians who said it wasn’t religion either. You don’t ground God in nature, the finite can never prove the infinite. Then there is Stephen Jay Gould, whose wonderful book Bully for Brontosaurus contains a chapter entitled ‘Kropotkin was no crackpot.’ He wasn’t either. But I hope the moral is now obvious – finding foundations is an eternal quest, and finding them in nature through the methods of science is a fool’s errand. Biological nature is little or no help, I recall Richard Dawkins saying with reference to creating the cooperative, generous, altruistic society. No wonder God is non-existent! I read all these books. And I don’t expect to persuade anyone not already persuaded by them. Excuse my little excursion here, there is a point. There’s an awful lot of symbols standing in the way of reality. I can merely advise people to get in tune. We can all sing and dance, and such things stand in no need of proof.

Redeem the time. Redeem the unread vision in the higher dream.
T.S. Eliot

But is it science? 
Blake and Dante are side by side on my top shelf in the front room, a lively exchange. Blake called Dante an ‘atheist.’ Reality is a very strange and deep place, and the truth about it is more than likely to be even stranger and deeper. In the meantime … I have parsnips to butter.

To get hung up in philosophical dispute and wait until clarity and certainty has been reached of the natural grounds of moral values is to miss the point as to why this issue is important. In light of intractable philosophical disputes concerning just what ‘nature’ is – let alone ‘God!’ - and how the worlds of fact and value relate, it seems more prudent to replace the philosophical ‘quest for certainty’ with an experimental, fallibilist and activist view in which we are co-producers in knowledge, and in which knowledge claims are provisional, subject to continuous criticism and revision as we engage with the endless creativity of the world around us. (Kloppenberg 1998: 85). Such an approach develops knowledge as a social intelligence.

It is experience, and not intellectual abstraction, that matters most when it comes to the way we live our lives. And it is our whole experience, our natural behaviour, our social practices and our cultural competences, that connect us to the world in which we live.

We need to move beyond dualisms of fact and value, object and subject if we are to live an integral life. Subject to these dualisms, we live a bifurcated existence, split between an ‘objective,’ impersonal, mechanistic world of purposeless, meaningless fact and a ‘subjective’ world of personal experience. For fact to acquire meaning and for value to acquire grounding, these two realms need to be bridged. An evolutionary, organic science and a holistic morality converge in this process of integration.

This approach fits the continuous creativity of the world and conceives the endlessly creative universe of which we are a part as a co-creation and an inventive unfolding in which we actively participate. Instead of claims to universality, absolute truth and certainty, the emphasis is upon unfolding patterns, emergence, potentials becoming actuals and, with respect to human society, beliefs and practices that are conditional upon the test-effect of experience.

This is to see ourselves as active participants in a creative universe, a world in which we play our part as co-creators. The embrace of the world as a co-creation replaces the singular or reductionist view of knowledge with a diffuse, activist, participatory view. This is to see ourselves as actively participating in the unfolding of the world. (Kauffman 2008).





This agenda entails a shift away from increasingly sterile foundational value debates and questions of moral worth towards a renewed focus on environmental practice and policy and a more democratic approach to environmental values and ethical decision making. We are active participants in this world, and we come to know and value the world from the inside rather than the outside.
 
Jamison expresses his frustration at the tendency to get bogged down in issues of values and politics, to the neglect of actually creating the ecological culture and sensibility leading us to the ecological society of the future:





This view confirms my conviction that, in light of an increasing environmental crisis, environmental ethics must be practical and must be politically and socially relevant. By the time we have finally gained a philosophically acceptable statement of the claims of nature, there may be precious little enough of our natural systems left to support civilised life. These are times that focus minds. At the same time, an environmental ethics must be environmental and must be an ethics too, so that practice and action is about something and has a substantive content. The problem in this respect, then, is not so much the philosophical statement of good and value but getting bogged down in philosophical controversies to the neglect of real movement.

Need for practical philosophy - escaping academic confines
Personal testimony from those who have worked in public policy as well as empirical research – Donald Brown, Susan Buck (1997), supports the view that philosophical environmental ethics is almost never read by policy makers and has failed to make an impact in the public realm. Environmental philosophy is read by environmental philosophers. The bridge between contemplation and action remains a difficult one to cross.

It seems that we are as far away as we ever were from the old figure of the philosopher-king. Rather than attempt to model an elitist and authoritarian political practice on that notion, it makes more sense to recognise that the pursuit of objective truth is a mediated activity and to reject the idea that any one figure or entity could embody and articulate that truth. Instead, we should opt for a cooperative and inclusive style of practical philosophy, seeking to redeem the field's original promise to make sense of our environmental concerns and values, but within a concept of democratic citizenship which recognises individuals as moral agents within an integrated human and natural community. Truth remains important, but so too is the constitution of a public of truthseekers, as against the rule of lawgivers.

Actions and values
Rather than beginning and ending with the definition of a set of metaphysical principles, the practical approach emphasises actions over words, with actions bringing out the meanings of words. The praxis approach is sceptical of justifications that are based upon principles known independently of experience, a priori. For Bryan Norton, the environmentalists' dilemma is mainly a dilemma of values and explanations than it is of preferred actions (Norton 1991: 187). In practice, environmentalists leave aside diverging worldviews and instead converge when it comes to environmental action. 

That convergence, I would argue, implies the existence of a central, cohering principle upon which agreement is possible. In our practical lives, we simply assume ‘reality,’ however we may mis/conceive it, as a background, without which nothing could happen. Reality is irreducible in this sense of being axiomatic, a self-evident truth requiring no further proof. Whether it is God or Nature or both doesn’t matter. In the pragmatic conception, theories are more like tools rather than ends in themselves, with environmental action involving a complex interplay of scientific, economic, and normative judgments. My view? I surprise people by referring to Marx’s essentialist metaphysics. I would probably surprise, and maybe annoy, Marx himself by calling him a metaphysician. Essentialist categories are embedded into Marx’s practical critique, which makes the point that Marx’s praxis is no visionless, valueless pragmatism but is principled at the core. And it is in this sense that I would make the case for an eco-pragmatism. First principles matter. It’s just that it is more likely that we will attain convergence on environmental goods in practice than we will in theory. The eco-praxis approach puts the two together.

Environmentalism and plural values
The challenge is to search for common ground from which a philosophically, culturally, and politically viable worldview can emerge, one which sees humans as integrated into larger ecological systems and which values objects as parts of their human, cultural, and biotic communities. On reflection, it’s not such a difficult search at all. We stand on common ground, the Earth that we share in common. The ground we are searching for in ethics lies solidly under our feet. It’s just that we struggle to define precisely what that ground is. But we walk on it all the same.

Politics and decision making
The practical orientation recognises the limits of our knowledge of environmental problems, even as we act on the knowledge we have obtained. Environmentalism operates on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, recognising that the latest evidence is always open to challenge and revision and can soon be replaced. Sooner or later, whatever the extent of our knowledge, we enter the world of politics, the world of normative commitments, practical reasoning and judgements. 

Pragmatism over philosophical purity
This argument makes the case for reconceiving environmental ethics as a branch of applied philosophy, no longer a philosophical exercise seeking truth about an objective reality, but relating to ethics as a field of practical reason, revising its normative structure and methodological orientation in order to address wider political and policy concerns.

Pragmatism, truth and real world problems
In the words of Graham Greene, ‘Truth . . . has never been of any real value to any human being—it is a symbol for mathematicians and philosophers to pursue.’ I’d just qualify that and refer to ‘abstract truth’, a truth apart from lived relations. Philosophy, as Wittgenstein recognised, leaves the world unchanged. The point, however, is to change the world.

The quote from Greene came from his book The Heart of the Matter. (Greene 1948: 58). Alexis de Tocqueville spoke of the ‘habits of the heart’, the mores which integrate human beings in community, including such things as consciousness, culture, and the habitual everyday practices of life. The mores are integral to our participation in community. I consider this ‘heart’ to be crucial to the question of living well. Biologists speak of an innate moral grammar, whilst the natural law tradition holds morality to be something inscribed on the heart. I will develop these ideas later with respect to virtue theory, going on to develop a conception of ecological virtue. There is an ecology of the heart. In this approach, the community in which we participate emerges as a habitus in which we acquire and practise the virtues – morality relating to who we are as well as to what we do. I go on to expand the notion of community to set human behaviour within the whole commonwealth of life, as adumbrated above.

Integrating democratic values and processes
This approach allows us to reclaim politics as a creative self-realisation, revalue democratic values and highlight creative environmental processes as part of a transitional strategy. Noting that there is a missing dimension in environmental politics, Jamison emphasises the ‘making of green knowledge’: 





The epistemological move entailed by eco-praxis, emphasising the active generation of green knowledge, views democratic forms of life and practices as preconditions for experimental inquiry and intelligent problem-solving with respect to environing nature. The human interchange with the social and natural environment is the ultimate generator of (human) knowledge and value, and the continuing process of direct experience forms the only authoritative source of moral and political guidance.

The advantage of this eco-praxis is that not only can we envisage the world as a co-creation, we can recover the moral sense of politics as a creative self-realisation and of community as a habitus enabling us to live well in light of a recognition of ecological constraints. 

Beyond anthropocentrism and ecocentrism
Environmentalism is split between anthropocentrism on the one side, and ecocentrism or biocentrism on the other. This split has practical implications. Anthropocentrism sees the environment in terms of human interests. Value through this lens often takes the form of economic value, hence criticisms of human arrogance and exploitation. But this need not be the case. There is nothing preventing an appreciation of the value of nature from the perspective of human interests, as, for instance, when we speak of the medical benefits made possible from biodiversity. On the other side, non-anthropocentrism sees biodiversity as good in itself. Ecocentrism and biocentrism affirm the intrinsic value or inherent worth of nature — especially wild species and ecosystems. Many environmentalists insist that human beings come finally to see themselves as parts of a nature that neither begins nor ends with human beings and their interests and concerns. Human beings shouldn’t treat the earth as a stock of resources and shouldn’t see nature as capital to be used and exploited. For many, the environmental ethic begins and ends there. Which begs the question of what, precisely, human beings can legitimately do. The problem with the approach is that everything in nature seems to be a legitimate agent except human beings, whose cultural creativity is most certainly true to their nature. The human interchange with nature cannot but be a practical and mediated one, involving the things of nature. If that is rejected as utilitarian and exploitative, what, precisely, can human beings legitimately do? The view curtails human activity so drastically as to amount to a practical misanthropy. It is bereft of political and economic implications with respect to forms of governance and economic systems. As such, it is worse than useless, not merely silent on institutional questions, but negative and critical, without proposing viable alternatives. The view will appeal to a minority of nature-lovers but will never be persuasive with respect to broad numbers of people. It’s a cul-de-sac, and an indulgence.

Pragmatism and weak anthropocentrism
I would question why we need to split environmental ethics in terms of any kind of ‘centrism’. These questions in reality are not either/or questions. A mixed conception of human community and natural community undermines any kind of centrism. The ‘nature-centred’ ethic of biocentrism and ecocentrism is as philosophically dubious as the ‘human-centred’ ethic of anthropocentrism, and is politically unpersuasive and ineffective to boot. The split between human and nature with respect to where value lies is unnecessary. There seems to be unanimous agreement that human beings are a part of nature, and agreement that we should value nature, both for our own interests and for its own sake. Attempts to determine where value lies with precision are not merely elusive and divisive, they are redundant:

The evidence of swift environmental change calls for an ethic uncoupled from other systems of belief. Those committed by religion to believe that life was put on earth in one divine stroke will recognize that we are destroying the Creation, and those who perceive biodiversity to be the product of blind evolution will agree. Across the other great philosophical divide, it does not matter whether species have independent rights or, conversely, that moral reasoning is uniquely a human concern. Defenders of both premises seem destined to gravitate toward the same position on conservation.
The stewardship of environment is a domain on the near side of metaphysics where all reflective persons can surely find common ground. For what, in the final analysis, is morality but the command of conscience seasoned by a rational examination of consequences? And what is a fundamental precept but one that serves all generations? An enduring environmental ethic will aim to preserve not only the health and freedom of our species, but access to the world in which the human spirit was born.

Wilson 1993: ch 15

A civic environmentalism is capable of developing a social identity and normative commitment that recognises a mixed conception of the human and natural community, bringing together theory and practice in order to inform, explain, promote and justify ecologically and socially sound practices and policies, building support and inspiring effort and activism in order to conceive the democratic transition to the sustainable society (Norton 1991; Norton and Minteer 2002; Norton 2005).

Pragmatism and intrinsic value
If labels are still required, this view could be called a ‘weak anthropocentrism’ allied to a civic environmentalism. It is a view which recognises the key aspects of biocentrism and ecocentrism too, and nature as an underpinning, axiomatic assumption to our living, to an extent that definitions and distinctions become irrelevant. Whatever the names, this view is capable of embracing intrinsic value arguments with respect to particular situations.

The problem with a nonanthropocentric position is that, whilst condemning human arrogance, it can fail to take proper account of perfectly legitimate humanist value positions and justifications. That’s the problem with general statements, whether condemnations or agreements, they miss the key details, determinants, structures and motivations. If human beings are indeed a part of nature, then it follows that human claims have a legitimacy with respect to valuing nature. The view that humanist values as such are metaphysically and epistemologically flawed is philosophically questionable. More than this, however, the nonanthropocentric position undermines attempts to formulate and promote a strong environmental agenda at the level of popular support and public policy. It makes more sense to be clear about the legitimate claims of humanist values when it comes to the winning the support of citizens and influencing decision makers. Do we want to be right or effective? Why do we need to choose between one or the other? It makes most sense to be both right and effective.

A public mode of deliberation and reasoning
My point is that philosophical searches for moral worth and intrinsic value reach an impasse, or a natural end point, in which we come to ‘know’ as much as we are ever likely to ‘know’ within certain time constraints. When this point is reached, it is doubtful that further investigations into moral ontology to discern what things in the world ‘count’ or have moral worth will resolve what will soon become intractable, sterile, disputes in environmental ethics. Philosophical agreement on this score is not only highly unlikely, it wouldn’t suffice to make the field useful, relevant and effective in policy making. The scientific consensus on climate change has struggled politically. This is not to deny the importance of scientific knowledge and truth, it is attempt to take the step from this knowledge to the practical world. And that step can be taken in ways that avoid reducing nature to utility.

I would refer to what John Dewey called ‘natural piety’ to infuse pragmatic instrumentalism with the ethical intuitions of the biocentric or ecocentric view, without requiring clarity, certainty and consensus on problematic and controversial metaphysical commitments to the intrinsic worth of nature. Dewey’s conception of ‘natural piety’ has clear affinities with what biologists call an innate moral grammar and with what natural law identifies as the moral law written on the human heart. 

We should stop seeing the issue of environmental crisis and policy failure as a failure of moral principle - a failure to adopt the singular, correct moral attitude toward nature – and instead focus on the failure of – and the required development of – the moral and social intelligence which is capable of apprehending this substantive ecological good from the inside.

All types of knowing and valuing 
Environmental values are the products of the interchange between the human and the natural community and are experienced as human values embedded in particular social situations and ecophysical contexts. It follows that culture is fundamentally entwined with the surrounding environment. Further, cooperative transactions with nature manifest ‘social intelligence’, something which enhances the political culture of democracy as well as the moral status of community. The result is a more balanced, adapted culture that is able to ensure proper relation between environmental values and political commitments within communities of place. That is, environmental problems should be addressed in terms of collective action and experimental methods based on an open and inclusive view of the range of human and environmental values as expressed by a range of actors as moral agents and eco-citizens.

In this way, we can reconceive environmental ethics pragmatically, as a dynamic and adaptive process of problem solving. I’d just call it living unencumbered by abstract codes and systems, internalizing the truths, norms and values of transcendent standards and articulating them within communities of character, conduct and practice. It is a praxis that sees creative human agency within the creative universe, beyond dualisms of subject and object, with our knowledge coming from the inside of this world, not from some Archimedean point outside.

The pluralist model of environmental value and action embedded in natural systems
The praxis orientation is a way of acting which recognises the way that intrinsic and instrumental values, ends and means, interpenetrate in experience, establishing environmental theory and practice in interactive relation. This avoids the dichotomy of anthropocentism or ecocentrism/biocentrism by incorporating critical elements of both sensibilities in a more integrated, balanced, and practical vision of a human environmental praxis that is thoroughly embedded in natural systems.

It is a view, furthermore, which is also able to accommodate political participation, sustainable community development and ecologically benign and adaptive forms of technological enterprise.

Public commitments and the civic spirit
Valuing the moral character of our relations as human beings with the natural world is an approach that is capable of embracing a normative commitment to intrinsic value in nature. The same approach is also capable of connecting the transformation of our attitudes toward nature with the transformation of our social and political life. This is to develop a politically grounded and civic-minded approach to environmentalism, something which sees our valuing of the world around us as a practice. This is life, no rehearsals, no more stalling, no prevarication, no living in anticipation in accordance with the strictures of an a priori rationality. A mixed, partnership conception of human and natural community, is concerned with the health of political culture and the civic capacity of the community as well as the health of natural systems, seeking to protect both in the face of diremptive economic and urbanizing forces.

This mixed approach is capable of affirming environmental values with respect to achieving and maintaining a ‘balanced’ or ‘healthy’ natural community, whilst at the same time advancing a public agenda expressing normative commitments. It sees both the human and the natural as integral elements of the good life lived within the democratic public community.

Eco-praxis is therefore a powerful tool that is capable of furthering the ends of civic regeneration and social improvement. Focusing on the realm of practice rather than the sphere of the ideal, praxis is not a mirroring philosophy which is concerned to reflect objective ideas that are extraneous to human culture, practice and experience, but an active materialism that does its work in the sensuous terrain of the everyday life world. It is a creative philosophy that emphasises the transformative practical experience that takes shape as individuals and communities confront problems, engage in social learning, change behaviour and progressively improve their natural and built environments.

Values, moral principles, ideas, are not theoretical abstractions relating to a reality that is objective in the sense of being an external datum, but are things we generate from and re-incorporate back into our transformatory activities, employed with the goal of bettering the human condition by enhancing our cultural adaptation to the environment. This is not to deny the existence of a real world at all, still less the existence of transcendent standards of truth and value, just to recognise that the world we live in is not some objective fact outside of human experience. Not as far as human beings are concerned. Eco-praxis is a reflexive social activity which generates new knowledge and values through the remaking of social reality, enriching experience through practical engagement, and expanding human understanding of the realities of the world we live in. This practical engagement deepens our appreciation of and involvement in the natural and social worlds, it takes us inside the very reality we wish to know about. We become part of it and it becomes part of us. This is what Marx understood by communism:

Communism is the positive supersession of private property as human self-estrangement, and hence the true appropriation of the human essence through and for man; it is the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e. human, being, a restoration which has become conscious and which takes place within the entire wealth of previous periods of development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature, and between man and man, the true resolution of the conflict between existence and being, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be the solution. 

Marx EW EPM 1975: 348

For Marx, society is the mediating term between nature and humanity:

The human essence of nature exists only for social man; for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with other men, as his existence for others and their existence for him, as the vital element of human reality; only here does it exist as the basis of his own human existence. Only here has his natural existence become his human existence and nature become man for him. Society is therefore the perfected unity in essence of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of nature.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 350

Of course, such a view could be criticised as denying that nature has a value or even an existence independently of human values and interests. There is nothing of interest and value in nature outside of the cause of humanisation. A genuine resolution of the conflict between humanity and nature rests upon a reconciliation that recognises the legitimate claims of both, avoiding the danger of encompassing the one in the other. 

I want now to relate the conception of eco-praxis to what has been called ‘citizen science’.

12 CITIZEN SCIENCE, PRAXIS AND PUBLIC LIFE

Being at One links a number of purposes – proceeding from the role played by science in yielding objective knowledge about the world (particularly with respect to climate change and the ecological crisis that is unfolding), and the role that scientific expertise plays in politics and decision making, and the way this impacts on our everyday lives, going on to review blockages preventing the translation of knowledge into public policy, action and practice. Here is where the ‘objective’ world of natural science meets the loaded world of interests, perspectives, meanings, the all too human world that does not automatically respond to truth claims, a world where fact and value may agree, but not necessarily so, and may diverge markedly. It’s a world where hundreds of thousands of research papers on climate science are not necessarily persuasive and not necessarily acted upon. A world of human motivations, wills, and purposes is shaped by more than fact. I go on to consider practical initiatives aimed at bringing science and the social world into closer relation, paying particular attention to developing the character traits that raise possibilities for a more active, informed 'ecological citizenship', linking all these issues together within a conception of public life and public policy in an age of environmental threat.

Noting the disabling effects of the divisions between fact and value, means and ends, my argument here attempts to find a way of easing the transition from theoretical reason on the one hand and practical reason on the other. To repeat, lest there be any misunderstanding, this is not to reject notions of objective reality and objective truth in natural science, or of moral truth in ethics, but to recognise that we live in a value laden world, a world that is in some part a social construction, and hence impregnated with human will, consciousness and purpose. This implies that the world can never be simply ‘objective’ in the sense of being an external datum, with politics and policy following in a direct line from there to practice. The human world, our world, can never be external in this sense. The attempt is made here to go beyond the monolithic representation of ‘reality’ and 'science' to establish the relations of knowledge to the 'public'. Here, the world of fact enters the realm of politics and ethics, the way in which human beings choose to organise their affairs, determine what goals to set and what ends to realise. In what follows, scientific understanding, social activity and interaction and meaning will be considered alongside the public apprehension and appropriation of scientific knowledge. (By extension, the same reasoning would apply to moral knowledge, transcendent truths and metaphysics).
 
Methodology - against constructivism
At this point, I should make it clear that notions of eco-praxis and citizen science do not justify a relativism or a social constructivism, or a pragmatism in which truth is merely something that varies according to time and place and prevailing social relations, something that is ‘made up’ or is conditional upon ‘what works.’ The reality check of scientific and moral truth remains, whether we see that reality in terms of natural science or metaphysics. We have learned, with the reality of climate change, that an objective reality does indeed exist, and cannot be spun or reinterpreted to meet the requirements of power, convenience, culture with drastic consequences. A denial of scientific fact is indeed possible, but the day of reckoning with reality is unavoidable.

The problem is that the way of checking reality is not so clear and simple, and neither is the reality we attempt to apprehend. But at least we can agree on a realist view as against an anti-realism. David Ray is emphatic in his rejection of Deconstructivism. For him, Deconstructivism is an anti-realist view which ‘eliminates the ingredients necessary for a world view, such as God, self, purpose, meaning, a real world, and truth as correspondence. This type of postmodern, deconstructive thought results in relativism even nihilism.' (Ray in Orr 1992). The reconstruction that is now in process is recovering those old discarded notions of God, self, purpose, meaning, a real world, and truth as correspondence. E.F. Schumacher called it a ‘metaphysical reconstruction.’

Against deconstruction, David Ray presents a constructive or revisionary postmodernism which ‘seeks to overcome the modern worldview not by eliminating the possibility of worldviews as such, but by constructing a postmodern worldview through a revision of modern premises and traditional concepts. This constructive or revisionary postmodernism involves a new unity of scientific, ethical, aesthetic, and religious intuitions. It rejects not science as such but only that scientism in which the data of the modern natural sciences are alone allowed to contribute to the construction of our worldview.’

A constructive worldview of this kind involves transcending the individualism, anthropocentrism, patriarchy, mechanization, economism, consumerism, nationalism, and militarism of the modern world through the realisation of the aims of the ecology, peace, feminist, and other emancipatory movements of our time. That sounds good but is actually so general as to be meaningless, ranging goods that we can all agree with in general against bads we can all dislike in general. It’s the specific forms of mediation in these areas that determine the true character of what is being proposed. What are the precise social and economic institutions and arrangements embedding the emancipatory commitment?

Such a constructive worldview and programme will earn the withering scorn of those deconstructive postmodernists whose radical scepticism makes the use of any concepts illicit. The attempt to find a positive meaning in life can be dismissed on account of being hopelessly wedded to outdated concepts, ‘because it wishes to salvage a positive meaning not only for the notions of the human self, historical meaning, and truth as correspondence, which were central to modernity, but also for premodern notions of a divine reality, cosmic meaning, and an enchanted nature.’ (Ray in Orr 1992). Such an invitation into relativism and nihilism demands that we take metaphysical reconstruction seriously. The real world still exists, and there is serious work to be done in this world. And there are ways of discussing meaning, self, purpose, truth and reality that avoid the tentacles of a repressive totalizing reason:

From the point of view of its advocates, however, this revisionary postmodernism is not only more adequate to our experience but also more genuinely postmodern. It does not simply carry the premises of modernity through to their logical conclusions, but criticizes and revises those premises. Through its return to organicism and its acceptance of nonsensory perception, it opens itself to the recovery of truths and values from various forms of premodern thought and practice that had been dogmatically rejected by modernity. This constructive, revisionary postmodernism involves a creative synthesis of modern and premodern truths and values.

David Ray in Orr 1992

I am broadly in agreement with this view. At the same time, I think there are serious issues with respect to notions of objective truth and truth as correspondence. The question is how we can reconcile notions of objective truth in science with the idea that we are creative agents within the participatory universe, in some way co-producing the reality we see. The fact that we are co-creators in the universe – a view I will later develop – indicates the extent to which the reality we attempt to study and understand is not an external datum but is humanly objective. In fine, there is always a degree of constructivism going on in the world.

[objective truth and reality]

Alan Sokal is critical of the intellectually ‘fashionable’ turn against the notion of ‘truth’ as ‘correspondence with reality’ in search of an alternative notion of truth. He targets the two main proposals of this kind: one is to define truth through utility or convenience, the other is to define it through intersubjective agreement. Richard Rorty exemplifies both tendencies:





This in itself is not so much a rejection of the notion of an objective reality but a recognition of the fact that, even if such a reality really did exist, we could only ever know it as human subjects. That said, the existence of a bedrock objectivity is the sine qua non of scientific endeavour, and it cannot be ‘pointless’ to ask after the reality of things. That bedrock objectivity remains a check of our views against reality, without which we attain a freedom to believe what we choose to believe. Rorty’s view here bears relation to Marx’s description of the search for objective truth as a scholastic question apart from practice. But Rorty says something different:

Philosophers on my side of the argument answer that objectivity is not a matter of corresponding to objects but a matter of getting together with other subjects – and there is nothing to objectivity except intersubjectivity.

Rorty 1998: 71-71 emphasis added

This may sound liberatory, the triumph of humanity as truth-makers and world-makers, armed with a self-legislating, self-validating reason, taking scientific and moral knowledge into their own hands. But this triumph of intersubjectivity comes with a number of implications. Such a view opens up possibilities of all manner of collective delusions, of the type that have seen many societies and civilisations hurtle to their ends in denial of reality. The possibility that contemporary civilisation is hurtling to its doom in denial of repeated warnings from scientists concerning climate realities shows the limitations of intersubjective notions of truth as created by people ‘getting together’ in the sharpest relief. At present, enough people are joined together in a belief that endless economic expansion will produce freedom, fulfilment, happiness and plenty to prevent the action we need to take to address the climate crisis. In truth, that ‘consensus’ is undermining the basis of civilised life. Moreover, whilst there is a consensus of scientists pointing to anthropogenic global warming, that consensus is the product not of scientists ‘getting together,’ but of the strong scientific case for AGW. It’s getting people together in politics to act on that truth that is indeed important but which is proving difficult to achieve. And that points to another problem with intersubjective notions of truth, the fact that human beings are divided between themselves according to power and class so that any ‘getting together’ on their part is always biased in some way. As Marx argued, the dominant ideas of any age are the ideas of the ruling class. Those who own the means of production also own the means of communication:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance.

Marx and Engels GI 1999: 65

If truth is a function of intersubjectivity, then it is not hard to imagine the continued domination of ruling class ideas. The means of common persuasion are in the hands of this dominant class. Any view which argues that truth is no more than human beings ‘getting together’ with each other clearly invites a return to pre-Socratic assertions that truth, like justice, is no more than the interests of the strongest. This is tantamount to saying that truth is no more than the view of the most persuasive, and in a divided society, those who own the means of communication will tend to have the most persuasive voice. In a society which is founded on asymmetrical relations in power and distribution of resources, some will be able to get together and impose their views more than others.

That Rorty’s view could lead to some such thing is made clear by his view that truth is ‘[nothing] more than what our peers will, ceteris paribus, let us get away with saying’ (Rorty 1979: 176). But what if our peers are unregenerate fascist monsters? What we can ‘get away with saying’ in any society involving classes and social interests is always biased in favour of the rich and powerful and against those challenging their domination. It is clear that truth in this conception is no more than a power struggle. And even if the demos could prevail over wealth and power, there remains the question of right and wrong. It took a Socrates to take a stand on what was right against the force of numbers in politics.

The only way that the view could be defended is by reference to Habermas’ ideal communication community in which the only force is the force of the better argument. I very much agree with this, and affirm that a key achievement of the Enlightenment is to have established persuasion through the force of stronger argument can provide us with means to resolve our conflicts peacefully and rationally without recourse to violence and power. It should be emphasized, though, that for all of his advocacy of intersubjectivity, Habermas retains the idea of objective truth. (Critchley The Rational Community of Jurgen Habermas 2001). There is a need to bring subject and object into relation rather than collapse the one into the other. The loss of objectivity is an invitation into delusion, fantasy and political tyranny. Truth, persuasion, the stronger argument and intersubjectivity thus need to be taken together. Later, I shall add character formation and the intellectual and moral virtues to this. It is upon this that we may build virtuous communities of practice.

The implications of Rorty’s view of truth as what we can ‘get away with’ are spelled out by Plantinga:





We need the check against reality in order to hold power and authority to account, as well as to ensure that our own views amount to more than wishful thinking, fantasy and delusion. Expressions of relativism along the lines of Rorty’s groundless pragmatism can be found across the field of social theory:

The relativist, like everyone else, is under the necessity to sort out beliefs, accepting some and rejecting others. He will naturally have preferences and these will typically coincide with those of others in his locality. The words ‘true’ and ‘false’ provide the idiom in which those evaluations are expressed, and the words ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ will have a similar function.

Barnes and Bloor 1981: 27

The inadequacies of these redefinitions become apparent once we start to apply them to real life problems. It may be useful in a social and environmental sense to induce people believe that if they fail to reduce their ecological footprint and cut their carbon emissions that they will go to the frozen pits of Dante’s Inferno as punishment for heating up the planet, but that would not make the statement true. Intersubjective agreement between individuals has many merits with respect to government by common consent, principle of self-assumed obligation etc. However, intersubjective agreement does not determine with truth. Different societies have believed many things about the world which science later came to reveal to be false. Rather, intersubjective agreement is important and desirable only to the extent that it is based on, articulates and establishes truth.

For Alan Sokal, the more fundamental problem is that these redefinitions of ‘truth’ do not even succeed in their claims to have supplanted the conventional ‘correspondence’ notion of truth. 

Take, for instance, utility: to say that something is useful (for some specified goal) is already an objective statement (it has to be really useful for the declared goal) that relies implicitly on the correspondence notion of truth. The same remark is even more obvious for the interpedendence agreement: to say that (other) people think so and so is an objective statement describing part of the (social) world ‘as it is’.

The positive arguments offered in support of redefinitions of truth involve a certain sophistry. Take this from Rorty:





Whilst the first part is correct, the implication that truth is identical to justification is unwarranted. We may be rationally justified in believing something that, on closer examination, can be shown to be false. Arguing that justification can only be relative to the purpose that an audience wants served ‘introduces a subtle confusion between knowledge and values, by implicitly assuming that all knowledge depends on some ‘purpose’, i.e. some non-cognitive goal.’ (Sokal 2008). But what if the ‘audience’ wants to find out how (some part of) the world really is? That Rorty may argue that such a goal is unattainable is implied in this statement: ‘A goal is something you can know you are getting closer to, or farther away from. But there is no way we know our distance from the truth, not even whether we are closer to it than our ancestors were.’ (Rorty 1998: 3-4). Sokal questions whether this is really the case. Aren’t we closer to it than our ancestors were? Don’t we know better? Aren’t we closer to the truth, in that respect at least?

We are right to be sceptical about our ability to discover ‘truth’ of a certain kind, the fundamental physical laws governing the entire universe, or an ‘absolute’ truth discovered by pure thought (as in classical metaphysics). The problem with the way Rorty makes the point, however, is that it applies to all possible knowledge; it denies the possibility of knowledge. If Rorty’s point is that all statements of fact (including the non-flatness of the Earth) can be challenged by a consistent radical skeptic, then we have known this since ancient Greece. Diogenes Laertius records, for instance, that Pyrrho mistrusted his senses to such an extent that had he not been accompanied by friend, he would have fallen off cliffs or been run over by carts and savaged by dogs (9.62). Some such view could achieve tranquillity and calmness in a storm. And many are already arguing that this may be all we can achieve in face of catastrophic climate change. But it is the very denial of realities by a hardened ‘climate change scepticism’ that brought us to the abyss in the first place. 

Environmentalism, postmodernism and social constructionism
















An Earth spirituality is psychologically beneficial, and is compatible with, rather than an alternative to, the view that there are facts with an objective existence. The problem is not the existence or otherwise of objective truth and reality, but our way of accessing, knowing and interpreting this truth and reality. In short, how to relate subject and object without reducing the one to the other. But recognition of objective truth is not in itself a reductionism. Historian Eric Hobsbawm saw the danger that postmodernism represented to emancipatory causes and movements from the first. He denounced ‘the rise of “postmodernist” intellectual fashions in Western universities, particularly in departments of literature and anthropology which imply that all “facts” claiming objective existence are simply intellectual constructions.’ Hobsbawm objected to the implication that there is no clear difference between fact and fiction. There is a difference, he affirms, ‘and for historians, even for the most militantly antipositivist ones among us, the ability to distinguish between the two is absolutely fundamental. We cannot invent our facts.. Either the present Turkish government, which denies the attempted genocide of the Armenians in 1915, is right or it is not.’ (Hobsbawm 1993: 63).

‘We cannot invent our facts’. Actually, in politics, we can ‘invent our facts’, and the most repressive, authoritarian and tyrannous regimes in history frequently have, inventing their version of the truth and succeeding in imposing it over sufficient numbers over a period of time. The commitment to truth and reality has been instrumental in contesting the power of such regimes. Hobsbawm shows how the commitment to facts through rigorous historical work can refute the fictions propounded by reactionary forces in politics, and how the postmodernist approach to truth disarms us in the face of these threats.

Postmodernist blurring of the lines between fact and fiction can indeed serve as a smokescreen for sloppy research and dubious interpretation. (Sokal 322-27). It also entails an intellectual, moral and political disarmament in face of powerful forces intent on asserting their own particular interests as the general interest. We expose politics as an ideological project concealing and preserving existing power relations only by affirming the existence of a truth that is more than the product of power struggles, compromises and agreements:

Whether the accused in a murder trial is or is not guilty depends on the assessment of old fashioned positivist evidence, if such evidence is available. Any innocent readers who find themselves in the dock will do well to appeal to it. It is the lawyers for the guilty ones who fall back on postmodern lines of defence.

Hobsbawm 1997: viii 

We can draw an analogy here with the proceedings of climate conferences, comparing the way that scientists marshal their evidence to the way that governments are constrained by corporate interests armed with teams of lawyers when it comes to negotiations as to what should be done at the level of policy. The ‘old fashioned positivist evidence’ is met with a scepticism that comes straight from ‘postmodern lines of defence’. As we hurtle towards an eco-nightmare of our own making, there is little decisive movement from evidence to policy and practice. 

Blurring the lines between fact and fiction is an open invitation to making up truth. And this has been an art that the powerful have excelled in throughout history:





Science, truth and values

In Earthdream: The Marriage of Reason and Intuition, Robert Hamilton compares scientific observation to actively looking for pictures in a fire, in contrast to the passive operation of looking at a photograph. His point here emphasises the extent to which scientists play an active role in creating knowledge, a role in which it is the scientists themselves who create the image. In making this claim, Hamilton is on contentious ground. Whilst the reference to active role of scientists is valid, Hamilton goes on to express the view that scientists only see what they already believe to be the case:





This idea that science proceeds by ‘self-selection’ effectively denies the possibility of objective knowledge. It implies that science is a rigged game. And that is to overstate (to put it mildly). There is a common method, protocol, procedure, and common rules in science so that theories can be publicly scrutinised and tested according to clear and accepted criteria. Science is the ultimate check against reality, and scientific protocol is a way of ensuring that the checks are common to all making scientific claims to knowledge. Hamilton’s claim is that scientists subscribe to a one-eyed view of rationality and therefore that facts deemed to be significant are self-selected according to a pre-determined belief. It’s a claim which turns science on its head: far from being the best check against reality we have, science is as loaded as any other discipline.

Is this true? Whilst it would not be difficult to find and multiply instances where science and the findings of scientists have expressed and/or been made to fit the prevailing biases and prejudices of the social order, or serve certain powerful social interests – from eugenics to nuclear power to pharmaceuticals, scientists have plenty of political ‘form’ (Sewell 2009) – that is more a question of the relation of science to society than it is of science. The limitations of Hamilton’s claims become clear when one considers the work of climate scientists. Climate change deniers are in the habit of claiming that climate science is a pseudo-science and that climate scientists are engaging in politics, not science, by focusing overwhelmingly on anthropogenic carbon emissions to the neglect of other factors such as solar and volcanic activity. In other words, the facts concerning climate change self-selected by virtue of the fact that climate scientists see through the eye of just one rationality – the belief in anthropogenic global warming. So we hear the claim that climate scientists are worshippers of the new religion of climate alarmism. Ian Plimer makes this charge over and again. (Plimer 2009).

There is one basic thing wrong with this theory of science – everything. The fact that Robert Hamilton’s attempts to put reason and intuition together should lead to a view on science that is perfectly compatible with the climate change deniers’ repudiation of sound science and scientific method is reason enough to dismiss the view entirely. But, with due caution, I shall try to extract the valid core at the heart of Hamilton’s reasoning. Because Hamilton is attempting to make a valid point: ‘There is no single, absolute scientific rationality, and therefore no single, absolute scientific reality. It all depends on the values we choose to build into the foundations of our model. There is no single construction that can be called correct.’

The notion of absolute objective truth pertaining to an absolute objective reality can be questioned, certainly with respect to the relation between science and society. But the idea that truth depends on the values we build into the foundations of enquiry needs to be sharply qualified. That the scientific endeavour is in some way value-laden, as value-laden as the world being studied, can be accepted, so long as these values do not distort or contradict scientific method. The commitment to truth over falsehood is itself a value commitment. The commitment to the pure, disinterested search for knowledge is a value commitment. There is a reason ‘why’ behind such a search, and that reason is a value.

The danger with the way in which Hamilton phrases the point is that it can make the ‘values we choose’ the determinant of the facts we find and deem significant. It puts the values before the facts. In this view, climate scientists find evidence for anthropogenic global warming because they are committed to the belief in anthropogenic global warming. Certainly, there are values involved in the enterprise. I would expect that climate scientists would tend to believe that a healthy, liveable climate is a good thing, and certainly better than a world suffering from drought, flood, crop failure, excess deaths from heat, disease, species extinction… But the science behind the notion of anthropogenic global warming remains science, with findings testable against accepted and known constraints and criteria. ‘There is no single construction that can be called correct’, writes Hamilton. Does this mean that we can have a scientific rationality that says there is no such thing as anthropogenic global warming? I’m afraid that here, Robert Hamilton is typical of a certain kind of environmentalist who will cite the wealth of evidence concerning environmental damage, and yet diminish the role of science and scientists in producing this evidence, thus putting the ‘earthcare’ Hamilton calls for on uncertain ‘spiritual’ foundations. As I have argued, living in harmony with nature is a lot more difficult than advocates of a green spirituality may be inclined to believe. 

So inundated is the world with environmental problems that environmentalism, in all its currents and varieties, needs to draw on all of its strengths. Environmentalists have a responsibility to make their arguments in a spirit of sobriety and restraint, recognising the complex paths that truth may take on the journey from theory to practice, and back again. Argument by easy reduction reinforces the difficult terrain upon which those attempting to advance progressive causes and measures find themselves operating. At a time when we are faced with a crisis in the climate system, to diminish the importance of science in explaining the problems we face is a dereliction. 

In the spirit of sobriety, I move to the positive aspects of Hamilton’s case for a more integral rationality, one that I do support:





The point is that the worlds of quantity and quality cannot be separated the way that they have been in traditional modes of rationality. Quantity and quality are inseparable.  The worlds of quantity and quality are the one world, and that does indeed point to a new rationality, one that puts reason and intuition together. And it is in this respect that the repudiation of an ‘absolute’ scientific rationality is valid. We need to take account of the social context, ethical character and cultural role of science. 

Erwin Schrodinger is pertinent here:

There is a tendency to forget that all science is bound up with human culture in general, and that scientific findings, even those which at the moment appear the most advanced and esoteric and difficult to grasp, are meaningless outside their cultural context.

Schrodinger 1952: 109-10 quoted in Prigogine and Stengers 1985: 18

But note, these ‘scientific findings’ are precisely that: facts, evidence and knowledge yielded by the scientific method, not products of values, intellectual constructions shaped by the dominant culture.

Science as social construct – reality and context
There is just a short step from noting that most scientific observations are context-dependent to the view that science is merely a social construction; there is just as short a step from the view that there is no such thing as an ‘absolute’ and ‘objective’ reality to the view that there is no such thing as reality. Finally, we end up with the view that science is merely a matter of human convention that has nothing to do with reality. The value determines the fact, committing the naturalistic fallacy in reverse. At this point, I would point readers in the direction of Alan Sokal and Paul Bricmont. (Sokal and Bricmont (​http:​/​​/​www.amazon.com​/​Jean-Bricmont​/​e​/​B004LRRTYS​/​ref=sr_ntt_srch_lnk_1?qid=1412172656&sr=1-1​) (1999); Sokal (2009); Bricmont and Sokal ( 2011).

The problem is not the original view at all. The view that scientific 'truth' is not ‘absolute’, but depends upon an agreed common conceptual framework is eminently reasonable. Similarly, the view that reality is not ‘objective’ in the sense of being some external datum removed from human experience is also sensible. And the view that the scientific enterprise is accompanied by value commitment and social construction is also valid, as is the view that science is in some way drawn into relation to the public realm, government, power, social relations and the world of vested interests, all of which involves alliances, biases, compromises and politics. That said, to move from here to the view that science as such is solely a social construction which depends upon pre-determined values is nonsense, and dangerous nonsense to boot, no matter how eloquently it may be phrased. For it deprives us of our best check against reality and, as a result, deprives us of the critical tools we need to combat ignorance and superstition and prejudice, all the best weapons in the mind-controlling armoury of ruling classes throughout history. Hamilton’s view that scientific rationality ‘depends on the values we choose to build into the foundations of our model’ comes with the corollary that science and its findings could be whatever scientists decided to agree upon according to their arbitrary value commitments or, worse, according to the values of the dominant culture within which they operate. Yes, that’s the postmodernist claim that reason and ‘Truth’ are no more than masks for dominant power.

Reason and truth could be masks for power and, throughout history, have been. But they have also been forces for uprooting such power. To give up our critical tools on account of their appropriation and use as rationalisations of power is to disarm ourselves in face of that power. It is to fail to distinguish between reason and rationalization. It is reason and truth, both scientific and moral, that enable us to expose the fallacies, and the power relations they conceal, behind rationalization and moralization.

How can we acknowledge that we can never have full, complete knowledge and yet retain a sense of the world as an objective reality? There has to be a reality check. Science is more than one form of knowledge amongst many; science is the best check against reality that we have. The danger is that recognising the difficulty in identifying the foundations of our knowledge of objective reality could lead to a rejection of such objectivity completely. And with that rejection, we lose our reality check, we lose our intellectual and moral bearings, and end up in a world of mere social construction.

So what has gone wrong? The view that science is only a social construction and rests upon conventions that are dependent upon values is guilty of missing out a central aspect of the methodological and conceptual framework of science. These conventions are not arbitrary, but are the product of a previous and ongoing scientific process, continually checked against reality. We need to remind ourselves here of the words of the Victorian mathematician-philosopher William Clifford: ‘It is wrong, always, everywhere and for any one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.’ If a scientist looks at the world and self-selects the facts according to the beliefs they already hold, at least other scientists are likewise able to look at the same world and find and highlight other facts, facts to support, facts to contradict, but facts all the same. What they cannot do is make the facts up and expect not to be challenged and exposed as frauds and fakes. As for conventions as no more than pre-determined values, something that is barely distinguishable from make-believe, these conventions rest on scientific process. Good sound science, checked against reality, holds that the force of gravity acts downwards rather than upwards. There is no way that scientists, succumbing to some delusional belief system, or becoming party to some agreement amongst themselves, can make the force of gravity act upwards and, as a result, send objects upwards to the sky instead of downwards to the ground. And there is no way that the facts of climate change can be altered one way or another by a consensus amongst climate scientists. Climate change deniers are right to point out that the 97% consensus of climate scientists concerning anthropogenic global warming does not prove the truth of the case of AGW. But it’s not meant to: the quality of evidence does that, and, as good sound science, that conclusion is open to challenge, scrutiny and falsification. The case for AGW is strong on account of its robustness in explaining facts, evidence and causal processes, not the consensus of climate scientists in its favour. Any consensus that is not backed by evidence would not last long. 

Here, I agree with James Lovelock:

During the next and scientifically correct stages in the development of the theory, it may become all but incomprehensible to any but its own scientific practitioners. Do not make the mistake of those disgruntled humanists who will reject Gaia because it is part of a science they do not understand. There is nothing solid in their claim that science is malign or bogus. Science is wonderfully self-cleansing and bad theories have a short life.

Lovelock 2000 Pref 

Science is self-cleansing and is the best check against reality we have. Any science that is malign and bogus is open to scientific challenge. Where science is bound up with power and social interests, it ceases to be science and its errors are exposed by good sound science. We throw this away at our peril. Stewart and Cohen write well here:

Science has more stringent reality checks than any other area of human activity, and applies them more frequently. Religion hinges upon faith, politics hinges upon who can tell the most convincing lies or maybe just shout the loudest, but science hinges upon whether its conclusions resemble what actually happens.

Stewart and Cohen 1997: 36-37

Stewart and Cohen resist writing that science hinges upon 'whether its conclusions are true,’ acknowledging that ‘the idea of science as absolute truth has gone the way of the dodo.’ The defence of an objective reality and an objective truth does not entail an assertion of absolute truth. To conflate the two is to be guilty of caricature and sophistry, enabling critics to convict science of self-selecting facts according to pre-determined values and engaging in a project of enclosing the world in a totalizing reason. Stewart and Cohen openly acknowledge that since human beings experience reality indirectly, through the medium of their senses, ‘there is room for genuine and reasonable disagreement about the nature of reality.’

Whilst science is the best check against reality we have, ‘even a reality check must have a contextual element.’ And that is precisely my point when dealing with the relation of science to society and social relations and interests, of knowledge in the context of public life and the people. 

Stewart and Cohen proceed to define the role of science as far away as possible from any absolutist or totalizing claims.  

At any rate, the role of science is not to establish some kind of factual data-bank about nature, but to help us understand nature. There are many different degrees of understanding, and many different kinds of understanding. Some aspect of nature may be not understood, or slightly understood, or fairly well understood - although it is unlikely that it will be fully understood. More subtly, it may be well understood from one point of view but an impenetrable mystery from another. Thus we may understand that a flower petal is red because it contains a particular pigment, but fail to understand why the flower uses that pigment and not a different one.

Stewart and Cohen 1997: 36-37

Even a reality check possesses a contextual element. Science is not removed from the world, it is part of a culture and relates to the social and public world of human beings. 

The defence of objective truth against praxis/pragmatism
My argument for eco-praxis would certainly draw the fire of those working in the field of natural science. The idea of praxis, for them, would be indistinguishable from pragmatism and the view that truth is a function of utility. Here is E.O. Wilson in The Social Conquest of Earth, showing what is implied should we lose the concept of objective truth. Identifying ‘the true nature of the search for objective truth’, Wilson argues that ‘science is not just another enterprise like medicine or engineering or theology. It is the wellspring of all the knowledge we have of the real world that can be tested and fitted to preexisting knowledge. It is the arsenal of technologies and inferential mathematics needed to distinguish the true from the false. It formulates the principles and formulas that tie all this knowledge together. Science belongs to everybody. Its constituent parts can be challenged by anybody in the world who has sufficient information to do so.’ (Wilson 2012). Science is not, therefore, ‘just "another way of knowing" as often claimed.’ Such a view would make science ‘coequal with religious faith.’ It would make all kinds of knowing co-equal, and this is clearly anathema to scientists. 

In the natural sciences, Enlightenment rationalism and naturalism still prevail, whilst in those areas of the arts and social sciences under the sway of postmodernism, rationality is seen as a social construction. I would argue that science, religion, philosophy, literature, art, architecture are different ways of knowing and seeing the world. But in terms of the ‘true nature’ of ‘objective truth’, different ways of knowing is not the same thing as all ways of knowing being co-equal. This is Armand Leroi’s point in drawing his study of Aristotle to a conclusion. In Aristotle’s Lagoon, Leroi argues that ‘not all forms of knowledge .. are equal’, praising ‘the pure and disinterested search for the causes of things’ as the best form of all. Aristotle’s claim that this is the best way to spend a life ‘is a claim for the beauty and worth of science’ (Leroi 2014: 378). This is a view that is contested by postmodernists, for whom science is not a privileged avenue to knowledge, just one form of knowledge amongst many others. Clearly, these are controversial claims, hence the outbreak of the 'Science Wars' concerning the scope and validity of scientific knowledge. (Emilios Bouratinos, Network, no.76, p.31).

To understand why the insistence on the existence of objective reality and the search for objective truth matters we have only to consider the problems we are currently facing in the world. We are learning the value of this search for objective truth in light of the climate crisis unfolding before us. Objectivity is not something to be treated lightly or cast aside without serious consequences. It matters that the evidence scientists are presenting on the crisis in the climate system is objectively true and not just ‘made up’ to fit certain value positions and perspectives. That objective facts do not determine the case and are filtered and interpreted according to different social and cultural viewpoints does not alter the objectivity of those facts. And the same applies with respect to the notion of moral truth. Any conception of human nature comes with the view what it is good for a human being to be in terms of fulfilment and flourishing, and what things detract from that goodness. There is a clear sense in which moral truth exists in an objective sense relating to what a human being is when enabled to reach full growth. 

Citizen science and eco-praxis
My brief with citizen science and eco-praxis is different to a value-free pragmatism. I am not collapsing science into politics, ethics and culture, something which serves to make scientific fact and truth a function of social power. Neither am I swallowing up the social world of meaning, intentionality, purpose, values into the facts and physical laws of natural science. Some years ago now, E.O. Wilson called for ‘ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized’ (Wilson 1975: 562). Insofar as this is a call for ethics to be informed by biology, I am in agreement. But it would remain philosophy. And ethics would remain ethics, and biology would remain biology. ‘Having cannibalized psychology, the new neurobiology will yield an enduring set of first principles for sociology.’ (Wilson 1975:575). In the years since, Wilson has come to adopt a more tempered approach, one that recognises the claims for morality as morality. And I am in agreement that natural science can inform such morality, if not establish first principles. Here we enter the tricky domain of the relation between facts and values, nature and reason, of which more later.

It is not a case of either side cannibalizing the other, of one being reduced to the other, of scientific truth to political power, or of value and meaning to scientific fact. It is a question of how we may bridge the worlds of theoretical reason and practical reason, recognising the legitimate claims of each. I try hold that balance between the sciences and the publics, between the world as objective fact and the world as lived experience. Most of all, the emphasis is upon moving beyond the sterile dichotomies that stand in the way of ever increasing knowledge being translated into public effect. My argument is that reason cannot educate from the outside. Knowledge may accumulate yet receive little or no response at the level of changes in behaviour. Reason has to educate desire, will, passion etc. from the inside.  In fine, this book is specifically pointed to the critical domain where analysis and meaning meet each other in the practical intervention and participation in the world. 

Armand Leroi emphasises that Aristotle’s naturalism comes with a humility and a respect towards the objects of the natural world which a scientist studies. Aristotle valued nature and animals of every type: ‘For inherent in each of them there is something natural and beautiful.’ Aristotle urged students to study the lowliest of things: ‘For there are gods here too’ (Aristotle). That didn’t prevent Aristotle from dissecting the animals he studied, mind, nor from breaking the world up and classifying it into its component parts, leaving twenty-first century biology with the task of putting it all back together again.

Reverence and humility has not always characterised the approach of scientists. Wendell Berry warns of the dangers of a scientific arrogance and hubris that assumes that the human prerogative is without limit and that whatever is within our power to do must be done. (Berry 1991: 127ff). We are lacking 'the idea that humans have a place in Creation and that this place is limited by responsibility on the one hand and humility on the other.' Berry refers to the dichotomy of 'unlimited technology vs. traditional value.' The problem is that the technological determinism which lies behind claims of ‘progress’ and ‘development’ 'cannot produce a moral or a responsible definition of the human place in Creation.' The specialization and abstraction of the mind, 'separated from responsibility and humility, magnanimity and devotion,' results in a split between our technological and moral capacities, and a world that is divided between fact and value, object and subject. The technology/morality and fact/value interface condemns us to a bifurcated existence, split not only from the world but also from essential aspects of our own internal nature. Reason must be made complete through the restoration of its ethical component, and tempered by other human qualities such as emotion and intuition. Fact and value meet on the ground of responsibility and restraint, a point that is now being increasingly recognised in the ethical discussions concerning contemporary scientific advances. The challenge is to conceive and embody this constraint in practical relations, particularly in the context of an expansionary economic dynamic and a competitive economic environment that promotes private self-interest first and foremost.

Sooner or later, then, we enter the social world of power and relationships. The world of human beings as social beings is a political world. The point is important, and helps explain why the appeal to objective facts is in itself indecisive. We enter not just a world of confirmation bias, but a social world that is inherently biased in terms of its prevailing relations of power. It's not just that people will see what they want to see, choose certain facts which agree with their interests, and discard the rest. Given asymmetrical relations of power and resources, all choices are constrained and biased, even those of the powerful. Bias is in some part systemic. Consider the calls for decarbonisation and for the degrowth economy. The scientific rationale for this call is impeccable – carbon stays in the ground and we cut back carbon emissions drastically or we are dead. This much is clear. What is not clear is to whom this appeal is made. To humanity? Humanity is a biological entity, not a political one. The short term private interests of some, and all who are involved in some form of dependence upon them, indicates why the appeal would fall on deaf ears. We live in the present, not the future. Further, we live under an economic system in which capital simply must expand its values or enter crisis and crash. Whether to grow or not is not an option. Accumulation is a systemic imperative that simply must be facilitated. It is nonsense to call for degrowth within such economic relations. And futile. Hence the perplexity as to why, despite countless warnings of the ecologically catastrophic consequences of endless economic growth, the obsession with growth continues. Accumulation is the central dynamic of the capital system. The capital system is an alienated social metabolic system, a new social necessity that rests upon a number of mediations: means of production separated from the workers; an hierarchical division of labour; alienated labour; the 'personifications' of economic categories and relations; money; production for exchange value; the state; the world market (Mészáros 1995: 17). This all constitutes a social necessity that has enabled human beings to conquer natural necessity but which is objectively imposed upon the social individuals and structures their essential productive activity (Mészáros 1995: 122). If we fail to uproot the whole social metabolic order of control, then the call for degrowth fails. And the same applies to calls for government action on climate change.

And transforming the general social metabolism from the roots upwards is a political task. For, given systemic imperatives constraining all, rich and powerful included, and given asymmetrical relations of power, constraining subaltern groups, the ability to act is lacking, even if the will to act was present. Groups lacking in social power are restricted in their options and, subject to everyday necessities concerning earning a living, are unlikely to reflect on the long-term environmental consequences of current actions or to respond to the evidence and warnings on climate change coming from the field of science, or accept the need for restraint and regulation coming from government, still less the need for environmental taxation. In other words, the appeal to reason lacks social and political relevance. Short-term matters of private survival in the everyday world prevail over long-term considerations of the common good. 

This phenomenon is known in games theory under the name of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. I have covered this extensively elsewhere (Critchley 2011). Here, I want to emphasise the extent to which choice is not simply individually rational but always proceeds within the context of social relations and interests. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, each prisoner makes a choice according to rational self-interest, chooses a private over a public good and thus bring about the least optimal outcome for each and all. Communication and cooperation between individuals in decision making brings about the most optimal outcome. In light of the above reference to the social system, we need to embed communication and cooperation into social relations so that human beings are capable of governing themselves by ends that they set, as opposed to being constrained by external imperatives deriving from a systemic necessity. And that would be a form of intersubjectivity worthy of support. In other words, reason and rational choice need to have a social relevance at the level of social relations and at the level of character, identity, will and motivation. 

These questions will be to the fore in the argument as I shall develop it. More specifically, I will consider the important relationship between science and politics and ethics with a view to developing a conception of ecological praxis, virtue and citizenship. 

My point is that any science that ignores the knowledges held by citizens will find its practical possibilities unduly restricted. At the same time, any citizenship that fails to incorporate the knowledge yielded by science will lack a critical purchase upon reality. I seek to develop a conception of environmental citizenship which joins the natural and social worlds and fosters a 'social learning' between science, technology, politics and public life. Such a conception, I will argue, is crucial to the continuing development of processes of sustainable development. 'Sustainability' is a meaningful concept only in terms of activating the potential for citizens to assume responsibility for their actions and take control of their social relations. Achieving such conscious awareness amounts to reconfiguring sustainable development as sustainable living, replacing a growth promoted by external goals and imperatives with an internal growth, a natural process of self-realisation. However, defining this ‘growth’ requires some careful thought concerning the relations between expertise, human needs and culture. Society emerges as the mediating term between fact and value. I therefore examine the practical aspects of such a rethinking, considering the character formation and social formation that is required to give life to these notions.

Social knowledge
The argument of this book is that the environmental crisis is a challenge that is as social and moral as it is scientific and technical. In other words, there is a need to go deeper than determining the details of energy infrastructures, as important as that undoubtedly is. The challenge is to develop character and the appropriate traits and habits and organize our relations to each other and to the planet so as to enable 'sustainable' living. We need to examine the nature of 'sustainability', how it is understood by different social groups and how it is constructed in different social relations. From this perspective, ‘knowing’ the environment is inseparable from 'living with' and ‘within’ the environment. This avoids the monological or reductionist account which sees science at the centre of an objective appraisal of the environment, with subjective factors in ethics, politics and culture operating at a secondary level. The account developed in this book sees social, political and ethical concerns at the very core of environmental issues.

The implication of this approach is that ‘nature’ is no longer considered to be an objective reality. This view needs heavy qualification. My argument is not that nature ceases to exist as a real world outside of human perception, interest and understanding. That kind of anthropocentrism and social relativism has involved us in an environmental crisis from which no amount of climate change denial will extricate us. There is a reality check against our concerns and actions. 

However, when it comes to our understanding of the world, society very much operates as a mediating term between nature and culture. Nature as such was here long before the human species and human society, and will be here long after human beings have gone the way of 99% of all species that have ever lived. I am not denying objectivity and objective truth in that sense. Rather, I am drawing attention to ‘nature’ and 'the environment' as concepts which are social in their origination and understanding. We see the world not as natural scientists but as meaning seeking creatures. Rightly or wrongly, human beings are teleological beings. From this perspective, there is no external world. The worldview, underlying belief system and structure of any society shapes and is shaped by how that society sees the outside world. As Mary Douglas argues with respect to pollution issues: 'the view of the universe and a particular kind of society holding this view are closely interdependent. They are a single system. Neither can exist without the other.’ (Douglas 1980: 289.)

It follows from this that scientific and theoretical disputes cannot be insulated from social and moral concerns and, even, could be expressions of disputes taking place between worldviews and social interests. That is not to say that statements of scientific fact are conditional upon social concerns and interests. However, it does suggest why, for instance, Darwin’s evolutionary theory was read in the way of competition and survival rather than in the way of mutual aid and inter- and intra-species cooperation, and why Social Darwinism prevailed rather than Kropotkin’s communist anarchism. (Gould 1991 chapter 22). I prefer Kropotkin, others prefer Huxley, but at least I’m honest in declaring my preference to be based on ethics and politics. Which view do the scientific facts support?

Cotgrove argues that environmental controversies concern a clash between 'different moral and social orders,’ so that disputes over apparently scientific and technical issues are really disputes over deeply held values (economic growth vs spiritual well-being, large technologies vs 'small is beautiful'). (Cotgrove 1982). The implication of this is that one's view of any environmental issue will have been, partially or even totally, decided in advance of acquiring any scientific knowledge and technical information about the issue in question. This point goes much deeper than confirmation bias. For all of the facts and figures exchanged on such things as, for instance, civil nuclear power, positions seem entrenched and move, if at all, only very slowly, and in tandem with greater shifts in the wider society, not with rational persuasion. We are dealing with worldviews and paradigms here. The advocacy of nuclear power makes sense in terms of a worldview which stresses economic growth, centralized power, bureaucratic management of complexity, large scale social organisation, ‘big’ science. Against this, nuclear power, as a centralising technology, will be treated with scepticism by adherents of an environmental worldview which is concerned with meeting essential needs, appropriate technologies, human scale, local energy, and community involvement.

My point is that human beings are not individual, disinterested and autonomous rational decision makers when it comes to acting in light of facts and knowledge. We are social beings and our 'worldviews' are bound up with prevailing social relations and interests. It follows that people will have different understandings of the natural environment, understandings which amount to more than statements of fact. These understandings shape how we respond to facts, what we do with them. The view that different groups have of nature therefore depends upon a broader social and cultural evaluation of the world in which we live. That doesn’t mean that nature in itself changes according to the perspectives we have of it. It means that the way that we see nature and the way we live our lives are inextricably connected. The ‘natural’ and the ‘social’ cannot be separated in terms of outer and inner worlds. 

There is a need to be careful here. To deny that the natural world is external to the social world comes suggests that there is no independent ‘nature’ as such, that nature is no more than a social construction, a view which renders nature liable to be incorporated within the social world and made instrumental to human purpose. This emphasis on social construction makes sense in terms of the ubiquity of the human impact on the natural environment. The supposedly 'unspoilt' countryside, for instance, is an agricultural creation. But the ecological crisis calls the human relation to nature into question. 

Joining scientific and social rationality
We need a way of bridging the worlds of theoretical and practical reason if we are to be able to act appropriately in light of scientific knowledge. This requires that science does more than yield facts pertaining to an objective reality and comes to find a way of operating as an active force within the social world. This is not an either/or, and it is not a collapsing of the one world into another. Rather, it is an argument to bring scientific and practical reason into relation so that the one enriches and informs the other, respecting the legitimate claims of both. As Beck argues: 'scientific rationality without social rationality remains empty, but social rationality without scientific rationality remains blind'. (Beck 1992: 30). Recognising its role as a source of 'modernization risks', science comes to re-establish its legitimacy, serving a socially useful purpose in the process of making the necessary institutional changes.
 
Throughout this book, I conceive this institutional change as a cognitive change, viewing human beings as knowledgeable agents and knowledge creators. This envisages eco-praxis as the generator of ‘green’ knowledge, of human self-knowledge in relation to knowledge of the natural and social environment within which we live and which we partially create and re-create. For the moment, the important thing to grasp is the dialectical relationship between 'science' and ‘nature’, ‘public’ and ‘society’, and the playing out of this relationship through the way that 'citizens' apprehend 'environmental’ concerns and threats. Establishing this relationship is crucial to overcoming the separations that rupture the process connecting knowledge/action/policy. Failure to make the necessary connections entails a continued failure to translate scientific knowledge into public policy and social practice. The dialectical approach means rejecting the assumption that science possesses a privileged position with respect to environmental response, with all other knowledges and actors considered peripheral, so that 'technical experts are given pole position to define agendas and impose boundary premises a priori on risk discourses', with all other knowledges and actors considered peripheral (Lash, S. and Wynne, B., 'Introduction' in Beck, U., 1992., p.4). 

We have been in this position for years, with little to show but a massive imbalance between an accumulation of scientific knowledge on the one side and an inadequate public response on the other. The separations that characterise the conventional approach need to be overcome and the necessary connections established.

The New Ecological Paradigm
In light of the inseparability of the ‘natural’ and the ‘social’, Catton and Dunlap advocate the construction of a 'New Ecological Paradigm' (NEP). Although possessing special characteristics, human beings are linked to other species, in terms of a dependence on natural resources, a competition for food, space, water and such like. Further, whilst human beings are influenced by social or cultural forces and relations, they are also affected by factors such as pollution and climate change within the biophysical environment. The 'New Ecological Paradigm' further recognises that certain physical laws, such as the First and Second Laws of Thermodynamics, cannot be overridden. (Dunlap, Catton 1980: 15—47: Dunlap 1979: 243-73; Dunlap 1980 5—13; Dunlap, Catton 1983: 113-35; Dunlap 1983: 200-3).

For Dickens, Catton and Dunlap fail to spell out clearly what is entailed by the New Ecological Paradigm. He nevertheless agrees the dualisms of ‘nature’ and ‘people’, and of natural science and social science, are untenable. He proceeds to advocate a ‘critical realism’ as the basis of an adequate understanding of environmental issues. The following are some of its principal themes:

1.	People are a species which, like all other living organisms, have needs like any other species and needs which are specific to human beings.
2.	Nature is integral to people's bodies. There is therefore no logical way in which nature can be treated as separate from people.
3.	Nature is socially constructed. It is always modified by people. And, in the process of changing nature, people change themselves.
4.	Under capitalism, nature is privately owned and exploited. People therefore find themselves becoming alienated or estranged from the nature on which they work. They also become alienated from their own species.




A critical realist epistemology is dialectical:





A critical realist philosophy proceeds on the basis of the necessary connections between organism and environment and unfolds through the dialectical relations between the two. We see here an essentialist philosophy in which power is defined in terms of a potential becoming actual and flourishing through the unfolding of necessary lines of development. This unfolding is necessary but not inevitable; lines of development are capable of being frustrated. ‘An organism is constituted by ways of acting, but these are realised in different ways according to the contexts in which they are operating. And again, if the conditions are not appropriate for such realisation, the organism’s powers may even fail to be realised. At the same time, however, active organisms (including of course human beings) should be envisaged as continually transforming their social and environmental ‘contexts.’ (Dickens 1992: xvi).

Dickens outlines the contours of a new environmental paradigm based upon critical realism, something I would develop as a moral essentialism. ‘Critical realism,’ in this sense, holds that we go beneath observable phenomena to identify relatively enduring structures in the social and natural world, understanding how these connect, are integrated in mutual dependency and how they unfold through dialectical relation and interplay. The approach focuses on the relations between organisms, including human organisms, and the way that structures both constrain and enable their actions.





This integrative perspective on 'Society' and 'Nature' is of major importance for the view I develop in this chapter - especially in its implications for our ways of knowing the world in which we live.





Anthony Giddens also emphasises the extent to which the social structure is undergoing a profound shift from a modernity characterised by faith in the Enlightenment tenets of Progress, Truth and Science to a late (or new or even post) modernity in which the old certainties have dissolved, with radical doubt, anxiety and reflexivity taking their place:





In a condition of pervasive uncertainty, human beings have lost their bearings. The question of self-identity, of who we are and what we consider ourselves to be, has become central.

Arguing that society is undergoing a phase of ‘reflexive modernization,’ Beck draws attention to the changing relationship between social structures and social agents so that individuals are less constrained by existing institutions. For Beck, this means that individual citizens are now in a position to actively shape the process of modernization rather than simply passively follow pre-established patterns of behaviour. Stated in those terms, this is a positive development. But there are other ways of conceiving institutions and patterns than as constraints which externally shape human actions. They also enable individuals to engage in the kind of actions that are individually and mutually beneficial. In other words, human agents can actively shape such patterns of behaviour. In this way, reflexivity is not just a libertarian freedom from institutional constraints, but an active freedom within and through collective forms of common life we have given ourselves as conditions of self-realisation, as integral parts of that freedom, even. This is how I develop the concept of ‘rational freedom’ throughout my work.

This is particularly important when it comes to developing the capacity to take the actions that are necessary to deal with the growing environmental crisis. An ecological citizenship requires that individuals come to join together to ensure that the human impact upon the planet is more benign and less destructive. This implies that freedom is less freedom from constraint as freedom through constraint. It is all about how that constraint is designed and implemented. A responsible citizenship is about a self-assumed obligation, individuals sharing a responsibility for actions, with rights being balanced with duties. In such a situation, the character of the 'political' is substantially transformed, with conventional notions of the 'political' (as restricted to parliamentary activity, political parties and elections) coming to be supplemented by, and even replaced by, a diversity of citizen actions within the associational space of civil society. The environmental movement is a social agency which has the potential to transform the whole infrastructure of public life, in the process coming to constitute what I call the Ecopolis. The ecological transformation of ‘the political’ amounts to a reclaiming of politics conceived in terms of creative human self-realisation, only this time setting the human polis within the wider context of ecological boundaries.

Beck suggests that new relations of knowledge, science and citizenship are in the process of emerging within late modern society. (Beck 1992). Whether what emerges is a postmodern society or an ecological society remains to be seen. But these new relations point to new constructive possibilities for science and its publics.

The experiment
[broader notion of 'the experiment' - new constructive possibilities for science and its publics - new knowledge relations]
‘One planet, one experiment,’ says Edward O. Wilson. To see this experiment in broad terms is to envisage new constructive possibilities for science and society, going beyond the idea of science as an abstract pursuit yielding discrete facts concerning objective nature. This highlights a key point about the relationship between science and public life and the character of ‘ecological citizenship’ I wish to develop in these pages. Bringing nature, science and society into closer relation with respect to environmental concerns entails that Wilson’s ‘one world experiment' be defined in the broadest of terms. Beck does this in terms of the environmental threats to which we are all subject: ‘science has itself abolished the boundary between laboratory and society.’ (Beck in Featherstone 1992: 108). And always we must act in conditions of imperfect knowledge. There are no certainties. ‘[A]ll life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation on some prophecy based on imperfect knowledge.’ (Oliver Wendell Holmes).

Anthropogenic global warming and climate change have effectively extended the 'laboratory' over the whole of society. The result is that we are now all being called upon to become citizen-scientists at work in the Earth’s community of life. If we are to have any life at all, it will be life as eco-citizens in an eco-public. We are all part of the one world experiment and we are all subject to the effects of our impact upon the planet. We are being called upon to respond to the evidence of increasing environmental threats. We are all confronted with the environmental consequences of our actions, and are being called upon to respond appropriately. These demands are the obligations that come from being members of an eco-public, they are obligations we undertake upon making demands upon the Earth. 

Put this way, the disassociation between natural object and human subject is unsustainable. We are the experimenters inextricably involved in the experimental object. Seeing human agency in terms of interactions within relations and networks alters the idea of the one world experiment radically. We experience the world as an 'environmental experiment’ and, for good or for ill, we are the experimenters. We live and act within ‘living laboratories.’ (Rowland 1992). It is not so much that nature is no longer something ‘out there’ but that we are ‘in there’ as creative change agents, active citizen scientists experimenting within the experiment. And this expansive conception of the environment as a laboratory implies a new conception of knowledge generation and assimilation, new knowledge relations that break down dualism between subject and object.


Intersubjective and relational notions
New relations between subject and object also entail a new understanding of the subject. The idea that agency and power are intersubjective and relational notions can be found in a range of social theorists (e.g. Habermas 1979; 1989; 1991; Giddens 1984; Foucault 1986; Foucault 1980; Hindess 1996). Agency and power are to be understood not as the properties of discrete individuals but as things which are expressed within relations and networks. 

The need to bridge the worlds of theoretical reason and practical reason
My argument is concerned with the need to bridge the worlds of theoretical reason and practical reason so that we can make the move from the knowledge that the scientific disciplines accumulate to the world of politics and ethics, the world in which we live, act, choose, decide.  Daniel Sarewitz writes well in this respect: 





I wouldn’t go so far as to say there is ‘nothing’ under our feet, that the objective world does not exist and that therefore we lack grounds for our knowledge. But we do need to reject the positivist conception of science, and along with it our dangerous and delusional dependence upon the idea that there is an ‘objective’ world somewhere ‘out there’ that is capable of yielding purely objective knowledge, and that such knowledge is necessary and sufficient in itself. We have built a civilisation on this misconception of science, investing our hopes and expectations in its ability to ‘deliver’ and satisfy our material demands. 

Michael Brooks argues for a different conception of science, an anarchic conception in which truth is pursued in any number of ways, intuition, imagination, etc:





Brooks proceeds to examine ‘the lengths at which scientists have to go in order to make a breakthrough.’ Chapter I is entitled ‘How it Begins: Dreams, drugs and visions from God.’ And it’s quite a rollercoaster from there. I’m left wondering if anyone could remotely believe the lengths I’ve had to go through to make the case for rational freedom, all after a chance reading of a quote from Marx in a book on Hegel written by a man who was visiting Manchester, Baron Plant of Highfield, a man who was invited to a party of celebrities at Number 10 on the misunderstanding that he was Robert Plant. It’s a strange old world, and fact is an awful lot stranger than fiction. The world is odd, Bertrand Russell wrote, and so the truth about it is bound to be odd. The oddest thing about Russell is his utterly complacent and completely total acceptance of scientific reductionism, something which accounts for the somewhat shrill tone of his ethical and political statements – he may well have been right in what he said on human affairs, but he seemed deep down to know he lacked grounds in his own philosophy to say so. If the world is all blind chance, why make ethical statements as to what ought to be, and why be as insistent and as persistent in making those statements as Russell was? Russell’s commitments make no sense in terms of his logical atomism and empiricism, but make complete sense in the religious frame he repudiated. But I digress, in a related kind of way.

This naïve faith continues but is beginning to be eroded. Ironically, fatigue and scepticism are joining hands over the issue of climate change. The problem is less public rejection of the findings of climate science than public dejection as governmental inaction and failure to act on the evidence has come to reveal the social and political limits of science. Far from being omnipotent and capable of satisfying our wants and fulfilling our hopes, science has been revealed to be morally and politically deficient, if not exactly impotent. The truth is simply that science is not ethics and politics and that these things exist as separate disciplines for a good reason. This, as the argument in this book seeks to make clear, is not a failure of science but of our failure to establish the proper relations between science, public and society within a process of knowledge/action/policy. I am therefore concerned to establish new relations of science, knowledge, power and citizenship, shifting from theory to practice, joining the worlds of fact and value.

For those who remain sceptical of the notion of citizen science I seek to develop, it is worth noting Shearman’s praise of James Lovelock’s Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth as the ‘one text pointing the way’. Lovelock's Gaia ‘was written not in a university or institute but in a house set in the English countryside. Its creation reminds one of Darwin's deliberations a century before.’ (Shearman 1997: 267). The revolution will not proceed through academic peer-review.

Civic Science
HEARING THE PEOPLE’S VOICES

Many commentators have outlined the need for a 'civic science' model in which scientific and other expert views are linked with other forms of knowledge held by society. The concern is to ensure that governance and decision-making is better informed through a variety of quality input, from the expressed knowledge of scientific and other professional expertise to the knowledges, needs and values of all members of society. (Naess 1989). Anthony Turton calls this a 'trialogue' of science, governance and society. (Turton et al 2006). A ‘civic science’ or ‘citizen science’ model seeks to connect scientific and other ‘expert’ professional or academic knowledge with the various knowledges generated and contained within wider society:

Communities need to get involved. The other important thing that people need to remember ... is that they probably know as much or maybe even more than some of the experts drafted in to view certain things. I know I get called into certain things . . . someone asks me about something they've been researching for a long time and they've put a lot of stuff together and quite often they know far more about it than I do, yet people will defer to me because I've done toxicology or something else. ... I am increasingly impressed with what people can put together.

Alistair Hay quoted in Allen 1992: ix.

This makes the point that human beings are knowledgeable and creative change agents, active and capable of making a difference within specific contexts. Human activities take place within these contexts, which are reconstituted in the process. Human agency therefore possesses a reflexive character in that knowledgeability stands at the heart of the ongoing process of externalisation, appropriation and reappropriation of human powers at a higher level of development. That is to say, human beings, through their creative praxis, are involved in a continuous interplay in which power is first objectified and then reclaimed as a social and human power against the abstracting effects of appropriating systems. 

Examining the conventional understanding of science and its relation to the public world in this way helps to explain why, despite knowing so much, we do so little. There is consternation in some environmental circles as to why a wealth of scientific knowledge concerning climate and environmental dangers, contained in hundreds of thousands of research papers, does not translate into effective public policy. The problem is that there is a gap between the worlds of theory and practice, and no bridge connecting them. ‘Society’ is the mediating term here. The problem is that society is constituted by asymmetrical power relations. Monetary (exchange) value and instrumental power filter and canalise the knowledge that comes to and from the practical world. From this perspective, the problem is not the scientific illiteracy of the public or the politicians at all but that public understanding is constrained by the character of the prevailing social relations. Understanding this yields a more complex picture of knowledge generation, interpretation and assimilation, one that recognises the operation of social and technical interactions within specific contexts. Stated clearly, there are relations of superordination and subordination involving chains of dependency which constrain and even destroy capacities to act on any given knowledge.

The failure to act on climate science, then, is not that people don’t understand or don’t want to understand or don’t want to act but that, in the context of prevailing social relations, they cannot act. That is, existing social relations make available a social identity in which individuals simply must pursue their immediate self-interest, even if this means overriding their own better judgement. And this reasoning applies also to the supposedly powerful people who constitute the elite; they are, as Marx described them, ‘personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class relations and class interests' (Marx Capital I 15). And it is as such that they take decisions and act, as functionaries in the service of ends which are external to them. There is not a capitalist who can choose not to expand the values of capital. It is not the capitalist that rules but capital, and capital must expand its values or collapse. Society is organised around that accumulative dynamic and it holds all human beings in its grip. And all the scientific knowledge in the world is powerless against that social metabolic order of alien control.

Science and the public domain
[science as one source of knowledge among others]
The relation of science to the public domain is a controversial subject. In some perspectives – criticised at length by Alan Sokal – science is considered to be one source of knowledge amongst others. A constructivist perspective sees science as invariably ‘interested,’ even inevitably political, as soon as it enters the public domain, a prop of the status quo allied to the most powerful groups within society. Despite the conventional view of objective, neutral and impersonal science to 'stand above' social interests and values, judgements about science cannot be disassociated from judgements about the institutions through which scientific findings are expressed. And here is where we will find public scepticism, not so much against the specific findings of science as against the notion that science as such yields 'objective knowledge' and is therefore always disinterested. Such knowledge may exist in the abstract, but once we enter the public realm we enter a loaded world of diverse social groups and interests. The social world is not a neutral world, and people know this and are therefore sceptical of claims of objective truth which come with very particular political and social agendas.

Critical and contextual science
We therefore move from the ‘objective’ view of science to a critical and contextual conception of scientific knowledge. Making the transition from theoretical to practical reason places us on dangerous ground – the danger being that we lose the scientific claim to objective knowledge and fall prey to a social and cultural relativism and pragmatism, with what we can ‘get away with’ or what ‘works’ becoming the arbiter of truth. At the same time, scepticism with respect to the relation of science to the governmental realm and dominant social interests means that scientific claims to objective knowledge will not be accepted by citizens at face value. People are well aware of the involvement of scientists in government, industry and the military. It is here that climate change ‘sceptics’ have struck hard against science and with great, if negative, political effect. It is not enough to bewail a lack of scientific understanding on the part of the public, and positively counter-productive to shout ignorance and stupidity. We need to move beyond the ‘Enlightenment’ model which holds that reason and knowledge will banish the forces of superstition and ignorance and set us free. The relations of knowledge and society are more complicated than is entailed by such uni-linear notions. In the practical world of ethics and politics, science must 'make sense' not just to governments and powerful interests but to citizens who are subject to and even party to decisions informed by scientific expertise. And that implies that knowledge generation and the generation of meaning must come to meet in the everyday life world of human beings. New knowledge must be appropriated and assimilated into the social matrix through the direct and practical experience of citizens. Without that mediation, knowledge may well be ‘objective’ in its abstract purity, but it is meaningless, mere fact without value. It will remain apart from the world it ought to be informing and influencing. Such knowledge is not affective, since it is distanced from the will to act.

It follows from this that we need to establish closer relations between expressed and tacit knowledge, revaluing the knowledge generated by citizens in their everyday lives at the same time as we incorporate scientific knowledge into lived relations. Such a view offers an aspect of what may be called eco-praxis, the way that our involvement in producing and reproducing our world yields knowledge of that world. We know the world as we come to create and re-create it. This participatory conception of the world as a co-creation suggests possibilities for citizen knowledge, a knowledgeable citizen body that is capable of responding to and absorbing scientific knowledge whilst at the same time generating new knowledge from within the world of everyday experience. This is to present a view of citizens as both knowledge generators and assimilators, constituting a citizen body that is active in disseminating knowledge from below and absorbing knowledge from above. This view does not replace the institutional processes of science but runs concurrently with them, offering a ready terrain for scientific knowledge to settle over the bridge from theoretical reason to practical reason. 

The purpose of my argument is to identify possibilities for opening a two-way channel connecting 'scientific' and 'citizen' knowledge. This channel brings the universal and the particular into direct relation, with citizen knowledge deriving from everyday practices within the social and natural world. In this respect, 'knowing' and ‘being’ are embedded in local ways of ‘living.’ This is to see social and practical experience as generating the epistemological capacity to play an active role in the world as a 'living laboratory.’ 

Citizen knowledges are knowledges for living and 'knowledges for doing' - they are highly sophisticated capabilities which are practical in orientation to specific contexts, making no necessary claim to universal applicability. This conception offers a socially relevant and responsive context for scientific knowledge, as against the notion of an abstract science whose authority rests on claims to universality, objectivity and impartiality. 

This approach answers a number of key questions. Knowledge for what? What is the point of knowledge? Does a fact have meaning? Meaning in relation to what? For all of the claims to impartial judgement and objectivity, scientific knowledge is not an end in itself. I would argue that climate scientists have not been engaged in lengthy and painstaking research merely to generate universal knowledge for the sake of an objective understanding of our world. I take it that climate scientists have worked so hard in the expectation of affecting and informing decision making and inspiring practical action in very specific ways. Sooner or later, the question ‘knowledge for what?’ is answered as ‘knowledge for doing.’ And ‘doing’ implies a doer, or a body of doers. And this is where the cultivation of a knowledgeable citizen body capable of responding to scientific claims counts. In the conventional model, the claims of ‘objective’ science make an appeal to a social identity that does not exist. Instead, there is a distance between science and public which is accompanied by a popular suspicion of a scientific establishment too closely allied to powerful social interests. As a result, the appeal to reason and evidence is treated with popular scepticism. The claim that governments are using science as a ruse to raise taxes and extend power is all too believable. Creating a knowledgeable citizen body capable of participating in knowledge generation, dissemination and assimilation is part of creating a social identity which is capable of responding to scientific appeals.   

Knowledgeable agency
[environmental citizenship  and the 'bottom up' notion of knowledgeable agency]
A 'bottom up' notion of knowledgeable agency entails a conception of citizenship in which environmental needs and concerns can come to be expressed in a positive fashion. In this way, an environmental citizenship operates within new expressivist modes of public life, generating and pursuing a range of possibilities from within the world of lived experience, as opposed to having to respond to the top-down directives and targets of central authority. At the same time, environmental citizenship will form an active and informed constituency which is capable of bringing pressure to bear upon governmental institutions and decision making bodies, offering popular support and legitimacy as governments respond to and seek to act upon scientific knowledge. Such a conception opens up a highly fertile terrain for environmental action, linking policies framed and implemented above in light of expert knowledge to practices undertaken and sustained below.

Environmental issues are social issues, they concern things which are of significance at the practical, everyday level of human existence. The environment, therefore, spans both public and private space. Environmental questions demand public response and require action at the level of public policy. But they raise questions which are ethical in both public and personal life, pertaining to how human beings manage their common affairs together as well as how individuals live their lives. Environmental questions concern ways of living, how we live both as communities and as individuals. The personal is political and vice versa. Environmental citizenship is therefore central to the envisioning of sustainable development as sustainable living.

Environmental problems, therefore, not just threats to be dealt with at the level of public policy but challenges which call for changes in human behaviour. An environmental citizenship goes beyond the dualism of public and private which characterises traditional notions of citizenship, so that political activity is understood to be more than personal choices exercised through periodic voting and membership in political parties and instead operates at the society-wide level in everyday activity undertaken in concert with others. This ‘bottom-up’ approach to building a publicly oriented character through an ongoing environmental praxis suggests how an environmental citizenship is capable of mobilising effective environmental response, in contrast to top-down environmental directives issues from the conventional political sphere.

The human impact
Human beings are having a massive impact on the earth. Our technological abilities are having increasingly destructive consequences for the natural ecology of the planet. We are engaged in an effort to mitigate the damage we have done to our environment and are attempting to regain an ecological balance whose complete loss could prove fatal.

Modernity has had a similarly destructive impact upon the social ecology. Human beings have been treating one another badly throughout history, but modernity has given us a capacity for destructiveness on a scale and intensity much greater than in previous centuries. War, genocide, and political repression are just the most obvious examples of this destruction. More insidious is the dissolution of the warm, affective ties that bind human beings to one another in community, leaving individuals alone and insecure. The destruction of the social ecology is more immediate and is felt at the level of everyday life. Unless we start to repair the damage we have done to our communities and develop new solidarities, we will implode as societies long before we reach the end of natural ecological catastrophe. 

The situation is far from lost. In The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and its Causes (2011), Steven Pinker employs the insights of affective and cognitive neuroscience to analyse a wealth of evidence and argue that modernity and its cultural institutions are making us better human beings. Despite a plethora of images on television, human beings are now less likely to die at the hands of another person than at any time in history. Pinker proceeds to give us the conditions for the continuation of this happy trend. 
Pinker’s figures have not gone unchallenged. But there is another aspect that Pinker has missed that I want to focus on. The problem is that modernity is characterised by its abstraction, a rationalisation that, in Weber’s phrase, proceeds ‘without regard for persons’. Modernity is characterised by the tyranny and violence of abstraction, and its violence and destructiveness are on a scale beyond personal relations. That inter-personal violence should decrease is not so surprising in that context. The challenge is to overcome this abstraction, recover scale and continue the trend for a diminution of violence at the personal level. And this requires that we develop new solidarities in community. 

And these solidarities pertain to the interrelation of all things. The Earth is the habitat of all living things, not just human beings. Human beings and their practices and societies are deeply interrelated, and their actions have enormous ramifications for the functioning of all things in nature’s web. Ecology as a science concerns these interconnections and impacts, but also has close connections to ecology as a philosophy and as a social movement. This does not mean that ecological science and ecological social philosophy are identical, only that there is no way to keep the worlds of theory and practice apart, since every ecological ‘fact’ has ethical significance.

Environmentalism and naturalism
Appreciating the interrelationship of all things, we understand the extent to which fact and value mesh in the living world. We need an approach that does not fallaciously derive values from facts. Rather, ecology sets the context in which the advocates of different value positions may argue the merits of specific policies. In this way, the science of ecology and ecological reasoning set the context for ethical debates concerning how we ought to live our lives. 

Ecology supplemented with ethics – beyond objectivity and positivism
Emphasising practical reasoning and the intertwining of politics and ethics recognises that we live in a world in which fact and value are in constant relation. This view calls into question the extent to which science can ever be a value-free enterprise. Attempts to observe the world ‘objectively’ appear futile and self-defeating and, in any case, have proven insufficient when it comes to dealing with the challenge of ecological crisis. We are not short of knowledge, facts and information in explaining our predicament. We need to span the worlds of theoretical reason and practical reason, fact and value. It seems better to recognize that the basic assumptions we make about the order and structure of nature are value-laden and have ethical implications. We need to re-unite the cognitive and the affective so that the expansion in knowledge is associated with a change in behaviour, seeing society as a learning process and our knowledge of the world as involving normative commitments. 

A world laden with values
The work of scientists is permeated by values. It is well-nigh impossible to separate the scientific, descriptive elements of a worldview from its evaluative components. And no more so than in the world of ecology. The conception of the world as an ecological system which has evolved to manage and allocate energy implies that there is value in maintaining those systemic processes. There is a concept of ‘healthy’ functioning here that implies a value. Neither monetary values, nor aesthetic, moral and cultural values can exist without the existence of the complex, organized ecological system upon which all values depend. The ecological processes that support all human activity form the context of implicit, background value. 

Whatever their differences at the level of values and politics, environmentalists converge in their commitment to ecological contextualism, recognising that all human values and activities depend upon a healthy environment.

Fact and value
The argument I am developing in this book is grounded in a philosophical anthropology that dates back to Plato and Aristotle, and which sees the ‘is’ and the ‘ought-to-be’, fact and value, as existing in close relation. My concern is with developing an adequate and objective theory of the human good, placing considerations of human good at the heart of the argument, but going further to expand the good to embrace living and non-living nature. Moral consideration and worth thus applies beyond human beings. Such a view necessarily presupposes a specific normative dimension.

I am concerned, then, with establishing the legitimacy of the relation between natural fact and moral value, arguing, in the least, that scientific knowledge with respect to the natural world has implications with respect to the formation of values about the world we live in. That doesn’t mean that science determines ethics in some direct, uni-linear way. Biology is biology, ecology is ecology, ethics is ethics, and the facts in themselves are not values. But values are shaped and defined in light of knowledge and information concerning facts. And that is certainly how I read Aristotle, a philosopher who carried over insights drawn from his pioneering studies in biology into the fields of politics and ethics.

Environmentalism and ethical naturalism
The argument that environmentalists can put aside the differences they may have at the level of politics and values and instead come to agree on a course of action on account of their fundamental agreement with respect to scientific axioms and ecological principles seems, at first glance, a clear example of committing the great sin of deriving values from facts – in other words, the ‘naturalistic fallacy.’ 

The naturalistic fallacy
Those with a philosophical background will be well aware of what is known as the naturalistic fallacy, the rule that values cannot be derived from facts. The rule tends to appear with warning signs in every book on environmental ethics. It derives from G.E. Moore, whose Principia Ethica held sway for so long that there is a presumption that it must be a very great book, and that Moore must have been right. I never did care for the book, and think the argument applies only in some cases. I am not even sure that David Hume himself, the philosopher who is considered the origin of this philosophical convention, consistently applied what was supposed to be his own principle; he very clearly did affirm values in light of natural facts. Those controversies are for another day, for those interested (I’d recommend reading John Finnis on Hume here, in Natural Law and Natural Rights 1980). 

Briefly stated, Moore (1930 esp. ch 1) argues that the term 'good' denotes an objective property of which we can have direct knowledge. It is a unique and unanalysable non-natural property, and for this reason its existence cannot be deduced from the existence of any natural (i.e. empirical) property. To attempt such a deduction would be to be guilty of ‘the naturalistic fallacy’. And that, for the brave soldiers of academic philosophy, is a very bad thing indeed. At risk of committing a philosophical outrage, I think there is just something so irrelevant about the entire debate. But maybe I presume too much and am missing something.

The relation between ecology and ethics is a central concern of Mark Everard in Common Ground. Everard notes that in spite of the long-standing global consensus about the basic tenets of sustainable development, ‘further practical and transparent tools are essential to support the complex and contentious decisions required to turn its aspiration into practical agreements and concerted action.’ Developing these practical tools is the central concern of my argument. My view is that, despite the extent of our knowledge and know-how in terms of science and technology, we will only get to grips with the social and environmental crises we face by developing our capabilities in terms of ethics and politics, paying particular attention to character and psychology, the quality of social relations, and social practices. 

Everard, having noted a lack of action despite agreement on the basic tenets of sustainable development, seeks to draw out the ethical implications of the science: 





I am arguing for an ethics and politics that are not culturally relative, but which possess a solid foundation in nature and human nature. Everard himself looks to the laws and principles governing ecosystems, as revealed by science, as the foundation for ethics and the vision of the common good. An attempt to do this risks committing the philosophical crime of the ‘naturalistic fallacy.’ Everard recognises that the ‘conflation of science with ethics may sound dangerous.’ I would choose a word other that ‘conflation’ so as to recognise the legitimate boundaries between the two. But I certainly agree with the attempt to draw science and ethics into relation. As he comments, the argument that science is essentially value-free is an ‘outmoded concept.’ He refers to ‘the bias of funding choices and other influences on the kinds of scientific explorations that are and are not conducted, as well as modes of exploration and conclusions that are accepted in the peer-reviewed literature.’ (Everard 2011: 158). But the relation involves more than this. We live in a value-laden world. To explore and analyse an ecosystem and define a system according to the way it functions implies a view of what is normal and healthy, a view which implies a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, with good being better. Functioning well is both a factual and evaluative statement.

Everard argues that ‘it is far from unreasonable that objective and testable theories and facts should provide a touchstone for what is manifestly 'right' or 'wrong' with respect to the human and ecological consequences of the ways in which we treat and share resources.’ On the basis of science, we can explore, debate and seek to reach consensus concerning the way that our actions or activities may impair supportive natural systems and undermine their capacities to support any or all dimensions of human well-being. This science-based view has clear moral implications:





Developing an awareness of the implications of our actions with respect to ecological and human consequences, becoming able to identify and eliminate wrongful actions, ‘represents a more helpful approach to stimulating changes in the prevailing ethical framework than bald statements about underlying scientific principles and pathways.’ (Everard 2011: 159). And it is more fruitful than dry, abstract statements about intrinsic value and where it lies and how it can be proven.

For Bryan Norton, the emerging consensus is unquestionably naturalistic concerning what needs to be done in specific cases, but does not dictate specific values. Ecology and ecological reasoning set the context for ethical debates in environmental practice, ‘in the sense that a consensus in policy emerges within an inductive debate concerning scientifically determinable local conditions.’ (Norton 1991 ch 10). 

Norton justifies pragmatism in terms of environmentalists who differ with respect to values coming together on the basis of a shared scientific understanding. His view is that the environmentalists' dilemma is mainly a dilemma of values and explanations, rather than preferred actions based on scientific understanding. (Norton 1991 ch 10). In practice, environmentalists often set aside their differences to work together for common goals. 

Insofar as environmentalists continue to express differing justifications for their positions, a consensus with respect to the evaluative aspects of a worldview seems unlikely. The claim of eco-pragmatists is that a shared scientific understanding leads environmentalists who differ at the level of values and politics to work together toward the same policies. The question is whether environmentalists who hold differing, and even contrary, values, come to determine what to do — which necessarily contains a value component — by reference to scientific facts, and thereby commit the naturalistic fallacy?

The question concerns the relation between the ‘ought to be’ and the ‘is’ and begs a further question: if values cannot be derived from facts, then what can they be derived from, if they are to have any basis at all? The point to establish is that any consensus that emerges at the level of practice and policy does not fallaciously derive values from facts; there is no implication that values are logically derived from facts. Rather, ecology as a science sets the context in which the advocates of different values debate and seek agreement with respect to policies. (Norton 1991 ch 10).

My point is that whilst such agreement, convergence or consensus is not science and does not determine the truth or otherwise of a scientific fact or statement, it is crucial to the world of practical reason, the world of human actions, obligations, duties and responsibilities. In other words, the value of pragmatism lies not in the science – scientific truth is quite distinct from utility – but in the bridge it builds between theory and practice.

Norton is seeking a way past the impasse created by divergent value positions. He does not seek an overarching ethical position by which to be able to decide between these positions, and clearly thinks such a search to be futile. Instead, he is concerned to get agreement and action at the level of practical policy. And he takes his stand on greater scientific understanding:

An ecological and systematic understanding of environmental problems therefore supports a policy consensus without dictating individual values. Deeper scientific understanding, as yielded by ecology, of the context of environmental policy questions drives together participants in the debate.

Norton 1991: ch 10

Further examination of practical ethics reveals that further understanding of the nature of environmental problems, brings convergence with respect to policy recommendations, even if divergence remains with respect to ultimate values. Policy consensus is reached ‘mainly because they agree about science, not because they agree about values.’ (Norton 1991: ch 10).

Environmentalists have been able to fashion a working consensus for addressing environmental problems on an ecological basis precisely because they understand the world as the context of multiple values. This understanding unites them behind goals essential to protect a wide variety of values, however expressed, but the impetus toward the consensus is scientific. Environmentalists are being driven together by their commitment to ecological contextualism, which implies that all human values depend upon a healthy context.

Norton 1991 ch 10

In fine, the suggestion is that a uni-vocal worldview will emerge as a result of improved ecological understanding, and that the solid contextual consensus that is emerging among environmentalists has no need of a strong version of naturalism.

For Norton, ‘the beauty of contextualism is that, once ecologically informed constraints are formulated, the society can undertake positive steps to encourage individuals to act in ways that counter dangerous trends.’ Combining a positive, biological conception of a healthy ecosystem with a program of incentives offers a path beyond having to choose between a reductionist cost-benefit economics on the one side and an idealist ecological monism, involving an onerous moral restraint demanding sacrifice, on the other. Following David Brower, Norton calls this alternative ‘restorationism.’ 

A positive definition of ecosystem health, one that incorporates human activities as long as they do not threaten thresholds inherent in ecological systems, opens the possibility of a truly positive ideal of humans living, creatively and freely, but harmoniously, within a larger, ecological context.

Norton shows how these constraints express the holistic ideas of environmentalists, seeing all elements of nature as ultimately interrelated. As the movement has matured, the metaphysical and moral worldviews of environmentalists have found distinctive habitats. (Norton 1991 ch 10). The result is nothing less than the ecological transformation of ‘the political’. We can thus make the transition from the need to define an overarching metaphysical conception to practising an ecological ethic as active, interrelating parts within the whole.

Values are therefore part of a fluid and ever-changing dynamic system, and gain their meaning ‘at the sharp cutting edge of the search for a culturally, politically, and environmentally viable conception of the good life.’ This is in sharp contrast to the fixed and immobile conception of values associated with apodictic truth claims regarding objective reality. As Norton notes, the static conception of human values as unquestioned preferences fails to appreciate the ecstatic aspect of observation and scientific understanding, something capable of causing a shift in worldview toward less consumptive and more contemplative pursuits, to give one example. 

Most interesting in this respect is the idea of environmentalism as a public education. Here, Norton takes us in the direction of citizen science. Since environmental managers lack a ready-made, a priori criterion to guide them in the search for a healthy environment, they must engage the public in a dialogue, a political process, of defining such terms as ‘ecosystem health,’ ‘ecological restoration,’ and ‘ecosystem integrity.’ (Norton 1991 ch 10). 

My problem with this way of putting it is that it doesn’t seem to be a dialogue at all. There is no genuine interaction, in that the action is all one way from those who possess scientific knowledge to those who are deemed to lack such knowledge. The presumption is that as scientific understanding of the larger, ecological context is disseminated throughout the broad mass of the public, individual citizens will begin to see the world in a new, ecologically sound and holistic light. The change in values and the change in behaviour seems to follow automatically from the dissemination of scientific knowledge. Norton optimistically comments that ‘this is the transformational element in the search for an adequate ethic for dealing with human impacts on the natural world.’ (Norton 1991 ch 10).

As citizens begin to see their behaviour in an ecological context, there will be a shift toward the ecological worldview, and management problems will be seen as scientific problems in the sense that science, especially ecology, determines the context in which resource use questions will be addressed. Goals will be formulated in ecological language; this means that some objectives will be justified simply as protecting functioning systems and their organization. In this sense, an environmental ethic is ‘holistic.’ Public discussion of the goals of environmental management will concern the search for the good life in a good environment, and a good environment presupposes stable, slow-changing environing systems.

Norton 1991 ch 10

The problem is that this has been the dominant approach to environmental issues from the start, the idea of environmental politics as a public education, with new values following in response to public information with regard to the latest scientific research and evidence. As disagreements on climate change have shown, the idea that deeper scientific understanding would be sufficient to produce agreement between people with different value positions expresses a degree of faith in the power of scientific reason and evidence to persuade that is unwise in light of experience. The change in behaviour has not followed, for the simple reason that knowledge is not appetitive, and does not in itself touch human beings at the level of motivation, will and attitude. People will often say that they know what the right thing to do is, only to claim that they cannot actually do the right thing. We are dealing with patterns of behaviour and ingrained mentalities that require more than knowledge, facts and evidence in order to change. We need to form characters and not just inform minds. And we need to form societies around identifies that connect individual and social goods.





The future as unknowable





It happens then as it does to physicians in the treatment of consumption, which in the commencement is easy to cure and difficult to understand; but when it has neither been discovered in time nor treated upon a proper principle, it becomes easy to understand and difficult to cure. The same thing happens in state affairs; by foreseeing them at a distance, which is only done by men of talents, the evils which might arise from them are soon cured; but when, from want of foresight, they are suffered to increase to such a height that they are perceptible to everyone, there is no longer any remedy.

Machiavelli, The Prince (1513)

If, as seems likely, the convergence of ecological threats could produce an eco-catastrophe sometime in the future, it is prudent to address the danger sooner rather than wait for scientific certainty. We can never have complete knowledge, and can never have certainty. A continuously unfolding world will always be partially unknowable. Sooner or later, some way short of complete knowledge, we are called upon to make a judgement. 

Energy infrastructures are not my concern here but, in light of what we do know, it seems prudent for governments to make a commitment to renewable energy. That seems obvious enough. My focus in this book, however, is upon politics and ethics, the question of how we can unite self-interested individuals according to an ethic of ecological restraint within political institutions possessing the strategic capacity to consider the common good within long term time horizons. If these political and ethical tasks may seem more abstruse and impractical than the questions of energy and technology, that is because they are more fundamental, and their effects more enduring. The problem with many of the discussions concerning energy infrastructures and economic frameworks is the absence of precisely what is most essential — the question of values, defining a way of life that is rooted in both nature and nurture. If we fail to develop an appropriate moral and political framework, then all the knowledge and know-how in the world will be to no avail.

Altering constraints
The environmental problems generated by the asymmetries between the infinite demands of an endlessly expanding economy and finite planetary resources requires more than a quantitative answer framed in terms of social systems, technologies and energy infrastructures but must set these essential factors within a qualitative response concerning what forms of life and patterns of behaviour are required in order to live a good life:





Practical motivations in ethics
The attractions of eco-pragmatism are easy to understand:





As I shall show, this waste extends to the waste of human capacities, capabilities, and powers. My concerns, too, are largely practical. I believe in an engaged philosophy. I can already hear the criticisms that this is not real philosophy, just mere politics. Well, I am against ‘mere’ politics, too. There is no value in power without principle and purpose. And power with principle and purpose is most certainly worthy of our respect. Politics in this sense is more than the ‘mere’ questions of instrumental power, what it is, how to get it and keep it. It is about creative human self-realisation:

Historically, beginning in the civilization of the ancient Greeks, the study of politics first emerged as a rigorous method of assisting man in this quest for the good life. Consciousness of the difference between existing reality and a non-existent, but potentially existent, future - a morally desirable future - was one of the most important ingredients of this quest. Unless we feel absolutely confident that we have now reached the limits of our capabilities and creativity, that we have advanced to perfection already, to dispense with utopianism would be to renounce a large part of what it is to be a political animal.

Goodwin and Taylor 1982: 254

Theory and practice come together in politics in the ancient sense. Politics is what makes us human - actualised, fulfilled, integral beings at home in our environment. Politics is that check against reality that philosophy often needs to avoid the perennial hazard of the professional – the temptation to navel gaze. Politics is the world of practical reason, that point where ideas, principles, thoughts touch people, strike roots and grow.

And we need politics in this expansive sense. There is plenty of needless, wanton violence, suffering and ecological destruction in the word, and this is a pathetic waste of resources, of capacities and powers, as well as a soul-destroying, heart-wrenching injustice. Those who discount the future express no concern for the unfolding tragedy. They are free riders. It is pointless attempting to persuade them with an appeal to the common good. They are defectors who cannot be persuaded by rational and moral appeals to cooperate. It is more profitable to try to rearrange society so that the common good emerges from within social relations through the choices and actions of individuals. 

My purpose, then, is to make clear to those who are concerned with our current predicament that an alternative future is possible. As Marx noted, there are those who are comfortable in their alienation, and those who are not. I write for those who are not and waste no time on those who are.

I hold to the not unreasonable view that it is not beyond our wit and imagination to put our powers to better use and engage in some wise living on the planet. At the beginning of the 1960s, we said that we would put a man on the moon by the end of the decade. We achieved the impossible. All that we are asking is that we should show the same ambition and, instead of looking ever upwards and outwards, just look down, appreciate what we have, see what is well within our reach, and come to learn to live with our feet firmly planted on the ground. To the Platonic trinity of truth, good and beauty, I would add ‘use’, but in its ethical as well as instrumental sense. Wise use goes together with the true, the good and the beautiful. Of anything we must ask, what use is it? In the manner of ‘what good is it?’ ‘What is it for?’ ‘What purpose does it serve?’ The end is a transparent sovereignty and reciprocity in the commonwealth of virtue.

Pragmatism, policy and environmental ethics
Ben Minteer makes a strong case for choosing policy pragmatism over philosophical purity, democracy over dogma, and impact over ideology. He argues for ‘a major reorganization of environmental ethics as a branch of applied philosophy — in particular the reconstruction of its normative structure and methodological orientation — and a fundamental rethinking of the field's wider political and policy ambitions.’ He envisages a more problem-focused, more experimental (and less ideological), more integrative and interdisciplinary environmental ethics that is pluralistic, naturalistic, collaborative and policy-relevant. (Minteer 2012 ch 1).

The pragmatist John Dewey argues that ‘Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men’ (Dewey 1917: 46). Dewey’s concern is to see a point and a purpose to philosophy. For Karl Popper 'genuine philosophical problems are always rooted in urgent problems outside philosophy, and they die if these roots decay.’





That’s my view too. And I agree too with Alfred North Whitehead. ‘The use of philosophy is to maintain an active novelty of fundamental ideas illuminating the social system.’ (Whitehead 1968: 174). This may seem very anthropocentric, until one remembers that the problems we face are problems with respect to how we relate to nature, how we come to respect and value nature, and this cannot but involve considerations of human interests. But if we are a part of nature, as ecologists say, then the question is about ensuring that human and natural interests coincide. We need to recognise the claims of nature in both human thought and practice.

Adapting John Dewey’s view, and seeing philosophy as responding to problems in the world in which we live, we can argue that: ‘Environmental philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers, and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers and others, for dealing with the environmental problems of society’. (Minteer 2012 ch 1).

This is to shift towards a more engaged style of moral philosophy. This shift is central to meeting the demand that human beings come to assume responsibility for themselves and for their actions. 

This brings me to the Aristotelian emphasis on practical reasoning over some abstract monolithic truth. Aristotle emphasised the importance of relevant experience for rational agency —‘we see that the experienced are more effective than those who have reason, but lack experience’ (Metaphysics A 981a 14-15). This view underlies my entire argument.

The rejection of foundationalism - experience over mirroring
Pragmatism is instrumentalist in character and places the emphasis on the realm of practice. As Minteer points out, pragmatism is not a mirroring philosophy, it does not seek to reflect ideas considered to exist outside of human culture, and it doesn’t claim to register an objective, pre-experiential understanding of nature. ‘It is rather an active, constructive (or reconstructive) philosophy, one that arises from practical experience and takes shape as individuals—and communities—confront problems, learn about their (and others') values and beliefs, and adjust and progressively improve their natural and built environments.’ (Minteer 2006 ch 1).

The cornerstone of pragmatism is the rejection of foundationalism, the idea that knowledge and values must be grounded in something self-evident or self-justifying in some way, (God in religion, Nature in science). Pragmatism denies the possibility of foundational truths, and rejects the ‘quest for certainty’ in favour of a more experimental and fallibilistic conception of knowledge (Kloppenberg 1998: 85). 

So what’s new? Any scientist will argue that knowledge is open to being tested and revised, that science works at the frontiers of knowledge, in the world of uncertainty. The difference is that pragmatism abandons the notion of an objective reality in favour of a greater emphasis on the production of reality and the generation of knowledge. 

The view we have of and the approach we take to reality and knowledge has profound implications that go beyond epistemology to shape ethical considerations and practical life. The foundationalist approach is motivated by a belief in the possibility of discerning certain immutable standards and establishing the grounds for a particular standpoint. In contrast, a pragmatic approach sees ethical judgement and political action as proceeding within the context. There is a straight split here. On the one hand, there is foundationalism’s universalist and absolutist claims to certainty and moral purity, apodictic truth claims which imply a theoretico-elitist model of top down politics; on the other hand, there is pragmatism’s emphasis on the contingent beliefs and social practices of particular communities (Festenstein 1997: 4).

A public mode of deliberation and reasoning
For Minteer, the field of environmental ethics needs to become more open to a public mode of ethical and policy deliberation, ‘one strongly supportive of environmental value pluralism and an experimental and contextual approach to ethical reasoning’ (Minteer 2012 ch 1). This sounds eminently reasonable and wonderfully practical, until one asks why any value pluralism should favour environmentalism in particular over any other value position. Environmental ethics is about the environment, natural and social, and its healthy functioning, or it simply ceases to be environmental ethics. Pragmatism is pragmatism; to add the prefix ‘eco-’ is to introduce a value preference that implies a foundational commitment. The prefix ‘eco-’ implies a moral principle, a moral foundation of some kind, even a moral monism.

Minteer urges that we cease to view environmental policy and management problems as a failure of moral principle — ‘that is, the result of the failure to adopt the single, correct moral attitude toward threatened species, wilderness, or the biosphere’ — and instead see these problems as a failure of moral intelligence. His view justifies pluralism over monism. From the vantage point of environmental ethics, environmental problems should be understood as ‘the result of the collective failure to adopt experimental methods and a tolerant and inclusive view of the range of human and environmental values over the long run. When such values are properly examined, critiqued, and integrated via debate, discussion, and deliberation, ethical judgment in conservation decision making and environmental management and policy contexts becomes more normatively robust—and therefore more durable.’ (Minteer 2012 ch 1).

Maybe. That is a claim that can only be empirically verified. It presumes that with more education and information and exchange of views, people will come to agree. As in the Habermasian communicative community, the only force will be the force of the better argument. Such a view demonstrates a great deal of faith in the power of reason. Here, I would emphasise the importance of character formation, so that any education that comes through the informing of heads also works with characters able to respond in the right way. Habermas made a significant declaration in this respect in an interview: ‘I know that all learning depends on the formation of inner motives’ (‘The Dialectics of Rationalisation: An interview with Jurgen Habermas', by Axel Honneth, et al. Telos, 49 (Fall), 1981, p. 28). 

Earlier, I criticised Rorty’s argument ‘that objectivity is not a matter of corresponding to objects but a matter of getting together with other subjects – and there is nothing to objectivity except intersubjectivity.’ (Rorty 1998: 71-71). Minteer is saying something that appears similar but is in fact very different. Minteer’s pragmatism would seem to imply an intersubjectivity, but it is more accurate to say that his view entails an agreement or consensus emerging on the science through debate, discussion, and deliberation. But it is the recognition of scientific truth that produces the agreement, not the agreement that produces the truth. And that is precisely my view as distinct from Rorty’s. 

In becoming more normatively robust, do not such values come closer to the very foundational principles that pragmatism is concerned to reject? It depends on what we come to agree about. The presumption is that when we come to debate and exchange information concerning the shape of the earth we will come to see and agree that the world is round and not flat. Agreement that the world is flat is possible in a communicative community, but only in denial of the evidence. We cannot lose the check against reality that science brings. The point is to achieve intersubjective agreement on the truth, not to determine the truth, but to act on it.

In taking this approach, I have sought to shift from the potential elitism contained in apodictic truth claims to a more inclusive, dialogic approach. The normative dimension in transcendent philosophy has been democratised and there is greater agreement and consensus through a greater participation in formulating normative commitments. The result is that the normative commitment has become more politically robust as a result of the greater involvement of various viewpoints in coming to ethical judgement. We have replaced the top-down didactic approach with an interactive dialogic approach that connects the above and below. But the environmental problems remain. And it seems that the foundational truth also remains, even if it is now something that has come to be apprehended in a more actively democratic manner. Human beings as moral agents have been active in the generation of that foundational reality and truth. This is a view that leads us away from pragmatism to what Marx understood by praxis.

Philosopher John Passmore quotes Marx from his Theses on Feuerbach (1845): 'The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question.' He comments that ‘this side of Marxism leads it into close relations with pragmatism.’ (Passmore 1968: 46). Close, I would argue, but not quite. Marx’s demand that truth be proved practically does not imply a groundless, value-free pragmatism on his part. Marx’s praxis incorporates normative values and truths contained in both idealism and materialism, seeking their realisation through human practical activity (Vazquez 1977: 2). And, being completely fair, pragmatism itself is not value-free and visionless either, as a brief acquaintance with the works of John Dewey would reveal.

For Peter Dickens, Marx and Engels developed a science of the kind that is now required for an adequate understanding of environmental issues. The principal themes highlighted by Dickens make clear the extent to which Marx’s praxis is distinct from a groundless, valueless pragmatism:

1.	People are a species which, like all other living organisms, have needs like any other species and needs which are specific to human beings.
1.	Nature is integral to people's bodies. There is therefore no logical way in which nature can be treated as separate from people.
1.	Nature is socially constructed. It is always modified by people. And, in the process of changing nature, people change themselves.
1.	Under capitalism, nature is privately owned and exploited. People therefore find themselves becoming alienated or estranged from the nature on which they work. They also become alienated from their own species.
1.	The institutions and processes created through social relations and social processes can, however, come to have an apparent life or power of their own. They become fetishized or reified as things in their own right. As such, they become means by which people gain a sense of being in the world. They enable people to organise their lives and experience.

Dickens 1992: xv 

Marx’s dialectical approach and realist epistemology provides the soundest basis for the construction of an environmental paradigm.

Pluralism requires second order principles – integrated worldview
Any eco-pragmatism we embrace must be based upon the common natural ground upon which we stand. Pragmatism in politics comes with the danger of collapsing into a visionless, value free, ad hoc decision making which merely reflects and reproduces the priorities and concerns of the status quo. This can be avoided only if we retain a bedrock of principles that help to determine which diverse moral criteria apply in any given situation. 

And that sounds like the old monism, if not by the backdoor, then as something that exists in our background assumptions. Nature is in our background, as something requiring no further proof. And that background seems to be necessary to overcome the deficiencies that are apparent in the pragmatist and pluralist positions. (Callicott 1990: 99-124). Pluralism in debate, discussion and deliberation offers nothing in itself by way of normative evaluation beyond the interests and interplay of various groups and interests. The view that different contexts have different principles of value establishes no moral criteria whatsoever. Such an approach can offer no guidance in environmental actions. With such pluralism, we are no further on from the neutral framework of modern institutions attempting to create order in a demoralised landscape.

Even worse than the moral confusion in the world of environmental decisions, however, is the tendency of pluralism to degenerate into a pragmatism that reflects existing power relations. Without a normative framework there is a danger of an ad hoc decision making which makes it impossible to develop and maintain a coherent policy over time. And that makes the environment available for use and exploitation whilst denying us the moral criteria by which to contest that situation. In a pluralist system, environmentalism is just one voice amongst many, with there being no criteria by which to evaluate and decide between positions.

A pluralistic system could work in a morally meaningful way only by being integrated within an overarching principled framework. In this integrated ethical framework, normative principles would have a clear and appropriate domain of application, according to the nature and context of the problem at hand. Integration would be achieved in the deepest sense, with normative criteria applied systematically. (Norton 1991: ch 10). Such an overarching principled framework, affirming the value of nature, however, is a monism and not a pluralism. And it establishes transcendent standards as against a conventionalism ad constructivism.

We therefore need an ethical and institutional framework that supplies mediating principles to guide decision making, policy formation and environmental action. This framework does not imply the imposition of rigid rules or mechanical techniques, but is sensitive to the unique attributes of each particular issue and problem, responding appropriately to each whilst keeping sight of the general normative commitments which make for coherence. (Farber 1999).

Environmental knowledge and values and priorities
[environmental ethics – environmental knowledge and values and priorities]
The philosophical ground of such a position is uncertain. We stand in need of an integral view, drawing on all of our capacities, because our knowledge always works at the frontiers of certainty. Our knowledge of environmental issues is always at that frontier. We know many things, and our knowledge is always expanding, but our knowledge will always be limited. The world is always in the process of unfolding. In practical affairs, we are forever trying to draw the line in a dark room, with only the occasional shafts of light to guide us. But we act anyway. We need to act in spite of all we do not know.

The limitations of knowledge
The call to abandon arrogance also entails a call for a greater humility on the part of science, or, rather, of the uses we make of science. We need to recognise that science can no longer perform the god-trick, the idea that we could obtain a view of everything from nowhere. The material, physical world is constantly and endlessly unfolding before us and is therefore always in the process of creation, is fundamentally unpredictable and is therefore incapable of ever being totally known and mastered by our scientific reason and technological power. The fact that we are a part of that creation indicates the extent to which we make our own knowledge. The knowledge that we come to debate and discuss, therefore, is in some part our own production. And this also points to the impossibility of ever having complete knowledge of a world that is always in the process of creation.

E.O. Wilson points to the exponential growth of scientific knowledge as something which makes it impossible to predict the future:

Scientific knowledge and technology double every one to two decades, depending on the discipline in which information is measured. This exponential growth makes the future impossible to predict beyond a decade, let alone centuries or millennia. Futurists are therefore prone to dwell upon those directions which, in their opinion, humanity should go. But given our miserable lack of self-understanding as a species, the better goal at this time may be to choose where not to go. What, then, should we be careful to avoid? In thinking about the subject, we are destined always to come back full circle to the existential questions — Where do we come from? What are we? Where are we going?




We are actors, the growing point in an unfinished story. The world of which we are active members is never finished; we are always engaged in a process of finishing. But our inability to predict the future, the limitations of our reason and knowledge, does not mean our ambitions need to be stated negatively, choosing what not to do and where not to go. We are indeed actors in a story, and we write that story as we go, and we do what we do as the growing point in that story.

But there are indeed certain things we can, in light of the limitations of our reason, choose not to do. Here I do agree with Margulis. Our pretensions of control are ‘laughable’ and serve only to emphasise our impotence. Responsibility in any meaningful sense means abandoning any totalizing ambitions associated with an overestimation of our scientific knowledge and technical power, the idea that our instrumental powers have made us gods. We are not gods. The source of that delusion is our deification of our technical powers, the worship not so much of science as the products of science. To repeat, we need to take possession of our own humanity, the nature within rather than the nature without. Genuine responsibility is respectful and recognises that we live in a world in which we have limited knowledge, a world of process and imbedded contexts within open and changing ecological systems.

The limits of our knowledge of environmental problems
Farber sees merit in pragmatism as a way of analysing hard environmental questions. Not the least of pragmatism’s virtues is its recognition of the fact that our knowledge is limited and subject to challenge and alteration:





In such a context, it is impossible to build a normative framework based upon notions of objective truth concerning an objective reality. The solution is to locate things in their appropriate place. We can place the emphasis upon the endless pursuit of objective truth – something tentative, open and uncertain – rather than the possession of objective truth – something fixed, closed and certain. We are always engaged in the active process of finishing, not passively serving something finished.

The need for a pragmatic approach is underscored by an awareness that the best efforts of philosophers to produce a body of objective truth have proven ineffective in the hard world of practice. Donald A. Brown, Associate Professor, Environmental Ethics, Science, and Law. Science, Technology, and Society Program, Penn State University, possesses extensive experience at the state, federal, and international levels, being involved in negotiations on issues of climate change, biodiversity and sustainable development. He says bluntly that the work of environmental ethicists ‘is almost never read by policy makers and infrequently considered in day-to-day decision making about pressing environmental issues’ (Brown 2002; Brown 2009: 215). Having read countless books in the field of environmental ethics, having tortured my poor brain in attempting to follow the arguments of environmental philosophers in all their refinement, complexity and intricacy, have spent a small fortune buying those books, that statement turns the blood to ice. It appears that the obsessive pursuit of objective truth and clarity has been and is a waste of time. It seems that Marx was right all along, any philosophical dispute that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question. 

Others with experience of the world of decision making and policy making make claims which confirm Brown’s experience. Susan Buck, public administration specialist, confirms that environmental administrators and agency personnel typically have very little use for the philosophical proclivities of environmental ethicists. (Buck 1997)

I would still, nevertheless, point to the need for an overarching ethical framework. For Susan Armstrong-Buck (a different Susan Buck to the one above), environmental ethics would greatly benefit from an adequate metaphysical foundation. She argues for the value of A.N. Whitehead’s metaphysical system as such a foundation. She compares aspects of his philosophy with Peter Singer’s utilitarianism, Tom Regan’s rights theory, Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, and Spinoza's system in order to indicate how a Whiteheadian approach can solve the difficulties of the other views as currently developed, and provide the basis for an environmental ethics which values individual entities in themselves and in their connectedness in a purposive natural order.
http://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=enviroethics&id=enviroethics_1986_0008_0003_0241_0259 (​http:​/​​/​www.pdcnet.org​/​pdc​/​bvdb.nsf​/​purchase?openform&fp=enviroethics&id=enviroethics_1986_0008_0003_0241_0259​) 

[escaping academic confines] 
My concern to develop a conception of ecological praxis and citizen science is motivated by an awareness of the need to bridge the gap between knowledge and action. In a similar vein, Ben Minteer argues that environmental ethics needs to ‘break out of the confines of academic life and become a key player—or even an active participant—in the public realm.’ (Minteer 2012 ch 1).

For Minteer, environmental ethics has failed when it comes to having an influence and impact at the public level. In explaining why this has been the case, he refers to ‘the tendency for environmental philosophers to press ideological moral programs that do not comport with traditional (aka ‘anthropocentric’) human values and motivations shaping public policy and management. (Minteer 2012 ch 1). Minteer’s pragmatism thus challenges a central concern of environmentalists who identify anthropocentrism – placing human interests and values before all others – as playing the key role in environmental destruction. Minteer is, however, adamant that non-anthropocentrism ‘produces a philosophical posture that fails to reflect (and often attempts to constrain) the diversity of interests and values at stake in particular environmental dilemmas.’ (Minteer 2012 ch 1). Beyond the issue of philosophical or ecological rightness or wrongness, the fact remains that human beings are anthropocentric and will always value the world around them (or not) according to their own interests, desires, needs. It seems that the best we can hope for is an expansive sense of who we are and where on Earth we are, bringing our interests, desires and needs into some kind of harmony with our environment.

The transition from theory to practice
The question, in other words, is not just one of the rightness or wrongness of our place and role within the whole Earth order, but of the practical effect and public impact of environmental ethics. In strict ecological terms, insects may well be more important to the health of the planet than human beings; it’s just that human beings will never see things that way. 

Philosophers and theorists can continue to discuss the finer points of environmental ethics with each other, free from the constraints of policy and practice. But such discussions have a scholastic character. Pragmatism offers a route out of scholasticism through a ‘collaborative, and inclusive style of practical philosophy that attempts to make good on the field's original promise.’ Importantly, eco-pragmatism bridges the natural and the social environment, with ecological restoration connected with democratic and civic renewal. This helps us to ‘make sense of our environmental values and choices as moral agents and democratic citizens within a mixed (i.e., human and natural) community.’ (Minteer 2012 ch 1).

The need for embodiment
Environmental radicals, committed to achieving the end of the ecological way of life as an overriding priority, can cut themselves off from others and thus fail to make the necessary connections with the wider public. Too easily, the stance taken against anti-establishment politics degenerates into the repudiation of politics and institutions as such. There is no holism at all here, merely a self-segregation and a settling into entrenched positions.  Here, I agree with Istvan Mészáros (1975, 1989) and his denunciation of ideas of unmediated reciprocity as a romantic delusion. A dreary one to boot, one that merely prepares the political and psychological grounds for the inevitable defeat of hope to come. 

[need for institutional embodiment]
At some point, values and power need to be embodied in a viable moral and institutional form, otherwise we are doing no more than engage in a permanent, impotent, protest, living an utterly pointless political existence. At some point, we need to take the common good seriously and take the steps for establishing common ground. We need to appreciate the meaning of holism and interconnection. We need to take seriously and act upon the first principle of ecology, the law of ‘integrated systems.’ This concept involves an interactive cooperation between the various parts of a whole. This is to call for an ecological politics that meshes with the way that nature actually functions. It is to respect the principle of holism that is central to an ecological conception of the world. Appreciating interconnection within the whole not only emphasises a collectivism against an individualism, it seeks to overcome tendencies to isolation by drawing the unifying threads together – the parts find their place within the whole. 

An environmental politics needs to keep sight of the larger ecological picture and make the commitment to finding the common ground that unites often disparate elements. We cannot continue engaging in guerrilla warfare over the planet, protesting and campaigning over particular issues, winning little victories here and there, but nevertheless participating in the general fragmentation of the whole. This is the case for politics and ethics – to meet the challenge of finding the bedrock common principles upon which all could agree. The Earth is indeed the common ground we stand upon, but the Earth is a geophysical reality, not a political entity. Human beings are dependent upon the physical reality of the Earth, but at the same time possess a moral independence. This independence may be relative to certain natural constraints, but it remains an independence to a very significant degree. Significant enough to transgress planetary boundaries and cause a crisis in the climate system. We need to assume responsibility for that level of power. And this means that, at the political and moral level, human beings are charged with the task of constituting the common ground as a set of principles which can command universal assent. My point is that without that common moral framework, all the references to our Earthly home in the world will be insufficient to lead us to the path of right living on the planet. To point to the one Earth is the easy part, there are no disagreements here. To achieve the one world, that is the hard part. And here there re disagreements. But achieve it we must, or we will not be long on the planet.

This need to achieve oneness brings me to the question of how to constitute eco-community.

Eco-community
The epistemic, moral and political worth of the community

Pragmatism demonstrates a high regard for the epistemic, moral, and political worth of the community. (Minteer 2006: 7-8). And here, another sense of truth applies:






For socially oriented and politically engaged pragmatists like John Dewey, community was a core moral concept, ‘embodying a communicative and social ideal in which individuals participated in collective experience, contributing to the development of shared values and the direction of group affairs toward a locally defined notion of the common good.’ In the Public and Its Problems, Dewey argued in favour of a participatory, face-to-face politics as a condition of retrieving the common good as something that is more than an abstract value. Human relations come to embody a communicative and cooperative ideal, affirming individual participation and personal face-to-face transactions in the experience of a common life, generating shared values and orienting actions within a locally defined notion of the common good.

The community thus emerges as a habitus, the social and educational environment, in which individuals could acquire the habits of the heart, and learn, grow and flourish, as individuals and as citizens. In an age of radical individualism, the survival, health and vitality of democracy depends upon this intertwined social and moral commitment coming to be embodied in community, yielding a renewed understanding of the common good. (Minteer 2006: 9). 

Human scaled communal life
In this way, environmental values are bound up with the intrinsic values of communities that have achieved a balanced and human-scaled communal life embedded in natural surroundings. Which is to argue that a concern for the civic health of human communities and for the integrity of wild places can go hand in hand, an observation that can be overlooked in some biocentric and ecocentric accounts. 

Place
This indicates an implicit recognition of responsible human agency at work in nature. To repeat, in anticipation of criticisms of ‘anthropocentrism,’ as equated with ‘arrogant humanism,’ assuming responsibility for our actions and their consequences is a quite different notion to human beings taking responsibility for and control of nature. It restores the creative and moral role of human will and activity, things which can be too easily denigrated or dismissed in the more zealous versions of ecocentrism and biocentrism.

I know turn to examine morality, looking particularly at character and the community as a habitus appropriate to the acquisition and exercise of the ecological virtues.

14 ETHICS
The failure of ethical theory
There is no shortage of compelling moral arguments in the traditions of utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, human rights-based ethics, and contractarianism. Most philosophers in the field of ethics work with some version or other of these traditions, and have produced a voluminous literature over the years. If you are in need of an ethical theory, take your pick, we are spoiled for choice. There is, however, a certain disillusionment abroad with respect to ethics. The many compelling arguments advanced from the field of ethics have proven to be so ineffective in evoking behavioural change that we find ourselves feeling powerless and hopeless in the middle of a social and environmental crisis. There are so many intellectually sophisticated theories in the field, yet so little in them that is emotionally satisfying. Where can meaning be found? We seem to live in a state of moral confusion, and the great philosophical disputes have done little to resolve the issues that confront us. There is a certain moral fatigue setting in, a scepticism with respect to the possibility of our ever achieving moral clarity, inviting a swerve to a full blooded pragmatism that abandons attempts to achieve moral certainty, unity and purity. We move from one extreme to the other.

Shelly Kagan considers that a moral theory can be so demanding as to be psychologically overwhelming:

[I]f morality demands too much . . . then when people fall short of its requirements (as doubtless they will do) they will say to themselves that they might as well obey none of morality's requirements at all. Given this all-or-nothing attitude, it is important that morality’s requirements not be too severe – for were they severe morality would fall into wide neglect.

This objection may be called Too Much. According to this objection, moral theory goes wrong through being overly demanding in the principles it advocates. In demanding too much, moral theory is counter-productive in provoking a feeling of futility in response. Too demanding a moral theory generates a sense of futility. People not only make no attempt to meet the requirements of an impossibly high ideal, they do not attempt to even approximate it. Of course, this is a psychological explanation as to why people would move away from moral purity. This speaks only about the practical efficacy of moral duties and principles in our public lives, and reveals nothing about their truth or otherwise. 

The most telling criticism of this rejection of ethics as a futile project is that it sets too sharp an antithesis between extremes of all-or-nothing. As Kagan argues:

Many people disobey the speed limit; few consequently feel free to run down pedestrians. I see no reason why we couldn't teach people to think, ‘Well, I'm not doing all I should—but only a monster would fail to do at least. . .’
Engel in Pojman 2005: 429

So the question remains as to why, despite any number of sophisticated moral theories, we seem incapable of responding to demands to change our behaviour in order to avert the converging crises which beset us. I think the answer is a combination of two things. Human behaviour is more than a matter of individual will and choice; it is structured, it is something that is shaped and reinforced in a context, in relation to others, and expressed through the social identity that a particular society makes available. To demand that human beings change their behaviour presumes that individuals are capable of turning round the patterns of behaviour within which they are integrated, something which involves an unwarranted degree of faith in the power of individual will. A change in behaviour requires more than voluntarism and moral exhortation.

On top of this difficulty is the simple truth that moral arguments frequently tell individuals that they ought to do things they don't want to do. If morality is something more than subjective likes and dislikes, then it implies a norm or a code that constrains individual choice, will and action. Thus, when individuals are given an argument telling them that they ought to do something they would prefer not to do, they seek reasons to reject that argument. They ignore the reasons in favour of that action.

Mylan Engel formulates a familiar reason given for rejecting the arguments presented by moral philosophers, what might be called moral fatigue:

Singer's preference utilitarianism is irremediably flawed, as are Kant's ethics, Aiken's theory of human rights, and Rawlsean contractarianism. The literature is peppered with devastating objections to these views. Because all of the aforementioned arguments are predicated on flawed ethical theories, all these arguments are also flawed. Until someone can provide me with clear moral reasons grounded in a true moral theory for sending large portions of my income to famine-relief organizations, I will continue to spend my money on what I please.

Engel is right to describe this rejection of moral theory self-serving, disingenuous and sophistical. It is a frank repudiation of moral theory in favour of individual preference, the dissolution of morality as something shared by individuals in society, something that motivates, binds, and obligates, in favour of personal likes and dislikes. As Engel argues, this is sophistical because such an objection can be used to ‘justify’ or, rather, rationalize virtually any behaviour. 

Because no moral theory to date is immune to objection, one could, for example, ‘justify’ rape on the grounds that all of the arguments against rape are predicated on flawed ethical theories. The speciousness of such a ‘justification’ of rape is obvious. No one who seriously considers the brutality of rape can think that it is somehow justified/permissible simply because all current ethical theories are flawed. 

Engel in Pojman 2005: 429

In fine, the fact that all moral theories are open to objections constitutes no grounds for abandoning morality as such. Morality matters, and morality is more than value judgements, personal likes and dislikes, pragmatic compromises, and more than Thrasymachus’ sophistical argument that justice is the interests of the strongest. If we ever enter a world that is beyond good and evil, then we will not be there for long. Which isn’t to deny that ethical arguments are often context-dependent. They are. But the truth or otherwise of an ethical argument is more than the values bound up with time and place. That transcendental quality points to the existence of something called moral truth, an ‘objective’ quality that supplies a standard for normative evaluation, that underlines the fact that truth is something more than a practical human product in given social relations. The fact that we continue to act as moral beings, despite flaws in our moral theories, is significant, confirming the existence of an innate moral understanding on our part. 

None of the moral theories is immune from damaging objections, but no one who seriously considers the damage to the environment can think this damage is somehow permissible or even justified simply because all current ethical theories are flawed. We object to environmental destruction regardless of an explicit or well-articulated environmental ethics.

This points to the extent to which a love for our environment is part of an innate moral grammar, an evolutionary inheritance or a gift from God whose truths are inscribed on the heart. Whichever you believe to be true, the moral equipment is the same, as are the effects of its use. There’s something more .. something that even non-believers can believe in … (there, you didn’t know I could sing, did you?)

Innate and Universal Moral Grammar
Reason and the emotions

Throughout this book I argue for the necessity of a grand overall ethical and institutional framework if human beings are to achieve the long term common good required for human and planetary flourishing. Let me make it clear that this does not entail the view that morality and right living are products of reason, with the ‘good life’ as an ideal conception to be implemented from above via an institutional apparatus, quite the contrary. To argue, as I do, for a concept of ‘rational freedom,’ is not to argue that society is an invention of reason. Society, like our ethics and reason, is something that has evolved in tune with our nature. The reason and ethics I refer to are not defined apart from and in opposition to our natures, but as expressions of our natures, integral to the development of our healthy potentialities.

Reason requires the emotions to function properly. Reason alone can become irrational. For Antonio Damasio, decision making and emotion go together. He notes that his patients become so cold-blooded about rationally weighting all the facts before them that they cannot make up their minds. ‘Reduction in emotion may constitute an equally important source of irrational behaviour,’ he speculates. (Damasio 1995). 

As Matt Ridley comments, ‘if you lack all emotions, you are a rational fool.’ Ridley points out the ‘remarkable coincidence’ that economists like Robert Frank, biologists like Robert Trivers and psychologists like Jerome Kagan have drawn similar conclusions from different evidence. ‘So instead of trying to arrange human institutions in such a way as to reduce human selfishness, perhaps we should be arranging them in such a way as to bring out human virtue.’ (Ridley 1996: 144).

It’s a good point that I would put slightly differently. Instead of devising codes and institutions in order to reduce or eliminate egoism or other aspects of human nature we consider to be harmful, we should be creating a habitus which enables us to develop certain aspects of human nature in such a way as to be mutually beneficial. The word ‘education’ derives from the Latin educare, meaning to draw out. A civic education draws out our innate qualities.

Innatists and culturalists
All ethical theories, it seems, are flawed, yet we feel and know right from wrong. This points to our knowledge of right and wrong as belonging to some innate moral grammar. There has been an age old battle between innatists and culturists, between those who think there is such a thing as human nature, and that this constrains historical possibilities, and those who think human beings are born with a blank sheet and are therefore culturally pliant. The problem with this conflict is that it presumes an opposition between nature and culture which can only generate one-sided perspectives, whichever side of the divide one falls on. Human beings, through reason, can be seen as elevated above nature, with instincts as things irrevocably mired in the animal realm. For culturalists, human nature, insofar as such a thing can be said to exist, is merely the product of experience. This, at first glance, can appear liberatory, giving us the freedom, through reason, culture, art etc. to choose how we would like to live, to become what we are and what we want to be. Closer inspection, however, reveals the culturalist conception to contain certain politically and socially manipulative, even totalitarian, potentialities. In this conception of human beings as blank sheets, individuals are little more than clay in the hands of dominant political and cultural forces, to be shaped this way or that in accordance with some political programme or belief system.

The innatist view holds that human beings are more than blank sheets. Culture is therefore more than a collection of arbitrary habits. Culture is how our instincts come to be expressed; whether for good or ill depends upon the way that the instincts are canalized through patterns of behaviour and habits. Nature via nurture is about turning predispositions into mutually beneficial outcomes – the common good – via dispositions taught in the social habitus:





Our knowledge of right and wrong, then, belongs to some innate moral grammar. Marc Hauser describes this universal moral grammar as a toolkit for building specific moral systems. His argument is that we evolved a moral instinct, a capacity that naturally grows within each of us, designed to generate rapid judgments about what is morally right or wrong based on an unconscious grammar of action. Part of this machinery was designed by Darwinian selection millions of years before our species evolved, the other parts were added or upgraded over the evolutionary history of our species, and are unique both to humans and to our moral psychology. Hauser’s idea of a universal moral grammar, however, draws on insights from another instinct: language:





I would agree, but with qualification. The possession of an innate moral grammar does not preclude learning about vices and virtues. On the contrary, the activation and canalisation of that grammar requires a habitus in which we acquire the virtues and learn to shun the vices. The social habitus may not be a Sunday school, but it may well include one in order to draw out the inner moral qualities and develop them as moral capacity; and living and participating in society is educative.

Hauser reads his innate moral grammar against an abstract and rational ethics handed down by written codes and systems. Our instincts are immune to such expressed commandments. I would agree that rational codes and systems work only when they are relevant to the character of those to whom they appeal and apply. But that was always the point of them, and how they were supposed to work – not in creating morality but in drawing it out and developing it. Hauser presents a radical rethinking of our ideas on morality, based on the analogy to language, buttressed by a wealth of recent scientific evidence. He writes:





With qualification, I would agree with this statement. Its truth is evident in light of climate change and the repeated failures of moral and rational appeals to us to change our behaviour and respect planetary limits. We therefore need to understand how our emotions, instincts, intuitions and reason form a complete package with respect to character, equipping us with the qualities we need to create a sustainable culture and be able to respond to and take responsibility for the effects of our actions.

Hauser throws down the gauntlet to modern ethics, and demands an ethics that is fit for purpose. It is clear that in formulating policies and deciding courses of action, we should listen more closely to the moral voice of our species and respond to our intuitions. The role for reason remains, since it is possible that some of our intuitions are no longer applicable to the social and environmental problems we face:

But in developing policies that dictate what people ought to do, we are more likely to construct long-lasting and effective policies if we take into account the intuitive biases that guide our initial responses to the imposition of social norms.

Hauser ends his appeal by emphasising ‘the fierce urgency of Now’, the words of Martin Luther King – he may have profited from an understanding of how Dr. King’s ethics were firmly grounded in natural law. ‘The dominant moral-reasoning view has generated failed policies in law, politics, business, and education. I believe that a primary reason for this situation is our ignorance about the nature of our moral instincts and about the ways they work and interface with an ever-changing social landscape. It is time to remedy this situation.’ 

Our dominant moral theories have failed and will continue to fail. In light of a looming environmental catastrophe, we can no longer afford such failure. We need an ethics that equips us to see, to value, to judge and to act:

This dominant perspective falls prey to an illusion: Just because we can consciously reason from explicit principles — handed down from parents, teachers, lawyers, or religious leaders — to judgments of right and wrong doesn't mean that these principles are the source of our moral decisions. On the contrary, I argue that moral judgments are mediated by an unconscious process, a hidden moral grammar that evaluates the causes and consequences of our own and others' actions. This account shifts the burden of evidence from a philosophy of morality to a science of morality. 

Hauser 2006 ch 1

Here, Hauser goes too far, and sets up a false antithesis. I, too, argue for a mediation. But I avoid a bifurcation between a hidden, innate or unconscious grammar and an explicit conscious ethics. There is nothing given by this innate moral grammar that Hauser refers to. It is an inner potential that needs to be elicited, drawn out. That’s the point of a conscious ethics and the practices that supports and articulates it. Without education in the sense of educare, that moral grammar will not develop. The capacity for language does not entail the inevitability that a person will develop the ability to speak, write and put meaningful sentences together. In short, the virtues are things we need to acquire. My simple point is that such moral qualities are not superimposed from the outside as in an abstract moral code, but develop inherent capacities from within. But, yes, I would develop the virtues internally, as expressions of inner qualities, not as external commands reflecting what kind of character a particular society would have its citizens have. And education comes in many forms within the social habitus, and doesn’t only have to be ‘handed down’ by any institution or written code.

Innate moral grammar and the natural law
Hauser argues that all humans are endowed with a moral grammar — a capacity that enables each individual to unconsciously and automatically evaluate a limitless variety of actions in terms of principles that dictate what is permissible, obligatory, or forbidden. 

Despite the many objections we could raise against the dominant ethical theories, we do not as a result reject moral behaviour. We know right from wrong, regardless of whether we present utilitarian, deontological or any other moral arguments. This is the moral law we all possess. In his Epistle to the Romans, the apostle Paul alludes to the concept of Natural Law and contends that it is written on the human heart. This law, he infers, transcends manmade laws and is accessible by human reason because it is innate and intuitive. (Romans 2:14ff). The knowledge of right and wrong is written within. This law transcends human-made laws, but is accessible by human reason because it is innate and intuitive. Natural law, then, is not the law of nature in the sense of biological or ecological principles but nature as seen through the eyes of reason:

God gives each of us plenty of information about right and wrong, not just in Church teachings and holy texts, but written into our very hearts and minds. When we go wrong, it is because we ignore all of this.

Pasnau and Shields 2004: 239-40

The universal and innate moral grammar Hauser emphasises as the natural endowment of the human species is well known to the natural law tradition. Not only that, this tradition is characterised by the way it integrates an innate understanding and a conscious teaching as complementary. 

To make this clear, I shall draw upon the work of Pasnau and Shields concerning St. Thomas Aquinas and the natural law.

According to St. Thomas, the task of prudence is not the cognitive undertaking of knowing the right thing to do. In an innate sense, we all know what the right thing to do is. For St. Thomas, knowledge has no appetitive component and is therefore not a virtue in the truest sense. To be a virtue, knowledge would have to make an agent positively desire to grasp the true. However, knowledge does not do this: ‘[H]aving knowledge does not make one want to consider the truth; it just makes one able to do so’ (QDVC 7c). In an innate sense, we ‘know’ the difference between right and wrong. The problem is that we do not necessarily want to activate this knowledge and live our lives in accordance with it. The moral agent’s task is to activate that practical knowledge at the right time, for as long as necessary. The natural disposition of prudence ensures that our intellect will attend to the relevant information we possess.

The underlying disposition ‘more truly has the nature of a virtue inasmuch as it gives a person not just the ability or the knowledge to act rightly, but also the will to do so’ (Aquinas QDVC 7c). Prudence does this by maintaining the intellect resolute in its orientation, thus allowing the will to act in accordance with right reason, in pursuit of ends that the virtuous person desires by way of a second nature. This emphasises the extent to which the virtues are not given by nature but need to be acquired in the appropriate habitus. Hence I make the case for the acquisition and exercise of the virtues, turning the predispositions we are born with into dispositions to act well and live well. Prudence is a disposition that ensures that our intellect will focus upon the practical knowledge we possess. 

Under the guidance of justice as a social virtue, the prudent person will focus on those aspects of any particular context that bear upon relating to others and treating them fairly and equally. 

Whether we call this a moral law written on the human heart or a universal innate moral grammar, the existence of this inner quality points to the role of moral theory in activating the moral predisposition within human beings, as opposed to creating and inculcating the moral law without. From this perspective, the objections that can be raised against morality at the theoretical level are not actually damaging to ethics as something that human beings do. 

The theoretical and philosophical quality of a moral argument, then, matters, but it matters less than being able to activate the innate moral understanding of human beings. Here we enter the realm of prudence and practical reasoning. And the task of prudence is to be distinguished from the cognitive task of knowing what the right thing to do is and constructing an argument in its justification. The prudent agent already has that knowledge of the right thing to do in a practical sense. What matters is that the agent is able to draw on that inner knowledge at the right time, and this is a matter of character, motivation, will and disposition to act rather than the formulation, dissemination and possession of the correct moral theory. Following the natural law position that the moral law is written on the human heart, we already ‘know’ in an innate sense what the right thing to do is. Moral arguments are attempts to persuade us to do the right thing; rationalisations are our attempts to evade obligation. We therefore err not through lack of knowledge but because we fail to make use the knowledge we have, and because we let our knowledge be occluded by our passions, impulses and desires.

Moral knowledge is important but it is not the basis of moral evaluation. A person is not more virtuous on account of coming to understand the natural law in greater cognitive depth or in becoming more aware of its consequences. A person is virtuous according to how they come to make use of the knowledge they already have. Moral knowledge is therefore secondary to our coming to act in accordance with what we already know. We all understand the natural law in some intimate sense, and we are all capable of applying that innate knowledge in specific contexts. The good person is not good on account of possessing greater knowledge of the correct moral theory, but by virtue of knowing what to look for and remaining steadfast in its pursuit. (Pasnau and Shields 2004 239-40).

One would expect that Aquinas, as the greatest of the Schoolmen, would offer a classic example of an abstract and universal moral truth, the kind that pragmatism is concerned to reject. Aquinas actually offers something much more nuanced, an overarching ethical framework that is sensitive to the details. The interest of Aquinas’ moral theory lies in the details. Aquinas’ ethics, indeed, are quite flexible and pragmatic rather than fixed and dogmatic:

He offers no dramatic and memorable theses, but only a careful and patient analysis of ethics in all of its intricacy. Rather than supposing that earlier theories of ethics got things wrong, Aquinas's tendency is to suppose that these theories were partially right and need only to be synthesized into a more comprehensive theory that does justice to the full complexity of moral behaviour.

Pasnau and Shields 2004: 240

We can ask no more of any moral theory, only more of ourselves. And that brings me to morality, modernity and the virtues.

THE LOSS OF AN OVERARCHING MORAL FRAMEWORK
The bankruptcy of modern morality
[rather than duty and obligation telling people what to do, morality should provide guidance regarding what kind of person to be. 

For the best part of a century, moral philosophy has been suffering an identity crisis. Nietzsche’s announcement that God is dead was a demand that moral philosophy discard any surviving theological support it retained and instead grow to an independent maturity – beyond standards of good and evil. The problem is that, as the dissolution of morality into value judgements and subjective preferences demonstrates, the notion of liberation through a self-legislating reason suffers from severe limitations. I would therefore look to go beyond the concerns of moral theory and examine moral character and its constitution.

The overarching moral framework
The overarching moral framework associated with the Judaeo-Christian tradition involved a common ethic that commanded widespread assent and formed a certain character. This shared ethic united people and offered a common reference point for settling conflicts. It also offered a vision by which to guide conduct. This framework has been dissolved in the modern world through a process of rationalisation, what Weber described as the disenchantment of the world. As a result, morality is now just value judgement, an irreducible subjective opinion, with no criteria capable of settling moral disputes. 

My argument with respect to virtue theory is this, an overarching moral and institutional framework establishes the appropriate habitus for the acquisition and exercise of the virtues. This framework articulates ideals for right living, and embodies them in social institutions, relations and practices. This gives us a context in which the virtues can be acquired and expressed through a range of intermediary bodies and associations. These function as schools of virtuous behaviour by which values are passed on through the generations, binding individuals together in community and giving society its moral bearings.
(I have developed this conception at length in relation to Hegel’s Sittlichkeit. 
Critchley 2001 Hegel 

Here, I follow Plato’s insight into the character of justice as the social virtue par excellence, enabling us to order society according to notions of the good life. But my argument goes further than Plato’s hierarchical organic functionalism which fits individuals to a particular station. I see ‘the social’ in egalitarian and democratic terms, valuing each and all. The virtues are thus social qualities which we acquire and develop only with the cooperation of others (family, schooling and so on), and which we come to share with others. First and foremost, though, the virtues are personal qualities which individuals come to express through personal moral effort in relation to others in society. Through acts of care and consideration we impart these qualities into the social world around us, repairing the fractures of society and establishing the warm, affective ties that bind individuals together, knocking the harsh, competitive edges off society and making it more cooperative, more akin to a civic friendship. 

The virtue tradition was overthrown by the modern revolution and the emancipation of the individual from religious, moral and political constraints. That movement was emancipatory, in the sense of opening the path to the valuation of each individual equally. The problem is that ties of personal dependence have come to be replaced by ties of impersonal dependence, the objective dependency of all upon the external constraints of the modern capital system (Marx 1973: 160ff). Equality has thus taken the form of an equality of subjugation. Emancipation from personal dependence imprisons the individual within 'objective dependency relations' so that ‘individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on one another’ (Marx 1973:164). Far from abolishing ‘relations of dependence,’ capital’s external relations' are the 'dissolution of these relations into a general form' (Marx 1973:163/4).

In other words, the overarching moral framework of virtue has dissolved and in its place has come an external, impersonal constraint that is binding on all, replacing moral ends which we set ourselves by imperatives which are external to us. Morality itself has fractured into myriad forms, with salvation sought in hard work, success and money, physical fitness, (regular visits to the gym as a form of church attendance), consumption and shopping, new age mysticisms, alternative lifestyles, counter-cultures, resurgent identities concerning race, religion, ethnicity and nationality, and social media as a mode of electronic connection.

Weber wrote of renascent gods taking the form of impersonal forces and stripping the world of intrinsic meaning. ‘The fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the "disenchantment of the world"’ (Weber Science as a Vocation 1991: 155). Instead of an overall moral framework based on a common ethic, Weber characterises the age as a new polytheism taking the depersonified, objectified form of an irreconcilable conflict between irreducible orders of value and life: 'Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces' (Weber SV 1991: 149). This rationalised world becomes meaningless, a struggle between a multiple set of values, ruling out the possibility of an objective, integral framework for the common good (Weber TL 1994: 78/9; Habermas 1991: 246). 

We may, with Nietzsche, celebrate the loss of the singular moral framework as the ‘death of god’, a liberation of the individual from repressive codes and structures. We are now free to enjoy ourselves and join in Nietzsche’s Dance (Stauth and Turner 1988).

In Nietzsche's perspective, the structure of nihilism leads to a new state of the organic, of sensitivity, valuations and interpretations of the individual, which as well could form (for the free intellect) a new stage of reversibility (of structural dominance) and of a joyful conscious rejection of given interpretations of order. With the death of God, the life-world had become open.

Stauth and Turner 1988 ch 5

The life-world is still ‘open’ in the sense that we have yet to attain that ‘joyful’ existence adumbrated by Nietzsche. But the world is far from as open as Stauth and Turner imply. It is easy enough to announce the death of God; it is much more difficult to shed the theological assumptions that come with God. Instead, they come to be attached to the new idols of modernity – the state, bureaucracy, commodities, capital, and any number of other surrogate communities – to form an incredibly closed world of impersonal, objective dependency of each and all upon ‘things.’ Nietzsche knew this, of course, hence his demand that those having given up a belief in God also give up the moral principle and evaluation attendant upon the existence of God.

Much of what I write could be dismissed from a Nietzschean perspective as an intellectualist resentment ethics. But here’s the rub for the adherents of Nietzsche’s joyful science: we are already free from the old moral and religious constraints. We have been free for some time. That we are not experiencing the joyful freedom promised is due to our social existence being lived under the external constraint of the objective, impersonal forces of the modern economy, against which assertions of personal liberation have nothing to offer. We have never had so many paths to salvation and freedom. But no matter how hard we try to tie the threads together to form a meaningful whole, it all unravels. R. H. Tawney took Dante’s Paradiso as a model of a ‘complex and multiform society which is united by overmastering devotion to a common end’ (Tawney 1982 ch 11). Ezra Pound likewise used Dante as his inspiration when attempting to integrate the world and its politics, economics, culture into one vast poem. His failure was a demonstration of the impossibility of such integration in the modern world. Pound’s huge Cantos are a ‘jumble of detail,’ a ‘mound of potsherds.’ ‘I cannot make it cohere’, Pound declared in his defeat. (Vendler 1984: 143). 

And that is the point, without that moral and institutional framework expressing a common ethic grounded in social relations and expressed in social practices, the whole lacks coherence and meaning. That exasperated ‘I cannot make it cohere’ sums up our predicament as we try to find a meaning we can share. An individualist and particularist morality cannot give unity to a life. At some point, as social beings, we find ourselves in relation to others. We need a bigger picture to give structure to our relationships and stability to our identity. A common ethical framework recognises that we are parts of a greater whole, creating a social identity which connects our legitimate private interests with a larger public purpose, thus giving a coherent view of human life as a journey of moral striving and purpose.

In contrast, the modern polytheism of values expresses a relativist and subjectivist morality which corresponds to the prevailing market society, the bourgeois society Marx condemned as a society where each treats the other as mere means to personal ends and all become subservient to alien impersonal powers. The market is a place where not only goods and services are bought and sold but also ideas, values and identities — we consume or are consumed. It is a society replete with monetary values but deficient in the values that bestow meaning upon life. That is a deficiency for which no amount of material quantity can compensate. Human beings are meaning-seeking creatures, capable of conscious thought, reflection, foresight, and a viable social order needs to speak to that aspect of human nature. 

This is the real issue at stake with respect to reason and knowledge. The modernist promise of endless progress through our knowledge and control of the physical world was associated with the assumption that reason would end superstition and ignorance and replace the conflicts and prejudices of the past with a liberal and tolerant public of free individuals. That hope has only been partially realised. There was a failure to take morality seriously. We need more than a neutral framework holding the ring between private individuals pursuing the good as they see fit. The only constraint here is the constraint of the state and law; morality reduced to value judgements cannot decide and cannot unite when wants and preferences collide. 

The modern world has seen the inversion of politics and economics. The world of politics now speaks the language of economics. (Lomasky in Paul, Miller, Paul 1989). The colonisation of public life amounts to a vast social and anthropological illiteracy. 

The situation is not, however, hopeless. The virtue tradition is in the process of being recovered and continues to inspire moral energy and aspiration. And it is to the virtues I shall now turn.

Whilst market society reduces human beings to atoms, held together by the external force of the state, human beings remain social beings, seeking individuality through relationship to others. Hegel’s Sittlichkeit is a structured dynamic of ascending purposes and loyalties, beginning with the family and extending outward, through the intermediary associations of civil society, up to the universal realm of the state. This system of the ethical life integrates particularity and universality via a complex ethical and social matrix of values, virtues, dispositions and habits, bringing individuals together and sustaining relationships by an ongoing, internal, solidary exchange. It’s a conception of a community of ends in which order is something that individuals generate for themselves from within reciprocal relationships, as opposed to having it imposed from the outside by the state or by economic imperatives.

A framework of virtue is required because these behaviours, although natural, pointing to an innate capacity, do not spontaneously emerge but are always expressed, or inhibited, in a social context:

The institutions by which society maintains itself are not natural, they are artifacts, and they are maintained by effort in order to sustain the personal life of men and women, and to prevent a relapse into . . . barbarism.

John Macmurray 1961: 153

The virtues need to be acquired, developed and constantly renewed through habits and practices. And on this I rest my case for ‘rational freedom’ as implying an ethical and political framework, presenting a principled reconstruction of the institutions, relations and practices that are necessary for the actualisation of the good life. I emphasise the creation of a habitus in which virtues are acquired and practised. Morality is not, therefore, something handed down by the state, no more than it is something generated spontaneously by individuals. The social mediates between the individual and the state. Morality is a social phenomenon, something that we learn in the concentric circles of society. Hegel describes ‘the circles of association in civil society’ as ‘communities.’ They are indeed; they are the places where we learn to speak, to interact with others, to reciprocate, to cooperate, to give and receive, to trust, to grow. Here is where we develop the reciprocal relations upon which society depends.

This passage in my notes is pertinent:
The grid pattern of our cities, Mark explained, is really a military pattern/colonial device, designed to allow maximum control of space and easy movement through it. But it is not designed for human interactions. "The grid also makes the earth measurable as a commodity unit," Mark said. "The grid regiments space in order to homogenize experience and imagination. Indeed, it is designed to discourage and eliminate interaction, so that 'Love your neighbor' remains a high ideal rather than a daily reality."

Strengthening social communities and building circles of association creates a mode of appropriate governance, one that arranges society according to an ascending purpose, with power distributed according to functional responsibility and competence. This amounts to investing civil society with a governmental significance, bringing social power back in touch with its origins. The alienation of social power to the state and to capital has been accompanied by a depoliticisation and demoralisation of society. Society, and the people in it, have lost too much of the power to govern to extraneous forces and bodies. 

Even worse than the physical coercion of alien control is the mental coercion. Modern society has the character of a psychic prison in this respect. (Morgan, G., 2007 ch 5 Exploring Plato’s Cave: Organizations as Psychic Prisons). Michel Foucault draws attention to the regulatory practices of the self in detailing the emergence of a whole panoply of techniques for the normalised regulation of the individual. The prison existed as an enormous laboratory in which a number of techniques were created. The term ‘discipline’ defines the transformations within modern society which have sought to produce a knowledge of the individual and provide the basis for a morality of personal conduct. There developed a plethora of ‘orthopaedists of individuality’ concerned to regulate personal conduct. Individuals are caught within a carceral network, ‘in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the "social worker" judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based’ (Foucault 1977:304), i.e. the normalising judgment that is exercised over the individual. (Critchley, P. 2001. RFM vol. 6.)

Judges, teachers, therapists, managers, bureaucrats – they are everywhere, taking all kinds of shape and form - governments at all levels, the police and judiciary, bureaucrats and managers of all kinds, health professionals and doctors, social workers, teachers, therapists and gurus, a category that includes non-gurus. The influence and power of all of these rests on conning us into believing that they can handle our emotions better than we can. With so much normative regulation of the individual in the world, we should by now be the most virtuous people who ever existed.





The return to Aristotle and virtue theory

Stewart Brand in Whole Earth Discipline (2010) dismisses ethics as a mere secondary frill – if worth consideration at all – to technical fixes. He quotes Brecht with approval: ‘Grub first, then ethics.’

Such a view betrays a complete ignorance of human life and behaviour, and suggests one reason why so many technical fixes misfire and fail. Morality enables us to engage in effective action. Morality makes action effective because it locates the demand for change at the level which makes a difference, the human character, patterns of behaviour and social practices and relationships. Any demand for change which bypasses those things is bound to fail or make things worse.

Starting with G.E.M. Anscombe in 1958, and going on to include the formidable Alasdair MacIntyre, a number of philosophers have declared the bankruptcy of modern moral philosophy and argued that we should stop thinking about moral obligation, duty, and rightness, as based upon the incoherent notion of a ‘law’ without a lawgiver, and instead return to Aristotle's way of thinking.

Elizabeth Anscombe sounded the clarion call to abandon the concerns of modern moral theory, urging that we come to think morality anew. In highlighting the flaws of the dominant moral theories, Anscombe drew attention to the fact that ‘we lack a rich range of moral psychological concepts in which to describe, understand, and evaluate moral behaviour marked the beginning of a contemporary debate regarding what role a moral theory ought to perform.’ (McKinnon 1999: ch 1). 

Roughly, the territory has split between those who think that a moral theory must provide a decision-procedure in the form of an all-purpose moral rule or criterion or authority telling agents what to do and those who argue that the primary concerns of a moral theory should be aretaic ones: its role should be to provide guidance regarding what kind of person to be. 

McKinnon 1999: ch 1

On the one side are those who think that a moral theory must provide a decision-procedure in the form of an all-purpose moral rule or criterion or authority which tells agents what to do. Here we find deontologists and consequentialists, who emphasize rules and impartiality in morality. 
On the other side are those who hold that the role of moral theory is to provide guidance as to what kind of person we ought to be. Here we find virtue theorists, who emphasise the importance of character.

The broad thrust of my approach in this thesis would place me firmly in the second camp with the virtue theorists. I would just add that these moral theories are not mutually exclusive. St. Thomas Aquinas, arguably, combines any number of moral theories rather than imposes one to the exclusion of the others. I have myself written extensively on Kant (and less extensively on John Stuart Mill), and so would be wary of having my argument classed as a virtue ethic and no more. In 2012 I wrote a paper entitled Kant and Virtue, which argued for the centrality of virtue in Kant’s ethics. I argue that Kant has plenty to contribute to the normative turn away from utilitarian and deontological ethics, with increasing emphasis coming to be placed upon agents and the sorts of lives they lead rather than upon atomic acts and the rules for making choices, even less upon the consequences of such acts. The paper makes clear that whilst Kant has been understood as a deontologist pure and simple, he did not so much turn away from virtue as place virtue ethics on a more secure foundation. In recovering Kant’s conception of virtue, I argue that Kant sought to build an ethical theory based not just on rules but upon agents and the kinds of lives they lead. In fine, Kant created a moral theory which, in paying close attention to both the life plans of moral agents and to their discrete acts, combined rule ethics and virtue ethics.

Critchley, P. 2012. Kant and Virtue [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
 (http://www.praxisphilosophie.de/critchley_kant_and_virtue.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.praxisphilosophie.de​/​critchley_kant_and_virtue.pdf​)).

I would also emphasize the extent to which John Stuart Mill, in formulating his utilitarian system, identified the formation of character as crucial in resolving the dilemma of how each, in pursuing his or her own happiness, could make it their concern to work for the happiness of all others, and not merely be intimately connected others. Through the prior formation of character, in the same manner that the well brought-up are horrified at the occurrence of crime, so they learn to be horrified when the general happiness is neglected. (Mill 1972 ch 3).

I make these comments to make it clear that, in arguing for virtue ethics, I am not ruling out insights drawn from other moral theories, and am concerned to avoid fracturing ethics along the familiar dividing lines. There is no necessary reason why a rule-ethic and a virtue ethic should be mutually exclusive alternatives. That said, I will now be concerned to argue strongly in favour of the virtue position.

I will argue that virtue theory offers the most promising approach to breaking the impasse in moral theory. The focus that virtue theory places upon what it takes to lead the good life is the right one, and is capable of incorporating ecological concerns, what it is to live within the web of ecological relationships. Significantly, the virtue approach recognises the non-codifiability of the quest to lead a good and meaningful life, and instead emphasises the complexity of the lived nature of that life. I will argue that the emphasis on the virtues provides us with the rich range of moral concepts possessing psychological depth with respect to human behaviour.

An adequate theory of ethics must provide an understanding of moral character; and this modern moral philosophy has failed to do. Elizabeth Anscombe is most adamant on this, openly stating that the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty ought to be jettisoned:

The concepts of obligation, and duty — moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say — and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of ‘ought,’ ought to be jettisoned. ... It would be a great improvement if, instead of ‘morally wrong,’ one always named a genus such as ‘untruthful,’ ‘unchaste,’ ‘unjust.’

G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy (1958)

Elizabeth Anscombe’s call to abandon moral duty, rightness and obligation opened up a new era concerning what role a moral theory ought to perform. It is not really necessary to jettison rightness, duty and obligation if we can enrich them from within the virtue framework. We could, therefore, supply utilitarianism, deontology, etc. with a better account of moral character, thus combining the best features of the right action approach with insights drawn from the virtues approach. Anscombe’s argument, however, made clear the extent to which moral theory is deficient on the very thing that would appear to be most important when it comes to moral behaviour, it had nothing to say on the key question: what kind of person ought we to be. 

Anscombe exposed an identity crisis at the heart of modern moral theory. As Bernard Williams commented, nobody is quite sure what the questions in moral theory should be anymore (Williams 1985). McKinnon notes a ‘general confusion both about what we want our moral theories to do and about what expectations we should have of ourselves and of one another as moral agents.’ (McKinnon 1999 ch 1). We stand in need of a rich range of moral concepts in which to describe, understand, and evaluate moral behaviour, concepts which go well beyond impartial rules and duties to go deep into the human psychology. McKinnon argues that virtue theory offers the most promising approach in moral philosophy. Requiring modification and supplementation in particular ways, the focus on how to lead a good human life in virtue theory is the right one. Virtue theory is the most pertinent moral theory when it comes to understanding why certain kinds of choices are conducive to leading a good human life, and why others are not. (McKinnon 1999 ch 1).

Virtue, character, the nature of the human good
A host of ancient thinkers asked the question what character traits make a good person, and in consequence the virtues were at the centre of their thoughts. The central questions in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics concern character. Aristotle begins by asking ‘What is the good of man?’ To which he replies: ‘The good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity with virtue.’ Ethics in therefore concerns what makes someone a virtuous person. Aristotle proceeds to examine such particular virtues as courage, self-control, generosity, and truthfulness.

Beyond morality as duty, obligation, rightness
Rather than ask what traits of character make one a good person, the main moral theories ask: What is the right thing to do? From here, they go on to develop theories of rightness and obligation. The main moral theories are:

*	Egoism: Each person ought to do whatever will best promote his or her own interests. 
*	Utilitarianism: We ought to do whatever will promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
*	Deontology: We have a duty to follow rules that we would be willing to have all people in all circumstances follow, rules that we could consistently will to be universal laws—that is, (Kant's theory)
*	Contractarianism: We ought to follow the rules that rational, self-interested people agree to establish for their mutual benefit. 

Virtue theory takes a different approach to these dominant moral theories. Virtue theory holds that certain character traits are morally good and asks what kind of person we need to be to flourish well.

If we think about our social relationships, we would not want to live in a community of people who acted only from an abstract sense of duty or a concern to do the right thing or out of self-interest alone, and, tellingly, we wouldn’t want to be such a person. A satisfactory account of the moral life requires a theory that emphasizes more than right action and highlights personal qualities such as friendship, love, and loyalty. That satisfactory account is a theory of the virtues.

The grounding of morality in human nature
[normative claims about good human lives]
A morality which is grounded in human nature is concerned with those things that matter to humans, those things that go to making a human life. One could refer here to proper functioning, but the behavioural implications of that phrase convey the wrong impression. Flourishing is more than functioning in this sense. The focus in virtue theory is upon those things that tend to make human beings and human lives go well. And that amounts to more than existing, it is living well. The building of character is therefore constrained by facts of human nature and by the demands of practical reason. And the facts concerning human nature serve to ground normative claims and commitments concerning what makes for a good human life. For instance, the fact that we are, as Aristotle says, social animals means that the well-being of others is an integral element in determining those things which contribute to a well-led human life and those which detract from such a life. The well-being of others forms part of our own well-being.

Successful character-construction serves agents in their quest to lead meaningful, fulfilled lives, providing agents with reasons to act in ways which are conducive to well-being.

What Is Virtue?
The first question is: What is a virtue? This question needs to be set in the context of the fundamental problem of moral theory – why do human beings need to do good? We can put this question in terms of the world peace sought by political philosophers such as Grotius, Pufendorf and Kant in the modern age, or the peace sought by Dante in the Middle Ages. Or we can put the question in terms of the need to address climate change, giving us an ecological peace on earth. A solidarity between each and all is a requirement of a moral order expressing rational freedom, emphasising the quality of relationships with respect to individuals and social and political institutions. It is plain that there has been a failure to embed this principle of solidarity and unity within actual relations. When we consider the requirements that the principle of rational freedom places on individuals and institutions, the absence of solidarity and unity is stark – as is the need to re-establish our commitment to it more effectively. The question is begged why this commitment to the mutually supportive and enhancing co-existence of each and all is so difficult to embed and articulate institutionally. The health of the planet, the well-being of human beings and the survival of civilisation depends upon its final resolution. 

Appeals to the common good – peace, social justice, climate action – supply clear examples of the problem of external reasons presented by Bernard Williams. Simply stated, this problem maintains that no person can be motivated to act merely by being presented with a reason to act that comes from without; such a reason is effective in inducing action only if a person is already motivated from within with respect to the question at issue. And the individual is already motivated on account of possessing an internal reason to act and do what reason requires. In fine, external reason is only effective if it has a prior internal reason to address and work with. (Williams 1981: 101-113). Education as the informing of minds is only effective in the context of the prior formation of character. Without the prior formation of internal reason, all the scientific evidence, pious rhetoric, heartfelt pleas, calls to action in the world will have no effect in moving people to action. Cue familiar laments on the passivity, greed and stupidity of human beings that are not only counter-productive and futile, but express the extent to which erstwhile do-gooders have absolutely no idea as to how good is actually done. To be effective, the appeals to action made in terms of external reason have to address those who are already in possession of the internal reason to act. Those in possession of such reason, as a result of prior character formation, can respond to the demands of external reason and thus be mobilised. The external stimulus thus resonates with the internal motivation, activates it and channels it in the right direction. The within and the without are thus united. 
It’s an all-hands-on-deck moment on the planet, says glaciologist Jason Box, issuing an all-too-familiar call to environmental action. That such calls have repeatedly fallen on deaf ears should have posed the question as to the failure of response on the part of the public. The problem is not one of the mass passivity, greed and stupidity – the default lament of misanthropists. The call to planetary action, social justice or world peace will fall on deaf ears unless the hearer already possesses the inner motivation to protect the environment, support others, and live at peace with others. The idea is simple: the demand for people to give up unhealthy foods and eat healthily will have no effect unless people want to live healthily; the demand to give up drugs will have no effect unless people want to stop taking drugs. With every failure we here the cry that ‘more education’ is needed. Education is always needed, but to be effective it has to relate to the inner motive and activate it. Without the formation of that inner motive, more education will be as ineffective as all previous education. 

We see, then, the reason why people who, in face of the myriad crises besetting the planet, are constantly surprised, and depressed, to find their rational appeals for action, backed by facts, figures, values, meeting with such little response. (Dobson 2006: 165-184). The appeals are ineffectual not because of the passivity, greed and stupidity of human beings, but because external reason is not working with internal reason – the prior formation of character is lacking. Resort to fear, shame, abuse and guilt as a follow up to rational appeal is also ineffectual, merely a way of berating the despised public for not doing as they were told.

The conclusion is that external reason – education, appeal to the common good, call to climate action etc. – can only provoke a response and mobilize individuals to action only if it addresses an internal reason that already exists, so that reason without joins with reason within in the inner motives. Herein lies the principal reason of the repeated failures of educational attempts to persuade the public and initiate action.

At this point, there is a need to avoid pitting external reason and internal reason against each other. This is not an either/or, forcing us to choose one over the other. The formation of an intrinsic motivation is required but is often activated only by an extrinsic motivation. Here, I reaffirm a key principle of the rationalist tradition that it is possible to persuade, mobilize and lead a public through the force of the better argument, a point I made earlier with respect to Jurgen Habermas and his communication community. There, I noted too Habermas’ argument that learning depends upon the formation of the inner motive. And that is the key point here.

That brings me to Aristotle, who clearly anticipated the problem of external reason, and found its solution in the prior formation of good character. For Aristotle, all ethical inquiries were empty unless they had an audience of well-brought-up persons to address. Without the formation of the right character, as established in a community context, the philosophical analysis of the good and virtuous life would be lacking in content. Moral philosophy on its own could not make people good, its purpose was to address well-brought up people who were already good. 

Over the years I have been frequently asked for systems, solutions and strategies to deal with the environmental crisis. My view is that we suffer from a surfeit rather than a shortage of these things. Our lack is elsewhere. I don’t believe in rescue squads and refuse to countenance environmental vanguards. Such things are well-meaning and well-intended, and have valuable work to do in equipping people and communities with the tools to take control of their environmental futures. But the educative approach from the outside can always only succeed to the extent it forms capacities on the inside. In Small is Beautiful, E.F. Schumacher hit the nail smack on the head:

Gandhi used to talk disparagingly of 'dreaming of systems so perfect that no-one will need to be good'. But is it not precisely this dream which we can now implement in reality with our marvellous powers of science and technology? Why ask for virtues, which man may never acquire, when scientific rationality and technical competence are all that is needed?

Schumacher 1973 ch 2

The virtues are personal qualities that individuals acquire and exercise in community. Schumacher understood well why we require the virtues. Scientific knowledge, technological know-how and economic growth do not suffice for a happy and fulfilled life – that requires that we learn to be and to do good. I mention this, and interest wanes. People go back to their assertions of an external reason that is utterly deficient in terms of a connection to internal reason, followed by expressions of frustration at the inevitable ineffectiveness of the appeal. No strategy, no vanguard, no rescue squad will suffice to compensate for a deficiency in inner motivation. That brings me to Aristotle.

For Aristotle, the cultivation of virtue was intended ‘to engender a certain character in the citizens and to make them good and disposed to perform noble actions.’ A virtue is therefore a trait of character, manifested in habitual action, that it is good for a person to have. The traits of character which should be fostered in human beings are as extensive as human social life: Benevolence; civility; compassion; conscientiousness; cooperativeness; courage; courteousness; dependability; fairness; friendliness; generosity; honesty; industriousness; justice; loyalty; moderation; reasonableness; self-confidence; self-control; self-discipline; self-reliance; tactfulness; thoughtfulness; tolerance.

Why Are the Virtues Important?
The virtues are traits of character that are good for people to have. They are the qualities we need in order to conduct our lives well. This begs the question of why the virtues are desirable. The answer is dependent on the particular virtue in question. Thus:

*	Courage is a good thing because life is full of dangers and without courage we would be unable to cope with them.
*	Generosity is desirable because some people will inevitably be worse off than others and they will need help.
*	Honesty is needed because without it relations between people would go wrong in myriad ways.
*	Loyalty is essential to friendship—friends stick by one another, even when they are tempted to turn away.

Sommers and Sommers 2001: 345

This seems to imply that each virtue is valuable for reasons of their own, according to context. Aristotle, however, says more than this and underlines the general significance of virtue. His view is that the virtuous person fares better in life, since the virtues are those character traits we require in order to conduct our lives well. (Sommers 2001: 345).

To grasp what this entails, we need to understand what kinds of creatures we are and the kinds of lives we lead. Aristotle proceeds from an understanding of human beings as particular kinds of creatures who, for healthy flourishing, need to lead certain kinds of life. As rational and social beings, we need and seek the company of others, and so form communities and live among friends, family, and fellow citizens. We live in communities constituted by ties of kinship, friendship, neighbourliness and citizenship. Living in such a social context requires qualities such as loyalty, fairness, and honesty so that interaction with others proceeds successfully. Whilst this may seem so obvious as to be trite, we should try to imagine a society whose members possessed the opposite qualities, or imagine being the person with those opposite qualities and trying to survive in society. Human beings as social beings need to habitually manifest the qualities for social living. 

In our individual lives, we require specific qualities for doing a particular kind of job or for following a particular interest, such as industriousness, patience, perseverance etc. Sometimes we face danger and therefore require courage, often we are confronted by temptation, and therefore need self-restraint. In fine, whatever their specific character, virtues may be defined in general as the qualities human beings must possess for successful living:

Societies provide systems of values, institutions, and ways of life within which individual lives are fashioned. The traits of character that are needed to occupy these roles will differ, and so the traits needed to live successfully will differ. Thus the virtues will be different. 

Sommers and Sommers 2001: 345

As a general statement, this is fine. The problem with this view, however, is that it makes the virtues no more than the character traits a particular society requires in order to function well as a society. Such a view is concerned more with the reproduction of existing society and completely loses the critical component of human self-realisation. I shall address this point directly shortly. What matters most in the conception of the virtues presented in this thesis is that social forms are changed to allow and enable the realisation of healthy human potentials, as against fitting the human character to prevailing social forms. The distinction that MacIntyre (1981) makes between ‘human beings as they are’ and ‘human beings as they could be’ is critical, making it clear that the virtues are more than the type of character a particular society requires for its successful reproduction. The virtues are about the qualities human beings need to flourish well, and that implies a critical perspective on the form and/or forms of social life appropriate to that end.

Aristotle argued that human beings, as creatures of a certain kind, as rational and social animals, will require certain virtues at all times. And that commonality brings a critical perspective enabling us to evaluate any given society by the extent to which it lives up to, or fails to live up to, the potentialities for human flourishing and self-realisation. Despite the differences manifested by human beings in different times, places and cultures, Aristotle held that human beings have a great deal in common and that therefore there are some virtues that will be needed by all people in all times. ‘One may observe in one's travels to distant countries the feelings of recognition and affiliation that link every human being to every other human being.’ 

Whilst Aristotle recognises difference, and goes into detail concerning the different interpretations of the virtues in different societies, his view does not entail a cultural relativism, in which a particular character trait is a matter of social convention, and instead evinces a concern with the virtues being true to particular sorts of lives in particular sorts of circumstances. Grounded in human nature, the principal virtues are mandated not by social convention but by basic facts about our common human condition. 

The particular ways in which these feelings are expressed may be different, but recognition and affiliation are universals. Human beings separated across time and space face the same basic problems and have the same basic needs:

*	Everyone needs courage, because no one (not even the scholar) is so safe that danger may not sometimes arise.
*	In every society there will be property to be managed, and decisions to be made about who gets what, and in every society there will be some people who are worse off than others; so generosity is always to be prized.
*	Honesty in speech is always a virtue because no society can exist without communication among its members.
*	Everyone needs friends, and to have friends one must be a friend; so everyone needs loyalty.

Sommers and Sommers 2001: 345-46

A list like this could go on for as long as life itself, and in the hands of the indefatigable Aristotle, it does. At this point, I need to draw some clear conclusions and move on. Whilst the virtues are expressed differently in different societies, and whilst some societies, in which people live certain kinds of lives, certain virtues are required more than others, virtue is not a function of social convention. ‘The major virtues are mandated not by social convention but by basic facts about our common human condition.’ (Sommers and Sommers 2001: 346). 

Character and the social process
I have been arguing for a shift of emphasis in moral philosophy from abstract codes and rules to character, going on to examine character formation in terms of creating the habitus for the acquisition and exercise of the virtues. The views of Erich Fromm are worth examining at length here, in order to distinguish my view of character and the virtues, expressed in terms of creative human self-realisation, from a more conservative view which places the emphasis upon socialising human beings according to prevailing norms and values and so fit them to the functioning of the social order.  

In The Fear of Freedom, Erich Fromm argues that ‘the subjective function of character for the normal person is to lead him to act according to what is necessary for him from a practical standpoint and also to give him satisfaction from his activity psychologically.’ (Fromm 1960 ch 8).





Fromm writes of the individual who has built up an inner authority —conscience and duty — which operates more effectively in controlling him than any external authority could ever do. But this would not amount to a genuine humanness or freedom, just the internalisation of the functional requirements of the prevailing social system. ‘In other words, the social character internalizes external necessities and thus harnesses human energy for the task of a given economic and social system.’ This being the case, we can hardly refer to this conscience and duty as an authentic expression of the moral being of the person. That inner authority still derives from something outside the person. There is still a failure to unite the inner and the outer so that any internal conscience and duty not only expresses the authentic moral being of a person, but also finds embodiment in the codes, norms and institutions of the wider society. That is, internalisation and socialisation go hand in hand as one and the same process of growth.

Arguing that social character is shaped by the mode of existence of a given society, Fromm addresses the problem of dynamic adaptation. When I argue for the importance of character and character formation in the context of the virtues, I am arguing for a social habitus that nurtures, empowers and enables the natural human growth to fulfilment. This is a very different notion to the idea of adapting human beings to the functional requirements of a given society. In the former view, character concerns the full development of healthy human potentialities; in the later, character concerns those functions a society must have its members perform for its reproduction. 

I have elsewhere made the case for essentialism as a dynamic philosophy based upon a conception of innate human nature and the actualisation of potentials as growth and flourishing. Essentialism has been routinely criticised as a determinism which presumes fixed essences and definitions with totalitarian implications. I have argued in response that the alternate view, which sees human beings as a blank sheet, possesses even greater totalitarian implications. (Critchley 2013 ITE). I don’t care to argue the same points again. Instead, it is worth demystifying and de-demonizing essences by noting the extent to which humanist psychologists such as Rogers, Maslow and, in this instance, Fromm, employ the notion of a human nature as something that involves stages of natural and normal growth. Fromm makes it clear that, far from inviting tyranny, the idea of human beings as essentially something and something essentially offers a defence against those who would mould human beings this way or that in order to fit a political ideology, a social order or an economic system:





I argue for an essentialism which focuses on the natural tendency to grow, so that the truly human society is whatever society, codes and institutions that nurture and enable the fulfilment of healthy human potentials and their flourishing as human powers. In other words, the virtuous character I argue for is that character which expresses human authenticity, an inner expression given social and institutional expression. This stands in opposition to the character required by a public realm defined in abstraction from human needs and nature, a public realm which conceives virtue in terms of the requirements for the stability and preservation of its own public order. Such a public regime is, of course, familiar in history, and explains the tendency to view talk of virtue in ethics and politics with suspicion. 

Erich Fromm refers to the social character that results from the dynamic adaptation of human nature to the structure of society:





This character is all about internalising the functional requirements of society, fitting the prevailing society and working for the reproduction of that society. The character I am arguing for is a different kind. The virtues are qualities which are required for the realisation of healthy human potentialities within the context of successful social living. And that perspective offers a critical standard of normative evaluation by which to judge existing societies.

Some Advantages of Virtue Ethics
An emphasis on the virtues offers a superior way to thinking about morality. Deontology emphasises rules and duty, utilitarianism emphasises consequences of actions. Neither offer a satisfying view of character. Acting out of duty or from a calculation of probable consequences is not what people understand as making a moral person. Virtue ethics is appealing because it provides a natural account of moral motivation. An ethics which focuses upon rules and duty or calculations and consequences are deficient in this respect. An example will make this clear:

You have suffered a nervous breakdown and are in a hostel or retreat recovering. You are worried about how friends and colleagues may react, and are wondering what you would say to them when next you meet. So you are overjoyed when Bert and Harry arrive to pay a visit. You thank them for coming, but both say they had to come. Bert says he was doing his duty (the deontological view); Harry says he came to repay favours you had done him in the past, in expectation of further favours in the future (a utilitarian justification of reciprocal altruism). The comments would strike you as funny, as if intended as jokes. But they are expressions of dominant ethical theories, and, when given as reasons in real life situations, you would find them impersonal, cold and calculating. And you would be right. There is no genuine moral concern being shown, just moral interest. There is no warmth, no empathy.

Deontology and utilitarianism are lacking when it comes to moral character and motivation, and an example like this shows this to be true. In terms of ethical theory, Bert and Harry did nothing wrong. They fulfilled their duty and they rightly calculated that a good act done would be more than likely returned at a future date. Except that the approach shown is utterly lacking at the level of moral motivation and, as social beings involved in relationships to others, we would clearly perceive and feel this, and be upset:

We value friendship, love, and respect; and we want our relationships with people to be based on mutual regard. Acting from an abstract sense of duty, or from a desire to ‘do the right thing,’ is not the same. We would not want to live in a community of people who acted only from such motives, nor would we want to be such a person. Therefore, the argument goes, theories of ethics that emphasize only right action will never provide a completely satisfactory account of the moral life. For that, we need a theory that emphasizes personal qualities such as friendship, love, and loyalty— in other words, a theory of the virtues.

Sommers and Sommers 2001: 347

A community of individuals who acted entirely out of sense of duty and concern for the rules or out of a calculation of rewards and costs and consequences could hardly be called a community at all, it would lack the warm, affective ties that bind individuals together. The loyalties, such as they are, are impersonal and instrumental. We require the bond of community to be supplied internally, via character and relations to others, not externally via a moral code, law or self-interest. The telling point is not just that we wouldn’t want to live in a society of individuals who act only out of duty, respect for rules, or calculations of consequences, but that we would not want to be such a person. Human beings are moral beings and we need that moral concern to be expressed in our character.

Feminism, virtue ethics and revaluing the private sphere
Virtue ethics has been criticised in the context of a public-private dualism. In this context, virtue has been seen as a quality of the public realm, a male sphere concerned with universal questions. Women have been confined to the private realm, with what have been identified as female issues devalued as lacking in public significance:

To see the bias, we need first to notice that social life has traditionally been divided into public and private realms, with men in charge of public affairs and women assigned responsibility for life's more personal and private dimensions.

Sommers and Sommers 2001: 347-348

This dualism can be challenged by a virtue conception. There is no reason why virtue should itself be confined to a public sphere elevated above, in superior relation to, the private sphere. Virtue ethics offers a way of overcoming the dualism between public and private spheres. Virtues refer to qualities valued in all aspects of life and certainly apply to those concerns raised by feminist thinkers:

In public life our decisions may affect large numbers of people whom we do not even know. So we may try to calculate, in an impersonal way, which decisions will have the best overall outcome for the most people.
In the world of home and hearth, however, things are different. It is a smaller-scale environment. In it, we are dealing mainly with family and friends, with whom our relationships are more personal and intimate. Bargaining and calculating play a much smaller role. Relations of love and caring are paramount.
Now with this in mind, think again about the theories of ‘right action’ that have dominated modern moral philosophy—theories produced by male philosophers whose sensibilities were shaped by their own distinctive sorts of experience. The influence of that experience is plain. Their theories emphasize impersonal duty, contracts, the harmonization of competing interests, and the calculation of costs and benefits. The concerns that accompany private life—the realm in which women traditionally dominate—are almost wholly absent. The theory of virtue may be seen as a corrective to this imbalance.

Sommers and Sommers 2001: 349

In fine, virtue ethics finds room for the qualities required in private life as well as the different qualities required by public life, valuing both equally in their own way. 

The Incompleteness of Virtue Ethics
[integrating moral philosophy]
My argument is that contemporary moral philosophy fails to provide an adequate conception of moral character; even worse, in the view that human beings are motivated only by a sense of duty or a calculation of consequences, modern moral theory comes to distort the moral character of human beings. In their interactions with each other, human beings act out of more than a respect for rules and do more than calculate advantages. Virtue theory, in fine, is more true to the nature of moral character of human beings than any other moral theory:

As we have seen, theories that emphasize right action seem incomplete because they neglect the question of character. Virtue theory remedies this problem by making the question of character its central concern. But as a result, virtue theory runs the risk of being incomplete in the opposite way. Moral problems are frequently problems about what we should do. It is not obvious how, according to virtue theory, we should we go about deciding what to do.

Sommers and Sommers 2001: 350

16 ECOLOGICAL VIRTUE
For effective action on climate change, planners and policy-makers need to pay attention to moral and psychological factors. The call for a change in behaviour has been made numerous times, but such a change amounts to more than informing and educating the public and then engaging in moral persuasion. Human beings possess characters that have been formed in society and these characters are expressed in patterns of behaviour. It makes no sense to ask individuals to be unselfish when the social identity connecting egoism and altruism does not exist and the dominant form of identity puts maximising individual self-interest first. To be effective, plans, programmes and policies need to take beliefs and values in the motivational economy into account. Since the support and involvement of the public is essential to the enduring success of any environmental initiative, it makes sense to relate knowledge and objectives to psychological, moral and social factors such as perceptions, attitudes, culture, values, beliefs, the socially structured patterns of behaviour and identities which shape the character of the individual actors and the way that this character shapes the actions that take place in society. Change has to address all dimensions of social being.

Ecological Virtue and Dependence
eudaimonia stands in need of good things from outside
Happiness or flourishing requires more than the right internal condition but stands in need of good things from outside: ‘for it is impossible or difficult to do fine things without resources' (Aristotle EN 1099331-3). Aristotle defends a conception of action appropriate human beings as needy animals vulnerable to influences from the world. Without external goods, it is not possible to be eudaimon (Aristotle MM 1206b30-5). 

Integrating moral philosophy
An adequate moral theory requires a combined approach which incorporates both virtue and duty ethics. There is no reason why we cannot have a total view that accommodates both an adequate conception of right action and a related conception of virtuous character in a way that does justice to both. Such a view would begin by taking human welfare as the surpassingly important value and arguing that, morally, we should want a society in which all people can lead flourishing and satisfying lives. From there, we would move to a consideration of the kinds of actions and social policies that would contribute to this goal and the question of what qualities of character are needed to create and sustain individual lives. 

This total view can, further, be expanded to include the claims of nature alongside human nature, to include the welfare of all sentient creatures, the health of natural ecosystems and the biosphere, going on to consider the actions that would contribute to planetary flourishing and the qualities of character that are needed to create and sustain a conception of ecological virtue.

The virtues are the qualities we need for successful living. Appreciating that we live in a natural as well as human community, those qualities can be expanded to include ecological virtues. Successful living involves more than interaction in a social setting but relates to environing natural relations. Grounded in human nature, the principal virtues are mandated not by social convention but by basic facts about our common human condition. Grounded in nature, the ecological virtues are mandated by our common natural dependence.

This begs the question of the appropriate relationship between humanity and its habitat, the position and role of human beings in the natural world, the relation between the human and the natural community.

Virtue as an exercise in participation in the whole order of being
The debate in environmental ethics and politics is stalled between those who believe that the public can be led to a survivable future only by moral arguments or political authoritarianism in favour of the long-term common good and those who appeal to short-term economic self-interest:

We now stand at a threshold and face alternative futures: one too awful to contemplate, and one where we can continue to thrive and prosper, but within the ecological limits of the natural world we inhabit. The Weather Makers, as the title suggests, makes it clear that we have just enough time to choose which of these futures we want.




Flannery makes the oft-heard point that ‘we have just enough time to choose’ the future we want, rightly pointing out that this is an issue for ‘everyone’ and that, beyond the domain policy and technology, ‘all’ must play a part. It is in specifying the nature of that participation that things become vague. This requires more than political organisation and activism in the conventional sense and must make available extensive spaces so that ‘all’ can participate as a matter of everyday interaction. To be part of the fight, we need some way of putting the macro and the micro together, having a universal conception but also giving incentives and developing motivations to inspire actions within new patterns of behaviour.

This is more than a technical subject, and requires more than an understanding of the relevant sciences, efficient resource use, and economic valuation. More than ‘knowledge’ in this sense, we need to call back ‘virtue’ in such a way as to enable us to live in accordance with nature within and nature without. We need to think seriously about the relationship between the human qualities contained in the word virtue and living well in an environmental context.

That’s about as likely as the whole world going vegan, a friend told me when I outlined this conception of ecological virtue. In which case, in the very least, I replied, I can offer a reason why the world has failed to address the environmental crisis in time to save civilisation – it had become so further removed from the virtues that they couldn’t get them back. He is a practical man, sees the scale of the crisis that is upon us and wants solutions that are practical now. He’s in search of institutional and technical fixes. They are possible, but they do not address fundamentals, and require the substantive grounding I am seeking to give in order to be effective and enduring. We have lost the virtues, and no amount of material and technological quantity will suffice to compensate for their absence. This was Schumacher’s old lesson. Few listened then, and with time pressing ever fewer are inclined to listen now. But the lesson remains true for all that. The difference is that many are no longer dreaming of systems and strategies so perfect that no one will need to be good, just workarounds and fixes that get something done now will suffice for them, leaving behaviour and social structures unchanged.

The conception of ecological virtue embraces a mixed conception that joins the human to the natural community so that we experience our essential humanity not in terms of separation from each other and from the world around us, but as ‘participation in the whole order of being’ (Proctor 1988: 166). In this way, virtue is about being active members of a human community that is embedded in a larger natural order, pursuing and fulfilling ends that are proper to both realms as one.

The exercise of reason to restrain the passions
Cicero defines virtue as ‘the ability to restrain the passions and to make the appetites amenable to reason’ (Grant 1987: 12.8). This is too narrow and too controlling a statement that is apt to mislead. Virtue is not about setting reason and desire in opposition to each other, but about reason educating desire from the inside, working with rather than against natural inclinations, internalising the right thing to do so that it becomes appetitive. But Cicero is on the right lines in identifying virtue with a restraint. It just requires that we define this restraint correctly, as an inner quality that gains external expression. Virtue is about being able to choose intelligently between extremes of excess and deficiency. The person of practical wisdom exhibits moderation as the mean between extremes. Virtue is chosen through the exercise of reason: ‘It is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral virtue’ (Oswald, trans., 1962: 172). It’s about appropriate action and behaviour.

Participation in the civic life of the community
For Aristotle, the cultivation of virtue was ‘to engender a certain character in the citizens and to make them good and disposed to perform noble actions.’ Aristotle was thinking here of politics and participation in the civic life of the community as a condition of civic order. But the view that no good community can be built by people without virtue can be expanded to embrace a commitment to realising the ecological society. This yields a conception of the Ecopolis. The task of ecological virtue is to engender a certain character so as to make individuals disposed to perform ecologically wise actions. My view is that it works with a natural disposition rather than creates it ex nihilo.

Virtues to live in equilibrium with the world
The virtues allow and enable us to live in harmony with the world around us. Traditionally, living in accordance with the virtues would have been understood as ways of perfecting the soul, as essential elements in the perfection of human existence. A pivotal doctrine here is the ‘unity of the virtues,’ the idea that it is not in fact possible to possess one virtue alone, but that the virtues come together as different facets of a single jewel. Understood in this way, the virtues furnish the means of being at peace with the world; they are expressions or manifestations of eudaimonia, the highest good for human beings, allowing us to experience what it is to be truly human and fulfil the ultimate purpose of human activity here on earth.

I would conceive the virtues and their acquisition in terms of both predispositions, the moral grammar we are born with, and the creation of appropriate dispositions. In other words, there is a natural growth of innate predispositions which works with a cultural process according to which the virtues are acquired, develop and are inculcated within us whilst our moral grammar is turned into moral faculties, capacities and dispositions.

In the past, the framework of virtue entailed the cultivation of qualities of courage, fortitude, honesty, restraint, charity, chastity, family, personal rectitude, integrity, and reverence. Community is the foundation of virtue. The virtue of a person is inextricably connected with the life that person leads within a community. 

Moral ecology and the sense of eco-community
[living within the boundaries of the earth – commonwealth of life as a commonwealth of virtue]
The problem is that we have lost the overarching moral framework which sheathed the virtuous community. Instead of virtues working from below within human relations, universality is now imposed externally by the accumulative imperatives of the economic subsystem, which finds its counterpart in the legislating and engineering of behaviour via the abstraction of the state as an attempt to police individual actions in this context. 

In the words of Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘the tradition of the virtues is at variance with central features of the modern economic order and more especially its individualism, its acquisitiveness and its elevation of the values of the market to a central social place’ (Maclntyre, 1981: 2.37). As Lewis Mumford wryly observed, the seven deadly sins of pride, envy, anger, sloth, avarice, gluttony, and lust have been converted into virtues of economic progress; the virtues of faith, charity, hope, prudence, religion, fortitude, and temperance now stand condemned as sins against the gross national product.

The loss of the virtues, and the concomitant creation of a society that allows and even promotes egoism and greed and short-term gratification as the essential character traits of the consumer society, explains the psychological inertia of individuals in face of climate change. We may condemn vested interests and institutional inertia, but we should also draw attention to the extent to which too many people lack the will to act in light of reason and evidence. They lack the character, the inner qualities, that we need to act well and live right on the planet. Taking responsibility presupposes a capacity to respond on the part of individuals, in both a personal and social sense, and in this we are deficient. It is pointless piling up more knowledge and innovating more technological know-how and thinking that just more education and communication will do the trick this time. It won’t, the springs of action are lacking.

Clive Hamilton has abandoned hope that we will make the changes required for survival and proceeds to examine the psychic and institutional inertia that has delayed action to deal with global warming until it has become too late:

Sometimes facing up to the truth is just too hard. When the facts are distressing it is easier to reframe or ignore them. Around the world only a few have truly faced up to the facts about global warming. Apart from the climate 'sceptics', most people do not disbelieve what the climate scientists have been saying about the calamities expected to befall us. But accepting intellectually is not the same as accepting emotionally the possibility that the world as we know it is heading for a horrible end. It's the same with our own deaths; we all 'accept' that we will die, but it is only when death is imminent that we confront the true meaning of our mortality.
There have been any number of books and reports over the years explaining just how ominous the future looks and how little time we have left to act. This book is about why we have ignored those warnings. It is a book about the frailties of the human species, the perversity of our institutions and the psychological dispositions that have set us on a self-destructive path. It is about our strange obsessions, our penchant for avoiding the facts, and, especially, our hubris. It is the story of a battle within us between the forces that should have caused us to protect the Earth — our capacity to reason and our connection to Nature — and those that in the end have won out — our greed, materialism and alienation from Nature. And it is about the twenty-first century consequences of these failures.




Leaving aside the question of whether Hamilton is right to claim that it is too late to take effective action against global warming – some continue to think, as they have always thought, that there is a (tiny) window of opportunity, and it all depends on what our goals are in any case – and whether he is right to let go of his anger against the miscreants most responsible for bringing us to the abyss – I think anger is most appropriate, in the good Aristotelian sense, and accountability too, one of many reasons to look at climate litigation - the key point concerns how we are going to act with anything like the urgency required, what it takes for human beings to have the will and the character to respond to environmental threats and scientific warnings and be able to take effective action. The failure to address the dangers of climate change has been an institutional failure, certainly, a market failure, a failure of the way we arrange our social affairs and do business on the planet. But it has also been a moral and psychological failure, a failure of character. We have lacked the qualities we need to survive and thrive. My argument is that without the qualities of virtue, we will not do the difficult things that we need to do to survive and live well within planetary boundaries.

To overcome this failure – in whatever sense that could mean in an age of mitigation and adaptation – we need to recover the sense of community as a place that undergirds the practice of virtue as a condition of earthcare, appreciating the affect our actions have on the larger world and modifying our behaviour in accordance with right living. Here, we move beyond game theoretic calculations and beyond rational restraint as an enlightened self-interest codified by an authoritarian state. Self-maximizers who discount the future interests of members of their own species, their own children and grandchildren even, are hardly likely to be moved by notions of kinship to bugs and biota, however much human life depends on the health of both.

We need more than rational calculations and rules, and more than scientific knowledge to succeed in this endeavour. We need the activation of our innate moral knowledge through the cultivation of the virtues, and the creation of forms of the common life to enable its exercise in community. We can call this a moral and a social ecology, a recognition of our condition of mutual dependence. Individuals who understand their welfare in terms of self-interest will not involve themselves in any large-scale social change that costs them something in the short-run in order to gain them something in the long-run. 

To be part of the transition toward the ecological society of the future, we need to develop a sense of the oneness of our being within a web of relationships in order to be moved deeply enough to act for the long term common good. We need a virtuous eco-public which exhibits the qualities of earthcare and is composed of members who are concerned to act to ensure the protection and enhancement of life on earth.

17 THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 

What are people actually able to do and to be?
[ecological citizenship and virtue – flourishing as creative self-realisation]

I now want to relate the acquisition of the virtues to the development of capabilities, before combining both within a conception of ecological citizenship. 

[human scale - human needs are interrelated and interactive and development needs to be based on the construction of 'organic articulations of people with nature and technology']

Manfred Max-Neef (1992) has shown the extent to which neo-liberal capitalist development fails to satisfy real human needs. These can be defined in terms of empowerment, participation, an active role in decision-making, economic democracy, cultural diversity, social autonomy, learning and community activity. This list indicates the extent to which human needs are interrelated and interactive. These needs require appropriate human scale making for quality of interaction and reciprocity. In defining this conception of human development, Max-Neef establishes two categories of human needs:

1	Being, having, doing and interacting;
2	Subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, creation, leisure identity and freedom.

Max-Neef argues that capitalist development fails to meet these requirements for a more fulfilling life. We therefore need to shift from a conception of development as measured by the narrow terms of the functional imperatives and requirements of the economic system to a conception of development as based on the construction of 'organic articulations of people with nature and technology.’ (Max-Neef 1992). 

These organic articulations embracing people, technics/culture and nature point to an integral, interactive and mixed conception of human and natural communities engaged in a process of mutual growth. 

Tackling the twin problems of social and environmental degradation so as to improve the quality of life requires both wise policy choices at the public level and the ongoing involvement of an active and knowledgeable citizenship at the social level. Martha Nussbaum has been at the forefront of a new approach, with both philosophical and policy-making implications with respect to the social and environmental problems we face. This is the ‘Human Development’ Approach, also known as the Capability or Capabilities Approach. By whatever name it may be known, the developmental commitment to human self-actualisation via building capability or equipping human beings with capabilities is clear. 

The Capabilities Approach begins with the questions: ‘What are people actually able to do and to be? What real opportunities are available to them?’ These questions possess a deceptive simplicity, ‘since the quality of a human life involves multiple elements whose relationship to one another needs close study.’ (Nussbaum 2011 Pref). Nussbaum offers complexity as one of the appealing features of the human development approach; the emphasis upon ‘creating capabilities’ is ‘well-equipped to respond to the complexities of human life and human striving.’ (Nussbaum 2011 Pref).

Nussbaum argues that the Capabilities Approach is the counter-theory we need to address urgent human problems and unjustifiable human inequalities. The purpose of the capabilities approach is to enable human beings to live creative and full lives, actualising potentialities and fashioning a meaningful existence that is commensurate with their equal human dignity. The capabilities approach is about putting means and ends in their right relation. Human beings are to be treated as ends in themselves and never merely as means. This approach affirms the equal dignity of all human beings, irrespective of divisions of class, race, religion, or gender, and is committed to achieving, for all, lives that are worthy of that equal dignity. ‘It is people who matter ultimately; profits are only instrumental means to human lives.’ Nussbaum’s argument is plainly Aristotelian, emphasising human happiness and flourishing in terms of creative self-realisation:






The capabilities or human development approach works with people's demands for a quality of life that respects their equal human dignity. Affirming the equal dignity of all human beings, regardless of class, religion, caste, race, or gender, the approach seeks to equip individuals with the capability that enables them to build the common life that embodies equal human dignity and to develop the capabilities that enable them to live lives that are worthy of that equal dignity. This approach seeks to achieve quality of life through a commitment to social justice. The capabilities approach ‘is sensitive to distribution, focusing particularly on the struggles of traditionally excluded or marginalized groups.’ And ‘it is sensitive to the complexity and the qualitative diversity of the goals that people pursue.’ Whilst articulating a universal claim and commitment to equal human dignity, the capabilities approach works with the particularism of life as lived. ‘Rather than trying to squeeze all these diverse goals into a single box, it carefully examines the relationships among them, thinking about how they support and complement one another.’ (Nussbaum 2011: 185-186).

[against behaviourism - people tend naturally and of themselves to grow into fully functioning people]
Putting the accent on capacities or capabilities conceives power in terms of flourishing and focuses on what human beings are actually able to do and able to be. From here, we may then go on to examine the conditions or forms of life in which those abilities may be actualised and exercised. The emphasis is therefore on providing the appropriate environment in which to shape, channel and reinforce human behaviour conducive to the good life.

There are parallels here with the humanistic psychology of Carl Rogers, which is distinguished by its optimistic view of human nature. Humanistic psychology holds that human beings have a natural tendency to realise their potentials and grow into fully functioning beings, though there are external social and internal psychological barriers which can frustrate the process of natural growth. The accent in this approach is therefore placed on creating the kind of society which nurtures and enables the realisation of human needs and powers, which is a very different notion to socialising human beings in order to meet the functional requirements of society. (Rogers 1961 1979 1995). In fine, authenticity is an experience of the real self, not just speaking of freedom, but of being able to act free and, what is more, of exercising that ability. In the words of Rollo May, 'Freedom is a quality of action of the centred self’ (May 1980: 176; May 1983; May 1989; Meade 1993).

The important point to grasp is that real self is not a concept but an experience. Self-actualization can be argued at a philosophical level, but only achieved in the practical, experiential world: As authentic beings, we recognise our individuality. Further, we recognise that this individuality is not a static quality but is, rather, a set of (possibly infinite) potentialities. As such, while in the authentic mode, we maintain an independence of thought and action, and subsequently feel 'in charge' of the way our life is experienced. Rather than reacting as victims to the vicissitudes of being, we, as authentic beings, acknowledge our role in determining our actions, thought and beliefs, and thereby experience a stronger and fuller sense of integration, acceptance, 'openness' and 'aliveness' to the potentialities of being-in-the-world. (Spinelli 1989: 109; Spinelli 1994; Spinelli 1997).

From alienation or anomie to creativity and spontaneity 

In Radical Man, Charles Hampden-Turner argues for a process of development leading from a condition of alienation or anomie, in which human beings see each other as competitors and use each other as means, to a condition of creativity and spontaneity, in which human beings treat each other as ends in themselves. (Hampden-Turner 1971). Hampden-Turner sees this process as a spiral of experience, in which we are either moving upwards toward full humanness or descending downwards towards alienation and anomie, depending on our assumptions, relationships, organizations. 

It follows from these observations that our beliefs, actions, relations, institutions, our modes of expression need to embody and articulate the authentic human interaction that enables us to ascend upwards. 

Power and Flourishing
Flourishing as wholeness – being in place
Human health is like ecology in being involved in a web of life-factors, the interaction of which generates well-being. Our 'wholeness' involves our biological and spiritual attachment to other living things, to the environment, to our 'place'. Wholeness rests on a recognition of our place on the planet and our relation to other things in the web of life.

Human and planetary flourishing proceed hand in hand. A healthy ecosystem is a condition of human health. Healthy interaction between the parts serves to produce the good health and well-being of each of the parts as well as the whole. Disruption may produce disease. There is an ecology of human health, something which places human beings within a spider’s web of life-factors. ‘Each of us, in health and disease, is more than the sum of our organs and systems. Each of us functions as a whole and medical practice ignores this at its peril. But our 'wholeness' includes our biological and spiritual attachment to the environment, to our locale or ‘place,’ to other living things, and to a recognition of our place on the planet.’ (Shearman 1997: 267).

In The Biology of Belief, Bruce Lipton writes of epigenetics as the new science of self-empowerment, pointing to the importance of power as flourishing. Genes-as-destiny theorists have obviously ignored hundred-year old science about enucleated cells, but they cannot ignore new research that undermines their belief in genetic determinism. While the Human Genome Project was making headlines, a group of scientists were inaugurating a new, revolutionary field in biology called epigenetics. The science of epigenetics, which literally means ‘control above genetics,’ profoundly changes our understanding of how life is controlled. (Pray 2004; Silverman 2004) In the last decade, epigenetic research has established that DNA blueprints passed down through genes are not set in concrete at birth. Genes are not destiny! Environmental influences, including nutrition, stress, and emotions, can modify those genes without changing their basic blueprint. And those modifications, epigeneticists have discovered, can be passed on to future generations as surely as DNA blueprints are passed on via the double helix. (Lipton 2008: 36-37; Reik and Walter 2001; Surani 2001).

To fully thrive, we must not only eliminate the stressors but also actively seek joyful, loving, fulfilling lives that stimulate growth processes. (Lipton 2008: 116).

18 ECOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP AS A MORAL EDUCATION 

Ecological citizenship
The ever looming ecological crisis has generated a growing concern with duties and responsibilities in our social behaviour, actions and choices. As a result, a concept of ecological citizenship is emerging, which has the potential to transform understandings of ‘the political’. A concern with environmental justice is generating a concern with political rights that would allow citizens to exercise more social and environmental responsibility. An ecological self-socialisation from below is in the process of emerging, re-defining the character and scope of citizenship, so the rights and powers that would enable individuals to exercise more responsibility. Ironically, as we are beginning to envisage such an ecological citizenship, the rights of citizens are being curtailed at the political level. There is, in the words of Elizabeth Ostrom, (2000), a 'crowding out of citizenship' at the level of the conventional political sphere at the same time that there is a growing pressure below to develop a citizenship as a social movement. The problem is that ‘political involvement is being circumscribed in part by ideologies of self-interest which help to undermine the social conditions of engagement.’ (Davidson in White 2004: 174-175).

The greening of political theory
I have been developing a moral ecology throughout this book; it is also a political ecology. In the ancient world, ethics and politics were intertwined, and the two combine in my focus on the field of practical reason. I develop this in terms of establishing the political and institutional features of the ecological society, the Ecopolis. In this sense, ecological principles are critically incorporated into the field of practical reason to offer an analysis of a prevailing political reality, present an ideal of the good life, and inform the actions, strategies and transitions that may take us from one to the other. 

In fine, ecological concerns and principles enable us to rework the core themes of political theory in light of the problems we face in the contemporary world. In this sense, climate change is begging – and receiving – nothing less than the ecological transformation of the political and political theory. The whole notion of ‘the political’ is being extended to include ‘the claims of nature’ (see Minteer and Taylor 2002).

Whilst nature has been typically ignored by political theory, this is changing as it is increasingly becoming a site of political activity, affecting as well as affected by political decisions. The field of economics has been quicker than political theory to take account of the importance of the environment, acknowledging that it can no longer be sustained as a free good and that as a result there must be pricing or some other mechanism for economic valuation and decision making.

David Held notes that political theory has traditionally been located in the nation-state, with the result that 'concepts of the political good have been elaborated at the level of state institutions and practices' (Held 1983: 8). In light of 'the growth of complex interconnections and interrelations between states and societies' – which Held calls 'globalization' – the state-centred focus of ‘the political’ is becoming increasingly inadequate (Held 1983: 9). Held argues that political theorists must come to 'theorize the changing form of the modern polity in its global setting' (Held 1983: 9). I would go further to argue that political theorists must theorize an expanded notion of ‘the political’ by coming to set politics in an ecological context. Three decades ago, David Held himself noted that ecology has the potential to widen and deepen 'the scope of politics as a practical activity' (Held 1983: 7). I will therefore examine the potential of the ecological transformation of politics and political theory and how this relates to ecological citizenship and virtue.

The ecological transformation of ‘the political’ brings the non-human natural world into the field of our practical concerns, no longer as some invisible taken-for-granted assumption, but in the centre ground. At the same time, human beings assume a more humble position within the whole, once the claims of the non-human natural world are brought into political consideration and deemed to be of legitimate concern in the public realm. The constituent elements of the natural world also come to be seen as potential members of the political community in that they are treated as, for instance, potential recipients of distributive justice, begging questions of their rights, our duties, relationships between us and them. (Goodin 1992; Grundmann 1991; Held 1983.)

Habits as an ecological moral education

Habits to check materialism and individualism
Alexis de Tocqueville thought that religion was the only hope for checking the radical individualism and materialism unleashed by democracy. In his view, religion fostered habits which challenged the narrowing moral effects of democracy. Religion places human will and desire above earthly goods and elevates the human soul to a sphere beyond the senses. Placing the individual within a matrix of duties and obligations in relation to and in common with others, religion draws the individual into a world greater than the ego, away from a preoccupation with self-interest. (Tocqueville 2000: 419).

I make these points not so much to offer religion as a solution to our environmental ills, but to indicate what an ecological moral education involves in terms of a moral-psychological depth. Whilst hopes that the myriad social and ecological crises we face could be solved by a moral reformation based on religion would seem vain, Minteer and Taylor draw attention to the remarkable similarity between Tocqueville's analysis and recent trends in environmentalist writing:

Like conventional critics of democracy, much environmentalism has feared the humanism and materialism and individualism of democratic society. And, like Tocqueville and other critics, environmentalists not uncommonly promote a view of nature that will teach moral truths beyond this humanism, materialism, and individualism.

Minteer and Taylor 2002

The difference is that the green spirituality of modern environmentalists is based upon a scientifically informed philosophy of nature rather than traditional religious or philosophical teleologies. Indeed, an ‘ecological education’ along these lines ‘has come to replace the traditions of religion and classical philosophy as the locus of moral limits on individual will and desire.’ (Taylor and Minteer 2002). That sounds reasonable, but is open to the objections to naturalism I advanced above. There is a good reason why religion possesses a transcendental dimension beyond physical laws and biological imperatives. That said, I am concerned here to develop a moral ecology, something which places the accent on values, character and behaviour and which assigns a creative, responsible role to human agency. This involves more than science, more than biological and ecological facts and principles.

[philosophy leaves the world unchanged]

The extent to which a scientifically informed philosophy of nature can reach to the emotional depths and satisfy psychic realities is open to serious doubt. ‘There is a difference between a contradiction and a cry’ writes Jonathan Sacks. He explains what he means: ‘Moses, weeping for his people, is not consoled by Leibniz's admittedly brilliant proof that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.’ And a cry may be stifled, but not satisfied, by an awareness that whatever befalls us, good and ill, is a necessary part of the normal, healthy functioning of nature’s web. That description of ecological harmony may or may not be scientifically accurate, but it isn’t humanly accurate. ‘You cannot solve a cry by thinking.’ (Sacks 2011: 141). Philosophy, said Wittgenstein, leaves the world unchanged. But faith does not leave the world unchanged. 

Jonathan Sacks makes the strong case for religion as being essential to the moral well-being of society. Leaving aside the non-issue of the existence or non-existence of God, it is worthwhile following his reasoning, because it points to the need for human beings to be drawn out of themselves and to come to see themselves as part of a greater whole. Sacks emphasises the fact that religious values are grounded in an absolute reference point for existence beyond the self. Sacks calls this God. Others may refer to Nature. I argue for a moral ecology that recognises values as something human beings define and develop and give themselves, moral codes which are at a remove from purely natural processes. Sacks simply calls such a thing God, which, as a three letter word, is good short hand for ‘nature plus culture, biology and ecology with a moral dimension’. Either way, this God for Sacks is an absolute truth which is morally binding, offering a clear standard by which we should seek to live our lives. (Sacks 2005: 36ff).

Sacks argues for God as the source of human values. Without this grounding, he argues, all values become relative, a mere a matter of pragmatics, taste and choice. I want to leave the question of God to one side and instead focus on the moral foundations that that this concept of God purportedly supplies. Arguably, it is the very same objective foundation that ecologists such as Taylor and Callicott have been seeking from ecocentric and biocentric perspectives. Without that foundation, all values are equally right or equally wrong, with no criteria for resolving disputes. We live in a meaningless world. We should consider here what several Popes have meant when warning that the abolition of God would soon be followed by ‘the abolition of man,’ to use the title of C.S. Lewis’ book of 1943. Jean-Paul Sartre denied the existence of a human essence according to which we are compelled to be true. The capabilities approach I outlined earlier removes the notion of compulsion when it comes to individuals developing and exercising their abilities, introducing the dimension of choice and value. But there remains a sense in which we may conceive of human development as being a necessary process. Think of the stages of human growth and development, the facts of human interaction and communication, and consider again the assertion that there is no human essence. For existentialism, moral values are simply a matter of choice and invention. (Sartre 1946, Existentialism is a Humanism). Rightness and wrongness are merely subjective preferences. This view leaves us without a standard of evaluation.

Sacks points out the implications:





After Virtue – rationality, means and ends
In After Virtue, Alasdair Maclntyre details the conditions of a coherent moral structure and traces its dissolution in modern society. Modernity, MacIntyre argues, has removed the two key foundations which had sustained previous moral thought and conduct, the belief in God, associated with a deference to God's law, and an understanding of the natural world as containing purpose, deriving from Aristotelian philosophy. (Maclntyre 1981: 68). As part of a scientific, intellectual, and political revolution, this rationalisation as a secularisation has brought about the dissolution of a meaningful moral framework in modern society. As a result, moral arguments have become statements of personal taste, choice and belief, value judgements, irreducible subjective opinion, with no means of deciding between competing views. In the absence of a deeper, shared moral framework, the disputes between the subjective beliefs of individuals and groups are irresolvable in moral terms. With the fragmentation of morality, Maclntyre argues that rationality has come to occupy the ground where morality once was. Here is a new belief system, the idea that rational reflection promises a deeper understanding of life and offers a moral guide as to how we should live our lives. This is no more than an existential security blanket. Reason offers no such guidance and comes without guarantees. This is certainly the case with respect to the dominant form of rationality in the modern world, the instrumental reason that has displaced moral purpose. For Maclntyre, the idea that reason alone offers a sound basis for ordering our lives is a moral fiction. Whilst reason can help us think about how to achieve the values and goals to which we aspire, it cannot tell us what the right values and goals are in the first place. (Maclntyre 1981: 54). MacIntyre’s point here specifically applies to the scientific reason and instrumental rationality that pervades modern society, a reason that is silent on ends and can only speak on the means of attaining those ends. MacIntyre also highlights the ideological character of bureaucratic rationality, exposing the interests and convictions that lie behind supposedly objective and rational moral arguments. 

MacIntyre’s critical comments point up the moral limitations of reason and rationality. Whilst the extension of rationality in modern society could appear a liberation from hierarchical systems of belief, and therefore contain the promise of moral freedom, the loss of an overarching moral framework leaves us with an extension of means and a diminution of ends. The world loses meaning and leaves us morally bereft. In this respect, the extension of rationality throughout all areas of social and cultural life is symptomatic of the erosion of the moral foundations of society. 

Moral Truth vs Moral relativism
Pitrim Sorokin was a sharp and penetrating critic of the individualistic, sensate culture of the modern world, predicting its gradual disintegration. Competent arbiters will be replaced by ‘the qualified ignoramuses of the daily press ... by writers of bestsellers and of other varieties of cultural chewing gum ... The statesmen will be replaced by politicians ... and ... at the late stages of sensate culture, its "machinery of selection" will be picking mainly pseudo-values and neglecting real values.’ Sorokin proceeds to anticipate the age of post-modernism: ‘The distinction between true and false, right and wrong, beautiful and ugly, positive and negative value will be more and more obliterated ... mental and moral atomism will grow and, with it, mental and moral anarchy.' (Sorokin 1992: 81).

 Pope Benedict XVI warned of the dangers of relativism in which the ego becomes a prison:

Today, a particularly insidious obstacle to the task of educating is the massive presence in our society and culture of that relativism which, recognizing nothing as definitive, leaves as the ultimate criterion only the self with its desires. And under the semblance of freedom it becomes a prison for each one, for it separates people from one another, locking each person into his or her own "ego". 

Pope Benedict XVI, June 2005

One reaction to moral relativism is a reassertion of absolute morality in fundamentalist terms. A more positive response is demonstrated by those who are described as 'Cultural Creatives' (Ray and Anderson 2000). These evince what Sorokin referred to as an 'integralist conception of truth, reality and values.' This integralist conception holds that social relationships should be guided by sublime love, buttressed by truth, goodness and beauty as absolute values, values which should be neither relativized nor degraded. According to this integralist perspective, science, religion, philosophy, ethics and art are united rather than in antagonistic relation since, in light of the understanding of true reality and value, they all serve the purpose of 'the unfolding of the Absolute in the relative empirical world, to the greater nobility of Man and to the greater glory of God.' (Sorokin 1992: 257).

Man is not only an organism but is also the bearer of absolute value. As such, he is sacred and, regardless of sex, age, race and social status, cannot be used as a mere means for anything or anybody. Likewise, the great values of culture — science and technology, religion and philosophy, ethics and art — are a reflection, a realization, of the absolute values in the empirical world. As such, they cannot be degraded to mere instrumentalities for purely sensual enjoyment or utility. They are in themselves ends.

Pitirim Sorokin 1992: 68

Overcoming moral relativism and spiritual uncertainty so as to realise the integral perspective demands a radical transformation. ‘Our remedy demands a complete change of the contemporary mentality, a fundamental transformation of our system of values and the profoundest modification of our conduct towards other people, cultural values and the world at large. All this cannot be achieved without the incessant, strenuous, active efforts of every individual in that direction.' (Sorokin 1992: 260). 

Facing environmental (and moral, social and economic) crisis, there has been a search for technological solutions, demands for governmental action and calls for economic new deals. All these things will play a part in any resolution of our problems. Sorokin, however, argues that practical and expert manipulation of economic, political, biological or other factors has never been sufficient to prevent the dissolution of past societies; rather, these societies have been preserved 'mainly through the transmutation of values, the spiritualization of mentality, and the socialization of conduct and ennoblement of social relations effected through the medium of religion.'

The belief or otherwise in God or not is not the question at issue here, and is not something that can be engineered or manipulated or theorised in any case. What is at issue is the possibility of moral grounds, the possibility of locating individuals within an overarching moral framework, of defining values in a greater sense than subjective preference. Individuals cannot, by mere personal choice, engender a viable or definable moral framework by which to live their lives. Personal preferences are subjective, arbitrary, responding to transitory wants and likes, and have no need of any larger moral framework. At the same time, such a framework cannot be defined and codified and implemented from above by the state and be expected to move and motivate those to whom it is applied. Morality cannot be legislated in this way. The attempt to do so has caused all manner of problems with respect to people’s lives. Such a moral system is too abstract.

God or Nature? Religion or science? I shall leave that phony war for the blinkered instead keep the focus on this notion of the necessity of an objective moral foundation. The idea of the existence of an objective reality remains central to the work of natural scientists. And it is interesting to note science and philosophers of science moving from here to affirm the existence of such a thing as moral truth.

Sam Harris is aggressive, provocative, and has a tendency to overstate, annoy and irritate. But that may be what is required to clear away the paralysis induced by ethical and cultural relativism. I should add, before this lengthy quote, that I dislike the tone of Harris’ relentless assaults on religion in general and Islam in particular. I think they are ignorant and bigoted, and play to those forces in society. In religious or non-religious hands, such traits have never done humanity any good. That said, I do agree with his claim that scientific and moral truth is possible, achievable and necessary – a claim that he will say identifies his position as standing against ignorance and bigotry:

Many people believe that something in the last few centuries of intellectual progress prevents us from speaking in terms of ‘moral truth’ and, therefore, from making cross-cultural moral judgments—or moral judgments at all. Having discussed this subject in a variety of public forums, I have heard from literally thousands of highly educated men and women that morality is a myth, that statements about human values are without truth conditions (and are, therefore, nonsensical), and that concepts like well-being and misery are so poorly defined, or so susceptible to personal whim and cultural influence, that it is impossible to know anything about them. 
Many of these people also claim that a scientific foundation for morality would serve no purpose in any case. They think we can combat human evil all the while knowing that our notions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are completely unwarranted. It is always amusing when these same people then hesitate to condemn specific instances of patently abominable behaviour. I don't think one has fully enjoyed the life of the mind until one has seen a celebrated scholar defend the ‘contextual’ legitimacy of the burqa, or of female genital mutilation, a mere thirty seconds after announcing that moral relativism does nothing to diminish a persons commitment to making the world a better place.
And so it is obvious that before we can make any progress toward a science of morality, we will have to clear some philosophical brush. 
It seems to me, however, that most educated, secular people (and this includes most scientists, academics, and journalists) believe that there is no such thing as moral truth—only moral preference, moral opinion, and emotional reactions that we mistake for genuine knowledge of right and wrong. While we can understand how human beings think and behave in the name of ‘morality,’ it is widely imagined that there are no right answers to moral questions for science to discover.

However, many people seem to think that because moral facts relate to our experience (and are, therefore, ontologically ‘subjective’), all talk of morality must be ‘subjective’ in the epistemological sense (i.e., biased, merely personal, etc.). This is simply untrue. I hope it is clear that when I speak about ‘objective’ moral truths, or about the ‘objective’ causes of human well-being, I am not denying the necessarily subjective (i.e., experiential) component of the facts under discussion. I am certainly not claiming that moral truths exist independent of the experience of conscious beings—like the Platonic Form of the Good—or that certain actions are intrinsically wrong. I am simply saying that, given that there are facts—real facts—to be known about how conscious creatures can experience the worst possible misery and the greatest possible well-being, it is objectively true to say that there are right and wrong answers to moral questions, whether or not we can always answer these questions in practice.
And, as I have said, people consistently fail to distinguish between there being answers in practice and answers in principle to specific questions about the nature of reality. When thinking about the application of science to questions of human well-being, it is crucial that we not lose sight of this distinction. After all, there are countless phenomena that are subjectively real, which we can discuss objectively (i.e., honestly and rationally), but which remain impossible to describe with precision.

In speaking of ‘moral truth,’ I am saying that there must be facts regarding human and animal well-being about which we can also be ignorant or mistaken. In both cases, science — and rational thought generally — is the tool we can use to uncover these facts.

One of my critics put the concern this way: ‘Morals are relative to the time and place in which they appear. If you do not already accept well-being as a value, then there seems to be no argument for why one should promote well-being.’ As proof of this assertion, he observed that I would be unable to convince the Taliban that they value the wrong things. By this standard, however, the truths of science are also ‘relative to the time and place in which they appear,’ and there is no way to convince someone who does not value empirical evidence that he should value it. Despite 150 years of working at it, we still can't convince a majority of Americans that evolution is a fact. Does this mean biology isn't a proper science?

We simply must stand somewhere. I am arguing that, in the moral sphere, it is safe to begin with the premise that it is good to avoid behaving in such a way as to produce the worst possible misery for everyone. I am not claiming that most of us personally care about the experience of all conscious beings; I am saying that a universe in which all conscious beings suffer the worst possible misery is worse than a universe in which they experience well-being. This is all we need to speak about ‘moral truth’ in the context of science. Once we admit that the extremes of absolute misery and absolute flourishing—whatever these states amount to for each particular being in the end—are different and dependent on facts about the universe, then we have admitted that there are right and wrong answers to questions of morality.

Moral relativism, however, tends to be self-contradictory. Relativists may say that moral truths exist only relative to a specific cultural framework—but this claim about the status of moral truth purports to be true across all possible frameworks. In practice, relativism almost always amounts to the claim that we should be tolerant of moral difference because no moral truth can supersede any other. And yet this commitment to tolerance is not put forward as simply one relative preference among others deemed equally valid. Rather, tolerance is held to be more in line with the (universal) truth about morality than intolerance is. The contradiction here is unsurprising. Given how deeply disposed we are to make universal moral claims, I think one can reasonably doubt whether any consistent moral relativist has ever existed.
Moral relativism is clearly an attempt to pay intellectual reparations for the crimes of Western colonialism, ethnocentrism, and racism. This is, I think, the only charitable thing to be said about it. I hope it is clear that I am not defending the idiosyncrasies of the West as any more enlightened, in principle, than those of any other culture. Rather, I am arguing that the most basic facts about human flourishing must transcend culture, just as most other facts do. And if there are facts that are truly a matter of cultural construction—if, for instance, learning a specific language or tattooing your face fundamentally alters the possibilities of human experience—well, then these facts also arise from (neurophysiological) processes that transcend culture.

Harris 2010 chapter 1

I have quoted at length because Harris states several key points concisely. The main quibble I have with the passage is whether Harris is able to ground scientific and moral truth as effectively as he thinks. He denies that he is claiming that moral truths exist independently of the experience of conscious beings—like the Platonic Form of the Good—or that certain actions are intrinsically wrong. He simply claims that there are ‘real facts to be known about how conscious creatures can experience the worst possible misery and the greatest possible well-being,’ and that it is ‘objectively true to say that there are right and wrong answers to moral questions, whether or not we can always answer these questions in practice.’ I agree with Roger Trigg when he argues that science needs metaphysics in the sense of transcendent truths, values and norms (Trigg 2015), and I agree with Kinneging that there is a ‘geography of good and evil.’ (Kinneging 2009).

Harris is on the right lines, but pulls short when it comes to establishing the grounds of his claims that there are such things as ‘real facts’ and that scientific truth and moral truth are real and it is possible to know them. Much of what Harris writes in The Moral Landscape recalls Aristotle. Aristotle too thought that biology and the world of scientific fact had moral relevance, his Ethics and Politics are certainly concerned with naturalist notions of flourishing. In his Notes, Harris is uncharacteristically shy. ‘I am not the first person to argue that morality can and should be integrated with our scientific understanding of the natural world. Of late, the philosophers William Casebeer and Owen Flanagan have each built similar cases (Casebeer, 2003; Flanagan, 2007). Both Casebeer and Flanagan have resurrected Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia, which is generally translated as ‘flourishing,’ ‘fulfillment,’ or ‘well-being.’ While I rely heavily on these English equivalents, I have elected not to pay any attention to Aristotle. While much of what Aristotle wrote in his Nichomachean Ethics is of great interest and convergent with the case I wish to make, some of it isn't. And I'd rather not be beholden to the quirks of the great man's philosophy.’ 

That may seem wise but, as Armand Leroi’s The Lagoon makes clear, it is perfectly possible to praise and value Aristotle whilst highlighting his mistaken views, and it is also certainly possible to praise particular aspects without being expected to defend the whole philosophy. I shall not speculate on Harris’ reticence here I’m thinking of Aristotle’s importance to Islam and Christianity here, although many consider this to be a distortion of Aristotle’s philosophy, others still pointing to the importance of the cosmic dimension in Aristotle, which the scientists ignore or downplay. The fact remains that Aristotle is anathema to mechanistic science, and was the great beast to be slain by modern scientists. I think Aristotle is back and, in truth, like purpose, never went away.

Truth and objective reality
The key point to extract from this long quote from Harris is the affirmation of the idea that there is an objective reality, and that this is significant not only in the sense of affirming the possibility of scientific knowledge, but also in developing the notion of ‘moral truth’ as against the relativist notions that have prevailed for a century or more.

The idea of ‘objective’ reality – a humanly objective reality - is therefore essential to developing the moral ecology which is required for a sustainable way of life, offering a source of authoritative values beyond subjective choice and pragmatic compromise, and playing an essential role in character formation, moral education and communal living. Without communities who can develop and relate their own forms of the common life to the wider social and ecological good, society risks becoming divided between an authoritarian objectivist ethics – note the rise of a reactionary religious fundamentalism – and a narcissistic subjectivism – note also how relativism and scepticism with respect to objective truth and reality opens the doors to various reactionary fundamentalisms, nationalisms and collectivisms. With respect to the latter, the idea that morality is no more than a series of value judgements fits the consumer culture perfectly, a society which is all subjective wants, choices and preferences with no overall meaning. And it creates a flabby moral terrain that those who are prepared to join together, make-up and impose any truth they like can ride a coach-and-horses through. Modern liberal society has hidden behind its agnostic view of the good for too long to be healthy and is now faced with having to be more clear, more emphatic and more prescriptive with respect to the good. Which is to say that we need to identify a single, substantive good, the very thing which liberalism denies (and yet embeds its own view of how society should operate under the guise of neutrality). ‘We simply must stand somewhere,’ Harris writes. A human reality simply cannot be turtles all the way down, and we must at a certain point take a stand on whatever ground we can identify as stable, upon which a practical existence can be built. Otherwise, things will continue to slide, not merely forever downwards, but in all directions, a state of chaos and confusion in which we will be able to identify nothing.

In light of the convergence of social, economic and ecological crises, it makes sense to develop a moral ecology, recognising the importance of the healthy functioning of natural processes, identifying the form or forms of the sustainable life, fostering an active engagement with the world and designing social practices and policy/action frameworks for the maintenance of a healthy society. 

I like the term ‘moral ecology’ for a couple of reasons. This search for objective moral foundations must, it seems clear, reserve a central place for ‘nature’, and yet be clear as to just what is entailed by such a notion. Natural processes which are an essential part of human growth and fulfilment would, certainly, be included, but human activity is so integrated with the natural environment that there is a need to be cautious about reading values off from a nature that is already infused with human will, consciousness and purpose, that is, a natural landscape that is value laden. Further, there is a need to recognise that a moral position always involves a degree of independence, a considered view based upon reflection, investigation and evaluation at a remove from ecological principles and biological imperatives. Were it not, we could simply replace morality with ecology and biology, both of which have been found wanting when it comes to deciding what we ought to do. E.O. Wilson, who once entertained ambitions for biology to cannibalize ethics, now recognises the independent status and importance of morality in this respect. 

The idea of moral ecology nevertheless considers that natural facts are morally significant in the sense of informing the process of evaluation. And we can make a much stronger claim than this if we were to see the worlds of fact and value as intertwined, as in the Aristotelian sense of potentials becoming actuals, examining the natural and social conditions for happiness, flourishing and fulfilment. That is most certainly an ethical and an ecological concern. 

The idea of a moral ecology emphasises the extent to which both social and ecological crises possess a common moral dimension. A subjectivist society based on individual wants and desires and choices is draining away the moral and cultural capital built up by previous societies and at the same time dissipating the resources of our physical ecology. The suggestion is that these are part of the one and same process, a consequence of a collapse of objective order and valuation into a world of what economists call ‘subjective preference’. In this instance, individual rationality and freedom most certainly does generate a collective irrationality and unfreedom. 

Ecological virtue and citizenship 
[the right to justice - political rights that would allow citizens to exercise more social and environmental responsibility]
The ecological crisis has raised the demand that we must assume responsibility for our actions, which in turn demands that we develop notions of ecological virtue and eco-citizenship. We require a properly articulated theory of ecological virtues and moral character. Here, I can do no more than adumbrate the main features and directions of such an approach. The idea of ecological virtue raises the old philosophical question of what it is to live ‘the good life’ in relation to nature, particularly how we can live a sustainable life in recognition of ecological constraints. Rather than focus on targets, detailed programmes and blueprints, setting standards that can always be postponed and missed as invitations to failure, the idea of ecological virtue addresses the question of right living with moral psychological depth, focusing on individual will, desire, appetite, and attitudes, and how fundamental moral ideals concerning what it is to lead ‘the good life’ can be forged into the appropriate dispositions so that actions lead in that direction.

Ethical naturalism – the natural virtues
Is moral ecology an ethical naturalism? Probably not, on account of the case made for the necessity of transcendental standards. But let’s test this further.
Xenophon wrote that ‘Earth is a goddess and teaches justice to those who can learn.’ ‘The better she is served,’ he continued, ‘the more good things she gives in return.’ I believe that knowledge of nature is morally significant in that it informs ethics, yields an understanding of natural processes and provides laws for social living as a correct cohabitation with human and non-human others. Science, particularly ecology and biology, determines the context in which resource use questions will be addressed at the level of public policy.

In fine, there is a natural knowledge that teaches us how to live according to nature. In addition to hope and justice as social virtues, then, there are the natural virtues: prudence, which is a knowledge of natural limits; fortitude, which is the appreciation of natural realities; and temperance, the awareness of natural restraints.

My focus is therefore upon the formation of moral character in terms of the cultivation of ecological virtue and the development of ecological citizenship:





The ecological virtues counteract certain human frailties, such as the tendencies to give in to immediate wants, and serve to strengthen the will to act so that there is a direct relationship between knowledge, belief and action. Many people would agree that we should consume less, recycle more, etc, when it comes to addressing the environmental crisis. The will (energy, courage), however, is lacking. The stress on character and virtue is about creating the will to act as we know we ought:





A focus on ecological virtues in building moral character and creating habits in society strengthens the will to act and develops patterns of behaviour which are respectful and non-harmful of nature. In principle, virtues like prudence, respect, care, moderation, self-control, tolerance, balance or activities and awareness of limits to growth and material welfare, seem to be of vital importance here. We need to translate these ethical conditions of successful living into the language of an ecological morality, conceiving a renewed spirituality through the recognition of the unity and interconnection of all things on the planet, socialising and ecologizing values by seeing right conduct and right living in relation to the Earth’s community of life, and forming character and defining appropriate behaviour within forms of living, being and doing. This would be to become active eco-citizens in the commonwealth of virtue.

Character, virtue and eco-citizenship
[from prohibition to creation of individual incentives to encourage actors incorporating human activities - the possibility of a truly positive ideal of humans living, creatively and freely, but harmoniously, within a larger, ecological context.]
I have argued that to break the impasse between instrumentalist economics and purist ecologism, we need an approach that can infuse the conception of a positive, biological conception of a flourishing ecosystem with a series of incentives and motivations based upon character. At present, appeals to the common good and to environmental health presuppose the existence of a social identity that does not exist. The appeal goes over the head of a public constituted as individual voters, consumers, workers. We need a social identity which connects the individual and sectional good with the good of others and, further, with the good of environing nature and of future generations. We need a character which is constituted by the ecological virtues. 

The beauty of this position is that society achieves a position in which it is possible to act in light of ecologically informed constraints, not just through public policy but through appeals which find social relevance in the character traits developed below through the acquisition of the (ecological) virtues. These constraints express the ecological insight that all elements of nature must be seen as ultimately interrelated. And that insight demands the creation of an integral personality. Conceiving character construction as proceeding through the acquisition of the ecological virtues envisages a shift within social relations toward the ecological worldview. Individuals will start to see themselves not just as citizens of the conventional political realm but as citizens of a wider commonwealth of life, as eco-citizens who see their behaviour as proceeding within an ecological context. When we put the macro and micro levels together in this way, society as a whole becomes able to undertake the positive steps required to counter environmental destruction and ease the transition to the ecological society with the active involvement and support of individuals. This amounts to an ecological self-socialisation from below within the framework of an overarching conception of the ecological good institutionalised above. The end in view is the Ecopolis, the vision of human beings living, creatively and freely, but harmoniously, within a larger ecological context as part of a mutual unfolding. A positive definition of ecosystem health incorporates human activities to the extent that they are consistent with and do not threaten the thresholds inherent in ecological systems. An ecological citizenship is constitutive of this eco-public, the attainment of political community which respects natural boundaries.

19 POLITICAL COMMUNITY
[community and modern atomism]

‘I think,’ Tocqueville wrote in 1840, ‘that the species of oppression by which democratic nations are menaced is unlike anything that ever before existed in the world; our contemporaries will find no prototype of it in their memories. I seek in vain for an expression that will accurately convey the whole of the idea I have formed of it; the old words despotism and tyranny are inappropriate: the thing itself is new, and, since I cannot name it, I must attempt to define it.

I seek to trace the novel features under which despotism may appear in the world. The first thing that strikes the observation is an innumerable multitude of men, all equal and alike, incessantly endeavouring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives. Each of them, living apart, is as a stranger to the fate of all the rest; his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind. As for the rest of his fellow citizens, he is close to them, but he does not see them; he touches them, but he does not feel them; he exists only in himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country.
Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident and mild. It would be like the authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in a perpetual state of childhood: it is well content that people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but rejoicing. For their happiness such a government willingly labors, but it chooses to be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness; it provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living?
Thus it every day renders the exercise of the free agency of man less useful and less frequent; it circumscribes the will within a narrower range and gradually robs a man of all the uses of himself. The principle of equality has prepared men for these things; it has predisposed men to endure them as benefits.
After having thus successively taken each member of the community in its powerful grasp and fashioned him at will, the supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. It covers the surface of society with a network of small, complicated rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals of which the government is the shepherd.
I have always thought that servitude of the regular, quiet, and gentle kind which I have just described might be combined more easily than is commonly believed with some of the outward forms of freedom, and that it might even establish itself under the wing of the sovereignty of the people.

Tocqueville here identifies the emergence of the totalitarian community on modern soil. The odd thing is the extent to which Tocqueville’s concern with the forces for abstraction growing in modern society chimes with Marx’s critique of the state and capital as alienated social powers. Conservatives are inclined to think that Tocqueville here is warning of the dangers of the socialism unleashed by Marx, what Weber criticised as ‘housing for the new serfdom.’ The truth is that Tocqueville, like Marx, is identifying the social roots of the new serfdom as lying firmly in bourgeois soil. Marx’s critique of the violence and tyranny of abstraction goes deeper in an attempt to uproot the problem at its source in the capital system, not merely the totalitarian political community. Conservative critics who are most vocal about the abstract central state tend to be silent on the totalising force of capital. At which point it is as well to bear in mind what Robert Nisbet writes on the dangers of reducing totalitarianism to any one cause:

We must recognize that there is no single intellectual image intrinsic to the totalitarian design. There is no single spiritual or cultural value inherently incapable of being made into the central image of a totalitarian society. It can as well be racial equality as inequality, godly piety as atheism, labor as capital, Christian brotherhood as the toiling masses. What is central is not the specific image held up to the masses but, rather, the sterilization and destruction of all other images and the subordination of all human relationships to the central power that contains this image…




OK, but such a general warning reveals nothing as to the specific causal and institutional dynamics at work. Nisbet writes that the ‘total State is evil, but we merely delude ourselves if we do not recognize in it elements of almost overpowering rationality. In terms of basic organization it is at least as rational as the huge industrial corporation, the mass political party, or the mammoth bureaucracies of all modern governments.’ Which invites us to seek the social causes of totalitarianism outside of their most obvious manifestation in the totalitarian political community. Nisbet’s focus is overwhelmingly on the State: ‘There are two central elements of totalitarianism: the first is the existence of the masses; the second is the ideology, in its most extreme form, of the political community. Neither can be fully described apart from its relation to the other, for the two exist always, in modern society, in sensitive interaction with each other.’ Marx’s critique of the capital system, it is worth pointing out here, began with his critical commentary on the ‘abstraction of the political state’ as a ‘modern product.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 89-90). He proceeded to discover the soil for the growth of this abstract state power in the capital system as a totalizing system of rule alienating social power from people and community.

Tocqueville’s analysis did not go deeply enough. It is individualism, and not democratic equality, that has grown cancerous, and which is unravelling the social ties and integuments that Tocqueville saw as necessary to checking the self-destructive potentialities of modernity. The democratic equality that Tocqueville criticized is itself the product of social atomism, something which breeds political centralisation above. Political centralism and social atomism go together as abstractions from the sources of a true communal life. Marx, again, criticised the modern state as an ‘illusory communal life.’ (Marx GI 1999: 87/8). I make these points to check the tendency of these very pertinent conservative criticisms of totalitarianism being diverted from their true object – the abstracting tendencies of the capital system – and directed against the radical critique of this very abstraction undertaken by Marx. There is nothing in the conservative critique with which Marx would have disagreed with, in general terms, and plenty he would have sharpened up to make more precise. What we need from Nisbet is some recognition that this totalitarian abstraction – the split between atomism and centralism - is precisely what characterises capitalist modernity. Conservatives routinely associate the radical critique of the capital system with totalitarianism, but that merely misdiagnoses the problem and misdirects energies in dealing with it. At some point, if he is to be a serious writer rather than a bog standard ideologist, he needs to get at the social roots of the problem.] That creates a mass audience out of powerless individuals who are easy prey to ersatz and surrogate ‘communities.’ As Hannah Arendt writes: 









We need to constitute real community. The challenge is to develop the social forms and practices that serve to check and constrain the destructive aspects of individualism, whilst at the same time supporting and enhancing a genuine individuality, providing a constructive model of how human beings may live, not just as social beings, but as free individuals. 

Against economic abstraction, for community commitments
[community and individualism]
The problem is that what has been called ‘progress’ has been associated with activities that have brought about the destruction of a supportive community and a healthy natural environment, the very things which are crucial to human flourishing. We need a new social identity so that we can overcome individualism and its central figure of the self-interested maximiser in competition for scarce resources. Within this dominant social identity, each individual acts against other individuals out of self-interest, resulting in a self-cancellation of interests and the least optimal outcome for all as individuals. Individualism is self-defeating. Against this, we need a social identity that favours community commitments, and revalues natural systems. We need an identity that recognises the ecological realities of the planet and enables us to engage in ecologically wise behaviour. Such a conception has implications with respect to governance, public policy, economic activity, land use and so on. It is an integral conception.

The habits of the heart
In defining the virtues as character traits and qualities, I would refer to what Alexis de Tocqueville called the ‘habits of the heart’, the mores of the everyday life world, including consciousness, notions, opinions, attitudes, culture, ideas, beliefs and the daily practices of life. These are the things that ‘shape mental habits’, ‘the sum of moral and intellectual dispositions of men in society.’ (Tocqueville 1969: 287).

The important point to grasp is that the mores, as habits of the heart, involve not just knowledge and information, ideas and opinions, but habitual practices which move human beings to the core, motivate, inspire and obligate with respect to such things as religious practice, civic involvement, political participation, and economic activity. In other words, the habits of the heart move individuals from within – they foster the inner motives required for appeals to action to be effective. Moral exhortations to serve the common good, scientific appeals to evidence, governmental demands for restraint are all calls for action that come from outside human dispositions and motivations and so have limited effect and even more limited appeal. There is a need to put external reason and internal reason together, so that educational campaigns and rational-moral appeals are appealing to an identity that actually exists.

Township democracy – civic engagement
For Tocqueville, individual participation in the civic associations of the small town is capable of turning self-interested motives into public commitments, transcending individual rationality to generate a sense of shared responsibility for the public good. In the process, self-interested individuals became ‘orderly, temperate, moderate, and self-controlled citizens.’ (Tocqueville 1969: 287).

Tocqueville’s observations with respect to the ‘habits of the heart’ are pertinent with respect to environmental praxis as a worldchanging and a people-changing. As Alex Steffen writes, ‘changing the world is a team sport, and there's a spot on that team for every person on the planet, though finding our spot can be damn hard. Learning what we can do is not easy in itself, but discovering what each of us feels called to do, in a way that only we can do it, is one of the hardest tasks life has to offer.’ (Steffen 2008). Learning what we can do, acquiring the right qualities, developing capabilities, creating contexts, building communities and coalitions of action, forming the right habits - all these things are crucial to creating the social identity that connects the individual good with the social good, the short-term interest with the long term interest, the good of each with the good of all. In other words, cracking the problem of ‘the logic of collective action.’

Community collaboration
There is a need to think deeply about the role of communities in addressing climate change in a responsible and creative manner. The gap between scientific knowledge and technological know-how, on the one hand, and civic involvement and social practices, on the other, has to be bridged as a form of community capacity building. 

There is an impasse in tackling climate change at present because an adequate and integrated policy/action framework is lacking. Such a framework involves not just decision-making at the top, but also action through participatory structures below. In his article, ‘Community-Driven Research in the Anthropocene (​http:​/​​/​thrivingearthexchange.org​/​wp-content​/​uploads​/​2014​/​08​/​ch6.pdf" \t "_hplink​),’ Rajul E. Pandya notes, ‘In the Anthropocene, the gulf between scientific understanding and civic decision-making simultaneously increases the likelihood of disaster, our vulnerability to natural hazards and the inequity of their impact.’ Pandya carefully articulates the need to ‘better integrate scientific knowledge into cultural, ethical and aesthetic frameworks.’ Throughout this piece, I argue for a bridge between theoretical reason and practical reason within an overall institutional framework embodying a common ethic, a framework that integrates the full range of human endeavour. 

It is clear that as we enter a more environmentally challenged existence, we will need a more collaborative, solutions-oriented science and politics, driven by the needs of the citizen science body within in the community. Active community participation is the key to translating theory into practice, strengthening local resilience, fostering social cohesion, extending networks and building a functional responsibility and representation in the face of the social and environmental challenges to come.

Latino Community (​http:​/​​/​www.huffingtonpost.com​/​news​/​latino-community​/​​)Climate Change (​http:​/​​/​www.huffingtonpost.com​/​news​/​climate-change​/​​)Anthropocene (​http:​/​​/​www.huffingtonpost.com​/​news​/​anthropocene​/​​)Climate Change Summit (​http:​/​​/​www.huffingtonpost.com​/​news​/​climate-change-summit​/​​)Un Climate Change Summit (​http:​/​​/​www.huffingtonpost.com​/​news​/​un-climate-change-summit​/​​)Smithsonian (​http:​/​​/​www.huffingtonpost.com​/​news​/​smithsonian​/​​)Generation Change (​http:​/​​/​www.huffingtonpost.com​/​news​/​generation-change​/​​)

One of the conditions of the health and vitality of free, democratic institutions is the renegotiation of the boundaries between private and public life so as to facilitate citizen participation in shaping and managing the common affairs of life. In the same way that collaboration between nations on climate change at the international level can promote action on issues of poverty and social justice, thus making the world a better and safer place to live, so collaborative strategies within the community can strengthen the forms of the common life and thus improve the quality of life for all. Co-operation between nations to tackle climate change needs to be buttressed by teamwork between and within communities, uniting the above and the below so as to make the world a better and safer place in which to live. It is important to develop policies that can draw communities together. The actions required to address climate change and effect the transition to the low carbon economy are so wide-ranging and deep that there is a need to build coalitions for action throughout the whole community. The communities which are most able to meet the demands of the climate crisis are those which have developed strong social institutions and ties so as to be able to sustain long-term cooperative behaviour. Such communities draw upon local knowledge and networks and are therefore able to innovate and experiment in the face of continuous change. And this applies to relations between communities too. The cooperative society is achieved by building effective institutions and coalitions for common action on the part of individuals.

Collective action and cooperation
We can reduce our vulnerability to climate change by taking collective action within our communities. Many examples may be given here, but the key point is that there is safety in numbers and in connections. New associations can be formed within the community to spread the risk associated with new practices and technologies.

The concept of ‘local cultural capital’ refers to the strength that the community draws from social networks ‘based in kinship, friendship and neighbourliness in household and community settings’. (Warwick and Littlejohn 1992). These networks hold the community together in a ‘period of change’ and form the social cement and moral backbone of towns and villages across the land, strong enough to withstand the destruction of the local economy. (Turner 2000:2).

The concept of ‘social capital’ defines the capacity of those lacking material power and resources to create their own capital through their own self-organisation and self-activity. Community organising creating social capital has a direct bearing on the success and sustainability of the forms of our common life in light of climate change, offering a much broader and richer perspective than solutions which focus on quantifiable measures alone.

‘Social capital’ generates cooperation between individuals in situations of potential conflict, embeds individual activity within trust relations, cultivates self-restraint and strengthens the social bonds and ties connecting individuals to each other and to the community. Unlike physical capital, which is measured in terms of products, and unlike human capital, developed through education and training, social capital possesses a cultural dimension in pertaining to ethical and behavioural norms within a community. These norms are crucial in determining the extent to which and the way in which we come to act on the knowledge and know-how available to us. (Critchley 2004, parts 5, 6, and 7).

The communities that will be most able to cope with the demands to face and adapt to climate change will be those which possess the most entrenched cooperative patterns of behaviour, the strongest social institutions and the most extensive social networks. (Jarman 2007: 23). Such communities are not only more grounded and robust, they are also more fluid; they can draw upon the local cultural capital created over time whilst being able to innovate and experiment in the face of change. Strengthening that social and cultural capacity is crucial to the effectiveness of any overall global strategy, giving real living content to form. 

Decentralism – bioregionalism and localism
In political and social life, the idea of self-organisation can be expressed in several ways. The vision of township democracy presents an idealised view of the self-sufficient community. It is a community scaled to human dimension and proportion, which has extensive spaces for rich and continuous interactions, and has a face-to-face familiarity. The living core of the community is formed by the co-operative behaviour of self-reliant individuals in the context of social institutions and trust relations. (Berry in Minteer and Taylor 2002 ch 10 p 206). Here I want to examine bioregionalism and localism in relation to the ideal of democratic government.

Appropriate scale enabling control and comprehension is crucial to realisation a core value of democratic theory, the idea that human beings should be active subjects determining the direction of their lives, not passive objects subject to external force. The idea is that participation in political life is vital to generating a direct interest in government and, consequently, in establishing the basis for an informed and developing citizenry. (Held 1987: ch 3). Central to the democratic tradition is the idea of human beings as individuals who have the capacity to be self-conscious, self-determining citizens of their political order, as opposed to being passive objects of external power. And the democratic ideal possesses a profound developmental significance: ‘Active involvement in determining the conditions of one's existence is the prime mechanism for the cultivation of human reason and moral development.’ (Held 1987: ch 3). 

In fine, interested, active, involved and informed citizens who are empowered as subjects in charge of the conditions of their lives and who are therefore capable of charting their futures are likely to engage in environmentally wise actions and choose ecologically and socially sustainable paths. 

I want to relate these democratic ideals to decentralism in the form of bioregionalism and localism. 

For Lester Milbrath, the key bioregionalist idea is that ‘economic, social, and political life should be organized by regions that are defined by natural phenomena.’ (Milbrath 1989: 211). Thomas Berry extols the virtues of the bioregional community with respect to ecological degradation. For him, the bioregions establish the context for reinhabiting the Earth:





The solution to environmental degradation is thus for us to join the earth community as participating members, fostering the health and well-being of the ecological communities to which we belong. Berry describes the bioregional community as ‘self-propagating, self-nourishing, self-educating, self-governing, self-healing, and self-fulfilling.’ (Berry 1988: 166).

Bioregionalists argue that forming a single political unit out of a bioregion would generate a more responsible environmental management. Individuals will come to act responsibly only when they can see the consequences that their actions have with respect to the community around them, natural and social. To assume responsibility, individuals need to be able to identify and acknowledge the effects that their actions have on the whole system, and must be able to trace and keep track of their actions and their impacts. When individuals are unable to appreciate the effects of their actions on others and on the environment, they will tend to act irresponsibly, bringing about social disruption and environmental destruction. 

The bioregionalist claim is that political units need to be based on ecosystems to ensure environmentally responsible actions on the part of individuals. By grounding political units in ecosystems, people come to appreciate the effects of their actions and act responsibly and choose sustainable paths internally, not as a set of external goals. This claim is questionable, for the reason that bioregions themselves may be so large as to be beyond human comprehension. Beyond a certain size and scale, individuals are unable to see the effects of their actions on the environment. For this reason, some advocate a localism, which includes a civic and cultural dimension, rather than natural biological units. There is greater possibility of control and comprehension at the local level, as opposed to the regional or national level, stimulating interest, fostering involvement and enabling individuals to become more informed. 

In The Green Imperative, Victor Papanek argues that ‘the problems may be world-wide, yet they will yield only to decentralized, human-scale and local intervention.’ I would argue entirely the contrary, that global problems require global solutions. Papanek’s reasoning is that since ‘we are still unable to assess the impact of what we do as designers and as consumers’, then ‘only if our intrusions are modest in scale are the chances of major miscalculations reassuringly remote.’ (Papanek 1995 ch 1). That, however, doesn’t solve the world-wide problems at all, merely seeks to displace them. Arguing that our intrusions on the environment be ‘modest in scale’ implies an extensive decentralisation. But this merely begs the question: If we could have achieved such decentralisation, we would have achieved such decentralisation, and the world-wide problems would not have arisen in the first place. If we have had such decentralisation in the past, and it proved ineffective in checking the generation of world-wide problems, then it is hardly likely to be a solution to those problems now. 

Localism makes sense in terms of bringing power within human reach. However, questions of scale concern more than democratic principle. The problems of scale, complexity and quantity need to be addressed. The globalisation of economic relations has made it impossible to separate the local and the global to any great extent. As Milbrath writes, ‘bioregionalism tugs at many of our traditional values: nature, rootedness, cooperation, compassion, self-reliance, participation, sustainability. Most of us would like to see bioregionalism work, but is it likely to come to pass?’ (Milbrath 1989: 214). Walter Truett Anderson says not. First, natural elements do not neatly define regions; instead, natural systems overlap and interpenetrate; second, we have learned that we are a part of the world’s biosphere: the Gaia Hypothesis tells us the whole planet is a system; third, bioregionalists underestimate the extent to which we already are inextricably linked into national and international networks. We are grounded not only in our region but also in much broader cultural and religious traditions, and in worldwide communities of like-minded people (scientists, environmentalists, and so on); fourth, economies interpenetrate so inexorably that it would require the most draconian measures to force economic actors to think and act regionally. (Anderson 1986).

Global problems evade local solutions. All the action in the world on the part of individuals at local level will not be enough to resolve issues that transcend local scale. Bioregionalism or localism are ineffective with respect to a problem like global warming. Indeed, many environmental problem are global in their nature – loss of habitats, environmental migration, species extinction, pollution, acidification, deforestation – and their solution requires global agreement, coordination and cooperation. Appropriate scale means that power may go upwards as well as downwards. There is no way of avoiding the need for a global politics and common ethic concerned with the health and preservation of the global commons. And that requires an institutional infrastructure that is international in reach and scope, as well as being filled in by scaled communities capable of identifying and dealing with local impacts. The point is that individuals who identify only with their local area will be environmentally responsible only with respect to local effects, and are unlikely to see, and hence likely to ignore, the effects of their actions on the climate system. This results in the very environmental irresponsibility that localism claims to be able to check. For similar reasons, bioregionalism is also limited in itself. Since the region of global warming is the whole earth, the distinctive localizing aspects of bioregionalism do not apply. The solution to a global problem requires global coordination and cooperation.

This is not a case against bioregionalism and localism, but against bioregionalism alone and localism alone. To be effective in ensuring environmental responsibility, there needs to be appropriate scale in power and control. This may well entail decentralisation and a diffusion of power downwards in many respects; but it may also involve centralisation, particularly in light of the need for global agreement, cooperation and coordination. With globalization, we require appropriate scale to enable actors to think and act sustainably. It is not a matter of opposing decentralization to centralisation but of appropriate scale. Many environmental problems are global in scope and their solutions require global coordination and cooperation. The truth is, tackling global problems at the appropriate level also involves a re-scaling of power to bring the world within human control and comprehension. And there is a place for localism and bioregionalism within the international order. (Minteer and Taylor 2002:  207-08; Berry 1988: 163-70, 166).

The need for a global politics

The key question concerns scale and social cohesion to alter a community's long-term perspective, and encourage people to value the future more. When political units are scaled to human dimensions, people become more interested and informed, get involved and take control of their own social and environmental futures. Civic self-governance comes to be linked to greater participation and consensus building in the managing of common resources. In such an active civic democracy, individuals more likely to become eco-citizens willing and able to choose sustainable paths. 

The Public Good: The conception of a just society
[moral substance – citizen solidarity]
A new conception of place and participation is needed to provide substance to citizenship within ecological conditions and constraints. The Ecopolis is built on a conception of social and environmental justice, a community of public ends in which citizens share the broad equality required to enable them to participate in social life and understand its rights and responsibilities. Indeed, the fundamental argument for the eco-public is that there is a moral substance to the social and natural environment that overrides the principles of economic exchange and sectional interest, a substance grounded in the solidarity of citizens who share an understanding of what living in harmony in nature requires. 

Social and moral ecology in the participatory universe
At every level — from the local community and neighbourhood upwards to the national and international community — we are losing the integration we need in order to flourish as social beings. In terms of both social and natural ecology, we need to remember the things that bring us together, the things we share, or ought to share, our fundamental unity as members of the same commonwealth of life. We have committed what the virtue tradition recognises as the cardinal sin: as individuals, groups, nations, we have put selfish interest first and the common good hardly anywhere at all. We have done so because we lack an identity that connects the particular and the universal, the self and the other. To change this requires more than moral persuasion and theory, but a change of social relations, structures and institutions so that, in whatever we come to do, we act for the common good whenever we act for ourselves. We need a social identity that puts egoism and altruism together. Beyond utilitarian calculations of self-interest, our sense of self is grounded in companionship with others, so that others’ appeals to justice and solidarity make powerful claims on our loyalty. And in expanding the moral circle, we expand our loyalties.

Conceptions of the Public Order
[politics and the public realm – the politics of the common good]
Public life is built and sustained through a web of interconnection that joins people through a thick welter of intermediary associations, generates trust, shapes character through practices of commitment, joins individuals through warm and affective ties, and makes them aware of their dependence on the larger society. Individuation, achieving personal identity, takes place in a community characterised by shared ideals of what makes a worthwhile life. Engaging in practices of commitment rooted in community, we identify with others who are different from ourselves, yet joined with us in interdependence, in a natural common destiny, and in common ends with respect to our place on Earth. Because we share a common relation to our Earthly home, we can work together to build a common future. These practices and relations form habits of living together within the matrix of a moral and social ecology.

[politics and the public realm – township democracy – civic engagement]
Worldchanging is a teamsport, and there is a place on the team for everyone. Participation in civic associations generates a sense of responsibility for the public good. The experience of self-government transform individuals into citizens, giving them an understanding of and feeling for public responsibility that transcends individual self-interest. The civic virtues that are developed in the process are much more than the product of calculations of self-interest. Rather, reciprocal relations transform enlightened self-interest into ‘habits’ that ‘unconsciously’ turn the will toward virtuous behaviour. Here, we may refer to what Tocqueville calls the ‘habits of the heart’, the mores, including such things as consciousness, culture, and the habitual everyday practices of life. The mores are integral to participation in community.

Sustainability and Liveable Communities
[environmentalism and community politics – linking movements - common assumptions, conceptual frameworks, and movement-building strategies]
Aristotle argued that human beings form communities not for justice, peace, defence or traffic, but for the sake of the good life. However, without an organic centre, it is impossible to hold things together. There is a pervasive sense of a loss of meaning, coherence and unity. Towns and cities lack a sense of cohesion and identity. ‘Not only is there no centre there — there is no there there.’ 





To be is to build. The old German root of the verb 'to build' denotes both to the process of making, and of dwelling within. Martin Heidegger established the association between the German root, buan, ‘to build’ and the cognate, bin, ‘to be’. As we build, so shall we be. But do we know who we are, what we want to be, what we want? It’s said that architecture reflects the spirit of the age, but if the age lacks spirit, our building can reflect nothing. Papanek asks ‘why are we only now becoming increasingly aware of the impoverishment of our sensory abilities?’ The answer lies in the fact that, in alienated social conditions, we can no longer see our reflection in the work of our own hands. We begin by denying the evidence of our own senses, and we end by having no senses. A thoroughly alienated landscape barren of all meaning and purpose and significance. One only needs to look at ‘the bleak and hostile configuration of most cities to see how the ideals of architecture, need for purpose, meaning, and truth have deteriorated.’ (Papanek 1995: 10).

Papanek finds inspiration in Aristotle.





The nucleus of cities, with all the variations in styles, therefore always included the same basic elements: inns and eating places, sports arenas and theatres to satisfy conviviality; churches or temples for the spiritual fulfilment; museums, zoos, libraries and schools for intellectual growth; city halls for politics. And, since the satisfaction of these four community-shaping desires required an economic base, these structures were naturally and organically grouped around the marketplace, creating and serving the fifth communal activity, trade and commerce.

The key point is that without an organic centre, neither the whole nor the parts can be held together. We need cohesion. The whole thing needs to cohere according to a purpose that inheres in the nature of things:





I will now examine the practices and modes of development and being which promote and sustain a vision of sustainable institutions and liveable communities, appreciating the profound connections between human community and social values on the one hand and the natural environment and sustainability on the other.

PLACE-BASED FOCUS SUSTAINABILITYAND LIVABLE COMMUNITIES
Community and Place
What I term the Ecopolis is premised upon a productive orientation to the world as central to self-realization, a way of being-in-the-world. Self-reliance in community cultivates a subjectivity grounded in the functional relationships and ecological realities of place. The cultivation of public life therefore spans the larger world of the ecological community and the inner world of self. The approach therefore joins both place and person, valuing not only the natural ecology of the region but also the interior space of the person. As a result, we do not just live on the earth, we live in it. As against the abstract organization of space which typifies the modern town, with its geometric gridiron of streets, we come to dwell in a place grounded in its social, cultural and ecological environment.

Against the view that the form and structures of the built environment shape the social life of a town in a direct and uni-linear way, civic environmentalism is premised on the view that community is fostered by a moral and shared sense of place, grounded in a respectful relation to nature. 

The public sphere so conceived establishes the social and cultural conditions of a vital and enduring ecological society in terms of a productive, just, and interactive relation between human and natural communities generating a sense of the commons based upon mutual respect and value. At the heart of the public sphere envisioned along ecological lines is a commonality that is more than an abstract ethic codified and implemented at the legal-institutional level, but is something forged within social relationships so that civic-mindedness and social unity are produced and reproduced in the reciprocal ties of everyday life. 

A holistic awareness of the importance of place, the natural environment, and the interactive relationship between human and natural ecology establishes community at the core of public life. And at the core of community is the human-nature nexus mediated by social relations. This is to incorporate the ecological principle of interdependence among and between species into a conception of community as a shared environment. Community is therefore formed and sustained by establishing the connections between natural and social ecologies within mutualist social relations. The Ecopolis is a public community formed from smaller communities, affirming the regional interde​pendence of humanity and nature through reciprocal and mutualist relations within the social and natural worlds. 

Community therefore emerges as an ecology constituted on the basis of functional interdependence and the realisation of subjectivities, and as a mutuality that unites the inner and outer worlds, overcoming the separation of culture from nature. As an ecological regionalism, the Ecopolis brings about the reconciliation of the human community and the natural community. 

The organic, therefore, is a social ecology rather than an unmediated nature. The Ecopolis is the organic vision expressed as polity, a place-based ecological democracy based on the reciprocal relations between the built and the natural environments and sustained by civic structures enabling and fostering participation.

Common assumptions, conceptual frameworks, and movement-building strategies
A community- or place-based focus embeds and articulates social and environmental justice the practices of everyday life, linking an array of social bodies and expanding environmental agendas. The connections between social and environmental justice generate opportunities within community for building coalitions for action, broadening agendas, and pooling experiences to sustain social learning, generating alternative practices and modes of development and promoting a vision of sustainable institutions and liveable communities. 

This type of linkage suggests a politics that is more than a pluralist interplay of different movements, compromising some middle ground, but is constituted by movements converging to act in concert through the construction of a common vision, sustained by the commitment to justice and by the practice of democratic participation. It is this forging of common bonds that can liberate environmentalism from its confines as single issue movement. 

Linking movements and constructing a vision 
[community- or place-based focus - issues of everyday life - community-based, yet global-focused politics] 
Adopting an integrated approach to social and environmental justice makes it possible to connect the cause of environmental responsibility with the issues of everyday life, expanding the environmental agenda and building a series of linkages throughout the community and between communities. The social and economic forces bringing about social disruption are the same forces that lie behind environmental destruction, so community- and place-based focus that combines the commitment to social and environmental justice makes sense. 

Such a linked politics overcomes the separation of the social and the ecological. There is hardly a social relationship that doesn’t have some environmental implication for with respect to resource use, pollution, ecosystem processes, or the biosphere. This ubiquity suggests the possibility of conceiving environmentalism as a social movement with a broad view and a broad agenda. Appreciating the connection between the social and the ecological, various movements converge around the common ground and generate a common vision, developing the capacity to become more powerful actors and engage in the ecological transformation of politics:

Similarly, by their nature as community-rooted groups, environmental justice organizations have the capacity to identify and promote community-building type initiatives. Community identity becomes significant as an environmental identity; the two tend to merge. Thus, environmental justice groups have begun to explore core community needs and themes, whether housing, transportation — or food. The concept of community building becomes essential to this approach, and helps expand a risk discrimination or equity framework into a broader and potentially alternative agenda of developing and strengthening community institutions.

Gottleib in Minteer and Taylor 202: 330

Community projects, as vehicles for community development, have the potential to generate alternatives, building community identities by encouraging neighborhood activities through such things as co-ops, community gardens, and farmers' markets. Community building expands an equity framework by developing and strengthening community institutions. Building on these, Gottleib draws attention to the extent to which environmental justice struggles have been most successful as empowerment strategies. ‘Environmental justice movements are noteworthy in their enabling new leadership to develop at the neighborhood or community level, including women and people of color who have often felt disempowered from participating in core community decisions.’ Environmental justice can therefore be conceived as a movement which is capable of renewing and extending democratic life. Gottlieb quotes his colleague Margaret FitzSimmons saying that environmental justice tells us that you don't have to be an expert to be a citizen. (Gottleib 2002: 330 331). 

To which I would add that citizens are capable of generating their own knowledge and capable of informing public debate from below. This is to identify a political synergy in combining social and ecological issues, reinvirgorating public life through democratic participation. 

Place-based focus
In struggling against inequities in the use and distribution of resources, environmental and community activists are developing new place-based relationships, establishing the basis of the future eco-community in the present. A concern with environmental justice enables the recovery of place-based social meaning; it also develops a moral sense of place. Environmental justice implies not just environmental security but community security:

While both environmental justice and community food security activists struggle against negative land uses or system-related inequities, both are increasingly oriented toward new place-based relationships; that is, how to overcome the lack of positive land uses in a community 




As both a process and a goal, the means of community building are the end in the process of becoming. Participation within an expanded and expanding associational space brings individuals together, generating a sense of common identity based on a shared ownership of problems and solutions, thus giving the democratic ideal of self-government an active content. And this unity and commonality enables individuals to see the effects of their actions and assume responsibility for all that they do. Social and environmental problems are beyond the power of individuals, and even communities, to solve. These problems are generated by supra-individual forces and therefore require collective mechanisms of control for their curtailment. Extensive public spaces for citizen involvement and interaction means that individuals can take responsibility where they can, and as a result of acting, they throw off the debilitating feeling of helplessness and hopelessness. At this point, action develops a dynamic of its own, creating a momentum that changes social and environmental struggles from being negative and defensive struggles against a threat, a danger or an external force to being positive and proactive struggles for a vision or an ideal. What the movement does want thus becomes more important in inspiring activism than what the movement does not want. And that shift in focus also entails an enlargement in political capacity on the part of the community and its citizens.

The construction of a common vision
[construction of a common vision, based on the powerful claims of justice and democratic participation
Creating coalitions of action and extending linkage across society still requires a politics to give direction, shape and coherence. Finding a common ground involves more than drawing lines between different movements and each meet the other halfway. There is a need to avoid a 'movementism' that is limited to reacting against the encroachments of the conventional political system and business world upon the life world, but is incapable of achieving an overall organisational identity which can found a new social order. A piecemeal approach to the collective problems we face leaves us subject to the contradictory dynamics of the capital system.

The construction of a common vision, centred on the connected claims of social and environmental justice, and given active content by popular involvement, creates a sense of cohesion between the parties on the basis of a joint ownership. The case for politics rests on this ability to transcend particularism through a common standpoint, uniting different groups and parties, enabling them to see the common element in their particular claims and interests. 

The achievement of a common vision would serve to ‘liberate environmentalism from its confines as a bounded movement, where it has largely been defined.’ As Gottlieb explains, ‘such a bounded environmentalism refers to discrete, separate, issue-based or ‘interest-group’ movements, as well as the separation of the social and the ecological.’ Part of the historical dilemma for environmentalism has been its lack of a 'natural' or enduring constituency that serves to anchor its base of support. For Marx, what matters most of all is material futurity, the structural capacity to act and engage in social transformation on the part of any social agent. Any ideal that lacks an agency for its realisation is utopian from a Marxist point of view. As a universal interest speaking to all in general and none in particular, environmentalism can therefore be criticised as utopian from a Marxist perspective. For Fred Buttel, this ‘absence of constituency’ on the part of environmentalism could be a source of strength, bringing a capacity to establish a universal vision. Buttel argues that since ‘environmental issues are ubiquitous in [the sense] that there is scarcely a social relationship that does not involve some implication for resource use, pollution, ecosystem processes, or the biosphere,’ then environmentalism can become a social movement with a broad overall view and a broad agenda. (Buttel 1995: 191). In this sense, environmentalism is capable of constituting what Hilary Wainwright calls a ‘totalizing vision’ (Wainwright 1994: 212).

‘When the social and the ecological are joined, and different movements begin to identify their common ground and construct a common vision, then movements for change have the capacity to become more powerful actors in the struggles to come.’ (Gottleib in Minteer and Taylor 2002: 333). I would agree, in general. The problem is that agreement on generalities is much easier than specifying precisely who agrees, to what they agree and to what end. Further away from the common ground, the common vision becomes less easy to discern, and more easy to gain a passive assent to.

The great danger is that environmentalism defined as a universalism as such risks presenting a common vision so abstract, so detached from particular claims and interests, as to be vacuous. There is no doubting that environmental health and well-being is a universal interest, that the Earth is a common ground upon which we all stand. But the way human beings relate to this common ground is very different. Marx was well aware that, despite a general alienation, some classes are comfortable in their alienation, and will not act in the interests of human emancipation in general. Any action they take merely ‘leaves the pillars of the building standing’. (Marx 1975: 253).

There is no ‘humanity’ in general. That universalising vision we seek can only be achieved by particular interests acting in concert, with the ‘class with radical chains’ at the core, the class whose emancipation will be the emancipation of all. Where is the possibility of universal emancipation?

This is our answer. In the formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, a class [Stand] which is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere which has a universal character because of its universal suffering and which lays claim to no particular right because the wrong it suffers is not a particular wrong but wrong in general, a sphere of society which can no longer lay claim to a historical title, but merely to a human one, which does not stand in one-sided opposition to the consequences but in all-sided opposition to the premises of the … political system; and finally a sphere which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from - and thereby emancipating - all the other spheres of society, which is, in a word, the total loss of humanity and which can therefore redeem itself only through the total redemption of humanity. This dis​solution of society as a particular class is the proletariat. 

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975





Unless the 21st century is spiritual, then it will not be.
Andre Malraux

The poet T.S. Elliott defined the challenge facing the diremptive modern world: 'only connect.’ Connection defines the 'holistic' vision of 'being at one', involving such terms as 'harmony', ‘unity’, ‘interdependence’, ‘interconnection’, 'balance,’ 'flow', 'integration', ‘integral’, ‘relation’, 'interaction', ‘interplay’, ‘intertwine,’ 'being centred.’ 

I’d like to make it clear that achieving such an exalted vision is difficult – it is not a given, guaranteed by some immanent natural law, but is a political and moral achievement developed out of that ethical immanence. That said, my call for realism is of a certain kind. Arguing that reverence for nature should be at the heart of political and social debate, Satish Kumar rejects the accusation from hard-headed realists that his goals are unrealistic in forthright terms:





But what is really real? We need to look deeper than an instrumental realism:





The idea that spirituality is at the core of green politics can be found in any number of writings (Porritt, 1984; Bahro, 1986; Dobson, 1990). I will examine the connection between spirituality and ecology from a number of perspectives, East and West, religious and scientific.

Concern over the state of the planet and the future prospects of humanity is apparent from both sides in the science-religion debate. When it comes to the environmental crisis, the human impact on the environment and the prospects for human civilisation, we enter an ambiguous terrain which contains both fact and value, often intertwined. After all, a healthy and flourishing ecosystem is not only a matter of scientific fact concerning the natural conditions of such health, it is a fact that implies such flourishing is indeed a good thing.

The ambiguity is apparent from the religious side in the example of a figure like Teilhard de Chardin, who was a palaeontologist and geologist as well as a Jesuit priest. Teilhard argued that ‘the fate of mankind, as well as of religion, depends upon the emergence of a new faith in the future.’ A new faith, scientifically informed, makes the resanctification of the earth imaginable. But what, exactly, would we see the earth as? As God's creation, which it is our responsibility, as stewards, to protect and defend? Or as Nature, of which we are a part and in which we need to take responsibility for our actions so as to ensure that we respect and live within planetary boundaries?

These questions can be phrased differently to give different answers. To see the world as the Creation of a Creator God could also imply a partnership ethic, with human agents as co-creators unfolding the divine immanence. To decide whether God or Nature is the true ground of our being ceases to matter when we come to see our true relation to and active role within the creative universe. To argue that human beings should take responsibility for the natural world is to be guilty of an arrogant anthropocentrism, because it implies that human beings have become as gods. More promising is to argue that human beings should see themselves as co-creators within an endlessly unfolding creative universe. Stuart Kauffman holds that all the unfolding of nature is God, presenting a conception of a fully natural God. The danger of this view is that, equated with the unfolding of natural processes, divinity becomes as finite as is nature. There is, however, a certain transcendental vision in conceiving nature as a field of materialist immanence, a constant creativity and coming to be which transcends a given reality. And we have a creative role to play in this coming to be:

And there is a place for devotion in this view of God. The planet and all of its life are worthy of our devotion in this reinvented sacred and global ethic. There is a place for spirituality as well. It is ours. We need only claim it. 

Kauffman 2006 ch 19

In this respect, the task is for human beings to take responsibility for their actions with respect to the greater whole, not for that whole as such. And to move in this direction is to make a shift from an immediate short-term rationality to an ability to think and act according to long-term considerations of the greater good.

Mechanicism - nature as a purely quantitative phenomenon
The idea of human beings as active participants in a creative universe contradicts the dominant paradigm of science in the modern world. The basic presupposition of mechanistic science is that nature is a purely quantitative phenomenon which can be known and measured by physics and mathematics. The quantification of the world goes hand in hand with its control and its commodification and commercialisation, a reduction to numbers and monetary account. Rene Guenon calls this the ‘reign of quantity’ (Guenon 1953; 1995).

The result of this calculating and accumulating myopia has been a spiritual malaise which prevents us from seeing the living purpose at the heart of the world. We are the inheritors of the disenchanted world, a world of instrumental reason, very modern men and women who can no longer see the creative principle at work in the universe, cannot see because they no longer look. There are none so blind as those who think their reason sees all and encompasses all. (Ash 1992). The blindness of this quantitative world-view, which is itself a function of an appropriating economic system, has come to cover more and more aspects of human life, but is most clearly evidenced in the impact of our economy of greedily efficient and rapacious self-maximisers upon the Earth. We have been lulled into a false sense of security by the advance of our technical powers and lured into moral and political quietude by the false promises of untold material riches as a result of economic growth. A misplaced faith in science and technology has encouraged the belief that any natural limits standing in the way of future progress and prosperity can be overridden and overcome. It is a delusion, and one that will prove fatal if unchecked. The problem with this gross materialism is not that it is materialist, but that it is not materialist enough – it is a gross idealist fantasy based on a denial and a denigration of the real world upon which we depend.

Intoxicated with the power that our technological achievement has given us, we acquiesce in our domination by an economic system that expands endlessly, paying no regard to the fact that there is only a finite supply of natural resources. The accumulative dynamic of the capital system gives us an economy that is committed to infinite expansion on a planet containing finite resources. We are on collision course but, seduced by promises of what endless economic growth will bring, many are inclined to keep running on the treadmill. There is a double alienation involved here. Through its inexorable systemic imperatives, the capital economy exercises power over our lives but, sharing to some degree in the largesse, we are content to believe that we exercise power over the earth. We forget the real meaning of power as a natural flourishing and fulfilment. And we forget that this power involves a recognition of our natural dependence. We forget our responsibility to the Creation. It is in this sense that the environmental crisis is a spiritual crisis. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr writes, ‘The ultimate question for us, the ultimate challenge, is: who are we? What are we doing here? And the response has always been that we are here first of all to remember who we are; we are here to remember what the world is in its spiritual reality; and above all we are here to remember God who is the source of both the world and ourselves.’ (Nasr 1996; Nasr 1997).

Rational calculation
The stress on rationality as the bedrock of thought and action narrows the horizons when it comes to deciding how we ought to live our lives. The prevalence of instrumental rationality has resulted in rational calculation becoming increasingly widespread in society, with even personal relations coming to be characterised by calculative thinking. We are in a world in which means and ends have been inverted, so that rationality is increasingly called upon to supply society with its core values. This is precisely what an instrumental rationality cannot do. It can show us the best means to given ends, but it cannot give us those ends. The extension of instrumental rationality is thus associated with a reduction in our ability to order our lives in genuinely moral ways. 

Weber makes a distinction here between formal rationality, in which reason concerns the most efficient means for attaining given ends, and substantive rationality, in which reason is able to define the ends which are to be pursued. That distinction points to the role that reason can play in morality, to the extent that we see this in terms of a substantive rationality that involves an overarching moral framework. 
We have lost this comprehensive framework as a result of the rationalisation processes of capitalist modernity. The extension of means over ends has resulted in a society in which functional requirements and systemic imperatives have replaced the ends which we set ourselves. Thus, we live in a society which takes ‘economic growth’ to be its normal and overriding concern, without any reflection upon whether the goals of economic rationality are actually good things at all, with any value apart from the system which generates them as imperatives. Public debates centring on economic rationality assume the very things that need to be questioned and demonstrated – that ‘jobs, economic growth and investment’ (a familiar mantra) are indeed good. The goodness of these goals is assumed as a given, necessary and inevitable features of the prevailing economic system. A wider rationality that takes in the moral and social implications and effects of economic activity is precluded by a narrow focus on the goals of economic efficiency.

Capitalism undermines a sense of mutual interdependence by its overemphasis on rational principles of control and utility
In consequence, the extension and domination of rational principles of control and utility, driven by the functional requirements of the capital system, undermines the shared sense of commonality and mutuality holding individuals together. For Carol Christ, the mystical sense of the unity of existence and the mutual interdependence of each and all has been displaced by impersonal and calculating attitudes in our relations to others in society as well as to nature as a whole. (Christ 144ff). In Martin Buber's terms, capitalist rationality results in ‘I-It’ relations coming to replace ‘I-Thou’ relationships. We relate to other people and to the things of the natural world in an instrumental way, turning them into objects for our purely personal satisfaction. At the same time, we too become objects in the eyes of others. Marx saw this coming as early as 1844: ‘in civil society, where he is active as a private individual, [the individual] regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers.’ (Marx OJQ EW 1975: 220-221).

The central theme of Max Weber’s sociology is the rationalisation which follows the domination of these alien powers, a world of bureaucratic and instrumental institutions and structures that proceed ‘without regard for persons’. The ‘objective’ discharge of business may be rational in terms of proceeding in accordance with calculable rules, but its disregard for persons exposes this rationalisation to be a dehumanisation. And it is a disregard that is generalised through the rest of society, coming to define the modern world. Weber goes on to emphasise that





That dissolution of morality is also a denial of responsibility. There is no distance at all from a system that proceeds ‘without regard for persons’ to actions which are undertaken without regard for consequences. A world of meaning and purpose is dissolved into an anonymous machine. Dull compulsion is at its core, numbing human feeling and routinizing behaviour. Marx writes that ‘the dull compulsion of economic relations completes the subjection of the labourer to the capitalist.’ (Marx 1974: 688-9). That compulsion is based upon the separation of the worker from the means of production. Max Weber made this separation, and the compulsion that comes with it, the general condition of modernity, hence the capital system can be characterised as a general irresponsibility that proceeds ‘without regard for persons.’

Capital cares for nothing other than the expansion of its values, and it will employ any productive power to that narrow end, without regard of consequences. Economies can be bankrupted, resources exhausted, communities unravelled, ecosystems polluted and poisoned, nations destroyed – capital as an organised irresponsibility could care less. (Critchley 2012: 725).

The extension and domination of instrumental rationality reflects the central accumulative dynamic and systemic imperatives of the capital economy – the self-expansion of values is the sine qua non of the capital system, capital must expand its values, or the system collapses. This objective necessity is understood euphemistically as ‘economic growth,’ something which is seen as an unquestionable end in itself. And this rationality is in flagrant contradiction of a substantive rationality that takes in the human good in the fullest sense of natural relations, conditions for flourishing, environmental health. It should come as no surprise that the goals given by economic rationality should come to contradict the principles of sustainability so often and so sharply. (Christ 1997: 263; Christ 1989; Christ 1995; Christ and Plaskow 1979; Berry 1999: 108ff; Berry 1988). 

The capital system alienates us from our bodies, from our true selves, from others, from our powers, from the social world we create by our praxis, and from the natural world. Instead, we inhabit the iron cage of an instrumentally rational modernity in which means have been elevated to the status of ends. It is a nihilism, the endless accumulation of means for the sake of further means. ‘Accumulate, accumulate, that is Moses and all the prophets!’ thundered Marx in an Old Testament rage against capital. Max Weber described this era as a ‘mechanised petrification, embellished with a convulsive self-importance’, human beings confined within a steel hard cage mind, body and soul, continuing until ‘the last ton of fossilized fuel is burnt.’ (Weber 1985:181/2). 





Until the inversion of means and ends is overcome and we are able once more to live our lives according to ends we have set for ourselves, then the accumulation of quantity through the exploitation of people and planet will continue to misfire, delivering material riches at the expense of human happiness. And, in the absence of a genuine human happiness, people will have recourse to the only happiness available, the happiness that can be bought at a price on the market. Denied the real thing, human beings turn to the superficial and transitory pleasures of consumption, achieving consolation at best, but never fulfilment. As Satish Kumar argues, 'obsessive attachment to acquisition leads to poverty of spirit and imagination.’ (Kumar 1992: 303).

More and more accumulation and acquisition distances us further and further from our genuine physical, emotional and spiritual needs. (Christ 1997: 146, 172). The more we expand, the more hollow we become. An external engorgement is accompanied by an inner emptiness. We lose sight of the origins of money in rituals of gift and exchange possessing a profound moral and spiritual significance. (Bloom 2004: 215ff.) This is something that Charles Eisenstein has sought to recover. (http://charleseisenstein.net/about-charles/ (​http:​/​​/​charleseisenstein.net​/​about-charles​/​​)). Against this, the modern world sees money merely as an instrumental device facilitating the processes of the capital economy (Bloom 2004: 215ff).

Earth-centred spirituality focused on the immanent divine
[our way of ‘being in the world’ - a religious sense of the natural order]
The failure to overcome the bifurcation of society and nature means that we will continue to misdiagnose our problems, seeking solutions to our most urgent problems by having recourse to the very thinking and forces that have generated the problem in the first place. Far from curing the malady, such remedies merely intensify the condition, wasting resources and inducing despair in the process. 

There is a need to be clear here. Politics, concerted action at the institutional level, governmental coordination and agreement, application of technologies and so on will all be important parts of any viable solution to the environmental crisis we face. But these things alone will not suffice and, indeed, on their own amount to an assertion of the very mentalities and modalities that have brought on the environmental crisis in the first place. 

Much of the debate about the environmental crisis continues to be set in terms of ‘nature’ as an external force to be controlled, a necessity to be conquered by technique and instrumental power. Further, within prevailing social relations, nature is a resource to be annexed, enclosed, commodified and monetised. This is to see the environment in terms of that disenchanted rationalisation analysed by Max Weber, that series of upheavals which overthrew the idea of nature as alive and purposeful. 

Our responses to the environmental crisis have failed precisely because we have failed to change the character of our political behaviour and have failed to set our technological power within an appropriate socio-ecological matrix. Confined within a global system constrained by a central accumulative dynamic, political, institutional and technological have inevitably misfired and will, without an alteration in the fundamentals of the underlying social metabolism, will continue to do so. The problem, in short, is not government and politics, science and technology, but the way that the character of these very human powers are shaped within specific - alienative and exploitative -  social relations. To point to the manifest failures of government and politics, to the ecological damage wrought by development and technology, and repudiate all these forces as such, not only fails to address the real problem – the social relations within which these powers are organised and employed – it deprives us of key resources and capacities in putting our affairs on a sustainable basis. A transformation of these underlying relations will allow us to reclaim our political, economic and technological power as human, social and, indeed, natural powers, integrating them within a truly ecological society. An unmastered practice will doom us.

The failure of economic growth and technological expansion to deliver the peace, freedom and happiness promised points to a need to reassess the nature of our social and environmental problems and solutions. We flatter ourselves into believing that we have conquered natural necessity through technique and organisation. But at the same pace we have mastered nature, we have come to subject ourselves to the constraints of a social necessity that is entirely of our own making. We are prisoners of the uncontrolled forces and consequences of our own powers. The problem, then, is not a lack of knowledge and technical power; rather, there is something fundamentally wrong with our way of ‘being in the world.’ There is something wrong in the way that our social powers are organised. And this points to the character of social relations. More of the same within prevailing social relations will not deliver the long promised and forever deferred ‘progress’, only the continued misfiring of technics, with increased environmental threat leading, eventually, to eco-catastrophe. 

The better standards of living promised by rational systems has proven elusive. The endless accumulation of material quantities has produced greater material wealth, however iniquitously it has been distributed, but it has not delivered in terms of the quality of life. This failure in terms of quality can be demonstrated in a number of ways. As Satish Kumar writes, the mass production of food has given us food that is environmentally costly but not particularly nutritious, at the expense of simple, nutritious food which is organically grown, locally sourced and made with our own hands. The price of quantity has been the sacrifice of quality and the loss of our sacred bond with nature. (Kumar 1992: 307ff.)

Tolstoy issued precisely this warning over one hundred years ago:

The deviation of the science of our time from its true purpose can be seen with striking clarity in the ideals that some men of science set up for themselves and which are not rejected but are acknowledged by the majority of scientists.
These ideals are voiced not only in stupid, fashionable books describing the world 1,000 or 3,000 years from now, but also by sociologists who regard themselves as serious scientists. These ideals are that food, instead of being obtained from the earth by agriculture and the raising of livestock, will be prepared in laboratories by chemical means, and that human labour will be replaced almost entirely by the utilization of natural forces.
Man will not, as he does now, eat an egg laid by a hen he has raised, or bread grown in his own field, or an apple from a tree he has been tending for years, which blossomed and ripened before his eyes, but will eat tasty, nourishing food prepared in laboratories by the combined labours of many people, in which he will take no part.
There will be almost no need for man to labour, and thus all people will be able to give themselves to that same idleness to which the ruling upper classes now give themselves.
Nothing shows more obviously than these ideals how far the science of our time has deviated from the true path.
People in our time, the vast majority of people, lack wholesome and sufficient nourishment (the same holds for housing, clothing, and all primary necessities). Moreover, this same vast majority of people are forced to work constantly, beyond their strength and to the detriment of their well-being. Both misfortunes can very easily be removed by abolishing mutual struggle, luxury, the improper distribution of wealth, and generally by abolishing the false, harmful order of things and arranging human life in a reasonable way. Yet according to science, the existing order of things is immutable, like the movement of the heavenly bodies, and therefore the task of science lies not in elucidating the falseness of this order and establishing a new, reasonable system of life, but in feeding all the people while maintaining the existing order, and giving them all the opportunity to be as idle as the ruling classes are now, living their depraved life.
With all that, it is forgotten that nourishment on bread, vegetables, fruits grown from the earth by one's own labour is the most pleasant, healthful, light and natural nourishment, and that the work of exercising one's muscles is as necessary a condition of life as the oxygenating of the blood by means of breathing.
To invent ways for people to be well nourished by means of chemically prepared food and to make the forces of nature work for them, while the distribution of property and labour remains wrong, is the same as inventing a means of pumping oxygen into the lungs of a man who is locked up in a room with bad air, when all that need be done is to stop keeping the man in the locked room.
No professors will ever set up a laboratory for the production of food that is better than the one that has been set up in the vegetable and animal world, and to use the fruits of this laboratory and participate in it, man has only to give himself to the ever-joyful need for labour, without which man's life is a torment. And here the scientists of our age, instead of applying all their forces to removing what hinders man from using these blessings prepared for him, recognize the situation in which man is deprived of these blessings as immutable, and, instead of arranging the life of men so that they could work joyfully and be nourished by the earth, they devise ways of turning them into artificial freaks. It is the same as if, instead of taking a man from a locked room out into the fresh air, one invented ways of pumping the necessary oxygen into him, enabling him to live not in a house but in a stuffy basement.




[earth-centred spirituality focused on the immanent divine - a new discourse for public life]
Tolstoy’s words point in the direction of a non-exploitative, non-harmful earth-centred spirituality implying a divine immanence. Coming to value the world in this way is to treat it with reverence, repudiating the possessive, controlling and manipulative approach of the capital system. This entails a much greater shift than seeking to change individual attitudes with respect to lifestyle and consumption, but involves uprooting the entire colonising and commodifying approach to the world, engendering a new discourse for public life. It is in this sense that Michael Lerner, to give just one example, has argued for the development of 'a new bottom line' which replaces social and economic relationships based on 'rational' principles of control and efficiency with a political calculus that is founded upon principles of justice, compassion and awe at the grandeur of the universe. (Lerner 2006: 227ff; Lerner 1994)

These observations allow us to bring the notion of the spiritual down from the clouds and extend it throughout the living world. This would be to appreciate the spiritual dimension of the ecological. To live and thrive throughout the course of life, we need to recognize and embrace the connection of all things within the whole, to see our lives in terms of an interdependence. Our future on the Earth will be shaped one way or the other by the way we come to understand the interdependence of all things, recognising the immanence of purpose and coming to experience purposeful unfolding within the world.

Earth community - law of the integral functioning of the Earth
From an active position within the world, we can look around and gaze in awe and wonder at the diversity of geological formations and living forms in all of their magnificence. My dog Cassie and I used to do that in the back garden at night. Here, realism and reverence converge as we come to see ourselves as members of a single community of life. As Charles Darwin wrote in the last paragraph of The Origins of Species: ‘There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.’ (CCD, 2:435; Notebooks Summer 1842; Foundations, 51-52; also 3, 6-8,17, 23-24,27,35-36,38,45-47.)

This community of life extends beyond the Earth to embrace the sun upon which we depend, and the stars and moon that light our skies at night. We are essential, purposeful components of this community of life and come into being as we realise our place within the unfolding of life. To see ourselves as integral, active, conscious members of this immense and infinite universe world is to be moved by an inner exaltation that makes the meaning of life manifest:

Each mode of being has its own unique rights and functions. So too each, as species and as individual, is able to contribute something that no other being can contribute to the integral functioning of the planet. We are so related that the well-being of each member of the community depends on the wellbeing of the other members of the community. This law of the integral functioning of the Earth constitutes what might be considered an ontological covenant bonding the universe into a single manifestation of the wonders of existence. This unity finds one of its highest expressions in the ever-renewing cycle of the biosystems of the planet. 

Thomas Berry, Foreword to Milani 2000 

Bounds of balance, order and harmony in the natural world
Stuart Kauffman refers to the ‘reinvention of the sacred’, but his idea of ‘reinvention’ should not be taken to imply that human beings simply make or remake a world that is inherently sacred, just that that world is a creative universe and that we are co-creators in its continuous emergence. Human agency plays an active role in creating sacred space, but this is a view of agency that recognises the sacred as something inherent in the natural world. An awareness of the sacred in this sense brings an awareness that there are boundaries of balance, proportion, order and harmony inherent in the operation of the natural world and that these boundaries set criteria for appropriate human behaviour, defining the parameters of sustainable living and thus ensuring that our ambitions are constrained within natural limits. The notion of invention or reinvention, then, involves a notion of human agency as a co-creativity, a working with rather than over and against the natural order. Fulfilment implies limits. Without limits, the sense of the possible within constraints soon degenerates into the permissible, driven by overweening ambitions, limitless desires, and systemic commercial imperatives. The result is a treadmill characterised by an endless accumulation of material quantities that can never fill the gaping hole in the heart of society. So, the idea of ‘reinventing’ the sacred has to be understood in the sense of a process of working with and within the grain of a natural order in its realisation, in the sense of human agency co-creating the world and valuing that world at the same time. This is a very different notion from the idea that nature as such is a social construction and that limits are no more than pragmatic compromises between political power, vested interests, scientific knowledge and technological capacity. The loss of an overarching moral framework in the modern world means that the only limits on what can and can’t be done are established internally by power relations on the one side and externally by the negative consequences of transgressing planetary boundaries on the other. 

The problem is that the transgression of limits is a negative, unconscious constraint that is only felt after serious damage has been done. Instead of conscious human action realising ends that have been set internally, through a recognition of natural constraints, there is a reaction to the negative consequences of a blind, uncomprehending and unmastered practice. In such a society, means have displaced ends, so that the only internal criteria is set by the range of technological capacity allied to systemic imperatives and institutional aggrandisement. The instrumentalisation of the world is a denial of our status as co-creators of the world, and it is a denial of our responsibility for our creative abilities and actions. That responsibility is shuffled off to abstracting systems and forces. The result is a society that lacks moral bearings and which is split between a society characterised by an alien control at the level of practice – relations and imperatives outside of conscious human praxis – and a nature considered to be something external and remote, something experienced only in terms of negative consequences. Instead of self-conscious, creative human agency determining directions, such a world is characterised by an endless reaction. We lack a way of governing ourselves by ends which we have conceived internally, integrating society and nature in the one social metabolic order of social control. Such internal control is based upon a moral ecology, the recognition and incorporation of natural limits within human praxis.

Ethos of the Cosmos
[dwelling in an environment that makes possible and sustains moral living]
The environmental crisis enjoins us to become aware of not only who we are but also where we are, before taking full and proper account of our actions with respect to the planet. In his book Ethos of the Cosmos, William Brown locates the origin of the word 'ethics' in the Greek ethos, meaning 'stall' or 'dwelling'. Used in this sense, the word denotes 'an environment that makes possible and sustains moral living'. In this respect, a moral ecology is about bringing ethics back into connection with its original meaning. As Brown argues, ethos and ethics affirm the significance and 'the primacy of place in moral discourse.’

Directly experienced reality over disconnected abstract theories
The universal planetary ethic that the world needs must be more than an abstract and ideal statement, however noble and worthy, but must be grounded in a directly experienced reality. And this involves the connection of inner and outer freedom through developing new modes of social expression. Awakening a mode of understanding and of ‘being in the world’ brings a heightened social and global concern that is felt more deeply than the intellectual appreciation of abstract theories disconnected from each other and from the world of experience. The world ceases to be perceived as an objective datum separate from the self. 

All life on Earth is part of an interdependent whole, dependent upon and interacting with the non-living components of the planet – the atmosphere, oceans and freshwaters, rocks and soils - to form one commonwealth of life. The human species, for all of its will, consciousness, cultural capacity and technical skill, is completely dependent on this biospheric commonwealth. The moral independence that human beings do possess, and use to govern their lives and future paths, is always relative and never absolute. Human beings cannot autonomize themselves from the biospheric conditions of life and survive. ‘After you have exhausted what there is in business, politics, conviviality, and so on — have found that none of these finally satisfy, or permanently wear — what remains? Nature remains.’ (Walt Whitman (1819-1892). 

We have to recognise the extent to which our independence is set within the context of a natural dependence and create a wise technics that enables us to live in interdependence on the planet. In the past, human technical power was so limited as to have just a localised impact on the environment. This is no longer the case. The human species is now having a deleterious global impact on the natural processes essential to life, as can be seen with respect to ozone depletion, global pollution, loss of biodiversity and species extinction, climate change are global warming. Worryingly, the more powerful our technological power and impact has become, the more inclined we have become to overlook our dependence on natural processes and fall for the delusions of omnipotence and autonomy.

Beyond the dualism of human and biotic worlds
Human beings are dependent upon natural processes for survival. However, our capacity for culture and thought and for the technological manipulation of our environment has encouraged us to inflate our relative independence into an arrogant and ignorant assertion of full-blown independence. The creation of city states were the start of a process in which the human species began the journey of abstraction taking us from first nature to a second nature which was entirely our own creation. And here is where it ends, self-made man confined within a self-made world, parasitic upon and destructive of the natural conditions of life. The human-made environment is testimony to both our power but also our impotence. We have severed our connection with the sacred Earth and have become neglectful of its living creatures and non-living components. Overimpressed with our technical and cultural power, we have become forgetful of what we owe to the Earth. And our failure to understand that real power is power as flourishing in interdependence within the Earth’s commonwealth of life is our predicament and prophecy:

It is becoming increasingly evident to many people that our currently unbalanced materialist attitudes to life are producing a spreading and deep-seated sickness in humanity. The technology which increasingly dominates our lives should in fact be one useful method among many which could be used to solve our problems, and individuals, instead of becoming ever more dependent upon authority as is happening now, should seek to develop their own innate abilities, take charge of their own lives, and find a more balanced and holistic way of life. We do not advocate a return to the past, even if that were possible, but we do suggest that humanity must try to rediscover the life-enhancing values which our ancestors understood and lived by.

Bord and Bord 1982

Our innate abilities refer to that universal moral grammar as well as to the potentialities we develop as part of a healthy growth. Our unbalanced materialism has inverted means and ends, elevating our technical capacities to the status of ends in themselves, subordinating our end of self-realisation to the external imperatives of economic and institutional expansion. Technology has escaped our social control and has ceased to be a means towards ends which we set for ourselves, instead displacing such ends. Worse, attached to a system increasingly abstracted from nature, the assertion of technological power is becoming ecologically destructive. We need to reappropriate our social and instrumental power and reorganise it within an appropriate, ecological way of life:





There is also evidence for a growing demand for a rich and satisfying spiritual life. (Lynch 2007; Heelas and Woodhead 2005). A shallow syncretism and eclecticism? A pick and mix morality reflecting the narcissism of the age? There is an element of truth in this, and there will never be a substitute for the truth of religious experience. (Winston 2005 ch 9). But the central themes are consistent and point to an enduring interest in a renewed spirituality:





If these concepts could come to be understood and followed, with a concomitant change in the behaviour of significant numbers of people, then we could envisage a social and ecological transformation of sufficient profundity as to ensure balance and harmony on the planet. ‘Many of the present concerns and activities of humanity would be seen as pointless, if not decidedly dangerous, and men and women would at last be free to devote their energies to the true purpose of their incarnation in this world.’ (Bord 1982: 238).





And the evidence for this claim is what? Just asking, out of a concern that the things people demand of God are demanded of all other things as well. And when we come to find that it’s turtles all the way down, we appreciate that we simply have to stand somewhere. My answer on grounds is contained in all my writing.

Overimpressed by our technical powers, and drawn further and further into our self-made world, our physical disconnection from nature has become a spiritual impoverishment. We have come to view our sustenance as deriving from our technologies and trading systems as well as from the artificial environment of the city, failing to see the dependency of all these things on nature and its life support systems.

Encroaching environmental threats are slowly but surely bringing us face-to-face with the facts of our natural dependency, and our actions have been so environmentally destructive that these facts are harsh and brutal in the extreme. When we haven’t been simply neglectful of the natural world, taking its resources for granted, we have treated it like an external force to be conquered and brought under human control. We have flattered ourselves with the view that our technology has won this victory. Part of the psychological inertia that has characterised the response to the climate crisis can be explained by our sheer disbelief that our machine gods have failed us. The environmental crisis is an existential crisis in that it is nature seemingly coming back from the dead to remind human beings of the limits of their technical achievements and powers. It seems that, for all of our much vaunted technological mastery, we are not masters of the universe after all. Even worse, our pretensions that we were and still are is a delusion that is coming with an unaffordable price tag. We need quickly to recognize the facts of our natural dependency and come to seek the terms of a viable and sustainable interdependence. 

In Immanence, Transcendence and Essence, I wrote: ‘Since Nietzsche announced the death of God, there has been a tendency to think that we are living in a godless universe. This is mistaken. Instead of a thoroughgoing secularisation, these theological and, indeed, teleological assumptions have come to be detached from their true objects and, instead, have come to be attached to secular powers, which in turn have become new idols determining the fate of human beings…
Instead of the end of religion, we live under the sign of a secular myth of progress. Detached from their true moral object, theological assumptions have come to be attached to new gods, the new idols of capitalist modernity – the state, bureaucracy, capital, money, commodities. These idols are the social powers of human beings in alien form. In the place of the salvation promised by the Judaeo-Christian tradition and in place of the reason and freedom promised by the Enlightenment, there is a secular religion of ‘progress’ in which salvation is conditional upon the propitiation of new gods of monetary and state power. The old theological and teleological assumptions have come to be attached to industry, science, technology to create a secular religion which promises salvation through progress. This progress is not measured in terms of human or spiritual growth, but in terms of economic growth, state power, military expansion, space exploration …..’ (Critchley ITE 2013). 

In effect, the modern world has taken over the vertical conception of God as some kind of higher entity and horizontalized it on the material plane. The result is that we are pursuing and attempting to realize the Infinite within a world of finite resources. The big question is whether our spiritual essence is transcendental in the sense of involving a thirst for the infinite. A thirst such as this can only be satisfied vertically, in a higher realm beyond the material sphere. But this threatens to return us to the old metaphysical dualism of spirit and flesh, mind and matter. The idea that our soul was made for the infinite and not the finite is a Platonic view that would be contested by Aristotle. The soul can be satisfied through the satisfaction of our earthly needs, so long as we understand this satisfaction in the sense of the realisation of inherent potentials for the flourishing life. However, both Plato and Aristotle would contest the view that the soul could be fulfilled by a gross materialism that panders only to basic needs and ephemeral wants, the hedonistic treadmill that keeps us in a constant state of anxiety and unhappiness. Individuals in a consumer society continue to believe that the next object they purchase is going to make them happier is a fantasy born of obsessing over the most ephemeral parts of human nature to the neglect of the whole being. The soul, if it means anything at all, refers to the essential nature of the human being as a whole, integral being. And, as finite, such a being can find fulfilment. The transcendental, in this sense, can be defined in terms of a process of growth in which a being moves through stages of self-realisation towards final fulfilment.

However we define the nature of the soul, the spiritual sense of nature and human being has been lost, and this loss is expressed in the devaluation of nature. Or, even more interesting, the spiritual sense has been annexed, and expressed in terms of the exploitation of nature in order to meet impossible demands. Environmental crisis inevitably follows the attempt to satisfy yearnings for infinite in a world of finite resources. It’s not that we cannot find fulfilment in the earthly sphere, just that we need to reconfigure our understanding of the spirit so as to avoid the delusions and dangers of horizontalising the vertical. 

Once we understand that we are parts of a greater commonwealth of life, we can come to start to develop the qualities and traits associated with ecological virtue. We need to recognise, respect and value other living things on this planet as our equals, acknowledge that we are inextricably connected with each other, and that we are all connected to our life source. It follows from this that it is not just human beings and human societies that possess an inherent right to their own unique existence: all things on Earth have a claim to life, mandated by the ecological principle that diversity strengthens living systems.

Spiritual reality
[spiritual essence - modern world is to transform that spiritual reality into a purely earthly one, thereby endangering the earth - cosmos means both order and beauty – universal order]
To survive, let alone thrive, we need a spiritual appreciation of nature and human life that relativizes our place, significance and needs within the greater whole. This is to seek to conceive our essence to be as spiritual as it is physical, aspects of the same thing, signifying the human essence as something more than basic biological necessities. We survive as physical beings but we thrive as human beings, realising needs which enrich our lives beyond physical requirements. One can be grand here and write of the spiritual essence as the manifestation of the Absolute in each being. The problem is that traditionally any such Absolute has been elevated about the material sphere and located in some ‘higher’ purpose. Even worse, the modern world has turned this abstracted spiritual purpose into a purely earthly one, without modifying its transcendent character. The result is that we are pursuing the infinite in a world of finite resources, thereby overwhelming natural limits and endangering the basis of life on earth. 

In what follows, I shall not making the case for this or that religion, still less for the necessity of certain institutions and codes identified with a specific religious tradition. These things have their place within a particular religious tradition, as part of an ongoing meaningful practice. My concern here is both broader and more specific than this, to establish the relationship between the ethical norms by which we govern our behaviour in society and the world of nature which bounds our social activities. We are natural beings, dependent upon nature for our health and well-being. The naturalist fallacy holds that one cannot derive a value from a fact, and this convention is repeated like a mantra. Yet Hume himself broke his own rule many times, as indeed anyone must in order to make sense of human life. Certain natural facts clearly come with positive, healthy, frankly moral connotations. The need for air and water and food is not just a biological fact, it is good to have access to such things. I agree with Daniel Dennett on this point:





An ‘ought-to-be’ can certainly be defined in terms of the natural world’s ‘is’, and gains its power and plausibility by its relevance to natural needs and purposes. An ethical naturalism is based on an appreciation of human beings as natural beings, seeing human nature in terms of its functioning in a natural environment. What a human being is or has the potential to be, what a human being may want to be, can only be understood in terms of human nature and its relationship to and dependence upon nature. Such a naturalism is no fallacy. We can establish the connection between ethical norms and the natural world by comprehending human nature in terms of the connection of nature within to nature without. 

To conceive nature as an ‘it’, a world of dead matter in the classical mechanistic sense, bereft of intrinsic value, is to deny human values any natural grounding, and cut human society adrift from nature as an island populated by ethical beings whose thoughts, actions, and choices have no relevance to the natural world. Seen from the other angle, the natural world is completely amoral, completely indifferent to the world of human doings. The consequences of such separation are drastic. The natural world becomes available as a mere object of instrumental exploitation, possessing no value other than that which human beings can extract and put in the service of narrow self-interest. It is not even a species wide human interest that is served by such exploitation, merely the interests and demands of certain powerful groups within prevailing social relations. The denigration of nature without is associated with the denigration of nature within. The exploitation of nature is part and parcel of the exploitation of human beings within society. Cut adrift from nature without, we are separated from our own internal nature. It is only one small step from seeing nature as being meaningless and possessing no intrinsic worth to seeing our own nature as of no worth as distinct from an exploitative bio-politics in which the human being, seen as a mere physical body, is set within relations of exploitation. (Foucault (2000) is good on this bio-politics).

Participation in the flow of creation
An ecological morality comes with a sense of participation within the whole as against that impersonal detachment which is associated with the view of rights as individual and legal claims against the wider community. This view holds that there is an imperative to partake in the creative flow of the world, facilitating movement to fulfilment and flourishing.

The idea that there is a law and order that is immanent in the ‘real’ world can be found in nearly all religious traditions. We can refer here to Tao, dharma, rta, Shari'ah, all of which hold that there is an underlying order and reality that governs nature in the cosmic sense. We can also refer to the Greek word cosmos, which refers to both order and beauty, an association which is significant: the idea of order as beauty, of a complex and orderly system which is the opposite of chaos. Cosmos is a term which can best be translated as ‘fitting order.’ It comes with moral connotations, as when employed by Aeschylus, when he refers to ‘good order,’ ‘good behaviour,’ ‘decency,’ the opposite of Homer’s kata kosmon for ‘bad order,’ ‘shamefully.’ 

The relationship between our ethical norms and the world of nature
[nature as more than objective it]
My point is that, focusing on underlying law and harmonious order, it is possible to see spiritual essence and its fulfilment in terms of how the world functions. Immanent but, in terms of purposes continuously unfolding beyond a present state, transcendent. This makes complete sense in terms of theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman’s description of self-organisation as ‘order for free.’

Taoism
[ultimate reality - the right way of life]
Taoists refer to the Tao as 'the Way’, the ultimate reality, the inherent and underlying order of nature. The Tao is the 'complete' and 'all-embracing' One thing which underlies and unifies the multiple things and events of the world. (Chuang Tzu 1971: ch.  22). The Tao is the process of the universe in which all things are interrelated. The Tao is the cosmic process. As the ultimate, indefinable reality, the Tao is akin to the Hinduist Brahman and the Buddhist Dharmakaya. The Tao is distinguished, however, by its inherently dynamic quality. Taoism conceives the world to be involved in a continuous flow and change. (Capra 1982 ch 7). 

As a way of life, the Tao is based on experience rather than dogma or abstract codes and rules, and recognises that life can only be understood from the inside, through being lived. There is no imposition from the outside, only a striving from within, an expression of inner nature, a bringing of the inner nature into harmony with the Tao. Taoism is a journey of discovery, a discovery of ourselves and of the world around us. Each of us is faced with answering the question: who am I? In answering, we are challenged to use our own understanding and develop our own awareness of reality, to make our own way on the journey to self-discovery. In the process we come to find our own place in the universe, our own relationship to the things of the universe. 

Taoism is all about right doing and right living, and coming to apprehend the reality behind the appearances by right thinking. It teaches us to understand that since the world is a continuous flow, we are involved in the continuously transforming moment of time where future meets the past. To play an active part in this movement, we must be responsive and dynamic, forever adapting whilst going with the inner flow of things.

Taoism strikes at the dualism between subject and object which has run throughout civilized existence, joining them together to overcome the split between mind and body, reason and intuition, intellect and emotion, the conscious and the unconscious so as to achieve inner harmony.

The Tao is the underlying evolutionary principle of the universe, the ultimate impulse to creation, prior to all dichotomizing categories. 

Since before time and space were, the Tao is.
It is beyond is and is not. How do I know this is true? I look inside myself and see.

Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, trans. Stephen Mitchell,   op. cit., Ch. 21

Look, it cannot be seen — it is beyond form. 
Listen, it cannot be heard—it is beyond sound. 
Grasp, it cannot be held—it is intangible.
From above it is not bright;
From below it is not dark:
An unbroken thread beyond description.
It returns to nothingness.
The form of the formless,
The image of the imageless,
It is called indefinable and beyond imagination.
Stand before it and there is no beginning. Follow it and there is no end. Stay with the ancient Tao, Move with the present.
Knowing the ancient beginning is the essence of Tao.

Lao Tzu 1973 Ch. 14.

The Tao is something that is experienced rather than something that is spoken about; it is more about doing than saying. 

The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal name.
The unnameable is the eternally real. Naming is the origin of all particular things.
Free from desire, you realize the mystery. Caught in desire, you see only the manifestations.
Yet mystery and manifestations arise from the same source. This source is called darkness.
Darkness within darkness.
The gateway to all understanding.

Lao Tzu Ch. i.

The Tao expresses the will to being within any organism. It is that vital, animating force that impels us to see the true reality behind appearances. Trapped by fear and anxiety, we lose the capacity to discover and engender meaning, we lose the ability to give and receive joy in life. We need the restoration of balance. By reducing the space occupied by the rational mind, we give room to our intuitive mind, and the two together work in harmony to attain balance. Carl Gustav Jung referred to 'synchronicity' to describe a meaningful convergence of outer and inner events that are not causally connected. Tracing the concept to Taoism, he described synchronicity as An Acausal Connecting Principle. (Jung 1955). Synchronicity involves an intuitive way of knowing when things are right and in time is right, or ‘out of sync.’ 

[the way of nature – social implications – individual is a matrix of relationships - participating in the universal]
The Taoist emphasis falls primarily on nature, but the conception of the interconnection of all things in the cosmic universe has important social implications. As a microcosm of the universe, the individual is a matrix of relationships, meaning that self-realisation is possible only in relation to the whole. Realizing one’s Tao involves realizing the Tao of others through participation in the universal Tao. 

Recognising the social nature of human beings and the facts of living in organised society, the Confucians began to refer to the Tao of man, and the Tao of human society, articulating the Tao as the right way of life in a moral sense. This could be considered to be a distortion of the original Tao, which clearly implies that if things are left alone they would spontaneously follow the Tao. That would be to believe in the possibility of a totally unmediated order, a laissez faire society. The attractions of Taoism to anarchists are obvious. The combination of laissez faire economics and the strong state on the basis of a belief in a natural order (I’m thinking Hayek here) should, however, make us cautious. We should have a critical approach to any views which seek to model society and human behaviour on notions of a natural order (not least towards the views I present myself in this book), just to make sure that these views are right, and not mere naturalizations of socially and historically created and specific relations, practices and institutions.

In a very specific sense, the notion of the Tao of society is an entirely appropriate development. Human beings are both social and moral animals, living in complex organised societies, with notions of right and wrong arising through their dealings with each other. There is nothing false or artificial about this social activity, it is quite natural to the human species, and so must be an expression of the natural order in some way. The controversy concerns the degree of social organisation which could be considered natural. Like Plato, Confucius argued for a well-ordered society in which everything and everyone found their appropriate place. And placing things and people according to their own business requires a degree of moral and social education. Many take a critical view of this approach, seeing it as authoritarian and political in the manipulative sense, too prescriptive, and too bound up with power relations. Instead, they emphasise the anarchist implications of the Tao. 
 
The Taoists hold that morality arises only when society begins to deviate from nature:

Therefore when Tao is lost, there is goodness. 
When goodness is lost, there is kindness. 
When kindness is lost, there is justice. 
When justice is lost, there is ritual.

Tao Te Ching, ch.38

This is the myth of civilisation in reverse. But it expresses something central to Taoism. Taoist writings stress the importance of non-action or inaction, wu-wei, which does not mean idleness, only that those things that need to be done will get done, in their own time, at their own pace. ‘A truly good man does nothing, Yet leaves nothing undone.’ Wu-wei is a state of equilibrium and tranquillity, an imperturbable stillness. The ability to do nothing in this sense is described as the Primal Virtue:

Are you able to do nothing? 
Giving birth and nourishing, 
Bearing yet not possessing, 
Working yet not taking credit!
Leading yet not dominating, 
This is the Primal Virtue.

Tao Te Ching, ch.38 10

Whilst Taoism eschews a defined or written moral code, it does articulate certain clear virtues, such as compassion, frugality and non-assertion - 'daring not to be ahead of others'. (Tao Te Ching ch. 67). And this compassion is extended to all animals, not just human beings. Taoism is nonanthropocentric in that it has no favourites amongst the species; the universe is indifferent to human desires and wishes: 'Heaven and earth are ruthless.' It follows that to be in harmony with the universe is to shed any human-heartedness: 'The wise are ruthless.' (Tao Te Ching, ch.67)

How ruthless? Ruthless in what sense? Here, I have difficulties in accepting Taoism. I am in agreement with Alastair McIntosh:

The metaphysical map set out here charts the terrain by which we can become more and more alive to the aliveness of life. It entails overcoming the deadness of apathy. The Greek root of apathy - apatheia or a-pathos - literally means ‘freedom from suffering.’ But the shadow side of that freedom can be to find ourselves 'without feeling'. Indeed, this is the normal usage of the word.
Creating community therefore means learning to share feeling; both in its joys and in the burdens of suffering. 

McIntosh 2008 ch 3

In this piece, I am explicitly arguing against apathy and indifference, and arguing for responsibility, our capacity to respond to the needs and desires of others, to be sensitive to planetary health, and our coming to assume responsibility for our actions and their consequences. We share pain and joy as we become alive to the aliveness of life. There is no apathy or indifference here. This is a philosophy for living which gives pride of place to the cry. That cry may made no difference to outcomes in the here and now, but it makes a difference to the person calling out, in plain belief that some power somewhere will hear and will be moved.

[Taoist flourishing]
The Taoist view of the world probably arises from the nature of peasant life, living so closely to and in cooperation with natural processes and learning to work with rather than against those processes. It’s a short step from the view that plants grow well when left to follow their natures to the idea that human beings do best when least interfered with. The lesson is plain, things should be left alone to take their natural course. If we followed this course of non-interference, we would achieve a long and happy life characterised by physical and mental health. Taoism is all about sustainable living in the sense of achieving earthly longevity. 'Whatever is contrary to Tao will not last long.' The person who is filled with virtue is likened to a newborn child. Taoism keeps close to our innate moral grammar. 

In line with the science of ecology, Taoism holds that overall harmony is ensured the more individuality and diversity there is. Taoism understands change not as a result of some external force or intervention but as the unfolding of an innate tendency which is present in all things and situations. Movement occurs naturally and spontaneously in the Tao. To follow the natural order is to be in harmony with the Tao’s continuous flow. 

The principle of non-action or inaction points to a belief in spontaneity in human action, acting in conformity with the operation of the Tao. Acting in accordance with one’s own nature means relaxing the rational mind and trusting to the intuitive intelligence which is innate in the human mind. And it means acting in conformity with the laws of change which are innate in all things in nature. (Capra 1982 ch 8; Needham 1956 vol. II, p. 88.) Those who follow the natural order flow in the current of the Tao.

The idea of an underlying harmony in all things begs the obvious question as to why human history is characterised by such disharmony. If going with the natural course of things is in our best interest, why have we intervened and manipulated and transformed so much by way of technique and organisation? Why do we not trust to spontaneity and let the natural order unfold as it should? The answer is quite simple, whilst nature is indifferent to the fate of human beings, human beings are not and cannot be. Even more than this, for all of the assertions that nature is benign and plentiful, for much of human history, living close to nature has been a harsh and insecure existence, marked by dearth, crop failure, disease and death. One may presume the existence of a pure and pristine nature as a veritable Eden, but, once human numbers reached certain levels and once different human groups were brought into contact with each other, this Paradise could never have been the human experience. Relations between extended groups need to be organised, and this points to a need for rules, for codes, laws, and institutions; in other words, it requires a civilisation at some remove from nature’s spontaneity.

The fact is that the relationship between humanity and nature is a paradoxical one. Human beings are dependent upon nature and yet also possess a certain moral autonomy. This autonomy gives a certain cultural freedom removed to a degree from natural necessity and biological imperatives. The full extent of that degree is open to debate, particularly in light of the environmental crises besetting the planet – extinction and loss of biodiversity, deforestation, desertification, drought, global heating. In seeking to conquer natural necessity, human beings have asserted their independence from nature to a degree that is unsustainable. The problem is that the tools by which we think ourselves to have become masters of nature have escaped our control and have come to enslave us to a new social necessity. And that necessity is associated with socio-economic imperatives that are destroying natural limits. We haven’t so much conquered nature as enslaved ourselves to a second nature dominated by our own alienated powers. We risk being abandoned by these powers, as their inability to deliver on the complete conquest of nature becomes manifest. Slaves of our own powers, we will quickly move from being the supposed conquerors of nature to becoming victims of nature. In thrall to our technological powers, we have forgotten the extent of our dependence upon nature, and we devalue our dependence upon each other. A reality check will not be far in coming. We have a very paradoxical relationship with ourselves, with our powers and with our environing nature. We are products of nature but are also in large part self-made. As our much vaunted technological powers fail to deliver the security promised by the claims to have conquered nature, so we will come to realise the extent to which we depend upon nature; the evidence for the damage we have wrought upon the natural environment is becoming increasingly apparent. 

There is no need to labour the damage we have done to our natural support systems, scientists have been carefully and comprehensively documenting the evidence for decades now, and the effects are now so clear and direct that only the myopic and obscurantist remain unaware. The errors of our past have been catalogued in many places. The wisest learn from the tiniest of errors. We have been committing errors so great that even the least wise amongst us much surely understand the message and change their behaviour accordingly. 

At this point we need to remember that the greatest power that human beings possess is not the technological power to transform the external world but the personal power to transform behaviour from within; we need to locate the roots of destructiveness within ourselves and turn our powers into roots of creativity. Up until this point in history, we have focused our creative energies upon the transformation of the natural world, and the irony is that we have been so successful in asserting our social and cultural independence from nature that it has brought us to the brink of destruction. There can never be the total independence from nature that our powers have seduced us into believing possible. We need to locate this transformatory predicament in our social relationships, the way our economic systems encourage certain destructive behaviours. Sooner or later we have to get back to certain character traits and whether and how these can be expressed or suppressed in different social forms. 

The emphasis on relations is central. In abstraction from social relations we can agree on an ethic that stresses what unites us over against those interests that divide us, and we can agree on what constitutes right living on the planet. Those who say that the environmental crisis is a spiritual crisis are correct insofar as the problems we face are expressions of the destructive, exploitative and instrumental ways in which we relate to our world. But the solution to these problems will not be some moral conversion or change of heart alone. Human society is organised and structured along particular lines, it is a metabolic order constituted by a specific division of labour. The problem is not so much that human beings lack a spiritual awareness but that they are locked into patterns of behaviour which promote self-interested thinking over long range considerations of personal and common good. It is within such a system that individuals are inclined to override their own better judgements and engage in activities which they know to be destructive. We see that the incremental impacts of our actions are ecologically destructive yet, in the absence of appropriate collective mechanisms enabling coordination, we continue to engage in destructive behaviour as individuals. 

Developing a spiritual awareness will, no doubt, be a part of our coming to change the way that we organise our interchange with nature, but it will not suffice on its own to alter the character of that interchange. At some point, we need to address the practical questions surrounding the division of labour and the way that this is involved in specific patterns of behaviour. We need to address institutional and structural questions so as to encourage some forms of behaviour and inhibit others. And that points to the need to specify the forms of the common life which foster and sustain ecological behaviour and suppress destructive behaviour. Any spiritual appeal or awareness that is considered in abstraction from this crucial question concerning the entire social metabolic order is condemned to irrelevance. A spiritual concern is part of coming to address the question of social control, organisation and order, an important part; but it is no alternative to that question. Sooner or later, we have to examine character, social identity, the social metabolism, and patterns of behaviour, and see how we can not only encourage human beings to act in an ecologically benign way, (and discourage them from acting in a destructive way), but actually enable them to live right. The problem with the current system is that individuals find it more difficult to do the right thing than to remain complicit in the destructive behavioural patterns of the prevailing social system. In fine, we need to look at character formation, social identity and social relations. And this means connecting spiritual awareness to social organisation via the virtues.

Hinduism
I want to focus here upon The Upanishads and the conception of the atman-brahman, referring to the ultimate identity of the individual soul with the divine unity which underlies all phenomena in the universe. Atman is the manifestation of Brahman in the human soul. At the centre of the Upanishads is the view that Atman and Brahman, the individual and the ultimate reality, are one:





This earth bound existence is more a wheel of deaths than a wheel of life. In this sort of cycle of existence [samsara] what is the good of enjoyment of desires, when after a man has fed on them there is seen repeatedly his return here to earth? (Radhakrishnan and Moore 1957: 93.) Pursuing this outlook to its conclusions issued in a notion of redemption as a final liberation from the endless, painful cycle of rebirths. In the Maitri Upanishad, the hope for liberation is expressed thus:

Be pleased to deliver me. In this cycle of existence I am like a frog in a waterless well. Sir [Sakayanya, one who knows the true nature of the Atman], you are our way of escape—yea, you are our way of escape! 

Radhakrishnan and Moore 1957: 93

The restless movements of being, which are the recurrent source of karma, come to an end in the mystical immersion in the atman-brahman. Here, all becomes one, eternal, without motion, and without individuality.

Is this a solution to the riddle of our existence? Or is it a mere denial of the human predicament? Max Weber considered Buddhism to be most radical rationalization of the karma-samsara complex. (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft and Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie). ‘Here, it may be said, the perfect rationality of the karma-samsara, having extended itself to its ultimate limit, overreaches itself and falls back into the irrational prototype of self-transcendent participation characteristic of all mysticism (Berger 1990 ch 3). 

Being at One has to involve more than a reversion to an unthinking immanence. 

Buddhism and ecological virtue
[Buddhist virtues]
I wish now to highlight the character of the Buddha’s teaching as a virtue theory and go on to demonstrate the extent to which Buddhist virtues can contribute to an ecological morality.

In line with the virtue tradition, the Buddha counsels balance, harmony and the avoidance of excess and extremes. The well lived life is a middle path between austerity and indulgence. I wish to present this view as a harmonizing of nature and culture in an ecological civilization, with joy as its keynote. The result is what we could call the sufficiency society. 

Jim Taylor (1997) argues that the Buddhist concept of Kamma (karma — action) has a key role to play in understanding environmental issues. Within Buddhism, Kamma is intentional action with many consequences. Whilst the familiar understanding of Kamma focuses on the negative consequences of actions, the stress should be placed on learning from mistakes within the context of speech, thought and action so as to induce a change in behaviour. 

Buddhism has plenty to offer a conception of ecological virtue, emphasising the interdependence of nature and society and the need for developing a respectful approach to nature within forms of the common life. The Buddhist belief system offers a range of virtues which are central to an environmental ethic, such as simplicity, compassion, restraint, generosity, empathy, a concerned awareness of the suffering of all living things as well as of the land, loving kindness. The parallels with the virtues that constitute the conception of ecological citizenship are apparent (for example, Smith 1998: 96-100). The Buddhist stress on merit-making behaviour is parallel with the concern with character construction in the virtue tradition.

Underpinning and uniting these virtues is the belief in the interdependency of all things and the attendant concern with the need to maintain a cooperative relationship between society and nature. An ecological ethic developed on this basis would be nonanthropocentric, removing human beings from the top of the ethical hierarchy, coming to dissolve all such hierarchies in favour of nature’s web of life (Swearer et al. 2004:1-2). 

This Buddhist conception of the virtues and the good life therefore envisages a cooperative relationship between society and nature in which an ecological citizenship places human beings alongside other species in a commonwealth of life.

[wise action - wisdom in Buddhism is analogous to the Western conception of prudence or practical wisdom and the cultivation of virtues - wisdom as a virtue is context-dependent]
We may draw on Buddhist understandings of virtue in an attempt to set our actions within the context of environmental responsibility, generating a conception of 'right behaviour' within an ecological society. ‘Buddhism provides a template for wise action rather than suggesting that a specific outcome is of itself wise or not. In addition, being wise is seen in Buddhist thinking as a combination of vijja (awareness) and panna (wisdom) - that wisdom is the deliberative outcome of a deeper knowledge of a specific environmental problem in a particular context. Wisdom (panna) in this tradition is also associated with a specific understanding of the idea of 'suffering'. In some ways, wisdom in Buddhism is analogous to the Western conception of prudence or practical wisdom and the cultivation of virtues that enhance both collective and individual improvement and development. However, rather than being fearful of change, the Buddhist conception embraces it as part of nature, humanity and the interdependent relations between them. Thus we can see that the meaning of wisdom as a virtue is context-dependent, based on distinctive philosophical traditions in different cultural contexts, often compounded by deeper religious differences.’ (Smith and Pangsapa 2009).

An ethic of interconnectedness and mutual responsibility
The notions of right behaviour and conduct beg the question of the kinds of measures individuals and society need to undertake in order to correct the practices that have led to the despoliation of the earth, what form or forms of common life are needed to restore life support systems to health, and maintain them in health, and what ethical principles undergird the ecological society.

Buddhism supplies the foundations for a natural ethic, stressing interconnectedness and mutual responsibility. Buddhism is most interesting when it comes to discussing the contentious issue of anthropocentrism, the human-centred approach to the world. Stressing the interconnection of all things, Buddhism denies the existence of a single, unique, discrete self and seeks to replace notions of separate, independent and autonomous beings with a conception of mutual interdependence.

Non-destructiveness or harmlessness
By virtue of living, each living being has a desire for the continuation of its existence. The Buddha therefore teaches an ethic of non-destructiveness or non-harm. Is such an ideal universalisable? Could there ever be a form of life that proceeds in accordance with the ideal of harmlessness? Leaving aside organised human society, we may doubt the extent to which such an ethic is true to nature. Many living things in nature continue to live through the destruction of other living beings. If the ethic lacks appeal in society, it does not apply in nature. We need to take a closer look at the paradoxical relationship of human beings to nature and to society.

Christianity - beyond anthropocentrism and man's metaphysical uniqueness
In Man's Responsibility for Nature, philosopher John Passmore argues that Christianity cannot be genuinely Green; discarding the sense of man's metaphysical uniqueness means losing the central plank of the Christian view.
But is this true? 

In recent years, Christian theology and social theory has been marked by a turning away from the narrowly anthropocentric themes of individual salvation, justification and atonement, and towards a more universal, cosmic and, indeed, ecological approach. Does such a turn amount to an abandonment of what is distinctive about Christianity? Not necessarily so. 

Christianity can be reconciled with a nonanthropocentric view. An anthropocentric view fails to recognise that God's ultimate motive is not human well-being at all but His own perfect goodness. St. Thomas Aquinas’ argument for complexity works both from a biological and theological perspective. Following Aristotle, Aquinas argues that human beings are unique in their rational capacity. So why didn’t God strip all the species down to the most rational one? Aquinas has the answer, and it is very far from the anthropocentrism for which Christianity is criticised. It is an argument which belongs to the same species as the deep ecological argument for biodiversity within a planet conceived as an interconnected web of life. Since any choice made by God must be suited to His perfect goodness, it follows from God’s choice to create the world that the world created must be good. And it follows that the things that God chose to create in this world must have been chosen with a view to making the universe good. Aquinas identifies variety as the most salient characteristic of the created world, the rich array of species supporting Aquinas’ general principle that ‘a higher nature at its lowest connects with a lower nature at its highest’ (St. Thomas Aquinas SCG II.91.4/1775). Nothing that God creates can adequately reflect God’s perfection, so to make just a few of the very best species would amount to a poor strategy. The best strategy would be to make a vast array of different kinds of things. Whilst the results will still be inadequate, in their complexity, they would better manifest God's perfection than would a simpler, more selective universe. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 139). It’s an argument for biodiversity and for interconnection. 

Subscribing to this logic, Aquinas argues explicitly that it is diversity among species rather than among individuals that makes the world better. Creating many different kinds of things is better than making many things of the same kind: ‘Many species adds more to the goodness of the universe than many individuals of a single species’ (SCG II.45.6/1224). 

So much for God making the Earth just for the human species, and so much for the uniqueness of human rationality giving licence to human beings to dominate and exploit the Creation. However much this may have applied in practice, it is an attitude that has no warranty in Aquinas, who shows that Christianity is theocentric, not anthropocentric. Those who respond by arguing that God is pictured in human form, as an old man with a beard, and therefore anthropocentric, are focusing on popular representations of God, and have missed the point by a very wide mark. God could have reduced the species to the one rational species and concentrated on making more and more individual members of that rational species. God could have made more planets like the Earth and populated them with human beings. But goodness and perfection is all about complexity, diversity and balance. The best universe, the universe which most adequately manifests God’s perfection, contains fewer human beings and a greater variety of species. It’s a theological case for biodiversity. (Critchley, P., 2013. Aquinas, Morality and Modernity: The Search for the Natural Moral Law and the Common Good). 

Beyond Life-As and Subjective Life
The virtuous life and the embedded life
The modern world has moved away from the view that people belong to a ‘given’ order in which essences are fixed and development has a certain inevitability about it. That kind of essentialism is rightly rejected. There is also a move away from the idea that there is a 'higher' self, something transcendent in the sense of being a collective, supra-self, something which serves as a person’s source of significance (see Taylor 1989). In religion, philosophy and science, we continue to search for those sources of significance. We search for the ultimate source, some ‘objective’ reality. Plato is still pointing upwards, Aristotle’s moderating hand comes downwards and is held flat. There is a sense in which to come to reject objectivity is to remove the ground from under science, and to lose that check against reality we need. I’m not prepared to do that. Instead, I place the accent on the search for knowledge and understanding, the probing, questioning, questing and journeying into the heart of our world. This entails something quite different from the idea that there is an objective world or order which yields an objective truth in abstraction from experience, a truth that is relayed downwards and which is embodied in a fairly static social order. 

Heelas and Woodhead describe this higher truth as ‘life as,’ life lived as a dutiful wife, father, husband, strong leader, self-made man etc. Their description is worth giving at length, because it presents a view of the virtue tradition and the good life that has been familiar in history, the dominant form even. I develop a politics of the good in contradistinction to this conception:

Accordingly, what matters is living one's life as a member of a community or tradition - whether it takes the form of a kinship system, a feudal system, a nation-state, a class system or a particular religion. What matters is obeying, heeding, pursuing ways of life which stand over and above the individual self and bestow meaning upon life. These higher authorities serve to direct one's life and accord real value to it when one performs one's duties or fulfils one's obligations. In some cases the roles of life-as may appear 'natural' and be pursued unreflectively; in others there may be pressure to monitor one's life self-consciously in order to conform. Virtue and 'the good life' are characterized in terms of sacrificing, disciplining or masking those aspects of oneself that pull one away from the 'oughts' of the embedded life.

Heelas and Woodhead 2005 

This has the form of the argument I am trying to present as a commonwealth of virtue, but not the content. I argue that there is no isolated, discrete self but, rather, that we are all involved in relations to others, and that we need those warm, affective ties within community to be ourselves. I go further to argue that the community in which we live our lives is wider than the human community and embraces the living and non-living world. Drawing lines and boundaries is difficult. But human beings are social beings; whether we refer to a kinship system, a feudal system, a nation-state, a class system or a particular religion, human beings belong to groups. We need to ensure that the loyalties we come to share and owe express a natural and a genuinely social character, and are not external impositions, as in a class system, or in surrogates for real community, as with many political entities. Most of all, we need to ensure that ‘the good’ is not some illusory ideal projected to a level standing over, above and usually against the individual self, to compensate for the absence of the real thing in social life. At the same time, I argue for a principle of authority as an expression of our long term, collective good, not as an abstract ‘higher’ authority, but as an expression of a good that recognises a greater human potential beyond individual self-interest. Being involved in such a common life gives direction and meaning to one's life. What matters is that we embed the principle of self-assumed obligation in these collective forms, so that virtue is an expression of a person’s character and living the good life is an unfolding of a person’s potentials, not a moulding of the individual to fit the norms and values of the prevailing social order. There are no abstract ‘ought-to-be’s’ postulated from the outside in the good life as I define it, and the acquisition and exercise of the virtues in community is about the transition from human potential to actual in the embedded life.

This view is distinguished not only from the ‘life-as’ view defined above but also from the subjectivist reaction against that view, the ‘subjective-life’ view. As Heelas and Woodhead describe the subjective turn:

If the 'massive turn' in modern culture is thus a turn away from life-as, it is correspondingly a turn towards subjective-life. The latter has to do with Mutes of consciousness, states of mind, memories, emotions, passions, sensations, bodily experiences, dreams, feelings, inner conscience, and sentiments - including moral sentiments like compassion. The subjectivities of each individual become a, if not the, unique source of significance, meaning and authority. Here 'the good life' consists in living one's life in full awareness of one's states of being; in enriching one's experiences; in finding ways of handling negative emotions; in becoming sensitive enough to find out where and how the quality of one's life - alone or in relation - may be improved. The goal is not to defer to higher authority, but to have the courage to become one's own authority. Not to follow established paths, but to forge one's own inner-directed, as subjective, life. Not to become what others want one to be, but to 'become who I truly am'. Not to rely on the knowledge and wisdom of others ('To the other be true'), but to live out the Delphic 'know thyself and the Shakespearian 'To thine own self be true'. 

Heelas and Woodhead 2005 Intro 

So what could be wrong with that? Become what you are, as Nietzsche urged. Note how often the words ‘one’s own’ are used, as though there is no reality, no truth, no other outside of ‘one’s own’ self. I would be wary descending into a subjectivist position here. As I argued earlier, we are none of us alone and self-contained, but are social beings dependent on resources outside of us for our own well-being. The position I am opposing is the one that was given to me in response to my work. ‘Seek fulfilment in life through bettering yourself, do not become focused on outside influences for happiness, be they relationships, material objects or any other such nonsense.’ Those social and material resources are not nonsense but things we need in order to become ourselves. Human beings are social beings and express their individuality in relation to others; human beings are natural beings, and live and thrive only in relation to air and water and soil and food. The problem with the subjective turn is that it is a turn inwards, away from the world and others, with the result that there is a failure to express and embody ‘one’s own’ power in and in relation to the social and natural world.

The way forward is to combine individuality and commonality, avoiding the twin reefs of conformity to external authority (life-as) and subjectivism (subjective-life). These modes are set at extremes, defined in antagonistic relation to the other, and yield only the bifurcated personality. We need to embody our subjective power in a social context, and this requires being able to define a communal life, institutional order and principle of authority that is our own, to which we belong and give active assent to. 

This is a vision of power as flourishing, of life as true wealth, an affirmative materialism that draws us out of ourselves so as to embody our authentic selves in relations to others. Call it a community of life or a democracy of ends, it’s a commonwealth of virtue that draws the strands of culture, ethics and ecology together to see us as active participants in the web of life. This conception of ecological virtue enjoins us to oppose the systems of economic, military and ecological exploitation and destruction that are threatening to unravel the fabric of life. In the words of Thomas Berry, this is the 'great work' before us.

The question is what kind of spirituality or religion is beyond dualisms of objectivity and subjectivity, nature and society, the world and self.

The unfolding, evolving cosmos within progressive spirituality
Partners in the process of creation
Conceiving spirituality in terms of an evolving, unfolding creative universe has a number of important implications. Given the natural basis of this process, it behoves humanity to discern the ways in which ecological forces sustain and guide the ongoing development of life on earth, our own included, and to work in harmony with the lines of healthy growth. Many advocates of a new, or renewed, spirituality describe harmonisation in terms of seeing ourselves as parts of Gaia, working with the spirit of Gaia. 

In Gaia's Body, Tyler Volk writes:

Arguably the most important molecule of the biosphere, chlorophyll would be a perfect icon of a science-based, earth-centered religion. In the form of a molecular model, its head and tail might easily replace, for example, the Catholic chalice. A nature priestess could hold the iconic molecule by its tail and lift its illuminated, green head, truly the bringer of light to life, glittering high in the air before a reverent congregation. That might even lure me back to church!

In a similar vein, in The Earth Path, Starhawk writes:

There is a different view of evolution, one that better serves the world-view of earth-based spirituality. We might call it Gaian evolution, after the Gaia theory developed by James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis. Gaian evolution is not so much a counter to Darwin as a shift in focus from the individual to the ecosystem, the whole. The earth functions like a living being, and the biosphere, the world community of life-forms, changes its environment as it is changed by it. The redwood tree does not evolve as a separate species; rather, the forest as a whole evolves, the interwoven lives of redwood and tanoak, huckleberry and salal, the mycorrhizal fungi in the soil below and the lichens in the canopy where the marbled murrelets nest. None of these creatures adapts alone, in isolation from each other—they coevolve as Forest-Being, in an interdependent dance that balances competition and cooperation. Individuals and species survive when their activities benefit the whole as well as the parts. Evolution becomes the story of how the planet herself comes alive.




A progressive spirituality developed in this way doesn’t reject science but draws on and sacralises the scientific understanding of nature. Thus Starhawk presents a synthesis of the story of Gaia coming alive, giving thanks to James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis, and Elisabet Sahtouris's Earth Dance: Living Systems in Evolution.

Many write of living in accordance with the 'universal process of development'. (Bloom 2004: 134ff). In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, the likes of Jonathan Sacks and others speak of ‘the great partnership,’ human beings as active partners with God in a process of ongoing creation. (Sacks 2011; Lerner 1995: 411; Andrew Cohen, http://www.andrewcohen.org). Underlying this partnership ethic is a view that human beings are responsible agents and have an active role to play in realising the divine purpose within an unfolding cosmos. 

This notion of a process at work has clear affinities with an ecological ethic, and savours a great deal of Arne Naess’s guiding maxim that 'the unfolding of potentialities is a right.’ (Naess 1989: 164.) Although very similar to the view I am presenting here, there is this significant difference – I argue for the unfolding of those potentialities which involve a healthy and positive growth. Not all potentialities are good in this sense. Human beings, for instance, have potentials for aggression, violence, destruction and self-destruction. Their unfolding is not a right.

The emphasis upon a ‘great partnership’ with God/Nature points to the active and creative role of human agency within the unfolding cosmos has the advantage of undercutting the abstract, philosophical search for ‘objective’ reality and truth, putting the emphasis on the search as a lived experience. But it also raises certain key questions with respect to environmental ethics. Whilst the notion of a partnership does envisage humanity working in conjunction with a natural process, it doesn’t preclude an anthropocentrism. On the contrary, in this vision, human consciousness appears to be the pinnacle towards which the evolutionary process has been developing. Gaia becomes conscious in the human species. 

John O’Donohue expresses this view from a poetic and philosophical angle:





But the same view can be found expressed by scientists like E.O. Wilson and James Lovelock, who writes of human beings as ‘Gaia’s intelligent elite’. In this understanding, the emergence of human consciousness is the universe becoming conscious of itself.

Many (Margulis, for example) reject this as entailing an anthropocentric view of the cosmos. On this reading, the human species is just one species amongst many, of no more significance to nature than other species. But if this is the case, there is only one way that this natural fact could ever be known – through human consciousness. Without nature, humanity could not exist; without human consciousness, nature would never be known.

We can call it an ineliminable tension at the heart of environmental ethics. Deep ecologists have tried hard to eradicate all such anthropocentrism (See, for example, Fox 1990:199ff.) I have a feeling that a form of anthropocentrism will be around so long as human beings are around, and see little point in obsessing over its extirpation. Wise living in right relationships is what it is, regardless of disputes over ‘isms.’ I like Aquinas’ God-centred view of the need for a variety of species on the planet. Similarly, from a Jewish perspective, Michael Lerner sees humanity as one example of God becoming self-conscious. This may sound like the views of Lovelock and Wilson concerning humanity as Gaia’s consciousness, but it has this crucial difference: human consciousness is just one of many different forms of the divine self-consciousness that have and will continue to emerge in the history of the cosmos. (Lerner 1994: 415ff.)

Lerner argues for this modest view given the fact that humanity has, thus far, fallen short of living up to the consciousness of divine purpose. Far from being Gaia’s intelligent elite, humanity is so ill at ease in its surroundings as to have been and to have remained a menace to other species as well as to itself. Conscious self-awareness would be a good idea with respect to human beings, certainly in the sense of coming to recognise the importance of other species and natural organisms. Many writers who affirm the importance of human consciousness are therefore concerned to emphasise a more humble position for humanity within the whole. Humanity is not the end point of the evolutionary process and is not indispensable to the planet. (O'Murchu 1997: 41 42). Our persistence in living in violation of ecological constraints shows a distinct lack of conscious intelligence, and our ecologically unsustainable ways will, sooner or later, see us as gone from the planet.

The sacralization of nature - a renewed vision of the divine presence within the natural order
To regard nature as sacred is to stress the importance of respecting natural processes and acting in ecologically wise ways so as to avert the danger of ecological catastrophe. Those inclined to dismiss talk of ‘green spirituality’ as woolly and vague should think more deeply, and look beyond the many statements that are indeed woolly and vague. Max Weber wrote of the disenchantment of the world, a dis-godding or demoralisation, a stripping of purpose from the world, and its replacement by instrumental rationality. Mircea Eliade also argued that industrialization has issued in a disenchanted world, a new experience in history:
 




The re-enchantment of the world is also the re-sacralization of nature, something which is crucial to humanity coming to develop the moral and cultural resources enabling us to halt our plummet towards ecological ruination and instead come to build sustainable societies. A progressive spirituality sees our only hope in a re-enchantment of the world, a renewed vision of the divine presence within the natural order that can generate new respect for nature and new ways of harmonious living within the natural order. In Ethics and Ecology, Thomas Berry argued for the relation between moral and ecological imperatives:





In The Dream of the Earth, Berry gave this call: 





The self and the evolutionary unfolding of the cosmos
In The Reinvention of the Sacred, Stuart Kauffman identifies the sacred with the creative unfolding of the universe. (Kauffman 2008). This points to a growing spiritual awareness which, with respect to the self, relates ethics to personal development as an ongoing process in life. It is in this sense that William Bloom refers to human development as a ‘moral imperative.’ (Bloom 2004: 142ff.) Indeed, personal development is seen in this perspective to be an integral part of cooperating with the developmental impetus of the creative universe. Personal development, that is, shares in the same creative energy and dynamic that underwrites the emerging complexity of the universe. Many authors here connect the development of the authentic self to the divine and to the conformity of the self to the unfolding of divine purpose. (Chopra 2000: 181; Freitas 2005: 163ff.)

An awareness of a greater whole thus takes us out of ourselves and averts a preoccupation with ‘our own’ concerns and a self-absorbed self-development. We come to appreciate our 'big self’ (Fox 1990 198). This is to see one’s self-consciousness and self-development as part of the greater whole, as an active part of the interconnected and unfolding cosmos. 

21 HOLISM
I shall begin this presentation of holism with a discussion of organicism and planning in relation to the conception of the Ecopolis outlined in this work.

Organic holism and planning

ORGANIC HOLISM AND PLANNING
Establishing the organic relation between nature and culture is a holistic concern that encompasses the full range of human activities. That relation requires a practical expression in terms of social organisation, an expression that must incorporate scientific knowledge and technological capacity, a recognition of biological and ecological realities and organic principles in planning, policy and design, aesthetics, ethics and the creative arts, and the everyday life world so as to overcome the spatial imbalances between the social and natural environments. This is to conceive politics in a broad and expansive sense as a public life grounded in the fundamental socio-economic and ecological realities of place, achieving a balance between human activities and environing relations to create genuinely sustainable communities. 

An integrative approach enables creative responses that appropriate the varied information generated in the world of experience and fuse it to give it form. Form is essential, since emergence entails the realization of form. In A.N. Whitehead’s process conception, ‘all actuality involves the realization of form’ (Whitehead 1968: 90). The organic conception of unity in emergence seeks expressions of form – planning, policy and design - that are functional within the world of experience. These forms possess a capacity to fuse art and experience, moral and aesthetic value and technological efficiency, reason and imagination, combining a functional robustness with creative vision. The organic approach thus counters the specialization of knowledge and fragmentation of life which characterises the modern world.

The Ecopolis can be presented as such a form, a planned eco-city and public community that expresses inherent potentiality creatively unfolding in experience, offering a vision of an immanent alternative to the actually existing social order. These processes making for unity are biological and ecological as well as cultural and technological. The Ecopolis as public form achieves a unity that overcomes the fragmented worlds of ‘knowledge’ so as to hold all processes in relation. Beyond specialism, this public form values all citizen knowledges.

The Ecopolis encapsulates biological and ecological principles and aesthetic and moral values in public form: it is an urban/ecological form that combines the application of new technologies and planning techniques in creative relation to lived experience within ecological boundaries to achieve a mutual unfolding of nature and culture. 

The organic-holist approach conceives an aesthetics of place that is sensitive to technological modernization and social differentiation, bridging technical and artistic worlds and creating the sense of place. The aesthetic and the practical are therefore established in a mutual relation. The potentialities of science and technology are to be drawn out with respect to their moral and social implications and rendered compatible with organic principles of design, achieving a new appreciation of modern technology and its use. At the same time, we come to underscore the importance of place in developing a sense of self.

The Ecopolis is therefore a public form that reconciles technological modernization, ecological design and human activities in such a way as to ensure sound, sustainable development that is in tune with the natural attributes of a place.

This conception highlights the extent to which human prospects depend on our coming to reconfigure and recontextualize our technological powers along the lines of natural relations. This is to establish the connection between ethics and ecology through a concomitant process of humanisation and naturalisation. In the process, we come to see our self-made world, comprising our built environment and technological powers, as an extension of living organisms. The point is, unless we address the moral and social implications of technological modernization, society will continue to be marked by a potentially catastrophic imbalance between human activity and natural limits. To overcome this, we need to render the development of social science, ecological science, and the systematic application of science to technological innovation, compatible with moral and social concerns within a holist-organic conception. 

This would be to transcend the mechanistic paradigm in favour of a way of life lived in full recognition of natural boundaries. An organicist technics reconciles economics, ethics and ecology, developing a form of economic activity that respects natural limits, expresses values and serves a social use. And this implies an ecological economics that rejects the systemic imperatives of endless appropriation and accumulation in favour of conserving resources, aiding natural processes and respecting the functional requirements of environing ecosystems. Such an economics sees ecological constraints in terms of both limitation and possibility. This would be to bring economics back to its origins in the oikos, combining economic development and ecological sustainability rather than setting the two in antagonistic relation as in the contemporary economy. 

The Ecopolis is a public community resting on and preserving the ecological balance of the natural region or locality. As against the mechanistic approach, which turns a place into a mechanism exploiting specialized knowledge in order to churn out endless quantities, the organic conception sees the world as an organism, capable of maintaining its balance internally. There is an internal coherence at the heart of the public life of Ecopolis that is self-stabilizing and which is upset only by the encroachment of extraneous forces. Based on holist and organic principles, the Ecopolis flourishes through being able to draw on its multi-faceted potentials as a habitus for organic life. 

The holist-organic conception overcomes the fragmentation of knowledge and of life as a result of the domination of the mechanistic paradigm. Holism sees the world in the essentialist terms of form, organism, connection, interrelation, pattern, configuration, affiliation. To come to value these organic and holistic principles and incorporate them within social practices would be indicative of an expansive, creative, democratic technics being applied in the transition to a biocentric civilisation. Good design is not only functional with respect to technology and technique, but appropriate within social and natural contexts. 

This would be to restore purpose and meaning to the world. Whereas mechanistic science sees the world as objectively valueless, the holist-organic conception sees purpose in emergent properties and life-enhancing activities. Such a view implies human beings engaged in a partnership with the living organisms of the earth, the earth as a commonwealth of virtue practising mutual aid. I shall develop this view at length in what follows.

That the underlying dynamic of the cosmos is benevolent, that everything is connected and that there is meaning
Holism is based in the experience of the harmony of existence. This harmony points to the underlying dynamic of the universe and, further, holds that this creative purpose is benevolent. And here, in the interconnection of all things, we find meaning. Scientists from Pythagoras to Newton and Einstein have emphasised harmonics and proportions in the universe. In this view, human health, fulfilment and flourishing come from being in tune with the harmony of the cosmos. (Ferguson 2008; Greene 2005; Calleman 2009; Pylkkanen 1989; Stewart 2007).

The moral imperative of the global village
[natural harmony – the morality of emergence and evolution] 
Harmony, meaning attunement, is already present within the natural order. It is not the creation of the prophets, the theologians and the philosophers. At best, philosophy and theology can give a commentary on this harmony, scientists a description. But written accounts are always necessarily partial, not merely because of the impossibility of a map ever being the whole territory but because this universe is unfinished, continuously unfolding, never completed. And we are co-creators of this universe, we know it from the inside. If our greatest minds do not create this universe with their words, merely describe and explain and comment on it, it is nevertheless true at the same time that we, as participants in this universe, are ourselves creators to some extent. 

[the moral code written into the very fabric of nature and cosmos]
I make reference throughout to a universal and innate moral grammar, a moral code that is written into the hearts of human beings:





The problem is that





Which begs the question as to where our true loyalties lie. To our compatriots in time and place? Or to transcendent standards that hold our rulers, and ourselves in our own words and deeds, to account?

A holistic view sees the inner moral grammar as a microcosm within the macrocosm of the moral whole. That is to see a moral grammar as being written into the very fabric of nature and the creative universe. Whilst we do not, through our culture and ethical systems, create this grammar, we can give expression to it, bring it to the light of consciousness. This moral grammar supplies the basis of an holistic ecological morality, a morality which holds that life is made up of emergent properties; that there is a developmental thrust to existence; that life is directional and has purpose and meaning; that all things have a natural impulse to develop their healthy potentials to the full; that all things are connected and interdependent, that the universe is creative and that all elements are self-organising and in the process of emerging into harmonic form; that human beings are developmental beings with capacities and powers and are active parts of this creative process; that we need to ensure that our behaviour is in harmony with this universal process of development; that creative behaviour leads to the development of our healthy potentials and is in tune with the natural flow; that moral behaviour pertains to all actions, attitudes and dispositions that support the development of life. 

Human beings are moral animals, not because philosophy and religion have defined us as such, but because of our instinctive, cellular and soulful connection with the harmonics of the creative natural universe. The motivation to be moral arises from our innate moral grammar. The philosophy and the religion, the ‘happy’ habitus in which may be fortunate to live, are the moral education drawing our potentialities out and developing them as capabilities.

Holism and emergence
Holism is more than a concept, it is a way of thinking, acting, doing, and growing. Holism is centred on the living dynamic at the very heart of the universe, the way that cells, plants, waves, particles, information of all kinds, thoughts, consciousness are all in the process of continuous emergence. In addition to an innate moral grammar within human beings, there is an innate harmony in the universe.

Holism is an approach that integrates and transcends the familiar dichotomies of faith and reason, spirit and matter. It could be described as a way of thinking, knowing and doing which is appropriate to a self-organising creative universe characterised by endless flows and transformations.

And we and our ideas and actions, the culture we create, are part of this creative universe. The holistic person is therefore one who is continually open to the universe unfolding around them, capable of receiving and responding to new information, assimilating diverse ideas and entities, and being an active part of the unfolding of the universe. The holistic person is not hostile and defensive when confronted by new ideas, but seeks to absorb, understand, learn and modify behaviour accordingly. The holistic person, therefore, keeps her/his eyes on the bigger picture, sees the relationship between the different parts and relates these parts to the whole system, has an awareness of all the connections and synergies, participates in the dynamism and process of emergence and growth and is continually open to, reflecting upon and responding to new factors.

Such openness and interconnection, thinking in terms of wholes, differs from the analytical and reductionist approach that has dominated in western philosophy and science. The western mind likes analytical clarity, logical rigour, non-contradiction and a strong conclusion. There is merit in all of these things. But there is a sense in which such philosophy and science is attempting to impose an abstract conceptual apparatus upon a reality that is incapable of being so precisely captured and contained. In The Common Ground: Essays in Ecology vol 2 Political Ecology, I wrote:

In forcing us to confront 'apocalypse', anthropogenic global heating exposes a fault line running through our mental universe – the split between reductionism and holism. Aristotle was a great systemizer and categorizer, imposing definitions and organising the materials of the world into neat, separate boxes. The academic world is Aristotelian to the core, organising knowledge about the world into distinct departments and disciplines. There is plenty to be said for the approach. It may have been the only way our limited minds could bring the entirety of the universe within the grasp of our limited intellects. The universe is infinite, yet our cognitive resources are limited. We only have so much time, our brains can only hold so much information. So it makes sense to break things up and organise them and parcel the whole knowledge out to specialists and experts. 
The problem is, we come to lose the sense of the whole picture. The earliest philosophers focuses not just on the rational approach to the universe, but expressed a taste for the mythopoetic. Unscientific, we may say, but it was a way of accessing truths that would otherwise have remained untouched, beyond the reach of our limited rational tools. The pre-Socratic philosophers, certainly, employed meta-constructs in order to make sense of their factual observations. Something of this approach carried on into Plato, the supreme rationalist, who nevertheless wrote sublimely mysterious books like the Timaeus. But even in eminently rationalist works like The Laws and Critias, Plato interwove impeccably rational accounts of prehistoric Greek climate change or natural history with a mythology that sets the facts within a morally and socially instructive context. 

In this respect, Plato’s philosophy may be presented as an organic or essentialist rationalism. Plato incorporate the primal roots of Greek civilisation in his conception of creation which perceived the world to be a living organism. In Timaeus, Plato argues that the creator created ‘a single visible living being, containing within itself all living beings of the same natural order’ (Plato 1965:54 42-3). Plato thus offered a cosmological interpretation of the world as a single, living organism.

Critchley CG vol 2 2013: 38-39

The whole picture – patterns over pieces
Holism holds that we need to look at the whole picture in order to gain a true sense of the parts. When we look at the totality, we get a sense of overall purpose and proceed to identify the patterns and systems in their emergence and interplay within that whole. 

Connected and ever changing
Holism describes a creative universe in which all things are related to each other and are continually changing. With new elements forever emerging, the structure is not static, but constantly unfolding and shifting as it accommodates new factors and dynamics. As such, holism not only describes the self-organising forces and emergent properties of the natural universe in which we live, it also expresses our experience of being, doing and knowing in a world in which all things are connected and are forever changing:





In this conception, diverse elements are emergent and self-organizing, forever unfolding to create coherent wholes that are more than the sum of their parts. In fine, all things are connected to each other and are continually developing together.

Holism is the view that no part of a whole can make full sense unless related to other parts within the whole. Nothing can be properly defined in isolation. You can take a watch apart and examine the different parts, but if the parts remain scattered on the desk, they no longer form a watch. We may recall here Aristotle’s description of the severed human hand considered apart from the functioning body. A human body can be taken apart, but the true meaning of each organ is apparent only with respect to the functioning of the whole body. 

This case for seeing the whole picture and not just isolated parts applies to human life. Human beings do not stand alone. The simple fact of being alive draws us into dependent relations with the elements, the air we breathe, and the water we drink. The fact that we are social beings means that we need others in order to be ourselves.

Emergence and interplay of natural systems 
Holism implies an ecological morality that is shaped in accordance with the emergence and interplay of natural systems, and is expressed through the synergy and the dynamics of these systems within the overall harmony of the universe. Such a morality articulates the relationships and connections that impel growth within the interconnected whole.

An ecological morality framed along these lines is concerned with identifying and providing the conditions which enable and foster healthy growth and flourishing, providing practical guidance for how best to build and sustain healthy societies.

Ecological morality is holistic
An ecological morality is holistic and is a morality of interconnection, relation and emergence. It affirms the moral coherence of the whole in relation to its inner dynamism and interaction. It affirms the possibility of a natural ethics, that there is no reason to separate nature and culture and that attempts to settle morality on a rational basis are too abstract and doomed to failure. At the heart of this ecological morality is an awareness that there is a direction and a developmental impulse to life, that life exhibits an insurgency and a purpose in the direction of growth and flourishing, and that there is an endless emergence of order out of chaotic elements. Biologists refer to emergent properties. (Goodwin 1994). Stuart Kauffman describes self-organisation within nature as order for free. (Kauffman 2008). It’s a view which sees harmonious form as emerging from the unfolding of random elements, order from chaos. 

Kauffman’s view that we can reinvent the sacred on entirely naturalist lines is important, for his emphasis on the self-organising properties of the creative universe affirms that harmony is natural, something internal to nature, and precedes any philosophical or religious scaffolding. This is to say that the creative natural universe is essentially harmonic, and that the architectonics of any system of ethics come from within natural processes. One can also refer here to Owen Flanagan’s The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World (2007). Such views are tantamount to arguing for a natural transcendence.

We are developmental beings – the human journey
An ecological view emphasises that human beings are natural beings and, as such, share in the developmental impulse of nature. We are creatures of nature, growing, learning and changing through participating in life’s developmental impulse. A moral ecology teaches that to be human is to be a conscious part of a journey towards fulfilment. Human beings are not born complete and finished but become so as a result of a process by which potentials for healthy being are realised. Life is therefore an evolutionary and positive process of emergence, and we are engaged on a life-long journey of learning and development as we move towards fulfilling our healthy potentials. This journey is a meaningful experience, it has a discernible purpose with respect to our potential and creative growth. Human beings go through certain stages of development through the life course. In the same way that a plant needs water, nutrients and light in order to grow, so human beings have basic needs such as food and shelter that must be met if they are to develop. (Coles 1997).

However, beyond basic needs, human happiness depends upon a number of other factors. As social beings, we cannot achieve fulfilment by ourselves, but require connection to others in a moral and social matrix. In ancient Greece, the term paideia referred to the rearing and education of the person to enable them to become a fully functioning member of the polis. Applied in the context of the argument I am developing, it defines society as a learning mechanism in which the overall educational experience matters as much as what is taught.

The emphasis on character formation within the virtue theory that I have developed in this piece is thus to be presented within a model of social learning as an educative process involving a change in human behaviour. Relating the virtues to an essentialist (but critical and historical rather than fixed) conception of human nature, the approach accents the healthy human potentialities to be actualised, the capabilities to be developed, the fundamental qualities to be expressed and the range of needs to be met. These needs include the need for belonging, the need for relationships, the need for novelty and stimulation, the need for meaning. 

As social beings, we have a deep need to relate to others, whether in kinship and friendship relations, work colleagues, neighbours, connections with other people which take us beyond immediate egoistic concerns. We gain well-being through our membership in a community and our active involvement – that is, as agents and not mere functionaries) in its reciprocal relations. We need to be physically and mentally active, and hence require a stimulating environment which draws us to develop and use our faculties. Beautiful exteriors make for beautiful interiors, and vice versa. There is a need for novelty and new challenges, fostering a lifelong learning. 

Human beings are thinking, feeling and acting beings. Each of these fundamental processes take place in connection to the social and natural environment. Changing our way of living so as to achieve an ecologically sustainable existence involves a change in behaviour involving these three processes. 

I would develop this need for relation to others in terms of a fundamental need for connectedness with the natural world. E.O. Wilson reasons that by coming to love and value nature emotionally, we will also want to protect it.

The practical application of the developmental model presented here is to enable human beings to acquire those qualities that are consistent with sustainable living. This would be done by enhancing the predispositions we are born with, developing the dispositions to act well, and forming the character appropriate to the practice of ecological virtue.

[fulfilled people and communities - capabilities]
An ecological morality therefore runs parallel with the developmental approach of humanist psychology as well as the virtue tradition in philosophy. I would refer in this respect to Carl Rogers and to Abraham Maslow and his famous hierarchy of needs, and to the capabilities approach of Martha Nussbaum. These approaches rest upon a clear ethic which indicates what kind of character, what pattern of behaviour and what forms of common life are required in order to foster realised human beings in the realised human society.

22 ECOLOGICAL HEALTH AND HAPPINESS

Community and the breakdown of collective feeling
In Dancing in the Streets: A History of Collective Joy, Barbara Ehrenreich notes the despair that an imaginary ‘unconverted savage’ might feel over the psychic as well as the ecological damage that civilization has wrought:





I love that Ehrenreich recognizes that ‘the gods’ cannot simply be (re)invented or imagined, summoned at the request of human reason and imagination. Such gods are no more than the work of human self-legislation, and command no more awe and reverence than that. But that’s just my opinion, and yours. Calling back the soul of the world requires much more than this.

We should be used to lists of human infamy and crime by now. Guilty as charged, but the mitigating circumstances count for a good deal. The key words here for me are contained in the final passage. Despite warnings of looming ecological catastrophe, humanity has failed to react with anything like the required urgency. Indeed, even alarming warnings of Near Term Human Extinction have done nothing to shake people out of their torpor. But the problem is not one of apathy but of the absence of collective mechanisms and solidarities enabling individuals to stand together and act in unison. Despite the globalisation of human relations and communications, human beings are atomised, separated from each other as individuals, and are thus too isolated from one another to be able to make common cause and mount anything like the mutual defence required in the face of environmental threats. We have become so clever and so sophisticated as to unlearn the lessons that early Homo sapiens learned in order to survive. 

The problem is not ‘humanity’ as such, but of how human beings organise and unite to exercise a degree of control over their lives. The old solidarities have unravelled, and have even been deliberately destroyed by political and economic elites hell bent on turning society into one large atomistic market. The result is that humanity has been dissolved and disempowered, reduced to one large atomistic mass, powerless and hopeless before the collective forces of the state and capital and finance. And powerless and hopeless too in the fact of the environmental dangers we have unleashed upon ourselves as a result of our unmastered practice. We hear the warnings, but cannot respond. We have been denuded of the collective means enabling effective action.

We have lost that sense of communitas, the warm, affective ties that bond individuals together in community, the love and mutuality and solidarity that is generated spontaneously by the experience of living together in close proximity. It’s what Aristotle would have understood as friendship, living together in a community of equals.

But, returning to Ehrenreich, there is something much more profound than designing the means and mechanisms of common conscious control and action involved. It’s about collective joy, an appreciation of the sacred and a celebration of the sense of belonging to something greater that entirely escapes those who obsess over getting things done through effective systems and strategies. My offhand response to ‘get in tune’ to people who demand systems and strategies from me actually expresses a deep truth. Just be careful to actually be in tune, and not get distracted and be diverted:

We try, of course. Many millions of people around the world are engaged in movements for economic justice, peace, equality, and environmental reclamation, and these movements are often incubators for the solidarity and celebration so missing in our usual state of passive acquiescence. Yet there appears to be no constituency today for collective joy itself. In fact, the very term collective joy is largely unfamiliar and exotic.
The silence demands some sort of explanation, so let us give the enemies of festivity—or at least the revolutionaries among them, like Robespierre and Lenin—their due. What is lost is not that important, they would argue, should they be good-humored enough to even entertain the argument. And indeed you would have to be a fool, or a drug-addled hippie, to imagine that a restoration of festivity and ecstatic ritual would get us out of our current crisis, or even to imagine that such activities could be restored in our world today, with anything like their original warmth and meaningfulness. No amount of hand-holding or choral dancing will bring world peace and environmental healing. In fact, festivities have served at times to befuddle or becalm their celebrants. European carnival coexisted with tyranny for centuries, hence the common "safety valve" theory of their social function. Native American Ghost Dancers could not reverse genocide with their ecstatic rituals; nor could colonized Africans render themselves bulletproof by dancing into a trance. In the face of desperately serious threats to group survival, the ecstatic ritual can be a waste of energy—or worse. The Haitian dictator "Papa Doc" Duvalier actually encouraged Vodou as a means of strengthening his grip on the population.
My own Calvinist impulses—inherited in part from those of my ancestors who were genuine Calvinists, Presbyterian Scots—tell me insistently to get the work done, save the world, and then maybe there'll be time for celebration. In the face of poverty, misery, and possible extinction, there is no time, or justification, for the contemplation of pleasure of any kind, these inner voices say. Close your ears to the ever-fainter sound of drums or pipes; the wild carnival and danced ritual belong to a distant time. The maenads are long dead, a curiosity for the classicists; the global "natives" have been subdued. Forget the past, which is half imagined anyway, and get to work.




The lack of common identity and involvement
The lack of common forms and structures, the enfeebling of associative institutions like the trade unions and local councils, means that most people have little or no power over the forces which govern their lives, and little commitment to the world around them as a public life. And this generates a crisis of socialisation. We lack strong and educative socializing agencies within the community, which in turn means that we lack the means of character formation, lack a sense of stable social identity. The result is profoundly desocializing and demoralizing.

This lack of involvement and identity results in a retreat from public commitments and community concerns into private life. Community is split along the lines of the core and the peripheral elements of the economy, with proletarianisation extending into the professions, casualization and short-term and zero hours contracts becoming prevalent. More and more people are being disconnected from what they do in their lives, and from the places where they do it. Where a connection and commitment remains, it is limited to personal life, ‘one’s own’ private space, which quickly narrows down to family, house, and car. These developments signal the retreat from the world of polites, those interested in public life and common affairs, to the world of idiotes, those interested only in private affairs. The atomistic conception of democracy is not a genuine democracy at all, it is an idiocracy. Such a society breeds not active, informed citizens, but uninvolved individuals passive in all things outside of personal significance. And this turn inward fits the morality of value judgements like a glove. Safely ensconced in the personal world of family, hobbies, and possessions, the individual sees the good in terms of personal likes and dislikes and loses the commitment to a larger ethic.
 
Housing the sacred, housing mystery
At this moment in history, ‘the ecological’ is making its presence felt not as principle in the abstract, but as a much needed mode of being in our practical lives. It is our particular mode to relate to and incarnate the mystery of the sacred immanence as it is experienced by each of us in both the large and the small. The ecological is the mode of consciousness that acknowledges the mystery of living into the future, that houses it without defining and confining it. 

In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber writes of the rational bureaucracy which characterises capitalist modernity as an ‘iron cage’ from which escape becomes increasingly improbable. Although the ‘iron cage’ metaphor is now well known, it fails to capture Weber’s precise meaning. Weber’s key point is that this casing embraces our very subjectivities, enclosing us so completely that we can no longer see the bars on the cage. 'Iron cage' therefore fails to convey Weber’s true meaning. Weber writes of the way in which 'the care for external goods', which Baxter says should 'lie on the shoulders of the "saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment”’, turns into ein stahlhartes Gehäuse: a casing, or housing, as hard as steel (Weber 1985: 181). It is in this sense that Weber could envisage a ‘rational’ socialism, as concerned with political control and economic organisation, as housing a new serfdom, perfecting the steel hard shell of bureaucratic capitalist modernity. An ‘iron cage’ is an external constraint which we may see clearly and escape in a physical sense. Weber’s Gehause is an altogether more repressive prison, embracing our very subjectivity. We do not see the bars on the cage, they are on the inside. Dependency on 'mech​anized petrification' forms an integral part of who we are. Instead of housing the psyche, we have disenchanted the world and imprisoned ourselves within a ‘mechanism’ premised on the 'objective indispensability' and ‘impersonal’ character of bureaucracy.

Weber’s realism is itself a lamentation for all that is lost as we come to be enclosed within the steel hard shell of modernity:





Ending his book quoting Goethe, Weber was acutely aware of the need to house the sacred. It’s just that he thought that the world we now live in was a thoroughly disenchanted environment, and that the old gods were beyond recall. Our housing is a steel hard casing. For Weber, the disenchantment of the world is a rationalisation that lacks moral significance and content. It is a rationalisation that is instrumental in being limited to means and silent on ends. The origin of the term is Friedrich Schiller and what he called die Entgotterung der Nature. This is the dedivinization or, more accurately, the dis-godding of nature (Herman, 1981: 57). All we have now is a polytheism of impersonal forces, with power rather than ethics deciding between them.

For Weber, the 'objective indispensability' of modern bureaucratic forms of organisation becomes ever more entrenched, in public and private life, so that the idea of their abolition 'becomes more and more Utopian': 'such a machine makes ‘revolution,’ in the sense of a forcible creation of entirely new formations of authority, technically more and more impossible, especially when the apparatus controls the modern means of communication .. and also by virtue of its internal rationalised structure’ (Weber 1970: 230). In fine, both the objective environment, thoroughly rationalized and bureaucratically administered, and the human condition determined by these structures, effectively resist re-enchantment. Not only are we condemned to live in an iron cage, we have become men and women wearing an iron mask. The cage is a psychic prison that embraces our subjectivities and blinds us to our true condition.

There is such a thing as an ecology of the imagination, something which draws on the moral, psychological and spiritual depths to envisage alternate futures, a housing of the sacred. 

I will now develop this notion of ‘housing’ with respect to our making a place of our own here on our Earthly home.

Letting the object in

‘This life's dim windows of the soul
Distorts the heavens from pole to pole
And leads you to believe a lie




To look through the eye rather than with the eye implies a distinctive way of seeing the world. Instead of an appropriating, classifying and colonising reason, which sees the world in terms of categories predetermined by the intellect, we make space for our other faculties – emotion, intuition, feeling, imagination, creativity – and in the process let the object in.

The ethical and the emotional
Aldous Huxley is pertinent when it comes to this question of housing. He wrote of the need to integrate reason with emotions and ethics. ‘For me,’ he wrote to Robert Nichols, ‘the vital problem is not the mental so much as the ethical and the emotional. The fundamental problem is love and humility, which are the same thing. The enormous difficulty of love and humility— a difficulty greater now, I feel, than ever; because men are more solitary now than they were; all authority has gone; the tribe has disappeared and every at all conscious man stands alone, surrounded by other solitary individuals and fragments of the old tribe, for which he feels no respect. 
. . And meanwhile the world is peopled with miserable beings who are neither one thing nor the other; who are solitary and yet not complete individuals . . .’ (Bedford 1973: 159). 

Isolated from each other, incapable of mounting a collective defence of the common life, the autonomous, self-interested, self-sufficient modern subject is a solitary, miserable being who falls well short of the true individuality human beings enjoy living the common life. This is the problematic running throughout my text, the problem to be cracked by developing collective modes of thought, action and organisation – embedding the individual within the form and forms of the common life.

A common Weltanschauung
It is useful, Aldous Huxley thought, to show precisely what the best and most intelligent human beings had agreed upon in the last three thousand years: ‘Seeing that it is perfectly obvious that we shall never get more than a temporary truce until most men accept a common Weltanschauung.’ Huxley thus defined an ethic of interconnection and interrelationship.

‘Never give children a chance of imagining that anything exists in isolation.
Make it plain from the very first that all living is relationship. Show them relationships in the woods, in the fields, in the ponds and streams, in the villages, and the country around it. Rub it in. And . . we always teach the science of relationship in conjunction with the ethics of relationship. Balance, give and take, no excesses— it's the rule in nature and, translated out of fact into morality, it ought to be the rule among people . . . children find it very easy to understand an idea when it's presented to them in a parable about animals . . .’

Huxley in Bedford 1974: 326

Aldous Huxley affirmed happiness as an intrinsic value and as an absolute good. He presented his argument in terms of virtue. Human beings cannot be happy unless they are virtuous: ‘Virtue is the essential preliminary to the mystical experience.’ And for Huxley, the supreme end of man is the mystical experience, enlightenment.

Putting reason and emotion together
By failing to integrate reason and emotion, by failing to give reason an ethical component, we have separated the worlds of fact and value and allowed distance to grow between them, thereby inviting the dissolution of a common moral worldview and its replacement by an instrumental, calculating, commercialising rationality. In face of the collective forces unleashed by our unmastered practice, we have lost our own forms of collective expression and governance. This has left the path clear for the selfish and the calculating to organise, entrench and extend their interests, allowing them to break down all forms of collective resistance – community and associative forms, traditions, moral codes – and enclose the global commons and expropriate common resources, land and labour both.






he does not care what colour you are
provided you work for him
   and yet you do!

he does not care how much you earn
provided you earn more for him
   and yet you do!

he does not care who lives in the room at the top
provided he owns the building
   and yet you strive!

he will let you write against him
provided you do not act against him
   and yet you write!

he sings the praises of humanity
but knows machines cost more than men.
Bargain with him, he laughs, and beats you at it;
challenge him, and he kills.
Sooner than loose the things he owns
he will destroy the world.
SMASH CAPITAL NOW!

   But as you hasten to be free
   And build your commonwealth
   Do not forget the enemy
   Who lies within yourself.

Christopher Logue  (1926-)

Front cover Workers’ Control Ken Coates and Tony Topham ed 1970 

The peace terms that nature will impose on us will be all the harsher for our failure to conquer ourselves, to come to terms with ourselves and settle internally the grounds on which we live. It makes sense to make whatever peace we can now. At this late stage, we require all our powers of reason to see a way through. However, reason needs to be joined with emotion, intuition, sympathy and empathy as major players, not mere minor partners, joining all the faculties in tandem within an integrated ethical system. The task before us is that of building a better society in harmony with nature, a society which integrates each individual and all individuals, living and non-living nature, and forms the natural environment as one whole commonwealth. 

I call this the commonwealth of virtue, in recognition of the fact that such a society can only be brought about by us as knowledgeable, moral agents, in unison with earth’s community of life. And this means we look at ourselves, reach within ourselves and explore the depths of our being, expose and address our fears, explore our desires and act on our hopes. We may not be the creators of the whole world around us, but we are its co-creators, and that entails a power and responsibility we need to live up to. This view presents a saner, more humble version of Stewart Brand’s God Species thesis. ‘We are as gods and HAVE to get good at it’, Brand asserts in Whole Earth Discipline. We have aspired to the status of gods, and have developed technical power of such capacity as to make the delusion plausible, at least for a while. Brand was half-right. We have to get good at exercising our powers, but we do this only by seeing ourselves as truly human beings, not gods. Wise use is possible only if we develop a wise technics, and see ourselves as co-creators in the creative universe, working with the inherent creativity of that universe rather than over and against it. 

Existential needs – rootedness, relations, power
Beyond basic needs, we have needs for rootedness, relations to others and to a bigger picture, embodiment. Erich Fromm refers to certain existential needs involved in recognising limits and finitude. This involves coming to recognise our mortality, the fact that the world will carry on without us, and the limits to our knowledge. Fromm expresses these existential needs in terms of rootedness and relationships, a unified worldview, stimulus and effectiveness. (Fromm 1977).

To be is to build. The old German root of the verb 'to build' denotes both to the process of making and of dwelling within. Martin Heidegger established the association between the German root, buan, ‘to build’ and the cognate, bin, ‘to be’. As we build, so we are. ‘I build, therefore I am’ could be the motto of the human race. We are what we build. And we build with more than physical things, we build with soul, values, ideas, ideals, and live in what we construct. We build the ground of our being and surround ourselves within nets of meaning. If we fail to house the psyche, we are ungrounded and unmoored, cast adrift. 
 
Housing and belonging
James Hillman writes well on housing and belonging with respect to familia. Living together in familiarity as a psychoeconomic organism— such is the meaning of family. Even the Greek word oikonomeia (from which come economy and economics) means household management or keeping house. The family is a function of the house, rather than vice versa, where house is the concrete container of multiple familiarities and intimacies, the domesticated (from domus = ‘house’) world of belongings—what belongs to us and to what we belong — and where ‘belonging’ also means what is fitting, appropriate and customary. (Hillman 1989 ch 9). 

The community of the soul
We need a community of the soul, argues Alistair McIntosh, spaces where we can ‘take rest, compose and compost our inner stuff, and become more deeply present to the aliveness of life.’ A home for the psyche, a housing of the sacred.

We need to keep one eye to the ground and the other to the stars. We need to remember that when we let loose our wildness in creativity, it is God-the-Goddess - or call it Christ, or Allah or Krishna or the Tao - that pours forth. It does so from within, as a never-ending river.




Housing our egos - belief as the ground we stand upon
Recognising the need to touch and move human beings at the level of appetite, desire, motivation – to form character and create dispositions to act well – points to the relevance of psychology, and the need to relate ethics to the life of the psyche. We are beyond reason and the intellect here. Any system of overall values we develop must be able to house the psyche, to provide a housing for being. 

Jose Ortega y Gasset is pertinent here, describing belief as something we inhabit, something we stand upon:

we have ideas, but we inhabit beliefs. Man always lives in the belief of this or that, and on the basis of these beliefs—which to him are reality itself—he exists, behaves and thinks. Thus even the most skeptical of man is a believer, and profoundly credulous.
It surprises me that Christian theologians never thought of this notion of belief, which would have enabled them to arrive at a simpler, more solid concept of faith, and to have provided—for the first time, albeit in a one sided way—a concrete, controllable meaning for St. Paul's sublime phrase that ‘we move, live, and are’ in Christ.

Jose Ortega y Gasset 1984: 21

We move, live and are participants in and members of a greater whole. Being is dwelling in, inhabiting, a familiar ground we know from the inside, not something we know about from the outside via the intellect. Our feelings and intuitions are as vital to the way we live our lives in the world as are our consciously articulated beliefs. They form the ground we stand upon, the world we inhabit, our knowing, living and being, who we are. 

Relationships and good health
 [useful and sensitive rules in functional communities]
Human health in the context of the total human environment
From the perspective of a humanist psychology, Carl Rogers affirms that human beings can develop into 'fully-functioning persons' by means of a natural process of organismic growth which requires nothing more than removing any obstacles that stand in the way of growth and providing the conditions and contexts for nurturing and enabling such growth. Rogers thus places the stress upon natural growth, something inherent in each and every person. Nothing more than unhindering and enabling is needed for natural growth to proceed. Human beings need nothing more than the appropriate habitus in order to be whole:





The concept of health needs to be broadened and deepened to set human action and growth within an ecological context. The concept of ecological health builds upon and enriches the views I have presented in earlier sections, emphasising that good health includes both our relationships with other living and non-living things in the natural environmental as well as our relationships to each other in the social environment. This recognition of interdependence has practical and ethical implications for the way we see ourselves and our lives, because it makes clear the extent to which the way we organise ourselves in society shapes our approach to the natural environment. Recognising interdependence, we see our responsibility and duty of care with respect to other groups of humans and to environments upon whose healthy flourishing all life depends. The concept of ecological health therefore gives us wise, useful and sensitive rules concerning living right within socially and ecologically functional communities, generating and reinforcing an ecological character and sensibility. Failure to follow these rules means that we will continue in our socially and ecologically dysfunctional ways, as a menace to ourselves, to other species and to the natural world. Simply, healthy, functional, flourishing social and ecological communities are to be achieved in one and the same process. This is to adhere to the mixed conception of the unity of social community and natural community outlined earlier. 

The concept of health therefore encompasses the functioning of ecological communities and the consideration of all living and non-living forms on the Earth. The term ‘sustainable development’ is now met with considerable scepticism, and with good reason. According to one count, there are some 140 different meanings attached to the term. The basic concept is easy enough to grasp (and easy enough to mangle and distort in practice). The United Nations (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​United_Nations" \o "United Nations​) World Commission on Environment and Development (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Brundtland_Commission" \o "Brundtland Commission​) (WCED) in its 1987 report Our Common Future (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Our_Common_Future" \o "Our Common Future​) defines sustainable development: ‘Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’ (Brundtland Commission (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Brundtland_Commission" \o "Brundtland Commission​) 1987).

Stated in this way, sustainable development is the organizing principle (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Organizing_principle" \o "Organizing principle​) for sustaining finite resources necessary to provide for the needs of future generations of life on the planet. It is a process that envisions a desirable future state for human societies in which living conditions and resource-use continue to meet human needs without undermining the ‘integrity, stability and beauty’ of natural biotic systems (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Biotic_community" \o "Biotic community​). (Leopold 1949).

An economic system that pursues economic expansion to infinity on a planet of finite resources is unsustainable, no matter the extent of our technological ingenuity. What began as the ‘limits to growth’ thesis evolved into the case for the no-growth society and now the de-growth movement. We have come to understand that an economic growth that consumes finite resources at exponential rates, pollutes the environment and expands material quantities at the expense of the quality of life involves a concept of growth that is detrimental to human, social and ecological health. It is unsustainable, in the sense of both sustainable development and sustainable living. The whole notion of growth has to be redefined so as to end its connection with a socially and environmentally destructive expansion, with the accent coming to be placed on healthy development and flourishing. The words ‘growth’ and ‘development’ need to be taken back from the world of endless economic expansion and restored to their original meanings. 

We live in an alienated social order in which creations have escaped the control and comprehension of their human creators, in which objects have acquired active existential significance whilst the human subjects have been turned into passive objects. ‘Money talks’, it is said. Money doesn’t talk; money does nothing. It is human beings who are the creative agents in this social world. Yet, through alienative social relations, social products such as capital and commodities possess an external collective and coercive force which constrains the actions of their human creators. Behind it all is the process of private capital accumulation as the central dynamic of the capital system. This is known euphemistically as ‘economic growth’. 

Nobel laureates call for a revolutionary shift in how humans use resources. (http://peakoil.com/consumption/nobel-laureates-call-for-a-revolutionary-shift-in-how-humans-use-resources (​http:​/​​/​peakoil.com​/​consumption​/​nobel-laureates-call-for-a-revolutionary-shift-in-how-humans-use-resources​)). The laureates state that mankind is living beyond its means and darkening its future, and call for a revolution in how humans live, work and travel. Only by switching to a smarter, less greedy use of resources can humans avert wrecking the ecosystems on which they depend. ‘The peril seems imminent,’ said US-Australian astrophysicist Brian Schmidt, co-holder of the 2011 Nobel physics prize for demonstrating an acceleration in the expansion of the universe. According to Peter Doherty, 1996 co-winner of the Nobel prize for medicine, the state of affairs is ‘catastrophic’. It is, but what’s new in this appraisal? 

The threat derives from ‘our exponentially growing consumption of resources, required to serve the nine billion or so people who will be on planet Earth by 2050, all of whom want to have lives like we have in the western world,’ said Schmidt. ‘We are poised to do more damage to the Earth in the next 35 years than we have done in the last 1,000.’
And …. we can guess the rest, having heard it a million times before. ‘We need to think sustainability – food sustainability, water sustainability, soil sustainability, sustainability of the atmosphere.’

We do. We have been thinking some such thing. But the problem is not ‘we.’ There is no ‘we’ as such in a social and political sense. Humanity is a biological entity, not a political one. Appeals to ‘humanity’ lack social and political relevance, and hence go unheeded. And we are baffled as to why people don’t listen. People do listen. It’s just that acting on warnings like this require the social and political organs of control and intervention that are lacking. And they require character and social identity which give us the will, appetite and ability to act. These too are lacking. The conventional political sphere is under the physical and, even more importantly, the systemic control of capital. The process of private accumulation must be facilitated and the interests of growth served, or else there is economic crisis and crash, loss of employment, investment and income, a decline in the resources upon which governments depend, unpopularity and illegitimacy. 

That’s the constraint that needs to be uprooted at base. It is easy enough to argue that ‘the economy’ must be subordinated to the preservation of and the health of the environment. It is clear that a free-for-all economy based on the pursuit of private interests is leading to the destruction of the common resources on which life and civilisation depends. But ‘we’ are not in control of ‘the economy’; ‘the economy’ is the capital system, comprising a whole social metabolic order including institutions of private property and division of labour. This system is indeed incompatible with sustainability. Its central premise is the self-expansion of monetary values and the endless accumulation of capital. This is a non-negotiable, however irrational and destructive, and no matter how wise and rational and informed the voices ranged against it, capital must expand its values or there is crisis and collapse. Capital is not a thing; capital is a social relation. We need to change the social relationships, recover our alienated social power and, in the process, constitute ourselves as the ‘we.’

The concept of ecological health recognises that human health needs to be seen in a complete environmental context, something which sets the health of the social world within the health of the physical and living world (the biosphere). Acid rain, ozone depletion, ocean acidification, global warming and climate change point to something very awry in the relations between development, human well-being and the biosphere. At the heart of the problem is an economy that is premised on exponential growth. 

Health, it follows, is more than the absence of disease, and has to be defined in the more expansive sense of the total social and natural environment. Our present way of life is socially and environmentally destructive, unravelling social ties and bonds, destabilising communities, dissipating moral and cultural resources and social and environmental practices that have been built up over generations, impairing the healthy functioning of the land, waterways, soils and biodiversity. Ecological health concerns our relationship with others and is concerned with functioning social and ecological communities. It is about truly dwelling in, and not just on, the Earth.

Health and well-being
In creating the social world as a second nature, we have removed ourselves further and further from first nature, in the process losing our connection with the mutually supportive relationships with the natural life processes that provide for physical, psychological and spiritual needs. 

At the heart of the quest for sustainability, however we care to define it, is the relationship between humanity and the land and ecosystems that support life on Earth. That relationship is a permanent feature of human life. Our quality of life depends ultimately upon the quality of the natural environment we inhabit. As Thomas Berry puts it, 'Human health is a subsystem of the Earth's health. You cannot have well humans on a sick planet. And that is what we are trying to do, with all our technologies: we are trying to have well humans on a sick planet.'

In A Sand County Almanac, Aldo Leopold began the search for an ecological morality, addressing ideas of 'right' and 'wrong' in ecological terms and extending ethics to embrace the land. For Leopold, ethics possess an ecological significance, arguing that 'an ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence' and established a standard that could be employed to distinguish social from anti-social conduct. For Leopold, the lack of any ethic 'dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' results in their degradation by economic forces. Leopold sought the extension of ethics to the natural environment as a condition for our survival and future well-being. Leopold's 'land ethic' 'simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land,’ a conception which also comprises mutual respect between human beings who share this common resource.

The need for a central ethical framework
Fundamentally, the idea of a land ethic entails a shared ethos which is capable of uniting wide, ideally all, sectors of society through founding a notion of the common good on the common ground we all stand upon. 

I have attempted to define this conception of the common good within a moral ecology would include the traditional themes of moral philosophy, rights, duties and obligations set within reciprocal relations which recognise that the freedom of each individual is conditional upon and coexistent with the freedom of all individuals. But putting the social world on a just and equitable basis requires that the environing natural world is also treated with respect and care. The ecological conception of the common good therefore entails ensuring the health of supportive ecosystems - land and landscapes, the atmosphere and climate, marine fisheries and oceans, fresh water and aquatic ecosystems, biodiversity, and so on, checking their degradation.

Establishing an overarching moral framework which commands common assent and enables concerted, decisive and effective action across policy areas is crucial in addressing environmental threats and ensuring harmony between human society and ecological systems. This central ethical system offers a critical support for a policy/action framework covering the comprehensive range of socio-ecological concerns such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, transport systems, energy infrastructures, water, urban regeneration and community architecture, alternative technology, social production and reproduction. This entails setting the ends of social and economic development within an ethical framework that recognizes both the importance of ecosystems in sustaining human and non-human life and the inherent value of nature in itself.

We need to bring the ecological and ethical perspectives together in a common moral framework that is capable of infusing our governance with a sense of direction and our practical economic activities with a sense of purpose. This common framework will be constituted by the reciprocal relations, expanded loyalties and communities outlined earlier. The universality of the common ethic is developed from below rather than imposed from above.

23 THE EVOLUTION OF UNIVERSAL COMMUNITY
Lewis Mumford refers to the birth of the person as making possible ‘the eventual emergence of united humanity, no longer separated by impassable cultural walls: individuation and unity thus go hand in hand.’ We become united with others as the world becomes our home. However, with this change, ‘man loosens his ties with blood and soil, which bound him to his limited past’. Mumford sees us as moving through three stages. First, we are earth-conditioned, then group-conditioned, but still largely the passive product of nature and culture, and finally we achieve self-direction and propels ourselves toward a universal community. (Mumford 1952 ch 4). The problem is that without an appreciation of the extent to which life remains dependent upon earth, this universal community is abstracted from the source of its own health and sustenance. We need to constitute this universal community via a recognition of our social and natural relations.

The obligation to join with others
[universal planetary ethic - our relationship to the world, including our communities - obligation to join with others]
Separation is the key figure in our environmental problems. As Al Gore writes, ‘this separation from community is clearly related to the assumption that we are separate from the earth. It has not only the same philosophical cause — the overriding faith in the power of the individual intellect — but also the same solution: a more balanced way of thinking about our relationship to the world, including our communities’ (Gore 2006: 279). We see here how an awareness of our ecological responsibilities widens the traditional concerns of political theory and practice. The reaffirmation of our connection to others in a political community, and our consent to be governed in accordance with the principle of self-assumed obligation, also involves an obligation ‘to join with others in adequately defending and protecting those of our rights — such as the right to breathe clean air and drink clean water — that are naturally among the individual rights belonging to others as well as to us, and are vested in the community — or nation, or world — as a whole’ (Gore 2006: 279).

The nonzero-sum moment - our welfare is crucially correlated with the welfare of the other
The call for a universal planetary ethic is a recognition that, in an age of globalised relationships, the one world of ‘perpetual peace’, in the words of philosopher Immanuel Kant, is coming to be within our grasp. 

Kant states the first definitive article of perpetual peace: First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace : The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican

A republican constitution is founded upon three principles: firstly, the principle of freedom for all members of a society (as men); secondly, the principle of the dependence of everyone upon a single common legislation (as subjects); and thirdly, the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens). It is the only constitution which can be derived from the idea.

Thus as far as right is concerned, republicanism is in itself the original basis of every kind of civil constitution, and it only remains to ask whether it is the only constitution which can lead to a perpetual peace.  

Second Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace: The Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States
Peoples who have grouped themselves into nation states may be judged in the same way as individual men living in a state of nature, independent of external laws; for they are a standing offence to one another by the very fact that they are neighbours. Each nation, for the sake of its own security, can and ought to demand of the others that they should enter along with it into a constitution, similar to the civil one, within which the rights of each could be secured. This would mean establishing a federation of peoples. But a federation of this sort would not be the same thing as an international state. For the idea of an international state is contradictory, since every state involves a relationship between a superior (the legislator) and an inferior (the people obeying the laws), whereas a number of nations forming one state would constitute a single nation. And this contradicts our initial assumption, as we are here considering the right of nations in relation to one another in so far as they are a group of separate states which are not to be welded together as a unit. 

This federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of a state, but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself, along with that of the other confederated states, although this does not mean that they need to submit to public laws and to a coercive power which enforces them, as do men in a state of nature. It can be shown that this idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states and thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality. For if by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic (which is by its nature inclined to seek perpetual peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among other states. These will join up with the first one, thus securing the freedom of each state in accordance with the idea of international right, and the whole will gradually spread further and further by a series of alliances of this kind. 

Kant PP in Reiss ed 1996: 103-104

The word ‘planetary’ in the concept of ‘universal planetary ethic’ emphasises that we are in the process of creating the ‘one world’ as a political entity commensurate with the one Earth on which and in which we live. No part of this world can be exploited or degraded without harmful consequences for the entire system. We need that universal planetary ethic, with a common good being embodied in and expressed by a common institutional framework.

Emergence of a global civil society and global governance

Human civilization is now so complex and diverse, so sprawling and massive, that it is difficult to see how we can respond in a coordinated, collective way to the global environmental crisis. But circumstances are forcing just such a response; if we cannot embrace the preservation of the earth as our new organizing principle, the very survival of our civilization will be in doubt.

Gore 2006 ch 15

The merit of Tim Flannery’s case for global governance and cooperation is that it makes clear how much scope we have for intervening in the seemingly vast and uncontrollable transformations so as to alter directions in favour of the preservation of life on Earth. How much ‘choice’ we have in this can only be discovered in practice, increasing its scope and parameters by the creation of collective organs and mechanisms of control. At present, the important thing to establish is that we have scope for action. It lies within our capabilities to form a global compact to care for Earth and for one another. We certainly have it within our power to avoid self-destruction, as well as the destruction of the diversity of life. We are certainly capable of destroying ourselves as well as biodiversity, as we have been busy proving. 

Fundamental changes in our values, institutions, and ways of living are needed and are possible. Each stage in history has been characterised by fundamental transformations in forms of governance, worldviews and economic systems. The modern world is characterised by rapid, continuous and far reaching change, ‘all that is solid melts into air’ as Marx put it. That kind of change has reached its limit. But change is possible, and we possess a greater degree of consciousness and reflexivity than any previous age. Having been so assertive with regard to our powers for transformation, it seems incongruous to become all coy at the moment when a greater sense of purpose and direction on our part promises the deepest of transformations. We have reached a level of self-knowledge that allows us to shape the character of our practical interchange with nature. We know, for instance, that once basic needs have been satisfied, human happiness and development concerns qualitative factors more than the further accumulation of material quantity. The Easterlin paradox, named after economist Richard Easterlin, states that once basic needs for housing, food, water and energy have been satisfied, average happiness does not increase with increased income. Beyond the satisfaction of basic needs, more money doesn't mean more happiness. Beyond material security, increased money detracts from human needs. At this point, human development is about being much, not having more. That being the case, it makes sense to ensure even development across the world, as opposed to letting material inequalities increase through continued economic expansion, over-development in one part of the world bringing less rather than more happiness, under-development in another part of the world ensuring that basic needs remain unmet. We have the technology, know-how and material resources to provide for all whilst reducing our impacts on the environment. (Brown 2001; Brown 2011).

At the same time, the potential for deepening and widening the scope of democracy is being developed through the participatory revolution underway in civil society. Indeed, the emergence of a global civil society is offering a democratic alternative to the unsocial globalisation that has brought the world together under the control of the transnational corporations and global finance. The fact that our ecological, economic, political, social, and spiritual challenges are interconnected gives us the opportunity to join together to build a democratic and humane world.

As Robert Wright, author of The Moral Animal and Nonzero, wrote in the New York Times: ‘All along, technological evolution has been moving our species toward this nonzero-sum moment, when our welfare is crucially correlated with the welfare of the other, and our freedom depends on the sympathetic comprehension of the other ... a religious motivation isn't necessary. Simple self-interest will do. That's the beauty of the thing.’

This is quite a claim, in that it indicates that enlightened self-interest written into our social evolution will suffice to bring the world together. Wright emphasises a mutual interest that unites each and all within our historical development. Which begs the question as to where it has been in the positive sum world that has emerged. I take the view that ‘religious motivation isn’t necessary’ to be defensible in the sense that an ethics which stands outside of the development of human social relationships in history lacks social relevance, and is incapable of motivating behaviour. 

Wright’s view for a nonzero society would appear to be stronger than this, a view which implies the sufficiency of an evolved rational self-interest. It is a view based upon Charles Darwin:





We live in an era that has become sceptical of ideas of ‘progress’ written into history or social and technological evolution. A mere hint of teleology or purpose is enough to cause the flesh of some to creep. So there is something refreshing about Wright’s argument and the way that he sees direction in history:

The Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg once ended a book on this note: ‘The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless.’ Far be it from me to argue with a great physicist about how depressing physics is. For all I know, Weinberg's realm of expertise, the realm of inanimate matter, really does offer no evidence of overarching purpose. But when we move into the realm of animate matter— bacteria, cellular slime molds, and, most notably, human beings—the situation strikes me as different. The more closely we examine the drift of biological evolution and, especially, the drift of human history, the more there seems to be a point to it all. Because in neither case is ‘drift’ really the right word. Both of these processes have a direction, an arrow. At least, that is the thesis of this book. 

Wright 2001 Intro 

Wright makes the case for the world moving in the direction of becoming a non-zero sum society, the cooperative society I sought to develop earlier in relation to games theory:

On the day James Watson and Francis Crick discovered the structure of DNA, Crick, as Watson later recalled it, walked into their regular lunch place and announced that they had ‘found the secret of life.’ With all due respect for DNA, I would like to nominate another candidate for the secret of life. Unlike Francis Crick, I can't claim to have discovered the secret I'm touting. It was discovered—or, if you prefer, invented—about half a century ago by the founders of game theory, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. 




Sometimes political scientists or economists break human interaction down into zero-sum and non-zero-sum components. Occasionally, evolutionary biologists do the same in looking at the way various living systems work. My contention is that, if we want to see what drives the direction of both human history and organic evolution, we should apply this perspective more systematically. Interaction among individual genes, or cells, or animals, among interest groups, or nations, or corporations, can be viewed through the lenses of game theory.

Wright’s contention is that you can capture history's basic trajectory by reference to a core pattern: 

New technologies arise that permit or encourage new, richer forms of non-zero-sum interaction; then (for intelligible reasons grounded ultimately in human nature) social structures evolve that realize this rich potential—that convert non-zero-sum situations into positive sums. Thus does social complexity grow in scope and depth. 

Wright 2001 Intro 6-7

History with a happy ending. Wright is giving us a commedia for our times, one based on an entirely naturalistic explanation that requires no extraneous religious or ethical input or stimulus. And Wright backs his argument with factual data, anthropology, biology and game theoretic reasoning:

This isn't to say that non-zero-sum games always have win-win outcomes and never have lose-lose outcomes. Badly governed societies are littered with losses, and history is littered with the remains of badly governed societies. Nor is it to say that the powerful and the treacherous never exploit the weak and the naive; exploitation — ranging from clear-cut parasitism to subtler inequity — is often possible in non-zero-sum games, and history offers plenty of examples. Still, on balance, over the long run, non-zero-sum situations produce more positive sums than negative sums, and more mutual benefit than parasitism. As a result, people become embedded in larger and richer webs of interdependence.

Wright 2001 Intro 
 
Wright’s argument is that both organic and human history involve the playing of evermore-numerous, ever-larger, and ever-more-elaborate non-zero-sum games. He calls the growth in biological and social complexity an accumulation of ‘non-zero-sumness.’ Non-zero-sumness is a kind of potential — a potential for overall gain, or for overall loss, depending on how the game is played. Non-zero-sumness, Wright argues, is something whose ‘ongoing growth and ongoing fulfilment define the arrow of the history of life, from the primordial soup to the World Wide Web.’

You-might even say that non-zero-sumness is a nuts-and-bolts, materialist version of Bergson's immaterial elan vital; it gives a certain momentum to the basic direction of life on this planet. It explains why biological evolution, given enough time, was very likely to create highly intelligent life — life smart enough to generate technology and other forms of culture. It also explains why the ensuing evolution of technology, and of culture more broadly, was very likely to enrich and expand the social structure of that intelligent species, carrying social organization to planetary breadth. Globalization, it seems to me, has been in the cards not just since the invention of the telegraph or the steamship, or even the written word or the wheel, but since the invention of life. The current age, in which relations among nations grew more non-zero-sum year by year, is the natural outgrowth of several billion years of unfolding non-zero-sum logic.

Wright 2001 Intro 7-8

If this conversion of non-zero-sum situations into mostly positive sums is written into social and historical evolution, why bother with ethics? Indeed, what role does creative human agency play in this evolution? Karl Marx thought that socialism as a social system that would necessarily replace capitalism, a view that was mistakenly understood to be an inevitabilism. Marx, writing from an essentialist position, saw history as containing necessary lines of development. The objective socialisation of the capital economy created the potential for what Marx called socialism, but no guarantees that that potential would become actual. The realisation of that potential was necessary to resolve the contradictory dynamics and crises of the capital economy, but not inevitable. Lines of development can be frustrated. The agency of realisation, what in Aristotelian terms would be called the efficient cause – the proletariat in the Marxist idiom – could fail to act or could be blocked from acting. Set in these terms of creative agency, the unfolding of essences, potentials becoming actuals and, I would add, an ethics of flourishing, then Wright’s argument is entirely consistent with the one I have been making. At no point have I argued in favour of an ethical argument being introduced into human nature and behaviour from the outside, at all times I have been working with the development of an innate moral grammar in relation to social and cultural evolution as the creation of capabilities.

And, consistent with the case I have made, Wright makes an explicitly essentialist argument, employing the essentialist metaphysics that I have defended elsewhere and which is at the core of my case for ‘rational freedom.’ He writes:

Some people may consider it cheating to use the word ‘destiny’ when you mean not ‘inevitable’ but ‘exceedingly likely.’ Would you consider it cheating to say that the destiny of a poppy seed is to become a poppy? Obviously, a given poppy seed may not become a poppy. Indeed, the destiny of some poppy seeds seems — in retrospect, at least — to have been getting baked onto a bagel. And even poppy seeds that have escaped this fate, and landed on soil, may still get eaten (though not at brunch) and thus never become flowers.
Still, there are at least three reasons that it seems defensible to say that the ‘destiny’ of a poppy seed is to become a poppy. First, this is very likely to happen under broadly definable circumstances. Second, from the seed's point of view, the only alternative to this happening is catastrophe — death, to put a finer point on it. Third, if we inspect the essence of a poppy seed — the DNA it contains — we find it hard to escape the con​clusion that the poppy seed is programmed to become a poppy. Indeed, you might say the seed is designed to become a poppy, even though it was ‘designed’ not by a human designer, but by natural selection. For anything other than full-fledged poppyhood to happen to a poppy seed — for it to get baked onto a bagel or eaten by a bird — is for the seed's true expression to be stifled, its naturally imbued purpose to go unrealized.




Let’s call it a restricted teleology, a teleology that has no need to impute some ‘higher’ agency or extraneous design from outside the natural unfolding of immanent purpose. It is central to my own position. De Sousa writes of a restricted, naturalistic teleology, an objective vestigial teleology, anchored in the reproduction of genetic forms:

But that apparent teleology reveals no unified plan. For that reason, social scientists have tended to regard the biological level of explanation of human behaviour as useless. They are right to stress the immense diversity of conscious and unconscious motives that drive human beings. In the last analysis, however, the capacities that make such abundance possible must be rooted in biology. Over the course of evolution, organisms have elaborated all kinds of strategies in the pursuit of their myriad intermediate goals — ranging from the representation of the three-dimensional space in which we navigate to the recognition of desirable qualities in a sexual partner. We should expect these strategies to prove as disparate in their functioning as our bodily organs. And there is no reason to believe that our cognitive modules will always work smoothly together.

de Sousa 2007: 81-82

But we can connect biological and cultural evolution. Wright makes a plausible case for teleology as a meaningful notion in evolution, spanning both nature and culture:





And just to answer the familiar criticism of essentialism for the umpteenth time, none of this entails a view that ‘progress’ is some inevitable, inexorable process written into nature and history, proceeding over the heads of the agents who are the efficient causes of events. Lines of development may be necessary, but they are brought to fruition only by action. Fail to act, and development does not take place. 

Essentialism refers to the growth of an organism into becoming what it has the potential to be. And it is an unfolding from within society and its evolution, not just nature:





We have reached a number of critical thresholds. Following political theorist David Held, I call them crises with transformative potential (Held 1987). Whether we resolve these crises positively depends, in large part, upon the extent to which we develop the political, institutional, intellectual and moral capacities to act. Wright presents an apocalyptic vision:





Wright gave us the history of the decade which was to follow. Many think that the resolution of these crises is beyond us, and are advocating an abandonment of the delusions of ‘progress.’ Rather than pursue great and ambitious solutions to our problems, they say, we should be more humble and look to forms of local resilience and personal salvation. I have no problems with rejecting hubris and delusions of ‘progress’ at all. And I am all in favour of developing local communities and resilient communities of place and purpose. But in light of the argument presented here, this scaling back of ambitions could be a fatal mistake. When the problems are big, there is a need to think big and act big. There is nothing inevitable in history, and there is nothing given in social and biological evolution. Lines of development can be frustrated. We need to develop the subjective factor so as to ensure objective potentialities are realised as actualities, so that the non-zero sum game is converted into the positive sum society. 

And here Wright does indeed acknowledge the active role of politics and ethics:





I want to emphasise these terms: ‘political imagination’ and ‘moral imagination’. This is the world of practical reason I have been highlighting throughout, ethics and politics as the game-changers with respect to the social and environmental crises we face. How we do in meeting this challenge depends on the extent to which we are prepared to face the challenge in the first place. Many think that that whole notion is misguided, that it involves a continued belief in ‘progress,’ the very thinking that has brought us to the abyss. So they sound the retreat. The view is plausible. The crisis we face threatens an eco-catastrophe that itself has all the hallmarks of inevitability. But sounding the retreat at this stage could well be the worst thing to do. This is an evolutionary game in which the stakes are the highest they could be; we win big or lose big on this. We are clearly coming to the point when, not only, is it all hands on deck, it is all cards on the table. To throw our hands in now signifies a spectacular loss of nerve. Having gone into this game so far and so deep, there is no backing down without big consequences. There can be no scaling back. The large forces we have unleashed will not go away, with or without eco-catastrophe. In the aftermath of any crash, rest assured, we will be facing the same problems of power, control, resources, technology – we will be confronted with politics, developing our own or being governed by an ‘alien politics’ (Thomas 1994). And in more straitened circumstances. To opt for a vision of localised communities at this stage in history does not solve the big problem we face, it merely postpones it. It is an evasion:

So how will we do on this test? Judging by history, the current turbulence will eventually yield to an era of relative stability, an era when global political, economic, and social structures have largely tamed the new forms of chaos. The world will reach a new equilibrium, at a level of organization higher than any past equilibrium. And the period we are now entering will, in retrospect, look like the storm before the calm.




And with that view I am in fundamental agreement. The potentiality for a positive outcome exists, and can be actualised if we develop our political, moral, organisational and psychological capacities. That is a big ‘if,’ of course. But to get into the mentality of equating the difficult with the impossible is a sure fire way of ensuring that probably odds harden into the inevitability of a bleak outcome.

We have plenty in our tool-kit to change the odds in our favour. ‘All told, our menu of options is rich, ranging from self-annihilation to graceful adaptation, and emphatically including the middle prospect of a long and turbulent adjustment full of strife and suffering. It is the destiny of our species—and this time I mean the inescapable destiny, not just the high likelihood—to choose’ (Wright 2001: 10).

And the time to choose is now. Are there reasons to hope? Following Wright’s argument, the answer is affirmative, pointing to increasing complexity, globalisation of social relations, extended communications and networks, new technologies all bringing the peoples of the world into connection. We are all connected biologically and ecologically, and we have been brought into increasing connection socially and politically. This has been achieved by the globalisation of economic relations. The challenge now is to raise that global interconnection to consciousness at the level of moral principle.

Wright asks whether goodness is too much to ask of an architect whose plans included natural selection. Natural selection is a cutthroat, zero-sum struggle for finite resources. And there are no rules. So how much good could come of that? ‘More than you might think,’ answers Wright, who emphasises how this dynamic has had the paradoxical effect of weaving ever-larger non-zero-sum webs, from a single strand of DNA all the way up to a society of multicellular animals. He points to the attendant growth in data processing, hence sentience, hence meaning, leading up to some semblance of actual good. When the impetus of non-zero-sumness reached the level of animal societies, it entailed ‘the invention and proliferation of love.’ More accurately, in terms of biological explanation, it entailed the evolution of altruistic behaviour among close kin, which in turn seems to have entailed — for reasons concealed in the more general mystery of consciousness — the subjective experience of love. With the arrival of altruism, animals were doing more than eat each other; ‘they were helping each other, and feeling good about it to boot.’ (Wright 2001 ch 22). 

Wright proceeds to discuss the evolution of intra-family altruism. ‘With closely related organisms tending to start out life near each other, commonality of Darwinian interest is thick, just waiting to be harnessed by the logic of kin selection.’ From maternal devotion, the original form of kin-directed love, other forms of altruism followed, branching out from paternal and sibling love to embrace others. This tendency of human beings to form bonds beyond close relations is central to the long geographic expansion of non-zero-sumness. The closer loyalty to ‘our own’ remains, but the tendency of reciprocal altruism is to generate wider loyalties. For all the underlying cold calculation at work, reciprocal altruism involves a heartfelt obligation, even affection, which is capable of expanding outwards to embrace ever more distant others. Natural selection thus created goodness by inventing altruism. Biological evolution thus dovetails neatly into cultural evolution, the second great evolutionary force, with which any hopes for expanding goodness would now lie. (Wright 2001 ch 22). 

Wright points out the downside of this bonding through affection, the phenomenon of the ‘Texas cheerleader’s mom’ who was convicted of plotting to murder her daughter's rival. Love is, by design, an invidious emotion. This all raises, again, the issue I addressed earlier of where our primary loyalties lie and the extent to which we widen the circle beyond those closest to us. ‘The problem isn't just that love gets extended selectively, often coming to a screeching halt at the bounds of family. The problem is that love is often deployed to the active detriment of people beyond the family. It's a jungle out there, after all, and we want our loved ones to triumph.’ (Wright 2001 ch 22). Loyalty begins with those closest to us, but it need not end there. Wright gives reasons for a branching out through the combination of reciprocal altruism and cultural evolution. Love, of course, needs to be directed to its true ends. In making that claim, I am, of course, drawing upon an older ethical tradition … 

Wright emphasises the extent to which people cooperate to evade such things as terrorism, international crime, environmental calamity, and economic collapse. ‘More than before, non-zero-sumness can thrive without zero-sumness as its ultimate source’, so that the conservation of antipathy is in the process of being repealed. (Wright 2001 ch 22). 

Is natural selection enough to produce non-zero-sumness? Is self-interest compatible with the cooperative society? I argue that egoism and altruism are two permanent aspects of the same human nature. What matters is how these aspects are canalised through social relations and structures. 

Egoism, self-seeking behaviour, can be expressed in both individual and collective forms, and can generate selfishness or a sectionalism that undermines notions of the public good. That kind of egoism needs to be rejected as an obstacle to the truly human society. But egoism as such cannot be extirpated. Further, the key to change lies in creating a social identity, complete with patterns of behaviour, contexts and social forms, which connect egoism and altruism as two aspects of the same human nature.

Matt Ridley notes a paradox in the common view of self-interest:

People are generally against it; they despise greed and warn each other against people who have a reputation for too closely pursuing their own ambitions. Similarly, they admire the disinterested altruist; tales of such people's selflessness become legend. So it is pretty clear that on a moral level, everybody agrees that altruism is good and selfishness bad.
So why are more people not altruists? The exceptions — the Mother Theresas and saints — are almost by definition remarkable and rare. How many people do you know who are true altruists, always thinking about others and never themselves? Very, very few. 

Ridley’s point is that while we universally admire and praise selflessness, we do not expect it to rule our lives or those of our close friends. To put it crudely, we praise selflessness and practise selfishness. Ridley calls this ‘perfectly rational.’ ‘The more other people practise altruism, the better for us, but the more we and our kin pursue self-interest, the better for us. That is the prisoner's dilemma. Also, the more we posture in favour of altruism, the better for us.’ (Ridley 1996: 145). 





‘The virtues of tolerance, compassion and justice are not policies towards which we strive, knowing the difficulties upon the way, but commitments we make and expect others to make — gods we pursue. Those who raise difficulties, such as economists saying that self-interest is our principal motivation, are to be distrusted for their motives in not worshipping the gods of virtue. That they do so suggests that they may not themselves be believers. They show, as it were, an unhealthy interest in the subject of self-interest.’ (Ridley 1996: 146).

We may refer here to Robert Franks’ attempts to build a bridge between Adam Smith’s apparently irrational assumption that people are driven by moral sentiments and his devotion to rational self-interest as the wellspring of a successful economy: a bridge between his first and second books. Here we come to the Adam Smith problem:

In his first book Adam Smith argued that if individuals had sufficient common interest in the good of their group, they would combine to suppress the activities of members acting contrary to the group's welfare. Bystanders would interfere to punish anti-social actions. But in his second book, Smith seemed to undermine this argument by suggesting that societies are not public goods carefully protected by individuals but are the almost inevitable side-effect of individuals striving in their own, individual interests.
The Germans, who, it seems, in their methodical manner commonly read both Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations, have coined a pretty term, Das Adam Smith Problem, to denote the failure to understand either which results from the attempt to use the one in the interpretation of the other.
Viner, quoted in Coase 1976: 529-46

Ridley describes the emergence of nonzero sumness as a result of natural selection: ‘Frank's theory of moral sentiments resolves this paradox and builds another, more modern bridge - between reciprocity and groupishness. By emphasizing that the challenge in the prisoner's dilemma game is to attract the right partner, he shows how reciprocators precipitate out of society, leaving the selfish rationalists to their fate. The virtuous are virtuous for no other reason than that it enables them to join forces with others who are virtuous, to mutual benefit. And once cooperators segregate themselves off from the rest of society a wholly new force of evolution can come into play: one that pits groups against each other, rather than individuals.’ (Ridley 1996: 147).

This returns to the point I established earlier with respect to forming clusters of co-operators and the ratchet effect which increases cooperation and drives out defectors and free riders. And this expansion in cooperation is built into social evolution on the basis of natural selection. 

Natural selection’s invention of altruism, biological evolution's expansion of meaning and goodness, and cultural evolution's movement towards the moral threshold of non-zero-sumness offer no proof of a benign universal architect. But these developments are ‘closer to being evidence of divinity than its opposite would be. Once you've accepted that evil is, for whatever reason, built into the fabric of human — indeed, organic — experience, the basic trend lines don't look all that bad.’ (Wright 2001: 327).

Which is to say, that once we’ve accepted the operation of natural selection and the ineliminable force of self-interest, there is every reason to envisage a happy ending. 

There is, however, an ambiguity in Wright’s reasoning that demands clarification. He writes of ‘trend lines’ and emphasises the evolution of cultural phenomena which serve to bring more and more people together. The problem is that this would appear to make human beings the passive bearer of trends written into the historical process, not active agents of that process:





The argument is phrased in such a way as to make empathy, affection, moral concern and goodness mere passive products of cultural, or even just technological, developments. So what, one may ask, if a benevolent outcome issues? The denial of creative, moral agency is a great loss indeed, striking at the core of human self-identity. It also underestimates the very force which brings a degree of self-consciousness to the historical process, the very force which alone could justify Wright’s claim that biological evolution comes to ‘surrender’ to cultural evolution. Wright gives sound evolutionary reasons for increasing human cooperation, non-zero-sumness leading to the positive sum global society. Human beings, as conscious, knowledgeable and creative agents are capable of acting in light of such awareness, capable of acting so as to actualise the full potentialities in any trend or line of development. In other words, I read Wright’s argument as entailing a form of human self-knowledge and self-understanding, as evolution becoming conscious through the human species. Which points to human beings as creative agents of the evolutionary process, not passive bearers of evolutionary trends and tendencies. We are in the realm of cultural evolution, and will, consciousness, desire, appetite, in short the voluntarism that comes with creative agency matters, gives living, breathing content to the notion of ‘progress’ as human development.

Wright recognises that nothing brings people together, heart to heart, quite like a war. That kind of bonding is impossible on a planetary scale. However, there are other common challenges, poverty, hunger, environmental distress, which possess bonding power of a universal scale. In A Blueprint for a Safer Planet, Nicholas Stern identifies fighting poverty and combating climate change as the ‘two great challenges of the twenty-first century’ (Stern 2006 ch 1). It’s the same challenge and same fight, and there is ample scope for bonding on a universal level in coming to take effective action on both fronts.
 
‘This doesn't mean that combatting global warming will lead to a transnational lovefest’, Wright acknowledges, but it is evidence that war is not the only thing capable of bringing large numbers of people together: ‘as global interdependence thickens, long-distance amity can in principle grow even in the absence of external enmity.’

Global interdependence is certainly something to build on. It’s not just the extent of human connections that is significant but their increasing intensity. ‘There is no telling what it could mean as technology keeps advancing; as the World Wide Web goes broad bandwidth, so that any two people anywhere can meet and chat virtually, visually (perhaps someday assisted, where necessary, by accurate automated translation). One can well imagine, as the Internet nurtures more and more communities of interest, true friendships more and more crossing the most dangerous fault lines—'boundaries of religion, of nationality, of ethnicity, of culture.’





But, whether or not I'm straining to find divinity, I don't think I'm straining to find meaning. The point isn't just that, for reasons that are exceedingly hard to fathom, we have consciousness, and thus are playing for real moral stakes. The point is that we are playing for the highest stakes in history. More souls are crammed onto this planet than ever, and there is the real prospect of commensurately great peril. At the same time, there is the prospect of building the infrastructure for a planetary first: enduring global concord.

Wright 2001 ch 22

Through cultural evolution, human beings have been establishing the foundations for peace, freedom, fulfilment and flourishing around the world. ‘It may literally be within the power of our species to swing nature’s moral scales — which for so long tended to equilibrate near dead even, at best — decisively in the direction of good.’

Wright speculates that it may be up to us, having inherited only the most ambiguous evidence of divinity, to construct clearer evidence in the future. Which is to say that history is not the product of divinity but the realization of divinity, ‘assuming our species is up to the challenge, that is.’ One theologian has paraphrased Teilhard as believing that ‘God must become for us less Alpha than Omega.’ American physicist Frank Tipler writes: 'People talk of God as the creator of life. But maybe the purpose of life is to create God.' (Tipler 1994). Are we up to that challenge? In Whole Earth Discipline (2010), Stewart Brand declares: ‘We are as gods and HAVE to get good at it.’ He then proceeds to deify a whole range of technologies, from GE crops to nuclear power to various forms of geo-engineering.

Nietzsche argued that ‘Man ought not to know more of a thing than he can creatively live up to.' With the ‘death of God’, human beings are charged with the responsibility to live as gods. Nietzsche suspected that they might well not be up to the burden. Human beings should only have such power that they can creatively live up to. Power not used creatively comes to be used destructively. According to 2011 figures, global arms expenditure stands at $1.738 trillion (The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute calculates). Means of production have become means of destruction. We have the potential to realize divinity, but it is being diverted and perverted into sterile and destructive channels.

The belief in the likely emergence of a feasible infrastructure for concord does not rob the present of dramas and dilemmas. As Wright says, ‘one plausible route to long-run success is near-term catastrophe.’ People like Guy McPherson are arguing not just for catastrophe but for Near Term Human Extinction. We are plainly poised on a knife-edge:





And here Wright does recognise the importance of creative human agency in tilting the balance in favour of universal concord. Whether potentials for amity and goodness within current lines of development are realised depends upon continued moral growth on our part. The problems we face are great, but not insurmountable. Lawrence Torcello and Michael Mann state our predicament:

Industrial civilization must become technologically, economically, politically, and morally sustainable to hold the earth’s temperature below 2°C (3.6°F) higher than its preindustrial average. The problem is not (​http:​/​​/​thinkprogress.org​/​climate​/​2014​/​05​/​13​/​3436923​/​germany-energy-records​/​​) insurmountable (​http:​/​​/​www.nytimes.com​/​2014​/​09​/​19​/​opinion​/​paul-krugman-could-fighting-global-warming-be-cheap-and-free.html?_r=0​). It is possible, then, that we’ll benefit in the long run from having to deal with human-caused global warming, by being forced to mature politically and ethically.




The hard facts are these, once tipping points are reached, numerous positive feedback loops will be/are being unleashed. Despite targets and government commitments to cutbacks, despite the deepest economic recession for eighty years, our emissions have continued to increase. We have now passed the figure of 400 ppm in the atmosphere of CO2. And this is as a result of emissions released in the past forty years. In addition to these, we have to take into consideration current and ever increasing emissions. There is no easy way to get these figures back below 350 ppm. Let’s recognise and face the difficulty. Robert Wright gives evolutionary reasons to argue we are ‘close to inevitable stable world governance’ ‘in the long run’. The only problem is that many think collapse in the near term is inevitable. They claim that the ‘long run’ is no longer available to us. Hence the case many have made against my emphasis on ecological virtue – we no longer have the time for the character formation and social formation I write in favour of. My response is that we do what we need to do in the immediate whilst setting those actions within the substantial transformations of social structures, institutions and behaviours.

‘There are many ways to react to all this, but nihilism and ennui don't seem to me among the more logical’, says Wright (Wright 2001: 333). And, in full recognition of the climate threat we face, I agree with him. There may be plenty of things that are now beyond our control with respect to climate change, but there are things that are available to human intervention and alteration. To focus on the former invites hedonism and despair; to focus on the latter is much more productive.

Wright refers to a several-billion-year exercise in game theory culminating in non-zero-sumness. He compares biological and cultural evolution to the way Hegel viewed human history — as a very long argument concerning how to organize organic entities:

One scholar has rendered logos as the ‘point,’ the ‘purpose’ — the end that one has in mind. And, indeed, the religiously inclined might speculate that the spiritual corollary of the triumph of non-zero-sumness — the expansion of humanity's moral compass — was the purpose of history's game-theoretical argument all along. In the beginning, you might say, was the end, and the end was a basic truth — the equal moral status of all human beings. 

Wright 2001 ch 22

The idea that a kind of logos might be the force guiding a directional history is very old. Philo of Alexandria argued for a ‘divine Logos’ permeating human history, a rational principle that was both immanent in the world and part of God's transcendent mind. And the Logos was moving in the direction of world unity: ‘The whole world may become, as it were, one city and enjoy the best of polities, a democracy.’ 

Whilst Philo lacked access to game theory, he certainly understood the condition of niceness which is crucial to the success of TIT FOR TAT and to the triumph of non-zero-sumness. ‘Be kind, for everyone you meet is fighting a hard [or great] battle’, he said.  And he was right. Philo certainly understood the moral point of games theory. Mutual need, he believed, wove all God's diverse creatures — people, plants, animals — into the one whole. God ‘has made none of these particular things complete in itself, so that it should have no need at all of other things,’ Philo wrote. ‘Thus through the desire to obtain what it needs, it must perforce approach that which can supply its needs, and this approach must be mutual and reciprocal. Thus through reciprocity and combination, even as a lyre is formed of unlike notes, God meant that they should come to fellowship and concord and form a single harmony, and that a universal give-and-take should govern them, and lead up to the consummation of the whole world.’

The argument is similar to the one that St. Thomas Aquinas made with respect to diversity, the incompleteness of each thing meaning that completeness requires a whole of all things together.

Game theorists have done excellent work in demonstrating the logic of interdependence, but they are essentially reminding us of central truths known to ancient philosophies and religions, teaching unity and meaningfulness through kindness, mercy, forgiveness, love, friendship, compassion. As Jonathan Sacks writes in The Politics of Hope:

Isaiah's 'Seek justice, encourage the oppressed, defend the cause of the fatherless, plead the case of the widow', or Micah's 'What does the Lord require of you but to act justly, love mercy and walk humbly with your God?' are not revolutionary programmes. They are reminders that with every act of kindness we undertake, every virtue we develop, every love we translate into life, we help to mend a fractured world and make society a little more just, a little less abrasive and inhumane.

Sacks 2000 ch 22

Wright says much the same thing using an evolutionary argument, ending with an ‘Amen to that’. (Wright 2001: 334). 

And here is the point to the essentialist metaphysics I defend (and which are central to Marx): there is nothing inevitable about anything in history. The possibility for universal concord is real and exists, but the possibility of universal enmity and destruction is also real. A moral growth points to our becoming aware of our role as change agents, taking responsibility for actions and outcomes. Wright describes the complexities of the human story as a story of growing knowledge, scientific and moral:





At this stage in history we win big or we lose big. And for Wright, this drama maybe the best argument we have for higher purpose: ‘that the history of life on earth is too good a story not to have been written.’ 





Slowly but surely we have been advancing towards an appreciation of the world as a single unity. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries saw the great sea voyages discovered that the world is round. The seventeenth century saw the scientific revolution and the first attempts to establish international law (Pufendorf, Grotius). The eighteenth century saw the first declarations of universal hu​man rights. The nineteenth century saw the capital system begin its rise to become what Marx called the universal mode of production. (Marx and Engels 1999: 66-67). The twentieth century saw human beings in space and the first images of the Earth as a green and blue ball, followed by James Lovelock’s Gaia thesis. Each development an advance towards universal understanding. And now, in the twenty first century, we are being called upon to play our part in this ongoing historical evolution towards the universal. 

After centuries of advance towards a global understanding, humanity has entered a new phase in its historical development. The creation of an ecological civilisation is the next stage in the cultural, moral, and social evolution of humanity. We increasingly have the means to communicate, cooperate and choose. 

Marx writes of ‘the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up with communism’: ‘because only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established, which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the ‘propertyless’ mass (universal competition), makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally has put world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones.’ (Marx and Engels 1999: 57). 

We are charged with creating the forms of common control which could bring this universal development to conscious realisation. Whilst we cannot know in advance what we will create together in this quest, we have purpose and direction, and the innate capabilities to create this civilisation together. 

Our problems may seem great, but our tools are much greater than those possessed by previous ages. We need the will, the courage, the imagination, the confidence and the creativity of those who succeeded in advancing knowledge and understanding in the past in order to rise to the challenge. And the challenge before us is to develop an appropriate form of government capable of embodying and expressing a universal planetary ethic incorporating social and environmental justice - global, cooperative, ecological. This would be universal government for the one world, a political, moral and philosophical goal that has eluded humanity throughout its history. But it is a challenge we must meet. The future of human civilisation as we know it, even the survival of the human species, depends upon us being up to the task.

A fully networked global community
In his Speech at the Anniversary of the People’s Paper, Marx noted that ‘In our days everything seems pregnant with its contrary.’ He continued: ‘We know that to work well the new-fangled forces of society, they only want to be mastered by new-fangled men - and such are the working men. They are as much the invention of modern time as machinery itself. In the signs that bewilder the middle class, the aristocracy and the poor prophets of regression, we do recognize our brave friend, Robin Good-fellow, the old mole that can work in the earth so fast, that worthy pioneer - the Revolution.’ (Marx AB SE 1973). Marx wrote in similar vein in his Letter to the Labour Parliament: ‘The labouring classes have conquered nature; they have now to conquer man.’ (Marx AB SE 1973: 277-278).

To which I say, with Marx, Well worked, old mole! It’s from Shakespeare’s Hamlet I, v, 162, 'Well said old mole, canst work i' th' ground so fast?' 
We are working the ground of our being.

‘In our days everything seems pregnant with its contrary.’ According to this reasoning, the scale of the problems we face also measures the extent of our potentialities. Marx avoided a paralysis in face of the enormity of the task before us not by presenting solutions formulated as reasonable programmes and blueprints to be enacted but by identifying the social agency capable of bringing any ideals immanent but repressed within a present social form to fruition:





Everything is pregnant with its opposite, these are the worst of times and the best of times; the scale of our problems is the scale of our powers and potentialities. The environmental crisis appears overwhelming, certainly in light of prolonged political and institutional inertia. At the same time, social evolution is pointing in the direction of a global transformation that contains the potential to finally achieve the ‘one world’ long sought by poets, visionaries, philosophers, jurists and statesmen. We stand on the brink of attaining a universality that far eclipses all the great empires past. The human species is ceasing to be fragmented between isolated communities and primary loyalties. Our universalising mode of production has generated communications and extended networks that serve to connect us all together in an increasingly self-conscious global community.

In this, Marx’s vision is ever more prescient. He points to the universal development of the productive forces, bringing about the ‘actual empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local, being’ as an ‘absolutely necessary practical premise’ of the universal intercourse making for communism:

Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples ‘all at once’ and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up with communism.   Moreover,  the  mass  of propertyless workers — the utterly precarious position of labour-power on a mass scale cut off from capital or from even a limited satisfaction and, therefore, no longer merely temporarily deprived of work itself as a secure source of life — presupposes the world market through competition. The proletariat can thus only exist world-historically, just as communism, its activity, can only have a ‘world-historical’ existence. World-historical existence   of individuals   means existence of individuals which is directly linked up with world history.
Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.

Marx GI 1999: 57

One may conclude, therefore, that with globalisation, ‘the world is catching up with Marx’s outline of the tendencies of capitalism rather than superseding it… In the long term, the hundred years since his death will be seen as a very short period; few will remember all the deviations and false starts along the way’ (Harris 1991:123). 





The Global Human Superorganism
Are we constituted so as to cooperate at a global level? Robert Wright’s presentation of non-zerosumness answers that question clearly and decisively in the affirmative. Following Wright’s argument, we are dealing with more than alternate possibilities. Wright makes a strong case for global cooperation being built into our social evolution. In other words, the attainment of a universal mode of cooperation in politics and ethics has more of a necessary quality about it, rather than being one mere possibility amongst many. Give this scale of complexity, technological sophistication, communications, global links, then global cooperation brings to fruition all the potentials contained in current lines of development. 

Gaia’s intelligent elite
The social and cultural emergence of the universal commonwealth identified above can be related to notions of the human superorganism being advanced by certain biologists. I referred earlier to biologist E.O. Wilson’s view that stewardship is an ‘intensely felt value,’ something which appears to arise from emotions programmed in the very genes of human social behaviour. This stewardship suggests the conception of the human superoganism:

Because all organisms have descended from a common ancestor, it is correct to say that the biosphere as a whole began to think when humanity was born. If the rest of life is the body, we are the mind. Thus, our place in nature, viewed from an ethical perspective, is to think about the creation and to protect the living planet. 

Wilson 2002: 133. 

This conception has clear affinities with James Lovelock’s description of the human species as ‘Gaia’s intelligent elite’. ‘We are the intelligent elite among animal life on Earth’, Lovelock argues, ‘and, whatever our mistakes, Gaia needs us.’ (Lovelock 2009 ch 1). That capacity for intelligence, thought, and consciousness distinguishes the human species within Gaia. We may not be gods, but we are active members of an emerging superorganism, constituting the nervous system and brain of Gaia:

Such is the power of the mneme that, as far as our relationship with Earth goes, little is either possible or impossible — unless we think it so. Perhaps we'll tread a middle road, committing our global civilisation to a prolonged and agonising transition before securing a sustainable future. 




This ‘human super-organism’ is the biological equivalent of Wright’s positive sum society, together forming the biological and cultural evolution of the win-win society which is certainly a potential in our current stage of social and historical development. As against prophecies of eco-catastrophe and collapse, it is entirely within the bounds of possibility that human beings will employ their intelligence and cooperate at a global level:





I repeat, we stand to win big or lose big, so great has been our transformations on the planet. That is the predicament. Our advance has resulted in a damaging human impact on the planet, yet we must go forward or collapse. There is no retreat. Going forwards may result in further environmental degradation. At the same time, going forwards may well be compatible with a rescaling of power and a resetting of priorities and purposes. If the problems that confront us seem overwhelming, the potentialities we are working with are similarly large, we just need to gain a greater measure of our full power. The possibility of creating a universal mode of government, the dream of philosophers, poets and visionaries since ever, is within our grasp:

If our civilisation does survive this century, I believe its future prospects will be profoundly enhanced, for this is the moment of our greatest peril. Should we cross the valley of death, democracy may well sweep the world, as Francis Fukuyama argued twenty years ago, creating a universal mode of government. 
With a homogeneous gene pool, universal communication and a common political system, our children and grandchildren may have a far better chance than we do of acting as one.. 

Flannery 2010: 277 

Humans as indispensable elements in the Earth system
Lynn Margulis makes the point that the planet and all its remaining species would get along fine should the human species come to extinguish itself. (Margulis 1998). It’s a view that may be questioned given the extent of human involvement in changing the face of the planet. Here is Tim Flannery:

It's sometimes argued that if humanity became extinct tomorrow, Gaia would look after herself. That may be true in the very long term — the tens of millions of years — but in the shorter term disaster would befall many species and ecosystems. That's because they've been so deeply compromised that only human effort keeps them functioning efficiently.
This notion of humans as indispensable elements in the Earth system challenges the concept many of us have about our relationship with nature — for example, that we are somehow apart from it, or just one species among many. The truth is that no other species can perceive environmental problems or correct them, which means that the responsibility for managing this world of wounds we've created is uniquely ours. We are, it seems, the Faustus species — the one that, on that day thousands of years ago when we started to assemble our intelligent superorganism, signed a fateful bargain not with the devil, but with the blind watchmaker. It made us lords of creation, but left our fate and that of Earth inextricably interwoven.. 

Flannery 2010: 277- 278

The global human superorganism
Tim Flannery anticipates a profound change in Gaia, from being a ‘loosely coordinated entity lacking a command-and-control system’ and therefore ‘unable to regulate herself precisely’ to becoming ‘an intelligent Earth’, an Earth that would, through her global human superorganism, be able to foresee malfunction, instability or other danger, and to act with precision. That’s an alluring vision, and quite a claim. It fits with James Lovelock’s notion of the human species as ‘Gaia’s intelligent elite.’ Whilst this sounds like the triumph of anthropocentrism, it recognises that human beings are part of the entire functioning system. It’s a view that invites comparisons with ‘the god species’ thesis of Stewart Brand (2010) and Mark Lynas (2011). The differences are, however, significant. Lovelock and Flannery see this ‘global human superorganism’ as an integral, holistic notion. Brand and Lynas see human beings less as gods than as planetary engineers, not as parts of the world but as its managers and manipulators from on high. Men as gods, they say. An age old delusion, I say. But their view contains a significant element of truth in pointing to the creative human role within the environment.

The idea of the Earth as one organism is better expressed by the much maligned Francis Bacon, who wrote of the Earth as the ‘one entire, perfect living creature.’ Flannery thinks that the global human superorganism possesses the surveillance systems and initiatives to optimise ecosystem function as to realise this one living thing:





That’s some ambition. It takes some optimism to envisage such a future in light of the looming eco-catastrophe. The argument rests on a number of big ‘if’s’. If the world is healed, if we stabilize population and if we achieve a sustainable lifestyle, I would hope that we would be more humble in our relations to nature, more thankful for what we have and more inclined to leave the heavens where they are. But, of course, Flannery isn’t talking about the human species as such, he is talking about the global human superorganism, and such thing does seem an expansive notion.

Wilson refers to ‘nature’s last stand.’





To which we can add, nothing has changed for the better, only the worse. 

When US President George W. Bush made it clear that he would not abide by the Kyoto Agreement on Climate Change in March 2001, putting economics, more specifically U.S. economic self-interest, before ecological health, Wilson, joined other academics in writing 'A Letter to President Bush', Time (9 April, 2001). The letter was a plea to 'reduce US production of greenhouse gases.’ But whilst Wilson expresses a deep concern about global warming, he expresses a view that the 'quenching of life's exuberance will be more consequential to humanity than all of present-day global warming, ozone depletion and pollution combined.’ (Wilson 2000: 30). 

Planetary politics and ethics – strategies for survival – the need for knowledge
Now that we are coming to recognise the extent of our planetary interdependence, it follows that the next stage in human history will be the development of a universal planetary ethic, with a global politic to fit. Ecological insight into our fundamental dependence upon the community of living things needs to be developed as an ecological ethic concerned with our survival and, beyond that, if we learn in time, with our flourishing.

The directions in which a universal planetary ethic and politics will be developed are clear, matching the expansion of our scientific knowledge and understanding, the globalisation of human relationships, and growing environmental threat. These are the main fields which accent the problems and possibilities contained in our current predicament. Whilst the threat of looming eco-catastrophe is an existential crisis implying the destruction of all hopes of ‘progress’ associated with techno-industrial civilisation, it also causes us to focus upon true realities. This switch in focus points to a deeper awareness of our social and environmental unity, a shared knowledge of our one world, a sense of partnership between human and ecological communities expressed in our economic systems and forms of governance, and expanding, interconnected loyalties within a wider loyalty so as to transcend the traditionally narrow allegiances associated with our ‘tribal’ past. (see E.O. Wilson for an elaboration of this latter point, Wilson 2012). 

There are already pointers to enlargement in the social and technological developments of the contemporary world, particularly the way that the world is being integrated at the level of economics and communications. That this integration has, at present, the form of an unsocial socialisation can be readily admitted. At the same time, it points to a potential which we have the responsibility to actualise, thus raising trends and tendencies for positive development to the conscious status of imperatives of our planetary flourishing.

The green enlightenment
E. O. Wilson calls for ‘a new enlightenment.’ Joaquim Radkau calls this ‘the Age of Ecology’. The seventeenth century was the Age of Reason, the eighteenth century the age of Enlightenment and the nineteenth century the age of Revolution. The twentieth century, the age of extremes, the age of lost opportunities and lost time. The twenty first century will be the Age of Ecology, if we to have any age at all. It simply has to be; it is necessary, but not inevitable. A new green Enlightenment will define our age as the Age of Ecology. This is the new Enlightenment, and it is eminently rational, putting reason back in touch with nature after an era of disenchantment. Ecology is the lodestar for our intellectual and political life in the 21st century.

Far from being anti-science, environmentalism is the future in a world of finite resources and global perils, Radkau argues. Rejecting 18th-century mechanical materialism and reductionism, the book follows the holistic environmental insight that ‘everything is connected to everything else.’ Frequently derided as romantic, irrational, against science, technology and industrial progress, environmentalism is not about going back to an era before all these forces but about using them wisely in a future world of finite resources and global perils.

In the 1980s Murray Bookchin warned of the danger that ecology could replace economics as the gloomy science. There are grounds enough for pessimism. But Radkau gives grounds for optimism, recording the many victories that have resulted when science and activism have come together. Pride of place goes to the discovery of the ozone hole, its swift attribution to CFCs, and how angst about skin cancer from UV radiation seeping through prompted the Montreal protocol. The whole episode serves as a model for global treaty-writing in the future. Radkau also highlights the forgotten successes, such as getting lead removed from petrol in most countries. The triple perils of deforestation, climate change and biodiversity loss remain to be tackled, with scientific knowledge and public concern needing to be translated into public policy on an international basis. There’s the challenge and the response. In the achievement of these goals lies all that can be real about any hopes for and aspirations of ‘progress.’

Radkau makes it clear that there is a ‘dialectic of Green Enlightenment’ at work:





The character of this age of ecology will be shaped by the political will and moral imagination. And here, environmentalism stands condemned as a political innocence that needs to grow up and grow up quick; environmentalism has been a political lightweight incapable of punching its scientific and moral weight. At the heart of this is a naivety concerning the nature of power, even a fear and rejection of power. Whichever way we cut such a politics, it is doomed to irrelevance. The meek will not inherit this godless, disenchanted world, and wouldn’t want to:





Radkau affirms that environmentalism may offer an alternative, in so far as it emancipates itself from the 'American way of life' and returns to its original aim of improving the quality of life; this would imply a new sense of self-esteem and a revaluation of traditional lifestyles suited to the ecological conditions of particular countries. I agree. I also agree with Radkau’s hard headed assessment of the necessity and the perils of politics:





And beware, I would add, the perils of rejecting politics tout court on account of identifying it with the bluff and bluster and all the other shenanigans associated with the lust for power. Reject politics all you like, it won’t go away. It doesn’t matter that you are not interested in politics, politics is always interested in you. That being the case, it makes sense to attempt to humanize and naturalize politics from the inside, as part of a process of overcoming alienated social conditions. It’s called engaging, and engaging with, others who do not necessarily agree with you, but could through persuasion. To reject politics as necessarily corrupting is a counsel of despair, a self-debilitating dead-end. This ecological transformation of politics would amount to taking politics back to its roots as creative self-realisation, only this time recognising the claims of all living things and not just human beings. Further, there is already so much of this ecological transformation that is well within our grasp:





Radkau finds the solid foundation for environmentalism in the instinct for self-preservation. It is an argument consistent with Robert Wright’s reference to rational self-interest leading to the positive sum world via non-zerosumness:





Environmentalism succeeds if it appeals primarily to the instinct for self-preservation. This does not preclude a selfless or spiritual dimension, just makes it clear that this dimension needs to be buttressed by sound evolutionary biology. As Radkau comments, ‘The one does not exclude the other. As Max Weber showed in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, the strongest force driving world history stems from a synergy of metaphysical and material motives.’ (Radkau 2014: 430-431). That, in a nutshell, is my view, recognizing the integration of external reason and internal reason, the force of the better argument finding response through the formation of the inner motives. Remembering, too, that character formation and social formation go together, so that personal moral effort, action and responsibility is able to find effective expression within and through the forms of the common life encompassed by the supreme common life. The Age of Ecology will be achieved by a synergy of metaphysical and material motives given direction with an overarching ethical framework grounded in innate biological potentialities and evolutionary realities.

Radkau’s understanding that the new Green Enlightenment isn’t about the one big solution, but many solutions is also worthy of comment. There is no grand creed here, just a ‘patchwork affair, with no grand definitive solutions’. And we can all join in at any point, making our own contribution to the resolution of the environmental problems that stand in front of us. The challenge may seem daunting when presented in the global terms of climate change, global heating, deforestation, ocean acidification, melting ice caps, thawing tundra, loss of biodiversity, species extinction …. The list seems endless, the task seems hopeless. But the new Green Enlightenment, as Radkau calls it, is a major intellectual, political, moral and spiritual calling that is taking over our lives and will define our age as the Age of Ecology. It has to be an Age of Ecology, if we are to have any age at all. The disparate forms of the Green Enlightenment draw on an extensive range of resources from across the disciplines to pioneer a holistic approach to the world and help shape the common concern we have about the environment in which we live as a commitment to the common good. The Green Enlightenment is, Radkau argues, ‘the only intellectual force giving context to the new global horizons’. For better or for worse, this is the Age of Ecology. We will achieve the common good or will suffer a common bad. One way or another, we are all in this together.

Where Radkau impresses most of all is in his emphasis upon the power of creative human agency to see through and break through the ossified and seemingly fixed structures and relations of the status quo, and so overcome the deadening weight of history and the inertia of institutions, to recover the power of the subjective factor, human beings as change agents, as against objective force.

Radkau concludes by emphasising that there no reason to accept that our current environmental awareness represents the best possible and most definitive level of ecological enlightenment. There have always been decisive ‘historical moments’ when human agents have overcome the inertia of the status quo to reveal that much that was hitherto considered impossible, if it was even considered at all, was eminently achievable. Such agency projects, realises and expands the boundaries of the possible.

The Gaian future
Whether we are to have a Gaian future depends upon the extent to which we can unite in politics and ethics in order to secure our place in the Earth’s commonwealth. We will have to act soon for, as Tim Flannery argues, ‘the best of our science and plain common sense are telling us that our influence on Earth is eroding our future, and that we cannot escape responsibility’ (Flannery 2010: 273-74).
 
There is a call to abandon ‘big’ schemes and plans associated with delusions of ‘progress’. We should certainly abandon delusions, but we shouldn’t, at the same time, start to think and act small. We are capable of more: ‘If we take too small a view of what we are, and of our world, we will fail to reach our full potential.’ Flannery calls for ‘a holistic, Wallacean understanding of how things are here on Earth with its illumination of how ecosystems, superorganisms and Gaia itself have been built through mutual interdependency.’ Our situation is, however, precarious. ‘Beckoning us towards destruction are our numbers, our dismantling of Earth's life-support system and especially our inability to unite in action to secure our common wealth..’ (Flannery 2010: 274-75).

Our ability to address the environmental problems that threaten us depends on our ability to develop a politics and an ethics capable of uniting us and enabling us to act in support of the long term common good. Achieve that unity, and the threats can be addressed (even if it is too late to rectify much of the environmental damage already suffered.) Flannery finds hope in the fact that we are social beings:





That is essentially the same view that E.O. Wilson presents in The Social Conquest of the Earth. I am loathe to write of optimism and pessimism, because these are subjective readings expressing nothing more than mood or temper. Some days I feel optimistic, some days I feel pessimistic. Nothing in the objective situation has changed. The glass has the same amount of liquid, whichever way we look at it. There are good reasons to think that a positive outcome is possible. There are plenty of reasons to fear the worst. There has been a tendency to think of ‘progress’ in terms of a family outing, with the kids in the back of the car endlessly asking ‘are we there yet?’ There’s a promise or expectation in that question which, no matter how boring the journey, keeps the spirits high. There is a growing sense, however, that ‘progress’ is here and now, that we have arrived at journey’s end. Techno-industrial civilisation has gone as far as it will go, and what we have is as good as it will ever get. And there’s every reason to think things will only get worse. 

James Lovelock's The Revenge of Gaia and The Vanishing Face of Gaia: A Final Warning and Jared Diamond's Collapse: How Societies choose to Fail or Succeed contribute to a pervasive sense that we have reached an end in civilisation, if not the end of civilisation as such. Lovelock and Diamond do argue that a positive resolution of our crises is available to us. But, in light of the climate crisis, it is not difficult to imagine the worst. In 2000, T.C. Boyle published A Friend of the Earth, a novel set in 2025 in a California recently devastated by ecological collapse, where numerous animals have become extinct and rain falls heavily for the majority of the year.

‘Looking back’ he says ‘I should have probably moved the date forward to 2015. We live in a very different world to the one that 19C novelists lived in. It’s a godless world, without hope.’ Boyle is gloomy in the extreme. ‘It’s all over. This planet is doomed. In a very short time, we’re probably not even going to have culture or art. We’re going to be living like we’re in Cormac McCarthy’s The Road.’

So that’s where progress has brought us? This is how it ends. The loss of culture and art, a pervasive meaninglessness and hopelessness, the fall of civilisation, the destruction of nature, the end of life itself. Look at all these things and ask with John Ruskin: ‘Are they not what your machine gods have produced for you?' (John  Ruskin, Fors Clavigera,  vol. I  p 270). (Critchley 2013 CG vol 2)

McCarthy's The Road conveys a sense of that utter humbling that Ruskin’s questioning of the gods of industrial progress called for in the nineteenth century. Even Ruskin couldn’t have envisaged the barrenness of the moral landscape of McCarthy’s world, a world where life has been reduced to a basic struggle for mere survival, with all thoughts of flourishing long abandoned. I referred earlier to Robert Wright’s evolutionary argument that we are moving from a zero sum society, where the gains of some are the losses of others, to a positive sum society of win-win. In the bleak landscape of McCarthy’s The Road, this win-win scenario is turned completely on its head. A world of eco-catastrophe is a negative sum society in which there are no winners, only losers. We are in a society of loss-loss. All game theoretic calculations turn to zero.

That scenario is bleak, but plausible. It is certainly possible. But here is my point with respect to trends and tendencies. The future is, or at least could always be, more than the present enlarged. There is a role for utopia in sparking the imagination and inspiring hope for positive reconstruction, inspiring effort to bring about a desirable, feasible future. Utopia becomes a problem when it becomes a blueprint, as though the future already exists as something fixed and to be implemented in the present in accordance with an instruction manual. There is something of a self-fulfilling prophecy about our values and beliefs, for good or for ill. Dystopias too can become self-fulfilling prophecies. We believe that the situation we face is so dire that nothing can be done to avert catastrophe, so we do nothing and, in due course, trends and tendencies harden into inevitabilities and catastrophe follows in short order. Against this, I affirm the creative, reality constituting and reality changing praxis of human beings. Human beings can be passive with respect to trends and tendencies, with the result that the worst case scenario threatened by their unfolding does indeed come about. But behind these trends and tendencies are human agents. By becoming active agents of their history making, human beings can identify and release the potentialities immanent but repressed within existing lines of development, thus turning trends and tendencies in other, more desirable, directions. This is to look on society as a field of materialist immanence, with human beings as conscious change agents in the evolutionary process. We can live in accordance with ends we have chosen ourselves, rather than merely serve imperatives which are imposed upon as external force.

As Marx famously wrote in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: ‘Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted.’

The problem now is that these circumstances are a lot less pliable than Marx had anticipated; the bequest of past generations is an encroaching and pervasive environmental crisis. Marx wrote in the next sentence that ‘the tradition of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living.’ This tradition has left us with ecological damage of such ‘weight’ that no amount of human creativity can reverse it. As Tim Flannery comments, ‘climate science is now so advanced that we can anticipate the kind of event that may, if we do not reduce the stream of greenhouse-gas pollution, initiate the end of the great “us” that is our global civilisation.’ (Flannery 2010: 274).

There are no positive potentials to liberate and realise in such circumstances. Flannery is realistic but not down-hearted. There are alternate possibilities, and our assessments as to what is possible will play a crucial part in determining which scenarios are played out in future.

24 UNIVERSAL PLANETARY ETHIC
Should the life of sufficiency rich in ends be achieved, grow and prosper, it will do so not because of some global plan or programme imposed from above, that is precisely what the overarching moral and political framework I argue for isn’t. Rather, a sustainable way of living will be developed as a form of ecological self-socialisation and self-organisation from below, advanced by individuals joining together in groups, networking, and sharing a common ethic which does indeed find overall expression and articulation in terms of an overarching ethical and institutional framework. The universal and the particular join together. It is not a popular view in many quarters. The anarchistic character of ecologism is evident in much writing. The way forward is to define the universal interest and common ethic in such a way as to recognise the legitimate claims of particular interests and groups, even as we seek to facilitate their working in concert. Rejecting the view that the new society will achieved by a master plan or protocol, Ehrenfeld points to the ‘countless people working separately and in small groups, sharing only a common dream of life.’





So what’s not to like about any of this? Whilst Ehrenfeld is right to be sceptical of master plans and protocols, there are other ways of formulating an overall, integrative global authority. The key lies in putting the universal and the particular together so that the one is an expression of the common purposes of the other, ascending to higher levels as and when this is required. Ehrenfeld writes vaguely of individuals and small groups ‘sharing only a common dream of life.’ The big question of politics and ethics, the question of how to establish unity out of diversity, the problem of the one and the many, is not so easily solved. We have had dreams aplenty in history, and as many well argued, impeccably reasoned arguments for perpetual unity and peace. Grotius, Pufendorf, Kant. Bertrand Russell made a reasoned argument for world government. Dreams, visions, ideals detached from the means of their realisation have never been enough. If individuals and small groups possess ‘only’ a dream of the common life, I doubt this dream will be shared by all, and I doubt that any life it achieves will be shared in common. There will be as many dreams and as many lives as there are individuals and groups. Yes, people will devote their first energies to the places where they live, but not their last. That’s precisely my point about extending loyalties all the way up to the global level through common affairs and concerns. And the point is this, without that grand overall way of life embodied and expressed in a universal ethic and politics, all the smaller actions we take will fall far short of what is required for living in a global environment. Remember the Parable of the Tribes. Four out of the five tribes desire peace, but the one aggressive tribe willing to use violence is sufficient to end peace. 

The way we live on this planet is a global question demanding a global resolution. Climate change is not a local threat but a global one. Ehrenfeld writes that people ‘will come to authority not by violence but by their evident ability to replace a crumbling system with something better.’ I agree. This view recognises the need for authority, for an overarching principle or body that binds different individuals and groups together. Not by coercion, assuredly. But by writing the principle of self-assumed obligation large. And that is the case for the overall way of life, the universal ethical and institutional framework. It is the case for a democratic self-constituted authority by which we obligate ourselves and renew that obligation through active consent.

‘And they will share an awe for a power nobler and larger than themselves, be it God, nature, or human history’, concludes Ehrenfeld. That’s quite a last line! It neatly sidesteps the problem of identifying the grounds of any common ethic, just takes for granted our cooperation with a power greater than we are. God or Nature, transcendence or immanence, God and Nature? If the greater power is ‘human history,’ how do we avoid relativism and historicism? How do we attain reason and freedom through history as Hegel’s slaughterbench? This power that is ‘larger’ than ourselves smacks of the old bad teleology. I will opt for the critical essentialism I have mapped out here.

Universal responsibility, identifying ourselves with the whole Earth community as well as our local communities
To realize possibilities for global cooperation requires that we develop the universal institutional framework that enables us to live with a sense of moral responsibility with respect to our interchange with the natural world, coming to forge a common purpose with others as well as with the whole Earth community. Whilst we are citizens divided from each other within different political entities across the world, a universal planetary ethic is capable of forging a common identity, connecting the local and global, sharing responsibility for the well-being of the planet and extending this responsibility to future generations and their right to a healthy environment. Living with reverence on and in the Earth, we extend the ties of solidarity and kinship to all living things. 

Finally, we come to express an appropriate humility with respect to our place in nature.

We stand in need of a shared commitment to the Earth based upon a common recognition of fundamental principles. These principles recognise the unity of the freedom of each and all in society but are extended to incorporate a respect for and a recognition of the value of the living and non-living world. The ethical foundation for the emerging universal commonwealth is thus established on the basis of us joining together to affirm the principles for the sustainable way of life based on the interdependence of all things. 

Recognition of our environmental inter​dependence - a wider rationale of unity
Our conscious recognition of the depth of our environmental predicament could, negatively, provoke us into developing the kind of universal ethic and ecological sensibility and into taking the kind of concerted action that enables us not merely to ensure our survival, but to go further and see our happiness as an integral part of a planetary flourishing. If that vision seems overly optimistic, it is no more unlikely than the idea that we can join together to avoid our self-destruction. If we can generate the expansive sense of community, and find a way of belonging and living together, then not only may human society survive, it can be developed further and come to thrive. Our connections and ties have been progressively expanding throughout history. Increased networks and communications have enabled us to exchange culture and share experience, breaking down insular loyalties and making common cause across traditional boundaries. Ethically, philosophers have made various attempts to establish the conditions of this unity, between individuals within societies, but also between nations within a universal government. Politically, the institutional framework for that wider unity has been lacking. In the contemporary world, scientists in the fields of ecology, biology, astronomy, physics, geology, chemistry, and anthropology supply evidence for a conclusion that the poets and visionaries grasped intuitively from the first – that to the core of our being, we are indeed one, members of the one natural system exhibiting a fundamental oneness in all its variations, the survival of each and all of its elements depending on the healthy functioning of the total system.

The incontrovertible facts of planetary unity buttress the ideals and visions of universal cooperation, giving us the unity of purpose required to build a universal order. Fact and value merge at this point to form a common insight into our place on Earth, enabling us to connect our legitimate pluralisms together within the universal order.   

Planetary interdependence demands that the functions are now seen to be world-wide and supported with as rational a concept of self-interest
Our increasing knowledge and awareness of our interdependence demands a universal planetary ethic that combines principles and practices of social and environmental justice. Governments and international agencies are already engaged in global initiatives and strategies, but these proceed within a world system still divided according to national interest. And behind these national interests are private business interests. In fine, the globalisation of economic relations has not constituted a genuine ‘global’ interest. It has been an unsocial socialisation. But it is, at the same time, a socialisation that contains the potential for a conscious appropriation of the ties and interconnections that have brought people all over the world together.

Social movement and interconnections among ecological, economic and equity issues
The ecological approach emphasizes the interconnections among ecological, economic and equity issues and marks the emergence of a new social ethos which sees human beings as active participants in the creativity of the webs of which they are a part. By taking a comprehensive view of these problems and sustaining action within a web of relationships, we are more likely to develop lasting solutions. The result is a revolution of interconnections.

The effectiveness of programmes for sustainability depends upon establishing the linkages between social, economic and ecological vitality. This requires a new concept of security, shifting from the military conception associated with the nation state to a concept of environmental security (transferring the $1.7 trillion arms budget from the cause of death and destruction to the enhancement of life in the process.) As a result, we will start to make our peace with the Earth, restoring the health of the environment by a process of community making in which we join with others and with the non-living natural world. From here, we proceed to connect sustainability with the renewal and extension of democracy. 

Eco-Sittlichkeit
A planetary ethic is supported by a concept of enlightened self-interest or rational restraint. This idea of a rational authority requires an institutional framework backed by a sense of planetary community and commitment. A moral and institutional framework of this scale and character is required to make the planet a centre of rational loyalty for all mankind. The idea suggests an ecological reading of Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, the system of the ethical life as the eco-Sittlichkeit operating effectively at the global level as a genuine universal. 

This reading envisages a renewal of democracy, modelled on Hegel’s conception of an associative civic public arranged according to ascending purposes and principles of functional representation. (Critchley 2001 Hegel). Affirming the goals of democratic sustainable development that all democratic parties, businesses and civil society organizations, and citizens can recognize as desirable, Christie and Warburton outline the principle features of this eco-Sittlichkeit:

*	a better quality of life for all, especially for the world's poor;
*	a cleaner, healthier environment, rich in biodiversity;
*	a fairer and more decent society;
*	a more open and accountable business world;
*	a fairer and more democratic approach to the management of globalization;
*	protection and enhancement of the Earth's environmental systems and resources, in order to provide for future generations;
*	a recovery of trust between citizens and Government; 
*	a renewal of respect for what nature provides for us, and for the fundamental life support systems of the Earth. 

Christie and Warburton 2004 ch 8

The ideas I develop throughout this book offer a principled framework for such a programme, but without forcing individual choices into pre-determined mould. 

Hegel’s system of the ethical life envisions the integration of the particular and the universal according to a theme of ascending purposes and loyalties from civil society to the state. The notion of an eco-Sittlichkeit entails an extended and ever deepening sense of loyalty within our shared biosphere. A universal planetary ethic is grounded in the facts of our planetary interdependence. And those facts have the capacity to activate the feeling of earthcare within us - the facts of our interdependence becoming a common moral insight into our mutual dependence within nature and society. That human beings can experience these interconnections as moral feelings is not in doubt. Human history is characterised by an ever expanding moral circle, from family to clan to nation to the world community - such enlargements of loyalty have occurred without extinguishing more primary loyalties. We have now reached a stage in our evolution in which we can only preserve our existence, in all of its particularity and diversity, by recognising our ultimate loyalty to our planetary home, developing an institutional order and ethic appropriate to that planetary connection and commitment.

We could take a hard headed ‘objective’ view and recognise that the planet cannot support of human population of seven billion plus. ‘We will not all make it’ says James Lovelock in A Rough Ride to the Future (2014). There will be some human survivors, the human species will carry on. We may learn the hard way how to live well on the planet, and come to live a life that is simple in means and rich in ends. But the point I wish to stress is that we have the reason and intelligence and foresight and moral capacity to learn, to choose the ends by which we live rather have them imposed upon us as a self-destructive social necessity or as a draconian natural necessity. My brief in this book has been to value the life of each and all human beings, seeking a common good and a universal settlement that involves all members of the human race. That universalism sets a tough standard in ethics and politics. We need to learn that happiness is not having more but being more. And that is a lesson we can learn now.

A bond that recognizes the sanctity of the Earth
Despite the continued thrust towards the enclosure of the global commons, the Earth forms an integrated whole. At present, our global economy is on a collision course with the planet's ecology. From an ecological perspective, no part of the environment can be isolated and valued apart from the other parts. Yet that is precisely what our economic system is doing to the planet, dividing it up and parcelling it out according to monetary valuation. The same point applies to our political systems, dividing the one Earth up and rearranging the parts as political entities. To argue for a universal planetary ethic and politics is to emphasise that since the natural world is a single system, no part of it can be annexed and appropriated by economic and political entities, corporations and nations, and held against the claims of those whose health depends on the flourishing of the whole system. We can call the universal planetary ethic an ecological contract or compact, if we wish to remain within the sphere of natural selection, games theory and enlightened self-interest. The evolutionary perspective of Robert Wright argues for the sufficiency of this perspective. He does not require an added religious or spiritual dimension. There is a strength to his argument. It would certainly appeal to those who believe that no green spirituality possesses the force of rational self-interest grounded in evolutionary development. At the same time, I think that a greater role for the spiritual dimension, and certainly for the ethical dimension, can be entertained in a way that is perfectly consistent with an evolutionary understanding. E.O. Wilson makes reference to ‘the increasingly detailed scientific reconstruction of religious belief as an evolutionary biological product’ (Wilson 2012: 294). Rather than read this as a statement of the irrelevance or redundancy of religious belief, I see this as setting ethics in their biological context. That is, a system of ethics does not in itself create morality, it activates an innate moral grammar and canalises it in patterns of behaviour. In fine, ethics retains an active, positive role. And in light of this, I think we can transcend the enlightened self-interest of contractarian thought – something which continues to see human beings as individuals – and instead call for an Earth covenant, something which recognizes the sanctity of the Earth in terms of a bond that unites all people, and which places long-term planetary health before calculations of the short-term material benefits of specific communities in specific times and places. We could call this covenant a spiritual bond, a visionary or transcendental commitment by one generation to preserve the health of the natural world for the enjoyment and well-being of the generations that, hopefully, will follow.

It’s a transcendental view. But is it spiritual? It fits Wright’s evolutionary compact, and can be explained in terms of rational self-interest and natural selection. I’ll leave the question hanging here. But for some idea of what I am getting at I shall quote Jonathan Sacks, who identifies the flaws in contractarian thinking in politics:

Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and others believed that individuals could act together on the basis of a contract which brought into being a state. They discounted the social in favour of the political. 
This was a great error. For without trust there can be no contracts, and without moral relationships there can be no trust. Politics is then confronted with a breakdown in the social order which it cannot solve because its methods are universal and impersonal, when what is needed is personal and particular. 
The procedural state supplied the means, the autonomous individual made the choices, and the model of human interaction became the market exchange. This was, quite simply, the de-moralisation of society, an unprecedented experiment in conducting a large-scale human environment without recourse to shared values and institutions. Within a single generation the costs have become high, even unsustainable.





These covenants concern more than self-interest, even though they are indeed beneficial to the individual:









That is a strong statement, and begs the question as what this God is. Biologist E.O. Wilson goes in the other direction, whilst at the same time presenting an us-together-in relationship conception, expanded to embrace the community of living things:

Yet it is foolish to think that organized religions can be pulled up anytime soon by their deep roots and replaced with a rationalist passion for morality. More likely it will happen gradually, as it is occurring in Europe, pushed along by several ongoing trends. The most potent of the trends is the increasingly detailed scientific reconstruction of religious belief as an evolutionary biological product. When placed in opposition to creation myths and their theological excesses, the reconstruction is increasingly persuasive to any even slightly open mind. Another trend against the misadventure of sectarian devotion is the growth of the internet and the globalization of institutions and people using it. A recent analysis has shown that the increasing interconnection of people worldwide strengthens their cosmopolitan attitudes. It does so by weakening the relevance of ethnicity, locality, and nationhood as sources of identification. It enhances a second trend, the homogenization of humanity in race and ethnicity through intermarriage. Inevitably, it will weaken confidence in creation myths and sectarian dogmas.




I would still point out that this globalisation of institutions will be given active social content through a network of ties, loyalties and solidarities. Call it an expansive notion of tribalism that manages to achieve social proximity and universal intercourse. And this interconnection would also stand in need of an appropriate ethical framework. I shall now turn to the idea of a global partnership requiring a global or common ethic.

Principles for a common moral and institutional framework
I would like to outline the principles which underlie arguments made in this book for a common moral and institutional framework.

A common global framework pertaining to all humankind embraces the juridical, political and the ethical levels, involving an analysis of law, rights, constitutions, forms of governance and values. I shall treat these levels as interrelated. The main accent, however, will fall upon ethics, the origins of moral behaviour, the contexts for moral behaviour and the institutional embodiment and expression of moral behaviour. In fine, the framework of virtue, what it is and how we can create and sustain it.

I have avoided any systematic treatment of religion. There is extensive coverage of science, philosophy, ethics and politics but mere sporadic references to religion. I recognise the importance of religion. I have, however, chosen to incorporate transcendence in such a way as to avoid having to attempt an impossible definition of God, attempt to identify the common threads of all religions, still less attempt to reconcile the concerns of the religious and the non-religious. That’s the work of another day, and another person with too much time on their hands. I declare myself something of an apatheist when it comes to these controversies.

A common ethic and inner orientation
An ethic alone is incapable of resolving the various economic, political and ecological crises we face. My case for a common moral framework is to set a context for the right actions and behaviours which will bring positive resolution of our problems. A common ethic provides the affective dimension, the emotional attachment, and the purposeful motivation that scientific knowledge, technical know-how, economic plans, political policies and legal regulations require to realise their goals and deliver effective change. The ethical dimension brings about a transformation in the inner orientation and mentality of people, changing their habits and hearts to achieve a conversion from an unjust and destructive way of life to a just, healthy, fulfilling way of life. It achieves re-orientation by enabling individuals to locate themselves in a new moral landscape, expanding horizons of meaning and encouraging them to search and find their spiritual home. 

A common ethic as a guide
A common ethic involves more than rights, more than legal and moral codes, and more than written constitutions and declarations. A common ethic has to be capable of commanding common assent and producing a consensus. It can only, therefore, be a very general statement, with the details filled in by lived experience. Despite this generality, the value of a common ethic lies in the unity it engenders and the guidelines it gives.

The Principles of a Global Ethic
The need for new mentalities and modalities
Why do we need a global ethic? The world is facing a convergence of a series of crises. The global economy is beset by stagnation, instability and uncertainty, a lack of a framework to resolve global problems on a global basis. The world of government and politics is suffering from a crisis of legitimacy, as unresolved problems mount and people are withdrawing active support. Framing both is a crisis in the world’s ecology, with the consequences of environmental degradation being increasingly felt in all areas of social life.

On the positive side, there are plenty of small-scale initiatives in all countries of the world, involving and inviting the active participation of the many people who think it’s ‘time for action’ and want ‘to do something.’ And there is potential for so much more in this direction. There is no deficiency at the level of content. The form, however, is lacking. We require concerted action and coordination of policies at the global level, buttressed and unified by a common ethic. Instead, there is no overall framework, no grand vision, no global view. Instead, there is an attempt to address global problems via an institutional framework shaped under the old system of national self-interest (and, behind it, private economic self-interest). The result is paralysis, an attempt to resolve 21st century problems with 19th century tools. The failure of political leadership follows with the air of inevitability. New challenges mount by the year, and yet meet with responses that reflect outmoded ways of thinking and acting. Such an institutional framework narrows horizons to the immediate short term and self-interest, inhibiting and finally choking off insight and foresight in politics.

We need new modes of thought, governance, organisation, policy making and action, not only to engender a sense for the long-term common good, but to create the reciprocities in human relationships capable of generating that commonweal.

The problems we face are all too familiar, unemployment and underemployment, poverty, hunger, war and civil strife, racial tensions and ethnic conflicts, organised crime, people trafficking, narcotics and… the list is replayed daily on the national and international news. Oddly, the prospect of runaway climate change and collapse of ecosystems, which casts a giant shadow on the whole of human civilisation, even threatening human existence as such, merits barely a mention.

Over and again we see political leaders, under pressure and in desperate search of popularity, incite hate, prejudice, and xenophobia, inducing people to project their frustrations upon others, splitting people up lest they unite and turn their demands for action upon the failing governments and economic systems. 

These crises are resolvable. The conflicts and antagonisms that accompany them are maggots in the rotting flesh of a decaying system. ‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.’ (Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks 1971).

The Need for an Appropriate Ethical Framework
To stimulate and sustain an ecological sensibility, we need to develop an overarching ethical framework for acquiring the appropriate virtues and for promoting the integrity of nature and natural processes, particularly in the light of the environmental degradation we are currently witnessing:

I have come to the conviction that the aesthetic and the historical elements, and the magnificent extension of our material knowledge and power, do not themselves form the essence of civilization, but that this depends on the mental disposition of the individuals and nations who exist in the world. All other things are merely accompanying circumstances of civilization, which have nothing to do with its real essence ... if the ethical foundation is lacking, then civilization collapses, even when in other directions creative and intellectual forces of the strongest nature are at work.

Albert Schweitzer, The Decay and Restoration of Civilisation, p.vii

The overarching ethical system
An overarching ethical system adequate to the scale of the environmental threats we face requires a major shift away from the exclusively human or anthropocentric focus that has characterised the dominant cultural tradition. This new ethical framework will be centred upon an ecological ethic that is informed by an understanding of the relationship between human beings and the rest of the natural world, acknowledging the interdependence of all things in the community of living beings. We are connected to the rest of nature by our evolutionary history. We have co-evolved with the complex natural ecosystems of the planet. We are made up of the elements. We are integral parts of an Earth community comprising all living beings as well as non-living reality. The health of each is inextricably connected to the health of whole, so that respect for the greater community of life forms the basis of an ecological ethic that makes sound evolutionary sense. 

Thomas Berry argues that ethical concerns must be shaped with respect to the greater community of the living so that the fundamental ethical norm is the well-being of the whole community, upon which the well-being of people, animals, plants depend and from which the healthy functioning of earth, water and soils follows. Berry’s view overthrows the anthropocentric focus of ethics:





Recognition of the claims of the entire community establishes the fundamental principle of an ecological ethic. Such an ethic requires a legal framework which accords rights to the geological and biological of the Earth community, not just to human beings. The difficulty, of course, is that the notion of rights is an anthropocentric conception and the granting of legal rights is most certainly an act of human social and political organisation. Do chimpanzees have rights? Who asks the question? Who grants or denies this status? I put these points not to deny the worth of chimpanzees, but to express scepticism as to whether we can ever eliminate anthropocentrism to the extent required by a thoroughgoing ecocentrism or biocentrism. Such an ethic seems to require an impersonal God which equates to the proper and orderly functioning of the whole system, completely indifferent to the fate of any of the parts, so long as it all fits. The impersonal God of Spinoza and Einstein. And of Heraclitus:

Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame and a disgrace among mortals, stealings and adulteries and deceivings of one another. . . . Mortals deem that gods are begotten as they are, and have clothes like theirs, and voice and form . . . yes, and if oxen and horses or lions had hands, and could paint with their hands, and produce works of art as men do, horses would paint the forms of gods like horses, and oxen like oxen, and make their bodies in the image of their several kinds. . . . The Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed; the Thracians say theirs have blue eyes and red hair.

Heraclitus argued against this conception of God as reflecting the subjective species self-importance and prejudice. Point taken, the health and well-being of all species depends upon the greater whole. Heraclitus’ view of God is similar to that of Spinoza and Einstein. He believed in the one God, unlike human beings in form and thought, who ‘without toil swayeth all things by the force of his mind.’

An indifferent, impersonal God. Nature, in other words. That’s a god of the scientists that fits the scientific understanding of the Earth. Species come, species go, and the grass pays no mind. The Earth was here long before we were, and will be here long after we are gone. Is that God enough to satisfy the cosmic longing for meaning? Talk to the trees all you like, they won’t answer. To whom or what will you cry? Why are we even bothering to write, read, communicate, argue … Because we are bothered. Because we have moral concern. Because, as small as we are, we matter to each other, and we matter in relation to the greater whole, and that greater whole matters to us. And because no amount of scientific fact concerning the complete indifference of matter is going to stop us from being concerned. We are the moral animal. When we stop being concerned, we will shrink and die as a species.

So maybe we are talking to each other? Against the impersonal conception, there is the personal God, the God of relationships, values, the God of moral concern, the God of love. A ‘made up’ God? Making up an image of our ideal selves, isn’t that what any species would inevitably do, if given the power of conscious thought and reflection, empathy and sympathy?

I argue for a conception of human beings as co-creators within the endlessly creative universe in which immanent purposes are in a constant state of unfolding through a dynamic interplay of subject and object. To those who are still unimpressed, still pointing to the indifference of the universe and our total insignificance in it, I say that such a view is itself a subjective view, a view of the universe and of our place in it as expressed by a human mind. It’s a view that still sees the world as an object that is ‘out there.’ I argue that the ‘out there’ and the ‘in here’ are involved in a dynamic and creative relation, and that goodness within and without are related, and that our quest for meaning is furthered by an expansive orientation to the creative universe, and diminished by the retreat to insignificance. It is a short step from seeing the universe as without moral significance to the loss of moral concern within personal relationships, from an indifference without to an indifference within. 

Construction of a global ethic
Stuart Kauffman expresses the hope that the conception of self-organisation in the creative universe ‘can be one of the seeds of a global conversation that will orient this generation and the next generations towards the construction of a global ethic, and help us to create a vision and reality of an emerging global civilization forever diverse, creative, and tolerant — a new Eden, a new Enlightenment.’ (Kauffman 2008 ch 19).

That’s an appealing vision, offering a global ethic which is capable of inspiring action, motivating effort, and obligating all those who would participate in its creation. Most importantly, it is a vision which places moral responsibility in our own hands, and ‘rests the restraints on the evil we do with we who cause it.’ (Kauffman ch 19). It is a vision which enjoins human beings to live up to their billing as moral agents; we are responsible for our actions, for good and evil. A global ethic enjoins us to be good.

Common ground across our diverse traditions
In all of our diversity, we can join together and find common ground in a global civilisation that rejoices in the creativity in our universe, in the biosphere we share, and in the civilizations we create and continue to co-create. In finding common ground we reach a new understanding of humanity. This, Stuart Kauffman states, is the task of generations, the next stage in the cultural, moral, and spiritual evolution of humanity. ‘Such a quest can serve to bring meaning, community, solace, reverence, spirituality, tolerance, and generosity to all of us.’ (Kauffman 2008 ch 19). For the first time in history, we have the means to communicate and choose at the global level. ‘Can we know what we will create together if we embark on such a discussion and quest? Of course not. How wonderful though—we have to invent it together.’ (Kauffman ch 19). The humane way forward is clear, we must come together to ‘reinvent a shared sacred and make it a safe space for all of us.’

At last, there is the possibility of finding our way together, with a shared value system that we jointly create — our chosen global ethic, our chosen spirituality, and our chosen sacred. Let us go forth and find a global ethic and reinvent the sacred for our planet, for all life, and for ourselves.

Kauffman 2008 ch 19

Ethical frameworks
Four decades ago, ecologist Robert Waller pointed the way in the direction of an ecological conversion of the principle of rational freedom:





Here we see how the conception of ‘rational freedom’ with which I started is broadened out to encompass an ecological concern. In terms of political philosophy, the ‘rational’ concept I defend defines the common good in terms of the unity of the freedom of each individual and all individuals, going on to establish the ethico-social institutional and relational matrix capable of embodying and articulating that freedom in forms of governance. This conception is expanded as an eco-politics to incorporate ecological concerns, recognising that the common good includes healthy and functioning ecosystems, a respect for and valuing of the common ground we all stand upon, what Aldo Leopold ‘the land.’ The land ethic is rational freedom expanded as a moral ecology. 

The common ethic that this achieves is constituted by social proximity, human scale and dimension, ecological balance, proportion, warm and affective ties:

The land that was farmed, every morning, with his father. Hard work, but there was a glint in the eye, a world in touch with realities, perhaps the horizons seemed narrow then, but maybe we are all finding out that the city roads are not paved with gold after all, not true spiritual gold.

A little thought I had, in conversation with the son of a farmer, now in his late seventies and retired after a lifetime in the city.

Common ethic and tribal loyalty
Lovelock gives up the ghost when it comes to living in accordance with a global ethic:





I, too, argue for an ‘internal tribal coherence’ – grounding people in place – and I, too, argue that ‘good intentions’ at an elevated institutional and moral level are insufficient. I would, however, embed the coordination we need within a global ethic. This is a question neither of chance nor of vacuous international appeals to the good. It’s about social proximity, the quality of human interactions, establishing a dynamic of reciprocity, networks and connections within a commitment to a common ethic. Any good intentions at the global level possess substance only at the level of social relations. 

Explanatory Remarks Concerning a Common Ethic
A shared global ethic
We are in need of a shared global ethic that will help us shape what we consider to be living appropriately in an ecological civilization. At this point in history, as our cultures are brought together by the globalization of economic relations and global communications, and as the global impact of environmental destruction starts to make itself felt, we have both the necessity and the possibility to create this universal planetary ethic.
 
A common, uniting framework
Mark Everard argues that ‘we need a common, uniting framework upon which all can agree to determine what is 'right' and what is demonstrably 'wrong' with respect to the diverse impacts of land uses, policies, technologies and economic instruments on our shared environment, and their inevitable consequences for all who share and depend upon them.’ He doesn’t think we can found the basis of this common ethic in cultural, political or religious beliefs:





If a common ethic cannot be developed through politics and culture, then we are left wondering just how we can distinguish between 'right' and 'wrong' within a common, uniting framework. Scientific knowledge and ecological principles are not enough to constitute this framework. 

Everard is wrong to think that cultural, political or religious beliefs are merely ephemeral or divisive. Reciprocity it seems is a universal, common to ethical systems the world over. (Gouldner 1960: 171). And the notion of reciprocity lies at the heart of the ‘Golden Rule’ — do unto others as you would have them do unto you. This is a positive statement, in that it enjoins us to treat others as we would want them to treat us, rather than acting in response to how we have been treated in the past. The Golden Rule has been expressed in a variety of ways in different times and places, but the form is basically the same (Zoroaster, Confucius, Mahavira (the founder of Jainism), the Buddha, the Hindu epic Mahabharata, the Book of Leviticus, Hillel, Jesus, Mohammed, Kant, and many more. (For references, see Swidler, ed. 1999: 19-21.) The golden rule is a universal across time and place and therefore offers the basis for an ethic which all men and women of good will would find plausible, persuasive and practicable. In For All Life: Toward a Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic, Leonard Swidler, head of the Center for Global Ethics at Temple University in Philadelphia, establishes the Golden Rule as the fundamental rule of ethics. (Swidler, ed., For All Life, pp. 29-36.)

An attempt to draw up a ‘Declaration of a Global Ethic’ was initiated by a meeting known as the ‘Parliament of the World's Religions,’ and continued with the Second Parliament of the World's Religions. The concern was to make a declaration of principles that are universally accepted across all cultures. Theologian Hans Kung is the author of a version approved at the Second Parliament of the World's Religions, affirming that ‘every human being must be treated humanely.’ In articulating this demand, Kung makes explicit reference to the Golden Rule:

For an authentically human attitude we especially call to mind that Golden Rule which is found and has been maintained in many religions and ethical traditions for thousands of years: What you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others. Or positively: What you wish done to yourself, do to others! This should be the irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life, for family and communities, for races, nations and religions. Self-determination and self-realization are thoroughly legitimate - so long as they are not separated from human self-responsibility and global-responsibility, from responsibility for fellow humans and nature. Every form of egoism, however, every self-seeking, whether individual or collective, whether in the form of class thinking, racism, nationalism or sexism, is to be rejected. For these prevent humans from being authentically human.
The Golden Rule implies very concrete standards to which we humans should and wish to hold firm when they concern the welfare of either individuals or humanity as a whole. There are above all four ancient guidelines for human behaviour which are found in most of the religions of this world. They should be called to mind with a view to a better world order.





I take it that an ethic that is well-nigh universal in drawing on a notion of reciprocity common to almost all human societies is a meaningful and feasible political and institutional goal. The only obstacle to its attainment is the not inconsiderable one of ecological constraints – the tricky business of supporting a human population of seven billion plus on a planet of finite resources.

25 THE POETRY OF EARTH

On the Grasshopper and Cricket 
By John Keats

The Poetry of earth is never dead:
When all the birds are faint with the hot sun,
And hide in cooling trees, a voice will run
From hedge to hedge about the new-mown mead;
That is the Grasshopper’s—he takes the lead
In summer luxury,—he has never done
With his delights; for when tired out with fun
He rests at ease beneath some pleasant weed.
The poetry of earth is ceasing never:
On a lone winter evening, when the frost
Has wrought a silence, from the stove there shrills
The Cricket’s song, in warmth increasing ever,
And seems to one in drowsiness half lost,
The Grasshopper’s among some grassy hills.

The poetry of Earth is never dead, wrote John Keats in 1816. And poetry has not only lived up to the claim, it is more vital to us than it has ever been. Can poetry save the Earth? The Shakespearean scholar Jonathan Bate made the claim in The Song of the Earth that poetry could save the world. He may well be right. By Earth, I do not mean the planet, which will go on for as long as the sun continues to shine. I mean the natural world, of which we are both a part of and apart from, dependent and independent beings in ambiguous relation to our earthly home. ‘If poems touch our full humanness, can they quicken awareness and bolster respect for this ravaged resilient earth we live on? Can poems help, when the times demand environmental science and history, government leadership, corporate and consumer moderation, non-profit activism, local initiatives? Why call on the pleasures of poetry, when the time has come for an all-out response?’

Poetry is the music in nature. A poem may succeed in tuning your ears and turning your mind’s eye toward the music in the garden, the goodness in the world, and lead you to a future that is worth living in. The birds' song is poetry, and when, in the hot summer, the birds ‘hide in cooling trees,’ the grasshoppers take over. We still have Poetry. We still have music. But the times are getting hotter… we need to hear nature’s music.

In his Defence of Poetry, Shelley argued that ‘poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world’. It makes sense. There are no finer lines to portray a complex, interlinked and multi-layered society united by the devotion to the common good than those written by Dante Alighieri as he describes the order of Paradise in The Divine Comedy. Here, Dante portrays a society which achieves harmony by assigning all stations and valuing all activities according to the common end. The parts derive their significance and their character from the place they occupy within the whole, articulating such a unity of purpose in their interimbrication that they form seamlessly within the whole.

The problem is that, in a culture of separation and specialization, ‘the old union of beauty, goodness and truth is broken’, in the words of poet and critic Wendell Berry:

The world, which seems,
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.

Matthew Arnold, 'Dover Beach'

In our own time, humankind has destroyed wooded plains and valleys, polluted the seas and the rivers, poisoned the land and the air, damaged the hydrogeological and atmospheric systems, built on green spaces, and inflicted uncontrolled forms of urbanisation and industrialisation upon the land. To use an image employed by the peerless poet-philosopher Dante Alighieri in The Divine Comedy, ('Paradise', XXII, 151), humankind has through ‘foul usury’ humiliated the Creation, that flower-bed that is our God given dwelling. For Dante, ‘despising Nature and her goodness’ is a violence against God. (Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, trans, by Charles S. Singleton, Bollingen Series LXXX, and Inferno, canto XI, lines 46-48 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).There is nothing in the Bible which entitles human beings to exterminate or destroy or hold in contempt anything on Earth, quite the contrary. We may use the gifts of nature but have no right to ruin or waste them. We have the right to use what we need but have no right to do any more than that. The Bible forbids usury and condemns great accumulations of property. As Dante argues, ‘the usurer condemns Nature ... for he puts his hope elsewhere.’ (Dante Alighieri, Inferno, canto XI, lines 109-11.) By taking more than we are entitled to, we are destroying our place within Creation and, as a result, are destroying our own Being.

Books on Dante have titles like Dante's Path (Schaub 2003) and The Soul’s Journey (Jones 1995), highlighting Dante’s emphasis on life as a journey, a path we must travel, however uncertain the terrain. 'In the middle of the journey of our life, I found myself in a dark wood.’ In these first two lines, Dante speaks in the first person, but speaks to all of us embarked on life’s journey. Dante’s Comedy tells the tale of a pilgrim who, lost in the darkness a wood, journeys forth to see the light of beatitude. The poem charts the ascent of mind, body and soul from the lower regions of egoistic desire to the height of the universal realm. The journey is a personal journey but is also a universal theme. Dante aims to convert those men and women who have strayed from the path and who are lost without hope in the dark woods of despair. So, of course, at a time of encroaching environmental threat, Dante is timely. (Critchley 2013).
 
Will we do it? ‘It’s time for action!’ 
The future is always uncertain. I am sceptical of all determinisms, biological, environmental, economic and ecological. I affirm the capacity of human beings to act as creative, knowledgeable and moral change agents to act in the historical process and make a difference for the better. Whilst such a view falls short of espousing the radical indeterminacy of the future, it does recognise the extent to which life is a creation.

There are no guarantees. We will make the path to journey’s end only by walking. We may have to run in parts. Those who go too slow are as much a menace as those who go too fast. And along the way, we will have to confront inequalities in power and resources, and the structures which generate those inequalities, and the acquisitive self-maximising individuals, the corporations and the governments who personify those structures. In the process, we replace the pecuniary motives which currently dominate human interaction with more gregarious and generous motives.

The Unfolding Cosmos
[GREEN SPIRITUALITY – THE UNFOLDING COSMOS]
Felicity as the goal and natural term of all life
The ‘comedy’ to which Dante’s Commedia refers is a happy end. We can see happiness as the end of all living things. The diversity of ways in which this idea has been presented has led to scepticism as to whether happiness is a meaningful term at all. Even worse, happiness can neither be measured nor quantified, the most heinous crime of all a world dominated by rational calculation. I would refer here to Aristotle’s eudaimonia as flourishing and well-being. Also relevant is Spinoza’s joy. For Spinoza, the wise and free person will avoid pain and aim necessarily ‘to act well and to rejoice’ (‘bene agere ac laetari’). To act well is fully to enjoy oneself, and fully to enjoy oneself is to act well: ‘there cannot be too much joy: it is always good: but melancholy is always bad’ (E Pt IV Prop XLII). The life of the free being is characterised by pleasure as conscious well-being and enjoyed activity, as distinct from particular pleasures in the limited sense of titillatio, pleasures which, in excess, disturb the balance and well-being of the whole organism.

Spinoza wrote of the need to develop ‘adequate ideas’, transcending our passive and unreflective dependence on sensory perception, the fallible workings of memory, imagination, language, and other such contingent, error-prone sources of ‘inadequate ideas’, in order to contemplate everything sub specie aeternitatis. This seems to demand an austerely intellectual appreciation of the world that seems more than, or less than, human. It demands too much of human beings, and too little.

The visionary materialism of William Blake
Kathleen Raine takes heart from an awareness that, at last, the assump​tions of materialism that have long dominated the modern Western world are being increasingly questioned and overthrown. 

According to another view — and we must remember that this is the view the Eastern world, in various forms, has held over millennia — ‘nature’ is a system of appearances whose ground is consciousness itself. Science measures the phenomena which we perceive, and which Indian philosophical systems call maya. Maya has sometimes been termed illusion, but it is, more exactly, appearances. Blake used the word ‘visions’: this world, he wrote, ‘is one continued vision of fancy or imagination.’ But if the materialist premises are reversed, then ‘reality’ is not material fact but meaning itself. And it follows that in those civilizations grounded on this premise—our own included, up to the Renaissance—the arts, as expressions of the value-systems of a culture, have been held in high regard as expressions of knowledge of the highest order. Is not our human kingdom in its very nature a universe of meanings and values?
For these are inherent in life itself, as such, the Vedantic sat-chit-ananda, being-consciousness-bliss: being is consciousness, and the third term ananda (bliss) is the ultimate value of being and consciousness. We are made for beatitude, as the theologians would say; Freud, indeed, said something not dissimilar when he spoke of the fundamental nature of ‘the pleasure principle’ as the goal all seek. Plotinus wrote of ‘felicity’ as the goal and natural term of all life, and attributed it not only to man and animals but to plants also. Beatitude—felicity—is not an accident of being and consciousness: it is our very nature to seek, and to attain, joy; and it is for the arts to hold before us images of our eternal nature, through which we may awaken to, and grow towards, that reality which is our humanity itself.

Raine in McDonald 2003 173

Poet, artist and visionary William Blake defended this view of underlying reality in the teeth of the materialism of the scientific and industrial revolutions: ‘all that I see is vision’, he said, ‘to me this world is one continued vision of imagination.’ Blake could be dismissed as an unrealistic poet and artist, except that he was on strong metaphysical ground, writing of the living sun:

‘What,’ it will be Questioned, ‘When the Sun rises, do you not see A round disk of fire somewhat like a Guinea?’ O no, no, I see an Innumerable company of the Heavenly host crying ‘Holy, Holy, Holy Is the Lord God Almighty.’ I question not my Corporeal or Vegetative Eye any more than I would Question a Window concerning A Sight. I look thro' it and not with it.

Blake, Keynes, ed. 1966 617.

Blake sees the spiritual and aesthetic qualities of plants and objects within Nature’s interconnected and seamless web of life. Blake’s poems allow clods of mud and pebbles to speak and flowers to feel. Blake's ecological sensibility here stands in complete contrast to those who lack the vision to see any horizon beyond this fallen world of callous cash payment, those who can see only with the eyes of the miser, for whom ‘a Guinea is more beautiful than the Sun, & a bag worn with the use of Money has more beautiful proportions than a Vine filled with Grapes. The tree which moves some to tears of joy is in the Eyes of others only a Green thing that stands in the way’ (793). 

‘I look thro' it and not with it.’ Blake looks ‘through and not with’ the eye. Plato also looked through and not with the eye. The innumerable multitude of beings, being themselves rather than objects in a lifeless mechanism, can only do the same. The world is not dead matter but ‘an epiphany of life which not only has, but is, being, consciousness and bliss?’ The real is, ultimately, not an object but a Person. Raine explains what this means: ‘A "Person" in this sense not by a human act of personification of something in its innate reality neither living nor conscious; but rather human "persons" are a manifestation in multitude of the single Person of Being itself, from which consciousness and meaning are inseparable, these being innate qualities of life itself, as such.’ (Raine 2011). 

This refers to ‘life’ not as a property of matter, but life as experienced. 

In his holistic approach to nature, Blake comes close to the positions of contemporary ecologists and the emphasis upon the interdependence and interconnection of all things, unity in diversity and organic growth. More than this, Blake offers a perspective on the re-enchantment of the world. If we can go beyond our five senses and cleanse the doors of perception, then we will see that 'everything that lives is Holy'. (Blake, Complete Writings, pp.777, 379,149,160). This encapsulates Blake's total vision of reality. Everything that lives is holy not because we choose to think it so, but because it is intrinsically holy. The holy cannot be defined, only experienced as the ultimate knowledge of consciousness. ‘Within the scope of human experience there are degrees of knowledge and value, self-authenticating, of which those who have reached the farthest regions tell us, the vision of the holy, and the beatitude of that vision is the highest term.’ (Raine 2011). And it is because of this that Blake's stars and grains of sand can say no other than ‘Holy, Holy, Holy.’

To see a World in a Grain of Sand 
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower, 
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand 
And Eternity in an hour.

Blake Auguries of Innocence

Here, we are beyond a narrowly intellectual appreciation of the world. As Raine concludes, this is not poetic fancy: it is the profoundest knowledge. The vision contained in the mind’s eye is realised by freeing the sensuous imagination to play upon reality as a field of potentialities:

. . . the whole creation will be consumed and appear infinite and holy, whereas it now appears finite & corrupt.
This will come to pass by an improvement of sensual enjoyment. But first the notion that man has a body distinct from his soul is to be expunged; this I shall do by printing in the infernal method, by corrosives, which in Hell are salutary and medicinal, melting apparent surfaces away, and displaying the infinite which was hid.
If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite.
For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks of his cavern. 

Blake The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, p. 187

How deeply we are mired in duality becomes clear in our concerns to restore the connection between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds. Through our disconnection from nature, we have become bifurcated personalities. The externalization of nature is a consequence of what Blake called the ‘wrenching apart’ of the apparently external world from the unity of the wholeness of being. 

And Los, round the dark globe of Urizen, 
Kept watch for Eternals to confine 

The obscure separation alone ; 
For Eternity stood wide apart, 
As the stars are apart from the earth. 

Los wept, howling around the dark Demon, 
And cursing his lot ; for in anguish 

Urizen was rent from his side, 
And a fathomless void for his feet, 
And intense fires for his dwelling. 

But Urizen laid in a stony sleep, 
Unorganiz'd, rent from Eternity. 

The Eternals said : "What is this? Death. 
"Urizen is a clod of clay." 

Los howl'd in a dismal stupor, 
Groaning, gnashing, groaning, 
Till the wrenching apart was healed. 

But the wrenching of Urizen heal'd not. 
Cold, featureless, flesh or clay, 

Rifted with direful changes, 
He lay in a dreamless night, 

Till Los rouz'd his fires, affrighted 
At the formless, unmeasurable death. 

Blake, The First Book of Urizen 223

‘This has created an unhealed wound in the soul of modern Western man, leaving nature soulless and lifeless, and the inner world abstracted from the natural universe, its proper home.’ (Raine 2011).

That wound can be healed. We are now coming to appreciate the fact that we are active members in a ceaselessly creative universe. We can overcome our abstraction from the natural universe and see our true place within it. This is more than the intellectual appreciation of some impersonal necessity. We are active co-creators of this creative universe; the world is always in some way humanly objective, infused with will, purpose, consciousness and choice.

26 THE CREATIVE UNIVERSE
The self-organizing universe




The most significant developments in science have resulted from asking the right questions. In the words of Werner Heisenberg, ‘What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning.’ And this is why perceptions matter. Our way of thinking shapes the questions we ask. How we think and what we think about, how we perceive the world, affects reality at a very deep and fundamental quantum level, informing and modifying the underlying fabric of the universe in the process. Philosophy begins in wonder, stated Plato, and what we wonder about alters the way in which reality presents itself to us. The world we see is already in some way humanly objective, shot through will human meaning, will, consciousness and purpose. For Kant, the conceptual apparatus of the human mind shapes the reality we see. With the questions we ask and the procedures we apply in order to find answers, we create the reality of our experience. When we ask questions of nature, we assume the existence of a world outside of ourselves, an objective reality that exists independently of what we can think and say about it. Kant wrote of the world of ‘things in themselves’. Rather than revisit the debate between realism and nominalism, I’d just like to put these observations in the context of environmental ethics in light of climate change. Encroaching environmental threats are reminding us that there is a nature that is independent of us. To this extent, the objective reality studied by natural scientists does exist. The problem, however, relates to our attempts to understand this reality. Our knowledge of the external world is our knowledge of the external world, not that external world in itself. And that is as much as we can know. My point is that the objective reality we study is always in some way a humanly objective reality. The creative universe is an ongoing reality, not just continuously unfolding in the sense of a revelation of immanent potentialities but also a world in the process of always being created, speaking to and from something within ourselves. Stuart Kauffman writes of reinventing the sacred, and we can indeed ‘divinize’ the universe by learning to recognize the values, purposes and meanings at the heart of ‘objective’ reality (Kauffman 2008). It matters not just that we question but that we ask the right question. In the words of theoretical physicist John Wheeler, ‘the question is what is the question?’ What does the universe reveal to us? ‘No question? No answer!’ Asking the right question at the right time is crucial in getting the right answer. 

Heisenberg compares holding on to the idea of an objectively existing world to the belief that the earth is flat: ‘The hope that new experiments will lead us back to objective events in space and time is about as well founded as the hope of discovering the end of the world in the unexplored regions of the Antarctic.’ ‘Objective-worlders’ are like ‘flat-earthers’ in clinging onto a belief in an objective reality that is an external datum, a belief inculcated through training and reinforced by habit over centuries. Wheeler considers that we are ‘sleep-walking’ to the extent that we fail to recognise the extent to which we are influencing the results of our experiments. Beyond physics, the human species in general is sleep-walking to the extent that people continue to believe in the idea of a reality that inherently exists separate from ourselves as an external, objective datum. That objective world model is itself a construct, a projection which reflects a particular stage in human psycho-spiritual development. The most important thing to note is that human beings are creative agents in this development.

Self-organisation, emergent properties, and the creative and participatory universe
For biologist Stuart Kauffman, we live in an emergent universe of unending creativity, an understanding which breaks the spell of mechanistic science, the reductionist idea that everything is covered by knowledge of physical laws. The title of Kauffman’s book, Reinventing the Sacred, states his aim:





I am less concerned with defining a new conception of God – a foolish enterprise that will fail for all the reasons the old concepts were found inadequate - than with exploring the idea of human beings as co-creators within a ceaselessly creative universe, achieving the integration of theoretical and practical reason within a conception of the good life.

Kauffman describes emergent self-organisation in nature as ‘order for free’. We are part of that self-organising nature, we need to tune our actions into that ordering from within the creative universe. I agree with this, but would just add that this still implies a moral position in that it amounts to a conscious recognition of our place in the world. Gaining a sense of the real world and our place in it is about finding common ground between the worlds of fact and value, knowledge of the parts and the meaning of the whole, bridging theoretical and practical reason, so that we may collectively revalue the ground of our being.

This view is beyond a reductionist materialism. Life and its insurgency, agency, meaning, value, purpose, and consciousness almost certainly arise naturally, which implies that the evolution of the biosphere, and, within that, human society and culture, is creative in ways that cannot be predicted, controlled, manipulated in advance. 

For Kauffman, we must rethink evolution. Kauffman thus speculates that the belief that the only source of order in biology is natural selection may well be wrong. He affirms self-organization as a second source of order, available ‘to mingle in yet unknown ways with natural selection and historical frozen accidents.’ (Kauffman 2008: 101).

For Kauffman this entails a radical challenge to science, breaking ‘the Galilean spell’ that has held natural laws to be sufficient to explain reality:





Affirming self-organization as a firmly established mathematical fact, Kauffman holds that there is early evidence that the same self-organization actually applies in the bodies of plants and animals. Whether and how this self-organization actually applies to contemporary cells, ‘it is a clear example of the kind of spontaneous order in biology that might occur.’ In the very least, it is a concrete example of the possibility of emergence, non-reducibility, and ‘the powerful idea that order in biology does not come from natural selection alone but from a poorly understood marriage of self-organization and selection.’ Examination of vast classes of model genetic regulatory networks suggests that self-organization, order for free, ‘is as much a part of evolution and natural selection as historically frozen accidents.’ (Kauffman Ch 8).

When I started my own work on this topic in 1964, no one had any idea of the structure of real cellular genetic regulatory networks. 
Or might even random networks behave in ways that were close enough to what we know of biology that their spontaneous order (‘order for free,’ I call it) might be available for selection's finer siftings?
Astonishingly, ‘order for free,’ much like real biology, does exist in random-model genetic light-bulb networks. This is emergent self-organization, not reducible to physics. 

Kauffman 2008: Ch 8

Spontaneous self-organizing dynamics of the world
In the words of science commentator M. Mitchell Waldrop, complexity entails ‘the spontaneous self-organizing dynamics of the world.’ He notes that ‘complexity, adaptation, upheavals at the edge of chaos [are themes] so striking that a growing number of scientists are convinced . . . [they point to] an underlying unity, a common theoretical framework for complexity that would illuminate nature and humankind alike.’ (Waldrop 1992: 12). The dialectics of complexity are evident in Waldrop's account as well as in the work of George Cowan and others at the Santa Fe Institute, which focuses on efforts to ‘uncover the mechanisms that underlie the deep simplicity present in our complex world’ (see www.santafe.edu (​http:​/​​/​www.santafe.edu​)).

The co-production of the world
I would now like to relate the conception of self-organisation in the creative universe to the views I have attempted to develop in this book. This book affirms a conception of eco-praxis which sees the world as in part a human creation, the realisation of the self-conscious, free, flourishing, truly human society in terms of a dialectical process of the externalisation of human social power, its alienation within appropriative systems of social control, and its practical restitution and internalization within the self-governing society.

Peter Berger develops a similar notion in terms of externalization, objectivation and internalization:





This presents a picture of an active materialism which revolves around a continuous process of externalisation and internalization. As against a determinism which sees human beings as passive products of material circumstances, the dialectical view sees human beings as knowledgeable, reflexive, reality-creating and constituting agents engaged in an ongoing dialogue with the world. Human beings are participants in the world, self-conscious agents capable of appropriating the social and natural environment as a humanly meaningful environment. That is, human beings are co-creators of the world, continuously creating and re-creating the social world within the wider natural world. The challenge is to develop an eco-praxis that joins social and natural worlds so that any ‘humanisation’ of nature is a genuine naturalisation of human beings, not the instrumentalisation and exploitation of the natural order, its subordination to human interests, but the conscious appreciation of its harmonious order. 

The emergent creativity in the universe
This conception of self-organisation implies a new view of ourselves, of who we are as human beings, and, indeed, of where we are, seeing the world as something we co-create. ‘In this view, much of what we have sought from a supernatural God is the natural behavior of the emergent creativity in the universe.’ 





The self-organising universe beyond positivism
More than half a century ago, Lewis Mumford presented a version of the self-organising universe producing order and freedom:

the universe, like man himself, who is continuous with it, may be in the midst of a process of self-fabrication: chaos shaking down into order: order providing a basis for pattern and purposive transformation: purposes diverging into alternative routes, leading to disengagement and detachment from biological compulsions, and so finally to human freedom.

Mumford 1952 ch 3

Mumford concedes that to suppose that this is the work of a detached author, who has written the script and has supervised the performance, ‘is to go far beyond the warranted evidence’. He nevertheless adds sardonically that to suppose that this is all merely ‘an aimless accretion of accidents is to claim a far greater miracle for materialism than religion has ever claimed for God.’ There is purpose in all of this, whatever its origin. Kauffman proposes to ‘rename God, not as the Generator of the universe, but as the creativity in the natural universe itself.’ Either way, the common core is that human beings are responsible, not God; morality lies in our own hands.

This view is partially beyond natural law and is certainly beyond reductionism. It sees nature itself as the generator of the vast creativity around us, and sees us as active co-creators in this process. This view, based on an expanded science, is God enough and creativity enough. ‘What more do we really need of a God, if we also accept that we, at last, are responsible to the best of our forever-limited wisdom?’ (Kauffman ch 19). Our relation to God has always been ‘the great partnership’ in which we have responsibility to act and live up to the goodness and beauty of the Creation. It’s just that the Creation is always in the process of being created, and we are co-creators in this process.

Metaphysical reconstruction – the creative universe
Stuart Kauffman holds that we live in an emergent universe of unending creativity, a view which breaks the Galilean spell that everything is covered by sufficient natural law. ‘We can experience this God in many places, for this God is real. This God is how our universe unfolds. This God is our own humanity.’





This notion that we are responsible, and that morality lies in our hands, has profound implications for ethics. The notion of moral truth as resting on an objective foundation offers too fixed and static a view to be able to account for a moral universe that, in some way, is always in the process of creation:





The next stage in human cultural evolution is for us to join together and assume responsibility for our actions and our choices.

The creative processes of nature as energy flows up the biotic pyramid
The view that we are active members of a participatory universe sets human agency in the context of a natural creativity. Any divine transcendence here can be conceived in naturalistic terms. Norton conceives the creative processes of nature as energy flows up the biotic pyramid. ‘The diversity and complexity of nature result from varied adaptations of systems that exploit that energy. The sun supplies energy and local variation provides the context for ecological and evolutionary processes.’ Freedom, in an ecologically organized world, denotes ‘the creative ability to react to environmental variations, to adapt to an opportunity in the pattern of flows in the energy pyramid.’ Each species carves a niche in an ecological system by coevolving with other species or by invading or colonizing their habitats. The adaptive ‘choices’ that species make, the way they react differentially to the varied ecological opportunities and challenges they are presented with, indicates the ‘freedom’ which inheres in natural systems. ‘This metaphysical concept of freedom provides the basis for the more inclusive concepts of ‘integrity’ and ‘autonomy.’ A system maintains its integrity and autonomy when its future states are a result of ecological processes, interactions among species in ecological time.’ (Norton 1991: ch 10). One can understand, then, how these normally slow-changing interactions come to be disrupted by human activities employing powerful technologies to alter systems:













The participatory universe 
To argue that we live in a participatory universe entails the recognition we cannot separate ourselves as observers from what we are observing. Who we are and what we are studying are inextricably connected. As Stephen Toulmin argues:

We can no longer view the world as Descartes and Laplace would have us do, as ‘rational onlookers’, from outside. Our place is within the same world that we are studying, and whatever scientific understanding we achieve must be a kind of understanding that is available to participants within the processes of nature, i.e., from inside.

Toulmin 1982: 254 209-210 emphasis added

And that is where we find meaning, as creative agents participating in the creative universe. Kauffman criticises our contemporary perspective as reductionist. ‘The more we know of the universe, the more meaningless it appears’, he quotes Weinberg. He recognises that reductionism can boast the most substantial scientific achievements, Einstein's general relativity, quantum physics, natural selection, molecular biology, the Human Genome Project. And that, it would seem, is achievement enough.

Kauffman’s problem is that there are no meanings, no values, no doings in the reductionist worldview. ‘Laplace's particles in motion allow only happenings.’ The reductionist worldview has left us trying to find meaning in a meaningless universe. It’s a serious question. Where does value lie? Who creates value? If the universe is indeed meaningless, then we have no choice but to create value ourselves if we are to have meaning. But, as Jonathan Clatworthy writes, the view that ‘we create our own values’ easily slides into the self-contradictory view that 'we ought to create our own values'. He quotes Don Cupitt to demonstrates the flaws in this position:

Our task is to make our own faith come true by building the Kingdom of God on earth. We do it all... Ethics is not a matter of fitting into a ready-made moral order, but of designing and building a better one... We are objectively valueless, but we give each other value when we love one another. And the most rational faith to adopt and to act upon is that which leads us to value each person, each aspect of the world and our life, as highly as is self-consistently possible.

Cupitt ‘The greening of faith in a damaged world'. The Guardian, 3 October 1988

'Our task is to...' clearly means 'we ought to'; Cupitt writes with a moral urgency as he insists that there is no ready-made morality and we need to create our own. Any argument of the type 'There are no obligations and therefore we must...' clearly contradicts itself.

Individualistic theories therefore tend towards inviting us to live self-centred lives. Do value, purpose and morality boil down to spurious justifications of what we were going to do anyway?

Clatworthy 1997 ch 7

Emotivism, intuitionism, expressivism, perspectivism, morality as no more than value judgements and individual likes and dislikes – in short, subjectivism. ‘The basis for all values is the individual's experience of life.’ (Clatworthy 1997: ch 7).

Emotivism is the idea that moral judgements are merely the expressions of the speaker's emotions. (Stevenson 1937: 14—31; Stevenson 1963; Ayer 1946). ‘How, then, can we justify our moral beliefs? Stevenson discusses what happens when we try to persuade others to change their moral views. It is a matter of using facts to show how our preferred situation will satisfy the other person's desires. When we are told to do something, and ask 'Why?', a reason is something which makes the imperative attractive. The speaker does not give reasons for a change in the hearer's attitude, but causes them. In this way emotivism reduces moral debate to psychological manipulation.’ (C L Stevenson, Ethics and Language, pp. 21-28.)

It is no wonder, then, that Nietzsche came to repudiate value, purpose and morality as repressive, manipulative, masks for power:

No one is accountable for existing at all, or for being constituted as he is, or for living in the circumstances and surroundings in which he lives... He is not the result of a special design, a will, a purpose; he is not the subject of an attempt to attain to an 'ideal of man' or an 'ideal of happiness' or 'an ideal of morality' — it is absurd to want to hand over his nature to some purpose or other. We invented the concept 'purpose': in reality purpose is lacking.

Nietzsche Twilight of the Idols, 1889, quoted in Kent 1982: vii

This view became the dominant one in the twentieth century, so much so we can seriously question whether ethics even continued to exist. I have already cited Bernard Williams’ view that no-one is sure what the questions in moral theory should be anymore (Williams 1985). There’s a reason for this lack of certainty. J.L. Mackie in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, emphasises the ‘queerness’ of the view that the world could contain values. Mackie questions how objective values could relate to or co-exist with those characteristics revealed by science; by what means we could come to know of them; what possible relevance they could have to our existence (Mackie 1977:38/42). We are objectively valueless. Moral discussions, he argues, presuppose that there is a right and wrong, but there is no right and wrong. Such scepticism holds out no prospect of reconstituting substantive morality. Indeed, Mackie would dismiss the attempt to recover values as a refusal to confront the hard facts of a meaningless world. (Mackie 1977: 48-49).

So is Stuart Kauffman’s ‘Reinventing the Sacred’ no more than yet another attempt to ‘invent right and wrong’, as right and as wrong and as groundless as all the other attempts? I say no, for the reason that Kauffman has recovered meaning, purpose and agency at work in the creative universe. 

Behind the whole problem is reductionism, removing meaning, value and purpose from the world and leaving us with nothing but our human choices. At least Mackie left us with the brutally honest view that we have to get used to living without values. The merit of the view is that it is consistent with the reductionist worldview. The fact that human beings are meaning seeking creatures and that no society or civilisation can endure without a sense of value and purpose suggests that human beings will never be reconciled to living without values. Hence, existentialism was an attempt, through human choice, to create value in a world lacking values. But any such choices can only be arbitrary, self-legislating, self-justifying, circular, ‘as void as the spacetime in which their particles move. Our human choices, made by ourselves as human agents, are still, when the full science shall have been done, mere happenings, ultimately to be explained by physics.’ (Kauffman 2008).

We need, therefore, to demonstrate the inadequacy of reductionism and recover the sense of value in the world. Stuart Kauffman does this by reference to emergence and the creative universe. He argues that ‘life, and with it agency, came naturally to exist in the universe.’ And ‘with agency came values, meaning, and doing, all of which are as real in the universe as particles in motion.’ Kauffman stresses the word ‘real’ here, explaining that ‘while life, agency, value, and doing presumably have physical explanations in any specific organism, the evolutionary emergence of these cannot be derived from or reduced to physics alone.’ For Kauffman, life, agency, values, meaning, and doing, come naturally to exist in the creative universe:

I shall show that biology and its evolution cannot be reduced to physics alone but stand in their own right. Life, and with it agency, came naturally to exist in the universe. With agency came values, meaning, and doing, all of which are as real in the universe as particles in motion. ‘Real’ here has a particular meaning: while life, agency, value, and doing presumably have physical explanations in any specific organism, the evolutionary emergence of these cannot be derived from or reduced to physics alone. Thus, life, agency, value, and doing are real in the universe. 

This stance is called emergence, and it is a view I find easy to reconcile with Aristotelian essentialism:





Emergence forms a major part of the new scientific worldview. ‘Emergence says that, while no laws of physics are violated, life in the biosphere, the evolution of the biosphere, the fullness of our human historicity, and our practical everyday worlds are also real, are not reducible to physics nor explicable from it, and are central to our lives.’ (Kauffman 2008). We are beyond mechanicism, beyond reductionism and beyond the futile search for meaning in an objectively valueless world:

Part of my goal is to discuss newly discovered limitations to the reduc​tionism that has dominated Western science at least since Galileo and Newton but leaves us in a meaningless world of facts devoid of values. In its place I will propose a worldview beyond reductionism, in which we are members of a universe of ceaseless creativity in which life, agency, meaning, value, consciousness, and the full richness of human action have emerged. But even beyond this emergence, we will find grounds to radically alter our understanding of what science itself appears able to tell us.

Kauffman 2008 ch 1

It seems that we are back in the purpose-driven universe, a world which contains values, a world of meaning. Kauffman’s conception of the endlessly creative universe sounds a great deal like Lewis Mumford’s awareness of the inventiveness of life beyond reductionism, of immanent purpose and of life as being directional in tendency:

This exuberance of life, this audacious inventiveness, cannot be reduced to an endless series of accidents. 
When ‘coincidences’ multiply far beyond the bounds of probability one must call the result ‘purpose,’ and suspect that it shows likenesses with similar processes and patterns man discovers in his own life. 

Mumford 1952: 28 29

Life, even at the lowest level, is a selective process: a process of choosing, restraining, promoting, taking from the environment just such sustenance as is helpful toward the creature's development, rejecting what is irrelevant. But life does not float on a timeless ocean of existence: it moves forward, impelled by an immanent purpose that in man becomes a conscious one. 









‘Be yourself!’ And that applies to human beings. To return to Mumford’s words, life is ‘impelled by an immanent purpose that in man becomes a conscious one.’ But what are we?

Here we return to Kauffman’s view of human beings as co-creators in the endlessly creative universe:

Science cannot foretell the evolution of the biosphere, of human technologies, or of human culture or history. A central implication of this new Worldview is that we are co-creators of a universe, biosphere, and culture of endlessly novel creativity.

Kauffman 2008 ch 1

Mumford identifies balance, autonomy, symbiosis and directional development as the fundamental concepts which can be discerned in living organisms and applied toward the understanding and development of the life and destiny of human beings in society. ‘Where these features are lacking, where life has become purposeless and unbalanced, we have reason to suspect that a profound miscarriage has taken place.’ (Mumford 1952: 33).

Ceaseless creativity in the natural universe, biosphere, and human cultures





Which begs the obvious question that if God is Nature, why do we need to call it God? (I have covered the problem of identifying God with the finite sphere of Nature, elsewhere. There, I draw attention to the limits of an entirely naturalist conception. Critchley 2013 ITE). And if Nature is indeed enough, why the need to keep referring to God?

For Kauffman, this ceaseless creativity is partially beyond natural law, meaning that we are living in a world of unknowable creativity. That begs the question of from where do values arise. From within the creative universe, in which human creative agency plays an integral part, Kauffman would reply. To that extent, we create our own values, but we don’t create them out of nothing, we create them with something. We return here to the partnership ethic and to a praxis that removes the dualism between subject and object and democratises power, knowledge and philosophy.

Kauffman anticipates a healing of the long split between science and the humanities, and of the schism between pure reason and practical life. This would be to create the bridge between the worlds of theoretical reason and practical reason I have been arguing for throughout:





This amounts to no less than the reintegration of reason with the rest of our faculties to create a full humanity, the wholeness of the integral personality.

'In some strange sense,' says physicist John Wheeler, 'this is a participatory universe.' (Wheeler in Woolf (ed.) 

Beyond particles, beyond fields of force, beyond geometry, beyond space and time themselves, is the ultimate constituent (of all there is), the still more ethereal act of observer-participancy.

Wheeler and Zurek p. 199

David Bohm also refers to the, 'participative universe' in A New Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter, (in The Journal of the American Society of Psychical Research, vol. 80, no. 2., p. 126). Ilya Prigogine, in Order Out of Chaos, (p. 299), writes of ‘knowledge that is both objective and participatory.’

We are part of everything we see. We belong to the same world that we are studying, our place is in that world. We can no longer view the world from the outside as 'rational onlookers' and we cannot separate who we are from the things we are studying. We cannot be ‘objective’ in some pure, disinterested and impartial sense. The scientific understanding is the understanding of participants within the processes of nature, something gained from the inside, not from some vantage point outside of the world. 

 God as the natural creativity in the universe
For Kauffman, the materialism of humanism is too thin to nourish us as human agents in the vast universe we partially cocreate. ‘We need a domain for our lives as wide as reality.’ We need a place for our spirituality. We need a housing for the psyche, for the sacred. Kauffman proposes a Creator God as this place. But it is a God that we create, not a God that creates us:





Here, philosophically, I have to dissent. This amounts to an assertion that we can invent our values, running once more into the problem of from where value arises. If we do invent our values, then we have dissolved the objective reality examined by science. Reason as its own ground is no ground at all. And then we are confronted by the slide from a self-legislating intersubjective reason into subjectivism, relativism and nihilism. To be fair, Kauffman’s ‘reinventing the sacred’ does recognise the existence of an ‘objective’ world of sorts, a naturally creative universe of which agency and meaning are a part of. There is just a need to clarify the ethical position so as to guard against an arbitrary invention of values. As co-creators within the creative universe, we create with something real. However, if we do live in a creative universe, and if we are co-creators in partnership with this universe, then we do create our values, it’s just that we do so in relation to something, both the social and natural worlds within which we participate. This view entails that we can never have complete knowledge of the world we live in, not least because it is always in emergence. We live into mystery. I now turn to metaphysical reconstruction and spiritual revolution.

Spiritual Revolution
[metaphysical reconstruction - lives lived appropriately to reality]

Beyond technical fixes and natural self-regulation
In an age which has equated ‘progress’ with the technological mastery of nature, people have come to expect every environmental problem to have a technological solution. Experience suggests that ‘new technological fixes usually come accompanied by dozens of unforeseen side-effects.’ (Papanek 1995: 10). 

We require a more profound transformation than contained in political and technological changes. We need a transformation of ‘the political’ in the most expansive sense. Daly and Cobb emphasise how deep the changes we require are. Addressing the problem of the clash between short-term interests and long-term well-being, they refer to ‘attitudinal changes’. Whilst ‘people may recognize that true welfare is increased by reducing throughput, many individuals and businesses will find that this also reduces their immediate profits.’ The ‘short-run advantage’ of these individuals and businesses lies with the very thing which is destructive of their overall well-being, and so they will continue to increase the throughput. ‘Indeed, this will be true of so many groups considered individually, that the pressure will be hard to resist.’ (Daly and Cobb 1990: 373). Unless that pressure is checked by a change of systems and structures, so as to change advantages and incentives, appeals to the common good are futile. 

Daly and Cobb argue that the transition that is required cannot be effected by appeals to political interests alone. ‘It goes too deep.’ 

It cuts against patterns of thought and expectation that have been cultivated for generations. It must appeal to long-term interests in unaccustomed ways. The long-term includes the lifetimes of children and grandchildren, and it must assume a deep concern for them. In fact, it goes beyond that. A sustained willingness to change depends on a love of the earth that human beings once felt strongly, but that has been thinned and demeaned as the land was commodified.

Daly and Cobb 1990: 374

We must appeal to ‘long-term interests in unaccustomed ways’. Daly and Cobb then proceed to issue a moral demand that we must express a ‘deep concern’ for our children and grandchildren. The problem is that we know that those with vested interests in the status quo are prepared to discount the future. We know that this ‘deep concern’ doesn’t work for all people. And this reinstates the need for the political dimension in terms of a recognition of a clash of interests. Those who gain a private advantage from free riding and from hijacking the cooperative efforts of others are unlikely to be persuaded by any deep concern that is concerned with the general interest. 
Daly and Cobb argue that a ‘sustained willingness to change depends on a love of the earth that human beings once felt strongly, but that has been thinned and demeaned as the land was commodified.’ The problem, again, is that powerful groups possess vested interests in this commodification of the land, and have succeeded in embodying these interests at the legal and institutional level. To appeal to the ‘love of the earth’ that human beings once had, but lost through enclosure and commodification, smacks of a futile nostalgia. The obvious objection is that no matter how ‘strongly’ human beings once felt the ‘love of the earth’, it proved insufficient to prevent the annexation and exploitation of the commons. There is no reason to expect that this love of the earth will be powerful enough, on its own, to overcome this commodification, now that it so institutionally – and psychologically – entrenched. 

The ‘deep concern’ for future generations and the ‘love of the earth’ need to be buttressed by changes in structures, relations and practices at the deepest level of the social metabolic order so that the required changes in behaviour are achieved at the level of incentives, choices, actions and motivations:

Does that mean that the situation is hopeless? Must we assume that people will overuse the earth's resources and sinks despite all warnings as long as they can make an immediate profit, that change will only come when there is nothing left? No! We do not believe that is inevitable. There is always a chance that the right combination of ideas and leadership will strike the right chords at the right time. 

The right combination of ideas and leadership points to the intertwining of ethics and politics, of morally infused and effective power, of principles that are institutionally embodied and articulated. Daly and Cobb place the emphasis on a mental and moral conversion:

We, the authors, are not unique. We are like other people, and the same arguments that have convinced us will therefore have similar power over the minds of others, once they are awakened from dogmatic disciplinary slumber.

Arguing for a spiritual reawakening, Daly and Cobb locate the source of our environmental (and social) problems at a deeper level than systems and structures. They demand a much more exacting change than the mere transformation of social structures through political action. From an awareness that the solution to the environmental crisis demands nothing less than the housing of the human spirit, Daly and Cobbs address depths of human being that cannot be moved by mere rationalism. Ultimately, their argument for the common good requires a fundamental revaluation and reorientation of the way we live our lives. They demand nothing less than a religious revolution:

Love of the earth is not altogether dead within the human heart. There is still concern that children and grandchildren inherit a livable world. There is still a willingness to live a frugal and disciplined life if that can be seen as truly meaningful in relation to the massiveness of the problem. Capacity for sacrifice is not altogether gone. In short there is a religious depth in myriads of people that can find expression in lives lived appropriately to reality. That depth must be touched and tapped, and it must be directed by an honest and encompassing view of reality. If that is done, there is hope.

Daly and Cobb 1990: 375

At which point, many may be inclined to lose hope. Either one has faith or one doesn’t. Daly and Cobb make their religious understanding and commitment explicit:

we doubt that without that faith we would have either seen what we have seen or persevered in an unwelcoming context in articulating that vision and calling for change. It is our observation that others who share this passion and commitment with us are also deeply religious in varied ways. We have tried to make our case throughout this book in a predominantly secular mode. We think each argument and proposal stands on its own merits in some separation from the wider context that gives it its ultimate meaning for us. But we also think the real possibility for change depends on an awakening of the religious depths in a world whose secularity has gone quite stale.

Daly and Cobb 1990: 374-375

Much depends on how these religious depths we need to touch are expressed. Victor Papanek also insists that our ecological consciousness must possess a ‘spiritual underpinning’. He argues that the world-wide concern for the environment is more than an expression of anxiety over the sustainability of life on earth, and is, rather, ‘a great spiritual rebirth or re-awakening, a desire to re-establish closer links between nature and humankind. Deeply embedded in our collective unconscious is the intuitive awareness of our relationship to the environment.’ (Papanek 1995: 10).

In fine, love of the earth and love of life – biophilia – is something we all possess. And we all possess an innate moral grammar. We must find a way of activating that grammar, of moving people from within. This is the depth that needs to be touched.





Out of the silence of infinite space comes the birth cry of human consciousness. Against the enveloping darkness man throws the searchlight of his intelligence. But the ultimate gift of this conscious intelligence ‘is a sense of the mystery that encompasses it.’ (Mumford 1952: 56). As Lewis Mumford argues, this sphere is the realm of religion: ‘the sphere beyond knowledge and certainty, where ultimate mystery itself adds a new dimension to meaning.’ 

One as the whole - purpose and meaning – mystery and unanswerable questions
Mumford defines religion as ‘a body of intuitions and working beliefs that issue out of that part of man's nature and experience which science, deliberately seeking piecemeal knowledge of an immediately verifiable nature, rejects.’ Science is concerned with particulars, specific questions as to the ‘What’ and the ‘How’ of things. Religion is concerned with the whole, general questions as to Why? Wherefore? For what purpose? Toward what end? ‘Religion seeks, in other words, not a detailed causal explanation of this or that aspect of life, but a reasonable account of the entire sum of things.’ (Mumford 1952: 59). 

Here we see again the extent to which mechanistic, reductionist science drove meaning and purpose out of nature and left us with the problem of having to invent meaning in an objectively valueless world. That moral project was doomed to failure from the first.
Weber denies that the natural sciences can teach us anything about the meaning of the world (Weber, Science as a Vocation in Gerth and Mills 1977:142). Hence the claim that the world is disenchanted:

The fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the ‘disenchantment of the world’

Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’ in Gerth and Mills 1977:155

[knowledge and loss of meaning]
Max Weber described the tragedy of the rationalisation of the world in terms of scientific advance: the more we come to know the world, the less meaning the world comes to have. Knowledge comes with that pain, dissolving our overarching moral support and leaving us adrift in a meaningless world. The even greater irony is that advances in science itself leave us even more aware of how little we know. With each advance we come to be aware that we know less than we thought we did. 

As knowledge advances, meaning retreats. However, if there is no purpose and meaning to life, then the science that states this fact is even emptier than the condition it describes:

The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself.

Weber, '"Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy' 1904 in Shils ed Methodology 57

In light of this, it is possible to cast the antagonism between science and religion in a different light. The conflict concerns the nature of knowledge, and the value of anything that lacks empirical verification. Mumford is talking of wholes, purposes and ends, the kind of teleological thinking that was once part of science, but which was expunged in the mechanistic revolution of the modern age.

‘In terms of positive science, most of the questions religion puts are unanswerable questions; and for the conventional scientist, still imprisoned in a partial, mechanistic ideology, they represent illusory problems.’ Questions that cannot be answered by empirical verification are non-questions. Unfortunately, the biggest questions of human life, questions central to the human quest for meaning, are discarded as a result. To assert that we must learn to live without meaning and values betrays such a lack of empathy as to be pathological. As Alfred North Whitehead pointed out in Science and the Modern World (ch 4), ‘if men cannot live on bread alone, still less can they do so on disinfectants.’

Religion is concerned with what, from the standpoint of science, is unknowable: the impenetrable substratum of reality, the mysterium tremendum. Since human beings have acquired consciousness and intelligence and seek meaning, ‘there is no way of casting off these questions or of evading a provisional answer, without repressing an essential quality in life itself.’ (Mumford 1952: 59). To discard the quest for meaning is to lose the very thing that makes us human. Human beings cannot live in an objectively valueless and meaningless world:





However, if, beyond reduction to physical matter, the material life process as a whole has significance, then even the humblest life and organic function gain splendour by participating in that ultimate meaning.

We shall never understand the dilemmas we face unless we realize that human beings are the kind of rational animal who persistently asks such ultimate questions about himself and the universe. We also need to understand that the questions are wiser than all the answers we have so far given. From the first, human beings have approached their world and their life in a spirit of curiosity, humility, and wonder. With the Unknown as our province and the Unknowable as our object, we need to understand the true condition of man is ‘beyond us,’ and that our fate is not entirely in our own hands. (Mumford 1952 ch 3). 

Ultimate questions and the need to picture
Without doubt, our sense of the whole is a fragile and imperfect achievement. However, without some idea of the whole, the part we play in the creative universe would be as meaningless as the severed hand in Aristotle's famous illustration, if one did not know its normal connections with the human body. The organ can only be understood in connection with the organism it serves. Our lives only make sense in connection with the world outside.

As Mumford argues, partiality and persistent error in a field of genuine interest are more active paths to truth than indifference. (Mumford 1952 ch 3). What is at fault is not our attempts to picture the whole, since this is a valid translation of human experience. We err if we come to cast this intuition in familiar form in an attempt to pass more easily from the known to the unknown. The process of development is not predetermined at either the beginning or the end. Rather, there is direction, a tendency toward organization, lines of development, so the culmination of meaning lies in the future. ‘In other words, a large part of man's nature and destiny must be taken on faith; and the groundwork of that faith is no firmer in science than it is in religion.’ (Mumford 1952: 70-71).

Living deep in the grain of the creative universe, we act without full knowledge and certainty, we invent, improvise, learn, absorb the new and the surprising, adapt. ‘If the creative power knew the answer beforehand there would be no reason to work it out.’ (Mumford 1952: 70-71). And we do so not because we have the answers beforehand, but because we are in search of them. If we knew the answer in advance of acting, there would be no reason for us to look for it out by becoming active in the universe.

We make meaning by participating in the world around us. The attempt to invent meaning by human will and choice alone cannot be sustained, the meaning is purely arbitrary and cannot convince in the long run. That ultimate meaning we seek to share in is more than a human invention, but pertains to the world around us as well as to ourselves. To address our social and environmental problems, we need to get to the heart of human nature and address these issues with real moral and psychological depth. We need to recognise that human beings are the kind of creature who persistently ask ultimate questions about themselves and the universe – about who we are and where we are and, most important of all, why we are: why are we who we are where we are?





The questions we ask are wiser than the answers we have given so far, and maybe wiser than the answers we could ever give. For our answers to these mysteries are bound by the very terms of our own finite nature to be inadequate:





Every culture has developed its own particular way of asking these ultimate questions concerning life and its meaning, has assigned its own special values to the experiences symbolized as God, eternity, immortality, being and non-being. Whilst the answers to these questions differ with respect to details, ‘they all point to a common substratum of human experience which is none the less real because language is so inept and ineffectual in coping with it.’ For Mumford, the more naïve conceits of theology are ‘impatient attempts to picture, in familiar terms, more obvious forms of continuity between the known and the unknown, between the immediate and the whole, the manifest and the mysterious, than the facts warrant.’ But that is no reason not to make the effort. Some recognition of the whole is better than none at all. Without some sense of the whole, ‘the part played by earthly life would be almost as meaningless as the severed hand, in Aristotle's famous illustration, if one did not know its normal connections with the human body: the organ, by its very existence, implies the organism it serves.’ (Mumford 1952: 61).

Any metaphysical reconstruction we attempt must respond to our need to picture the whole. ‘Even a false picture of man's cosmic relations—and no picture can be free from many finite human errors—may give a closer image of reality than no picture at all.’ We may overestimate our powers, give too absolute a value to our individual lives, and project our own passions and animosities upon the universe itself, but ‘there is still more of the cosmic process in these distorted pictures than in the neat mathematical frame of positive science, which disdains even to place a picture within its boundaries. Partiality and persistent error in a field of genuine interest are more active paths to truth than indifference.’ (Mumford 1952: 62

The fault lies not in our sense of mystery and divinity, for this rests on valid translations of human experience: ‘we err merely in our effort to cast this intuition in a too-familiar mold, in order to pass more freely from the known to the unknown.’





In an endlessly creative universe, the best is yet to come. We have known this since Aristotle. ‘What each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature’. And in the ongoing creation of the universe, that process of self-realisation goes on and on. Meaning and understanding, like fulfilment, lie in the future. 

The sphere beyond knowledge and certainty is the sphere where ultimate mystery adds meaning to life:

The ultimate gift of conscious life is a sense of the mystery that encompasses it.

Mumford 1952 ch 2





I find it significant that E.O. Wilson, having made a strong defence of science as our surest path to knowledge, having defended the notion of and the search for objective truth, ends with what he calls a statement of ‘blind faith.’





Time and again, we come back to this – coming home. We are engaged in the Last Great Cause. Fail, and the world becomes a hellhole. Succeed, and we will not just survive, we will thrive. Because the stakes are so high, we lose big or we win big. Climate change is forcing us to know ourselves and know our world for the very first time. We are being called upon to achieve self-knowledge in the most expansive of senses. 

I would just query the harshness of Wilson’s split between ‘the unrelenting application of reason’ and the ‘ethic of simple decency to one another’. The one seems so tough and exacting, the other so easy. There is nothing easy about ethics. Had we been capable of living according to that ethic of simple decency – and we all know the Golden Rule – then we would not be in the mess we are in today. And whilst I would defend reason vehemently against the myriad irrationalisms and nihilisms breaking out in social and cultural theory, the notion of a relentless reason shows us why the reaction was provoked. Pushed too far, reason becomes an irrationalism. Reason can go so far, but no further. 

If we can balance our powers and our faculties, we can rest our hope for the future upon much more than what Wilson calls ‘blind faith’. We can have faith, but we work with a certain vision and direction.

If we must understand our humanity in relation to our world and our place in that world, wisdom suggests that we use all the resources available to us. All disciplines shed different light on the same reality.

Need for the integral approach
Shearman speculates that the ideas and solutions which will save us ‘will not evolve from more science and technology, but perhaps from the philosophers, the religious, the humanists or the environmentalists.’ (Shearman 1997: 267). The role of science and reason is clear. But we need vision and imagination too, we need to appreciate the poetry of Earth. Earlier, I emphasised the poetic vision and the contribution it could make to our salvation. It’s a view which suggests the mytho-poetic vision of Alastair McIntosh:

I have attempted to shift the paradigm of climate change over a threshold and into a realm that speaks in poetry, myth and vision. I have attempted a restoration to consciousness of the metaphysical that was crushed in the heartless vice of uni-dimensional positivism. Exactly how that translates back again into the world of politics, economics and technology I'm not quite sure. I think I can see the general principles. 
I hope that this is not just evasion of the practical by transcendental displacement. Instead, I think that what has been laid out here - the imperative of rekindling the inner life alongside outer life - is an agenda that just cannot be pinned down in detail. It cannot be measured, controlled and managed with the boxes of all due performance indicators ticked. What is offered here is something complementary but different: a politics more of poetry than of prose.




I would argue that the nature perceived by the poet, the theologian, and the scientist is the one and same thing, beyond our disciplinary separation and specialisation. (Bellah 1985: 383-384). The truth is that if we are to have a positive resolution of the crises we face, we will need all disciplines working at their peak, but most of all working in tandem with each other, complementing and enriching the insights each bring to make for a vital whole. 

But at some point we reach the limits of reason and must choose and act beyond the reach of our knowledge. 

It is no surprise that frequent calls for greater connections in all areas - greater connections between disciplines, between all levels of society, between theory and practice, means and ends, fact and value - should be heard coming from the field of environmental ethics and politics. One of ecology’s central principles is the interrelatedness of all things, something which entails a holistic understanding. The fact remains, however, that the field is fractured between divergent worldviews. Jamison argues for a ‘green knowledge’ that makes the connections and brings us closer together. He notes that whilst there is a voluminous literature on environmental politics, there is still a need for an argument that explicitly tries to make connections: ‘across disciplines and social roles, across countries and continents, across the generations, and, perhaps most importantly, across the divisions that have continued to grow between activists and academics, practitioners and theorists, the doers and the thinkers of the emerging ecological culture.’ (Jamison 2001 P). 

Stuart Kauffman writes that since we live in a creative universe, we must live into the mystery of the unknown future:

If we only partially understand our surroundings, if we often truly do not know what will happen, but must live and act anyway, then we must reexamine our full humanity and how we manage to persevere in the face of not knowing. Reexamining ourselves as evolved living beings in nature is thus both a cultural task, with implications for the roles of the arts and humanities, legal reasoning, business activities, and practical action, and part of reinventing the sacred—living with the creativity in the universe that we partially cocreate. Because we cannot know, but must live our lives anyway, we live forward into mystery. Our deep need is to better understand how we do so, and to learn from this deep feature of life how to live our lives well. Plato said we seek the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. Plato points us in the right direction.

Kauffman 2008 ch 14

This confirms an insight found in Lewis Mumford: ‘a large part of man's nature and destiny must be taken on faith; and the groundwork of that faith is no firmer in science than it is in religion.’





Nil tam difficile est quin quaerendo investigari possiet.
Nothing is so difficult but that it may be found out by seeking.

Terence, Act IV, scene 2, line 8 (675).

Kauffman examines the ceaseless co-constructing creativity of the biosphere evolving in part by Darwinian preadaptations, and their analogues in technological evolution. He states that ‘these preadaptations are radically unpredictable.’ If we define a scientific law as a compact description beforehand of what will occur, ‘then this evolution is not fully describable by "natural law."’ Kauffman therefore argues that we live in an emergent universe of ceaseless creativity, a universe in which life, agency, meaning, consciousness and ethics have emerged:





Kauffman therefore argues for the existence of a co-constructing biosphere, economic evolution, and cultural evolution. Within this creative universe there is ‘a persistent individuation of subsystems and processes with diverse and ever modifying or entirely novel functionalities, that persistently fit with one another more or less seamlessly, and also fit into larger systems, hence come to exist and persist for periods of time, then evolve further.’ 





This self consistently co-constructing nature is law ‘governed’ and partially beyond natural law, and ‘has given rise to all that we have called upon a transcendental Creator God to author.’ Kauffman therefore argues that we should let God be our name for the creativity in the universe:





The ever building of ourselves as fully human
[be-ing as the persistent becoming of culture, science, the economy, knowing, doing, and inventing] 

Kauffman writes of living a becoming existence:

This persistent becoming of culture, science, the economy, knowing, doing, and inventing is the ever building result of ourselves as full humans. It is our very making of meaning in our lives. It is emergent. And it is as amazing, awesome, and as worthy of respect as the creative biosphere. 

He argues that as we see ourselves in a creative universe of biospheric and cultural evolution, so we should see ourselves ‘in a single framework of our entire humanity’ spanning all of human life, knowing, doing, understanding, and inventing. 

We need more than rationalism to address the problems we now face. An overweening confidence in scientific knowledge, technological know-how and economic expansion – what Max Weber calls the rationalisation of the world – has brought us face to face with impending ecological ruination. Any reason that will help us now is a reason with its ethical – and emotional – component firmly in place. 

‘The word we need for how we live our lives is faith, bigger by far than knowing or reckoning. A committed courage to get on with life anyway.’ (Kauffman 2008 ch 14). Kauffman identifies his concern with how to live a good life with faith and courage with a philosophical tradition dating back to ancient Greece. This is the tradition I have worked in my entire life, which I sum up in terms of a concept of ‘rational freedom’, a tradition which I have defended against accusations of a totalizing intent and totalitarian consequence. (Critchley 2001). Kauffman offers a way of recovering the inherent vitality and creativity of the connection between reason and freedom by relating agency, meaning and value to the creative universe unfolding around us.

We may refer here to Owen Flanagan, and his book The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World. Flanagan argues that we make meaning in our lives through a set of meaning domains, a ‘meaning space’ which includes the sciences, arts, law, politics, ethics, and spirituality. 

Owen Flanagan describes human beings as ‘embodied conscious beings’ participating in a Space of Meaning:

We are embodied conscious beings engaged in high-stakes psycho-poetic performances. The quality of our lives, indeed whether our lives are meaningful or not, depends in significant measure on how we participate (to speak platonically) in the spaces of art, science, technology, ethics, politics, and spirituality. These six spaces are members of the Goodman set I call the Space of Meaning Early 21st century. We cannot opt entirely out of the Space of Meaning Early 21st century if we want to live meaningfully. No one – not even someone who chooses to live ‘off the grid’ and succeeds at doing so in the sense that he does not pay utility bills – can (or wants to) escape living within the constraints of a culturally available Space of Meaning.

Let’s speak platonically by all means. Flanagan’s argument is premised on Aristotle’s conception of human beings as social beings, beings who need others and society in order to individuate themselves. We need society and we need culture in order to develop:

Our nature as social mammals requires us to find meaning in a culturally available Space of Meaning or not at all. It is possible, of course, to find one’s time and/or place unsatisfactorily and to attempt to relocate in the past or to attempt to create new ways of being or thinking. Such relocation is commonly fantasized and sometimes succeeds. Nonetheless, relocation – backward or forward – requires moving from the Space of Meaning into which one was raised to another.




Agreeing that we make our meaning within all these spaces of meaning, Kauffman makes it clear that the existentialist view that meaning in a meaningless universe is possible only by our choices and actions was a response to reductionism. Once we are beyond reductionism, the universe ceases to be meaningless, with the result that our choices and actions cease to be arbitrary inventions. The world is no longer objectively valueless. Life is part of the ceaselessly creative universe. ‘In a newly envisioned universe, biosphere, and human culture of unending creativity, where life, agency, meaning, value, doing, and consciousness have emerged, and that we cocreate, we can now see ourselves, meaning-laden, as integral parts of emergent nature.’ (Kauffman 2008 ch 14).

Whether we believe in a Creator God, an Eastern tradition, or are secular humanists, the key point to grasp is that we make the meaning of our lives, and have the choice to commit ourselves to seek and to live a good life. We make that meaning out of something, and in relation to something as well as to each other. The ‘good life’ we make is more than personal choice and subjective opinion. But the good is always emergent. Since we must act without knowing everything, the question is what we should do in the face of the ignorance that we confront? ‘Our choice is between life and death. If we choose life, we must live with faith and courage, forward, unknowing. To do so is the mandate of life itself in a partially lawless, co-constructing universe, biotic, and human world.’ 

The view of emergence as a never ending creativity comes with the corollary that we can only understand the biosphere, culture and our social action retroactively. Yet we must live our lives forward. We must live forward as if we knew, living into a world which is only partially knowable. Since reason is a necessary but insufficient guide, we have to reunite the many-sided aspects of our humanity, within a framework of ultimate values we come to choose. At this point, we become fully responsible for ourselves, our lives, our actions, our communities of place and practice, ultimately the global civilization, seeing the world as our co-creation:

We can find common ground across our diverse traditions, religious and cultural, and come together toward a global civilization, rejoice in the cre​ativity in our universe, our shared biosphere, and the civilizations we have created and will continue to co-create. We can find common ground as we seek a new understanding of humanity. Such a quest can serve to bring meaning, community, solace, reverence, spirituality, tolerance, and generosity to all of us. This is the task of generations, for it can be the next stage in the cultural, moral, and spiritual evolution of humanity. For the first time, we have the means to communicate and choose. Can we know what we will create together if we embark on such a discussion and quest? Of course not. How wonderful though—we have to invent it together… There is only one humane way forward—we must together reinvent a shared sacred and make it a safe space for all of us.

Kauffman 2008: ch 19

In this sense, much of what we have sought from foundations, whether in God and/or Nature, we appreciate as the natural process of an emergent creativity in the universe. We are integral parts of that creativity, working together as co-creators of our shared biosphere and civilisation:

Humanity is a biological species in a biological world. In every function of our bodies and mind and at every level, we are exquisitely well adapted to live on this particular planet. We belong in the biosphere of our birth. Although exalted in many ways, we remain an animal species of the global fauna. Our lives are restrained by the two laws of biology: all of life's entities and processes are obedient to the laws of physics and chemistry; and all of life's entities and processes have arisen through evolution by natural selection.




The advantage of this view is that it places morality in our own hands; that is, it recognises the value-centred nature of human beings capable of setting and living by ends we have given ourselves, rather than referring to and attempting to read off these ends in relation to some ‘objective’ entity. I therefore develop a value-centred theory of virtue (reconciling Kant and Aristotle) according to which virtues are traits that enable their possessors to promote, express, and honour the value of ecosystems and life forms, and to exercise self-restraint, prudence and foresight so that long-term (i.e. sustainable) well-being prevails over immediate self-interest. Regardless of the mystery of origins and ends, there is a creative force in the natural universe itself, and we are connected to that force. How we relate to that force is our responsibility. To the best of our forever limited knowledge, we are responsible. If some such notion as Spinoza’s God/Nature exists, then we are in active partnership with it, within it. And that brings a responsibility with it.

As E.O. Wilson writes:

Another argument for a new Enlightenment is that we are alone on this planet with whatever reason and understanding we can muster, and hence solely responsible for our actions as a species. The planet we have conquered is not just a stop along the way to a better world out there in some other dimension. Surely one moral precept we can agree on is to stop destroying our birthplace, the only home humanity will ever have. The evidence for climate warming, with industrial pollution as the principal cause, is now overwhelming. Also evident upon even casual inspection is the rapid disappearance of tropical forests and grasslands and other habitats where most of the diversity of life exists. If global changes caused by HIPPO (Habitat destruction, Invasive species, Pollution, Overpopulation, and Overharvesting, in that order of importance) are not abated, half the species of plants and animals could be extinct or at least among the ‘living dead’ — about to become extinct—by the end of the century. We are needlessly turning the gold we inherited from our forebears into straw, and for that we will be despised by our descendants.





What should be noted about Wilson’s argument here is not just its spiritual dimension but it’s recognition that, as we take morality into our own hands, we are nevertheless charged with appreciating the inherent value natural world and its various species. In other words, our morality is no mere invention ex nihilo, a product of reason and culture with no relation to nature, but is something we create out of something and in relation to something. We do not live in an objectively valueless world after all, the world in which we live has meaning. No matter how technologically advanced we are, our health and our survival are still bound up with the flourishing of all forms of life. We carry our animality and natural ancestry into any and every future that we may project. Our knowledge of these primordial connections must be supplemented by a recognition of our constant dependence upon our partners throughout the whole range of organic creation, as part of reconnecting with our own original nature. 

The only thing is, we will always lack complete knowledge of that world. Wes Jackson, founder of the Land Institute in Salina, Kansas, argues that we should replace our knowledge-based system with an 'ignorant-based' view of the world in order to halt the environmental deterioration we have inflicted on ourselves, what he calls a 'do-it-yourself extinction.’ He argues that we must start from the premise that we know almost nothing about the future consequences of our actions. (Johnson-Davis 1994). 

A world view which recognizes how little we know could serve to protect us from social and ecological devastation in the future, whilst also divesting us of that arrogance in planning, control and design that leads to such destruction in the first place. 

Some such worldview is contained in Kauffman’s argument. Kauffman affirms the importance of human choice and action in a world in which we will always lack complete knowledge. As Kauffman puts it, we live our lives forward, as if we knew, but only partially knowing, with faith, stepping into the mystery of the unending creativity at the heart of the natural universe. We live in a creative universe. The moral dimension in this universe is our own continually evolving sense. It follows from this there can be no ‘objective’ foundation which is given in complete form beyond time and place, and therefore no self-consistent axioms drawn from any such foundation; there is no completely known objective reality from which moral acts can be derived and justified. Rather, there are views which develop and converge in the process of practical reasoning, using the full range of our humanity in relation to contexts, practices and ways of life. In the process of practical engagement and reasoning within the creative universe, we assume responsibility for our own choices and actions. But morality is more than a meaning created by human agency. Our actions as a part of and in relation to that creative universe make for a moral universe, with morality spanning nature within and nature without. 

This is a very different notion to the view rightly criticised by Margulis, that of human beings assuming responsibility for the planet. The question concerns us, who we are and how we relate to each other and to our planetary home. We develop a sense of identity not only through association with other human beings but with nature. As Arne Naess argues:





Association with others and with nature is therefore crucial in achieving self-identity. The question is what is so special about people? Why should one species survive and consider the rest of nature to be its 'inorganic body'? Is not ‘man’ also ‘nature's inorganic body,’ as Marx stated? (Marx EW EPM 1975: 328-29).

An integral part of deep ecology is what Naess calls 'biospherical egalitarianism'; the idea that all living organisms should have the right to develop in their milieux. All life on Earth, both human and non-human, is deemed as having an intrinsic value, worth preserving for its own sake, apart from any value it may have for what Naess calls ‘narrow human purposes.’ (Naess 1989: 29). 

Naess sees intrinsic value in the richness and diversity of life forms. Human beings have no right to interfere with nature and, furthermore, they should contemplate reducing their own numbers: 'The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease.’ (Naess 1989: 29). However, the human species will itself benefit from the preservation of nature and other species. It will begin to appreciate ‘life quality,’ dwelling in places of inherent quality rather than adhering in a materialistic fashion to a high material standard of living.

Life as directional in tendency - the insurgent quality of life
Life is directional in tendency, it moves forward, impelled by an immanent purpose that, in human beings, can become a conscious one. This is what Patrick Geddes called the insurgent quality of life, every organism coming to be what it is.

As Lewis Mumford wrote, when ‘coincidences’ multiply far beyond the bounds of probability one must call the result ‘purpose,’ and suspect that it shows likenesses with similar processes and patterns man discovers in his own life. (Mumford 1952 ch 2). 

The human personality emerges out of the matrix of communal functions and activities
Every creature is involved in an active give-and-take relationship, with the physical environment, and with a multitude of other organisms. The whole environment is being constantly remade through the co-operation of living organisms. Life therefore flourishes by extending the space of mutual aid, reciprocal interplay, or symbiosis. 

The fundamental concepts we take from a study of living organisms are balance, autonomy, symbiosis, directional development. Life is directional in tendency, it moves forward, impelled by an immanent purpose that, in human beings, can become a conscious one. Nature’s ceaseless creativity becomes, in humanity, a capacity for culture that transcends biological necessities and imperatives:





Unity and meaningfulness of all life 
The case for purpose and the sense of participation.

[the outer world and the inner self are one]
The idea of the fundamental oneness and meaningfulness of all life, indeed, of all existence is expressed fully in the Upanishads, where Brahman – the cosmic principle, the ultimate, underlying essence of the universe - and Atman – the true self, the pure essence of each being - are one. You are That. We can say that the inner self and the outer world are in origin identical, or, indeed, that they become one through a dynamic process of mutual growth. 

Participation in the commonwealth of life
[purposeful world – participation in the commonwealth of life]
[living forwards]
I return here to where I began, recognising that we are active members of the commonwealth of life. We are participants in the unending creativity in the natural universe, biosphere, and human cultures. We find that meaning and oneness within the creative universe. However, since this creativity is never ending, we do not and cannot know what the future will hold. We live our lives forward, and only understand it backwards, as Kierkegaard said. We live as if we knew, as Nietzsche said. Participating in a ceaseless creativity, we therefore live forward into mystery, for that is life’s injunction, to become what we are. And since we cannot fully know, then we cannot govern, or even guide, our lives by reason alone. We must therefore reunite our capacities and make ourselves whole, integral personalities flourishing in a creative world we can only ever know from the inside. 

Do not they bring it to pass by knowing that they know nothing at all?

Terence, Andria (The Lady of Andros), The Prologue, line 17.

The limits of reason and the need to reunite our full humanity
Kant expressed the motto of enlightenment with the words Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding!’ (Kant What is Enlightenment? 1991:54). We have. And reason, the core value of the Enlightenment, led us to see the limitations of reason, hence Kant’s great critiques. ‘We must therefore reunite our full humanity. We must see ourselves whole, living in a creative world we can never fully know.’ (Kauffman 2008 Pref). 

Seeing ourselves whole in this way requires an integral personality. And an integral rationality. We need to put reason and intuition together.

In his Inquiry into the Human Prospect, Robert Heilbroner notes that the driving energy of human development has come from the Promethean spirit. It is this spirit that has enabled us ‘to subjugate nature to his will, and to create societies designed to free man from his animal bondage.’ The impending ecological catastrophe is only now revealing the limitations of that freedom. Heilbroner considers that some of that Promethean spirit may yet serve us in good stead in the years of transition. ‘But it is not a spirit that conforms easily with the shape of future society as I have imagined it.’ 





The environmental crisis is an existential crisis. Brought up to believe, indeed expect, that an endless economic expansion and technological innovation would deliver peace, freedom, plenty and happiness, modern men and women cannot quite believe that their god is dead. Indeed, in this context, the various geo-engineering schemes now being proposed to deal with climate change look more like a last, desperate attempt to reassert human technological power over a recalcitrant nature. The game is up; we need to make our peace with the Earth and with each other. We need to make peace with ourselves, with both sides of our nature, and put reason and intuition back in touch with one another.

Prometheus and Orpheus
The demand for the reintegration of reason is a call for balance between the technical and the artistic aspects of human nature. Since the scientific and industrial revolutions, we have been overdeveloping the technical aspect to the detriment of our ethical, emotional and psychological faculties. To achieve balance, Mumford argued that alongside Prometheus, who stole the gift of fire from the gods, we should place Orpheus: the player of the lyre, he who almost rescued Eurydice from the technological underworld of Pluto. Orpheus symbolizes a part of human nature that Prometheus, ‘for all his love of man, never could bring to its full development.’ (Mumford 2000: 36). 

Mumford challenges the definition of ‘man’ as ‘tool-using’ or ‘tool-making’ animal, particularly the way that this trait is considered to raise human beings above the rest of brute creation. ‘This overweighting of tools, weapons, physical apparatus, and machines has obscured the actual path of human development.’ (Mumford 1967: 6). The definition clearly fitted the self-image of man in the age of the industrial revolution. Plato attributed man's emergence from a primitive state as much to Marsyas and Orpheus, the makers of music, as to fire-stealing Prometheus.

Mumford is concerned to challenge the assumption that tool-making and tool-using is the original source of human development. Supplementing the Promethean myth, rather than rejecting it, Mumford argued for Orpheus as ‘man's first teacher and benefactor’: ‘man became human, not because he made fire his servant, but because he found it possible, by means of his symbols, to express fellowship and love, to enrich his present life with vivid memories of the past and formative impulses toward the future, to expand and intensify those moments of life that had value and significance for him.’ (Mumford 2000: 35).

In Mumford's interpretation, the word and the symbol, the writer and the artist, matter at least as much as the tool maker. The arts come to assume a central place in a balanced life. (Mumford 1967). For Mumford, ‘man was perhaps an image maker and a language maker, a dreamer and an artist, even before he was a toolmaker. At all events, through most of history, it was the symbol, not the tool, that pointed to his superior function.’ 

Mumford acknowledges that his position is ‘heretical’: we have become so ‘thing-minded, tool-minded, object-minded’ as to be distrustful of symbols. The common belief is that ‘true education should be restricted to an experience with "things" and with "real" situations.’ That same spirit has led to a pervasive neglect of religion, ethics, the humanities, ‘because these disciplines have, in a world of machines, no obvious operational value.’ (Mumford 2000: 36). But if only mechanical things have value, ‘what is left of man except a living corpse, a corpse whose life is so meaningless and valueless that it presents no sound reason for seeking either individual employment or national survival?’ This is the world of the megamachine, a world in which a person’s value is measured in terms of the contribution he or she makes to the expansion of the Gross National Product. 

‘Over a large part of human history, then, the tool and the object, the symbol and the subject, were not in fact separated.’ Here is the integration we are seeking. Whilst serving Prometheus, the tool-users were listening, ear half-cocked, to the distant sound of Orpheus's lyre, or the wildest notes of Pan's pipes. And the result was a balanced, integrated life in all its dimensions:

All work was performed directly by human hand, and that hand was not a detached hand, a specialized hand, it was part and parcel of a human being who, no matter how faithfully he followed his craft, had many other interests than the performance of work.
One of them was that the operations were under the direct control of the craftsman himself. He took his own time about his work, he obeyed the rhythms of his own body.




It takes more than rationalism to nourish a whole human being.





As we find our place in the world and participate in the flow of the creative universe, we bring reason and intuition together, and we appreciate the spiritual dimensions of the natural. This experience is good for us and for the communities to which we belong. It expresses our involvement, indeed our immersion in the community of life. In the process, mind, body and soul integrate. 

There is a need, in fine, for an organic interconnection, a collective identity, for a living tradition that serves to foster a greater awareness on the part of diverse elements of how closely related they are.

My argument draws on the various disciplines, and spans theoretical and practical reason, to address the question, ‘How do living things survive and flourish in relation to one another in their common habitat?’ 





This integration yields a fuller understanding of the situated richness of life. We come to know ourselves as we create our lives. In the process, the split between pure reason and practical life is overcome:





In this way, we create the environmental ethic as we live it, living in a shared space, participating as one in the natural creativity inherent and unfolding in the universe.

The spiritual underpinning to our ecological consciousness
[intuitive awareness of our relationship to the environment - ethical obligation to our planetary home]

I would argue that the desire to re-establish closer links between nature and humankind gives evidence of a spiritual re-awakening. Deeply embedded in our instincts is an intuitive appreciation of our dependence upon the natural world. The notion of an integral awareness locates the origin of the social and environmental crisis at a much deeper level than can be moved by any technical or calculating rationalism. We need a revaluation of life, a change of behaviour, a reorientation of social purpose.

In his book The Voice of the Earth, Theodore Roszak writes: ‘If psychosis is the attempt to live a lie, then the epidemic psychosis of our time is the lie of believing that we have no ethical obligation to our planetary home.’

The difficult part is formulating the nature of that ethical obligation. In light of the seemingly intractable nature of philosophical disputes, it seems easier, more prudent, more effective to just live that obligation. This requires seeing our connection with nature as a guide for all our actions, our creativity and our lives.

For Stuart Kauffman, we live in an emergent universe of ceaseless creativity in which life, agency, meaning, consciousness and ethics have emerged. The emergence of life and of agency, and its evolution in the creative universe, comes with value and meaning. We play our part in the unending co-constructing creativity of the biosphere. Our historical development, our cultures, and our activities, are evolving, emergent, and unpredictable. Through our histories, inventions, ideas, and actions, we are parts of the creative universe. We are ceaselessly co-constructing in relation to our environment:

we have looked at the ceaseless co-constructing creativity of the biosphere evolving in part by Darwinian preadaptations, and their analogues in technological evolution. These preadaptations are radically unpredictable. And if we believe that a scientific law is a compact description beforehand of what will occur, then this evolution is not fully describable by "natural law." In the new scientific worldview I'm describing, we live in an emergent universe of ceaseless creativity in which life, agency, meaning, consciousness and ethics … have emerged. Our entire historical development as a species, our diverse cultures, and our embedded historicity, have been self-consistent, co-constructing, evolving, emergent, and unpredictable. Our histories, inventions, ideas, and actions are also parts of the creative universe.
There is in the co-constructing biosphere, economic evolution, and cultural evolution, a persistent individuation of subsystems and processes with diverse and ever modifying or entirely novel functionalities, that persistently fit with one another more or less seamlessly, and also fit into larger systems, hence come to exist and persist for periods of time, then evolve further. 




Whilst we only partially understand our environment, and do not know what will happen, we nevertheless must live and act anyway. We cannot rely on reason alone, whether this is expressed in the form of market incentives, moral codes, informed public policy. Instead, we must revalue our full humanity so as to live forwards in the face of not knowing. Seeing ourselves as evolved living and co-constructing beings in nature is a cultural task in that it changes a way of life, with implications for the roles of science and technology, economic activity, public policy, practical reasoning and action.

Our deep need is to learn how to live our lives well by participating with the creativity at work in the universe, and understand this world as something that we partially co-create. 

This is to see our lives as integral parts of the ‘conditions of becoming’ in the biosphere:

Again, if a scientific law is, as Murray Gell-Mann suggests, a compact description, available beforehand, of the regularities that will unfold, then evolution of the biosphere by preadaptations and the economy by similar preadaptations are not describable by ‘law.’ In fact, as Aristotle already argued with his four causes, scientific knowledge fails for practical human action, where, he thought, final, formal, efficient, and material causes were necessary. But even Aristotle did not discuss the implications of the persistent limitations of our knowledge for how we manage to act anyway. How inarticulately we speak of practical action. Yet we live it every day.




The transition from the world of theoretical reason to practical reason has haunted philosophy since Plato. Yet, no matter how difficult it is to write of practical action, we succeed in living it every day. 

We must carry on with life, and act even though we do not know. We need to find some way of orienting ourselves for practical action so as to bridge the gap between what we know and what we cannot know. How do we live forward into mystery? By using the tools that evolution has equipped us with, reason, foresight, emotion, intuition, understanding, experience, metaphor, the capacity for invention, the capacity for seeing and seizing an opportunity in an adjacent possible.

Psychologists and neuroscientists examine consciousness, feeling, sensation, emotion and intuition, and the debates as to what these mean rage on. These sensibilities are the tools that evolution has equipped us with to be able to engage in practical action, to think, act, and do, despite not knowing the future. 

Partially knowing and understanding, but flowing
We are equipped with the capacity to see and take opportunities, without knowing or calculating the long term consequences of our actions. We live forward through the creativity of human culture. In face of the environmental crisis, we need to act wisely. This is where we go beyond rational restraint and systems and codes of enlightened self-interest to address what it means to act wisely in the absence of knowledge. This raises the issue of an appropriate environmental theory and practice – eco-praxis.

[be-ing as the persistent  - the ever building of ourselves as full humans] 
It’s about Living a Becoming Existence, making ourselves fully human, fitting our cultures within ecosystems.
This continuous unfolding of nature, culture, knowing and being is about living a becoming existence, making ourselves fully human in the process. ‘It is our very making of meaning in our lives. It is emergent.’ And it is part of and as worthy of respect as the creative biosphere:

This persistent becoming of culture, science, the economy, knowing, doing, and inventing is the ever building result of ourselves as full humans. It is our very making of meaning in our lives. It is emergent. And it is as amazing, awesome, and as worthy of respect as the creative biosphere. As we see ourselves in a creative universe, biosphere, and culture, I hope that we will see ourselves in the world in a single framework of our entire humanity that spans all of human life, knowing, doing, understanding, and inventing. The word we need for how we live our lives is faith, bigger by far than knowing or reckoning. A committed courage to get on with life anyway. How to live a good life with faith and courage is at the core of philosophic traditions dating back to Greece, with Plato stating that we seek the Good, the True, and the Beautiful.

Kauffman 2008 ch 14

To live our lives, we need faith, something greater by far than knowing or calculating:

The existentialist insistence that we make our meaning in a meaningless universe by our choices and actions was a response to reductionism, in which the universe is meaningless. But life is part of the universe. In a newly envisioned universe, biosphere, and human culture of unending creativity, where life, agency, meaning, value, doing, and consciousness have emerged, and that we cocreate, we can now see ourselves, meaning-laden, as integral parts of emergent nature. Whether we believe in a Creator God, an Eastern tradition, or are secular humanists, we make the meaning of our lives, to live a good life, in all these ways. And we act without knowing everything. What should and can we do in the face of the ignorance that we confront? Our choice is between life and death. If we choose life, we must live with faith and courage, forward, unknowing. To do so is the mandate of life itself in a partially lawless, co-constructing universe, biotic, and human world.

Kauffman 2008 ch 14

The insurgency of life is central to the creative universe. We are integral parts of emergent nature, co-creators in a universe, biosphere, and human culture characterised by a never ending unending creativity, a meaningful, purpose driven and value laden world where life, agency, consciousness, have emerged. As we come to see ourselves as being at one in the creative universe, biosphere, and culture, the hope is that our participation within this single framework, knowing, doing, understanding, and acting, will span all of life. 

27 BEING AND BELONGING

The emergence of a new understanding of the Earth
[futures - After a long period of psychological disruption stability will return only with the emergence of a new understanding of the Earth

And so, the end of this brief excursus into what it means to be truly alive within the Earth’s commonwealth of virtue approaches. It should be clear by now that more than knowledge and know-how, we require imagination, moral courage and even a spiritual awakening that moves us in the depths of our being and inspires us to great heights in the world around us. 

The inner and the outer
E.F. Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful presents a message which resonates today. Interest has focused mainly on his message concerning the need to develop appropriate technology. There has been much less attention paid to his call for metaphysical reconstruction. Such reconstruction is imperative. ‘Only when the space between outer and inner life is lubricated can community be kindled.’ (McIntosh 2008: 102).

The Economics of Purpose - E.F. Schumacher and R.H. Tawney
E.F. Schumacher’s true significance has yet to be fully appreciated. People read his book Small is Beautiful, and respond to his message concerning an ‘economics as if people mattered.’ Then they go straight to his practical solutions and his emphasis on appropriate technology. These are, of course, important but not, for Schumacher, the most important. The most important thing for Schumacher was what he called ‘metaphysical reconstruction.’ Schumacher holds that the modern world’s abandonment of the ancient and the Christian conception of economics as a branch of ethics has impoverished our social and moral lives and left us blind worshippers of the new gods of money, capital, commodities – the false religion of economic growth. He thus calls for an appropriately scaled society in which material activities are organised according to purpose, and social organisation proceeds in accordance with a scale of metaeconomic values in which people come before profits. That ethical commitment is to the fore in ‘distributism’, a theory of social organisation and economic provision that derives from social Catholicism and which profoundly influenced the proposals Schumacher advanced in his book Small is Beautiful. Distributism is very closely linked with the environmental and ecological questions of today.

What I’m struggling to do is to help recapture something our ancestors had. If we can just regain the consciousness the West had before the Cartesian Revolution, which I call the Second Fall of Man, then we’ll be getting somewhere.

The practical men and women of the world, impatient to get things done, go straight to Schumacher’s words on solutions and technologies. Very important these things are too. But Schumacher himself considered the ‘metaeconomic’ foundation of his case for the appropriately scaled society to be prior to the specifics of his economics.

An atheist friend of mine told me that Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful should be taught on every economics course. I agree very much. But I’m not quite sure my friend was quite alive to the real flavour of Schumacher’s economics. Some have spotted it. Thus Charles Fager writes: 

Small Is Beautiful -- a message so skillfully delivered that it has been absorbed by his audiences apparently without being noticed. What is the message? Nothing less than a passionate plea for the rediscovery of old-time Western religion -- Roman Catholic religion, to be precise.





He readily owned up to being a Catholic, a certified convert as of five years ago. This item is not mentioned in his book; in fact, one of the most frequently cited chapters, “Buddhist Economics,” almost made it appear as if he were deeply involved in Eastern religions. But wasn’t this chapter, I inquired, really more informed by the Catholic writings and thinkers he mentioned so frequently elsewhere in the book -- the papal encyclicals, Newman, Gilson and, above all, Thomas Aquinas?

Schumacher grinned. “Of course. But if I had called the chapter ‘Christian Economics,’ nobody would have paid any attention!”

This is not to say that the reference to Buddhism was a sham; he is firmly convinced that the basic elements of a common religious outlook are to be found in all the world’s major religions. But it was done artfully, to help get his message across. “You see, most people in the West are suffering from what I call an anti-Christian trauma,” he explained, “and I don’t blame them. I went through that for 20 years myself.”

Paradoxically, it was Buddhism that opened the door to Schumacher’s return to Western religion, so his use of Buddhist concepts, besides being shrewd, is authentically based in his experience. “I was raised in Germany in the atmosphere of scientific materialism,” he explained, “though with a veneer of Christianity -- Lutheranism. But after I went to the university, I reacted very strongly, like many young people, against veneers of religion and culture, and that was the beginning of my own version of the anti-Christian trauma. There’s much truth to that reaction too, of course, because the churches have become associated with so much that’s wrong about our culture.”

But this scientific materialism was hardly a satisfactory alternative world view for a sensitive soul. “These attitudes,” said Schumacher, “all left the taste of ashes in my mouth,” and it wasn’t long before he was searching for some better view of life.

Fager, drawing on the expertise of Catholic theologian John Coleman, reveals the sources of the core concepts of Small is Beautiful as lying in Catholic theology and social ethics, in the neo-Thomistic philosophy of French Philosopher Jacques Maritain, who considered small-scale institutions more humane than large-scale institutions. Catholic thinkers such as Maritain criticised the individualism of bourgeois capitalism but rejected a totalitarian, top-down state socialism as an alternative. He sought a middle way between social atomism and political centralisation as two sides of the same problem, and this middle way is integral to Catholic social thought.
There are many who sing the praises of Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful who do not realise the background he drew upon for his ideas. Catholic distributists such as G. K. Chesterton, Hillaire Belloc and Eric Gill were arguing for the decentralisation of industry and economic democracy in similar terms to Small Is Beautiful many years before that book was published. On the continent, Christian Democratic parties have supported the idea of workers’ councils as part of management in corporations, the co-determination system in Germany, for instance. The very same proposal is also to be found in Schumacher’s book. And much more besides.

Schumacher’s views are consistent with Catholic social teachings, which should come as no surprise, because that is precisely where Schumacher got them from. Schumacher was explicit in his Catholicism. His argument for appropriate scale is central to the Catholic principle of subsidiarity, in which power resides at the lowest level of competence. Schumacher even has a chapter in Small is Beautiful entitled ‘Subsidiarity.’ Schumacher was a convert to Catholicism precisely because such views fitted his own thinking on social and moral questions. He belongs to a Thomist tradition that includes such figures as Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson. Catholic social thought stresses the principle of subsidiarity, which holds that power should reside at its lowest level of competence, scaling higher when necessary. Social and political institutions ought to be manageable in size, scaled to human proportions and dimensions, comprehensible, and run in accordance with purpose so as to enhance rather than inhibit the dignity of the people involved in them. This tradition emphasises the importance of the intermediary associations which between government and market, public and private realms, and which mediate the relations between the individual and the state, constituting a form of social and moral self-government in the associational space of civil society.

I’m interested in the shock, even horror, when those influenced by Schumacher come to discover the profoundly Catholic nature of his principles. Call them Buddhist, and people are drawn in; call them Christian, and the same people recoil. Hardly a promising mentality for the metaphysical reconstruction that is required. And then there is the fuss over the fact that Schumacher cannot be classed as a ‘progressive,’ since he is a ‘conservative radical.’ His attempt to recapture what our ancestors had, which we have lost since the Cartesian revolution, marks him out in some eyes as a ‘reactionary.’ I suggest those critics read again Stuart Kauffman’s words above, who argues that Plato points is in the right direction in integrating all the faculties, and that the ancients were right to proceed from an understanding of the good life; read Kauffman’s rejection of modern mechanistic reductionism; and see that Schumacher is right on this. If he is not a ‘progressive,’ but an adherent of the ancient wisdom, a Catholic, a conservative, a religious radical – so what? How does any of that alter the initial appreciation of his core principles as applied to economics? And why is it that the brave soldiers of positivism are so timorous in face of metaphysics?

How is metaphysical and socio-economic reconstruction to be achieved? What are the moral choices? These are the questions that Schumacher asks in the final chapter. He addresses both technical and institutional issues as well as the monetary costs and then points out the lesson: ‘But it is bound by truth. Only in the service of truth is perfect freedom, and even those who today ask us 'to free our imagination from bondage to the existing system' fail to point the way to the recognition of truth.’ And the truth points to a society organised around the Four Cardinal Virtues:





Arguing thus exposes Schumacher to the criticism that he is an anti-progressive reactionary. The most important question is is he right? That so many have been drawn to Schumacher’s writings on economics, and work on appropriate scale in eco-design, would suggest yes. So why the resistance to go deeper into the metaphysics upon which Schumacher’s design principles were based? Schumacher’s emphasis on the recovery of the virtues is right, for all the reasons I have developed throughout this book. These virtues are the hinge upon which all else depends. Together, with prudence at the heart – the ‘mother’ of all other virtues – the cardinal virtues constitute a healthy and just alternative to the ‘small, mean, calculating attitude to life, which refuses to see and value anything that fails to promise an immediate utilitarian advantage.’

Schumacher’s final passage in Small is Beautiful puts it concisely:





Justice relates to truth, fortitude to goodness, and temperantia to beauty; while prudence, in a sense, comprises all three. The type of realism which behaves as if the good, the true, and the beautiful were too vague and subjective to be adopted as the highest aims of social or individual life, or were the automatic spin-off of the successful pursuit of wealth and power, has been aptly called ‘crackpot-realism.’ Everywhere people ask: 'What can I actually do?' The answer is as simple as it is disconcerting: we can, each of us, work to put our own inner house in order. The guidance we need for this work cannot be found in science or technology, the value of which utterly depends on the ends they serve; but it can still be found in the traditional wisdom of mankind.’ (Schumacher 12 Epilogue).

The four primary moral virtues are called the cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. The ‘cardinal virtues’ are well named. These virtues are cardinal because all other virtues are categorized under and ‘hinge’ – Latin cardo - upon them. These virtues form the building blocks of Schumacher’s economics of human scale and appropriate technology. They constitute the fabric of the just and functional order.

Asking whether such thinking is progressive or conservative is not the right question. The right question to ask is whether such thinking is right. I think Schumacher is spot-on with his call for metaphysical reconstruction. In talks given at the Davis Extension Conference, Schumacher emphasised that the first task before us is ‘to sort out our values and our views of reality, to clear our minds.’ 

Unfortunately, the great temptation of ‘practical’ men and women in an age of action and industry has been to go straight to the concrete work of construction, and ignore the prime importance of metaphysical reconstruction, with the result that our technics have continued to misfire. The problems we face are not mere technological problems; they are fundamentally moral problems that go to the heart of the way our social powers are organised and used. Time and again, actions sprint past questions of morality, purpose and meanings to the practical issues. Schumacher knew this was happening. He even wrote Guide for the Perplexed to make his point absolutely clear. To the end he insisted on the primacy of ‘metaphysical reconstruction.’ This is the first task and the most important task since, without such reconstruction of our values, ‘the various technological fixes will only add to the confusion. But nowadays, to talk openly about such issues is hardly permitted in polite society.’

Such times we live in are beyond good manners, it’s time to ‘talk openly’ – get your values, visions and virtues in order, recover purpose and have an answer to the questions ‘why’ and ‘what’s the point.’ And then we will find the practical questions of life will be so much more easy to solve. Don’t act! Think!

These views can also be found in the work of Christian Socialist and economic historian R.H. Tawney, for whom industry is to be organized to express most perfectly the principle of purpose. As he writes in The Acquisitive Society:

A function may be defined as an activity which embodies and expresses the idea of social purpose. The essence of it is that the agent does not perform it merely for personal gain or to gratify himself, but recognizes that he is responsible for its discharge to some higher authority. The purpose of industry is obvious. It is to supply man with things which are necessary, useful, or beautiful, and thus to bring life to body or spirit. In so far as it is governed by this end, it is among the most important of human activities.
When men have gone so far in imbecility as to talk as though their idols have come to life, it is time that some one broke them. Labour consists of persons, capital of things. The only use of things is to be applied to the service of persons. The business of persons is to see that they are there to use, and that no more than need be is paid for using them.

Tawney 1982 ch 7

So the organization of society on the basis of functions, instead of on that of rights, implies three things. It means, first, that proprietary rights shall be maintained when they are accompanied by the performance of service and abolished when they are not. It means, second, that the producers shall stand in a direct relation to the community for whom production is carried on, so that their responsibility to it may be obvious and unmistakable, not lost, as at present, through their immediate subordination to shareholders whose interest is not service but gain. It means, in the third place, that the obligation for the maintenance of the service shall rest upon the professional, organizations of those who perform it, and that, subject to the, supervision and criticism of the consumer, those organizations shall exercise so much voice in the government of industry as may be needed to secure that the obligation is discharged.
It is obvious, indeed, that no change of system or machinery can avert those causes of social malaise which consist in the egotism, greed, or quarrelsomeness of human nature. What it can do is to create an environment in which those are not the qualities which are encouraged. It cannot secure that men live up to their principles. What it can do is to establish their social order upon principles to which, if they please, they can live up and not live down. It cannot control their actions. It can offer them an end on which to fix their minds. And, as their minds are, so in the long run and with exceptions, their practical activity will be.

Tawney 1982 ch 11

If liberalism is untenable, on account of its refusal to live up to its principle of self-assumed obligation, and extend democracy as an active and participatory conception, if obligation functions as a mere myth and ideology concealing the fact of political obedience, then ought we not place this obedience on isn’t this the best way to order the natural duties and stations and put political authority on a proper footing? Here, I am following up on Pateman’s critical analysis of liberalism cited earlier. I’m with the democratic revolution, so long as it is democratic, and so long as the individuals composing the demos are led by the nous and not the nose – so long, that is, it is a revolution, and not a liberalism that conceals iniquitous power relations behind the mask of neutrality.

Importantly, in arguing for the functional society in which human activities are organised in accordance with purpose, Tawney emphasises that ‘The first condition of the right organization of industry is, then, the intellectual conversion which, in their distrust of principles, Englishmen are disposed to place last or to omit altogether.’ (Tawney 1982 176).

Tawney’s ‘first condition’ is Schumacher’s ‘first task’ – a mental, moral and metaphysical reconstruction, the creation of a standpoint or viewpoint through which to organise practical activities and common affairs. That’s the bit people are more likely to ignore, because it is the most difficult bit, the most intractable, and the most fundamental. It is easier to go to the physical tools and start acting. But the problem of common living is not an engineering problem, it is a social and moral one. Ignore that fact, and we just get more of the same, an endless technological fixing that generates problems as it solves them.





Anyone who is inclined to dismiss such a view as utopian and idealist needs to consider the alternative:

The alternative is war; and continuous war must, sooner or later, mean something like the destruction of civilization. The havoc which the assertion of the right to unlimited economic expansion has made of the world of States needs no emphasis. Those who have lived from 1914 to 1921 will not ask why mankind has not progressed more swiftly; they will be inclined to wonder that it has progressed at all.

We are still wondering. Ultimately, it is the principles upon which society is founded, the values which persons hold, the purposes by which people live, and the visions they pursue that matter the most. The principle which Tawney advanced, and which Schumacher was to reaffirm decades later, is that industry, property and economic activity should be arranged and scaled in terms of functions related to a social purpose. ‘Such a political philosophy implies that society is not an economic mechanism, but a community of wills which are often discordant, but which are capable of being inspired by devotion to common ends.’

Conservatives may not like talk of class struggle. Tawney didn’t like it either, and he opposed Marxism. But, asserting a Christian social ethics, he drew attention to the origins of such struggle in a divided and atomistic society bereft of true social purpose. ‘That attempt to conduct human affairs in the light of no end other than the temporary appetites of individuals has as its natural consequences oppression, the unreasoning and morbid pursuit of pecuniary gain of which the proper name is the sin of avarice, and civil war.’

It is of some significance that when Tawney seeks to describe his functional society, he finds inspiration in the words of Dante Alighieri concerning the power of love and the respect for boundaries, ‘through which our wills become a single will’, the peace of the blessed life.

but you’ll see no such discord in these spheres;
to live in love is—here—necessity,
if you think on love’s nature carefully.

The essence of this blessed life consists
in keeping to the boundaries of God’s will,
through which our wills become one single will;

so that, as we are ranged from step to step
throughout this kingdom, all this kingdom wills
that which will please the King whose will is rule.

And in His will there is our peace: that sea
to which all beings move—the beings He
creates or nature makes—such as His will.”

Then it was clear to me how every place
in Heaven is in Paradise, though grace
does not rain equally from the High Good.





The famous lines in which Piccarda explains to Dante the order of Paradise are a description of a complex and multiform society which is united by overmastering devotion to a common end. By that end all stations are assigned and all activities are valued. The parts derive their quality from their place in the system, and are so permeated by the unity which they express that they themselves are glad to be forgotten, as the ribs of an arch carry the eye from the floor from which they spring to the vault in which they meet and interlace.

Tawney 1982 ch 11

An argument such as this could make an inveterate revolutionary democratic such as I – someone who has argued consistently for the democratization of power, politics and philosophy – warm to the idea of a law and order constituted in terms of obedience to a scale of values. I shall retain the principle of self-obligation and emphasise will, holding out for the possibility that one day all individuals will come to appreciate the good and come to will it. This would be to achieve a democracy of place, person and purpose, a functional society organised in accordance with true ends.

Tawney’s conclusion is worth quoting and pondering at length in this respect:

Such a combination of unity and diversity is possible only to a society which subordinates its activities to the principle of purpose. For what that principle offers is not merely a standard for determining the relations of different classes and groups of producers, but a scale of moral values. Above all, it assigns to economic activity itself its proper place as the servant, not the master, of society. The burden of our civilization is not merely, as many suppose, that the product of industry is ill-distributed, or its conduct tyrannical, or its operation interrupted by embittered disagreements. It is that industry itself has come to hold a position of exclusive predominance among human interests, which no single interest, and least of all the provision of the material means of existence, is fit to occupy. Like a hypochondriac who is so absorbed in the processes of his own digestion that he goes to his grave before he has begun to live, industrialized communities neglect the very objects for which it is worth while to acquire riches in their feverish preoccupation with the means by which riches can be acquired.

That obsession by economic issues is as local and transitory as it is repulsive and disturbing. To future generations it will appear as pitiable as the obsession of the seventeenth century by religious quarrels appears today; indeed, it is less rational, since the object with which it is concerned is less important. And it is a poison which inflames every wound and turns every trivial scratch into a malignant ulcer. Society will not solve the particular problems of industry which afflict it until that poison is expelled, and it has learned to see industry itself in the right perspective. If it is to do that, it must rearrange its scale of values. It must regard economic interests as one element in life, not as the whole of life. It must persuade its members to renounce the opportunity of gains which accrue without any corresponding service, because the struggle for them keeps the whole community in a fever. It must so organize its industry that the instrumental character of economic activity is emphasized by its subordination to the social purpose for which it is carried on.

Tawney 1982 ch 11





It is institutions and institution building that makes society work, and society does have to work to satisfy the needs and demands of its members. 

[the holiness of life - membership one of another - community of soil, soul and society]

The Scots writer Ian Crighton Smith wrote of what we have lost:

Sometimes when I walk the streets of Glasgow I see an old woman passing by, bowed down with shopping bags, and I ask myself; ‘What force made this woman what she is? What is her history?’ It is the holiness of the person we have lost, the holiness of life itself, the inexplicable mystery and wonder of it, its strangeness, its tenderness.

Crichton Smith 1986: 56-7

Alistair McIntosh describes this holiness, the membership one of another, as the ‘community of soil, soul and society.’ (McIntosh 2008: 102).





[to stimulate a change of 'psychology, status and motivation – fostering an ecological citizenship]

Schumacher’s metaphysical reconstruction and the recovery of purpose within a scale of values rightly originates in the understanding that the problem is not fundamentally one of technology. We have no shortage of means. The greater part of the problem concerns ends and the ability of society to determine purpose and direction. For all of our advances in knowledge, there is no guarantee that any beneficial practical consequences necessarily follow. Knowledge is not a virtue in that it is not appetitive. Reason, evidence, knowledge are not sufficient to change behaviour. Scientist James Hanson has tirelessly attempted to bring the issue of climate change to the attention of governments, with the hope of effecting public policy. 'I Thought There Would Be a Rational Response', he now laments (http://www.desmog.uk/2014/10/10/hansen-devil-how-climate-change-became-political (​http:​/​​/​www.desmog.uk​/​2014​/​10​/​10​/​hansen-devil-how-climate-change-became-political​)). Leaving aside the fact that governments are not unconstrained but are structurally dependent upon and systemically constrained by the private economy, there is an even greater problem in Hansen’s appeal to reason. The problem is that not enough has been done to stimulate a change of psychology, motivation and behaviour, through the formation of an appropriate character and the development of capabilities. By such means, an ecological citizenship would be fostered, with ecological virtue becoming a vital force in everyday life. The depth of social transformation is thus measured not just in terms of institutional and structural changes, but in terms of the extent to which is changes the quality of social life and the character of human relationships for the better. A fundamental transformation involving a change in behaviour and a new way of life results from a joint process of moral and social reconstruction.

In The Reenchantment of the World, Morris Berman remarks that during periods of rapid transformation, 'the meaning of individual lives begins to surface as a disturbing problem'. (Berman 1981: 9). In putting a question mark against the future of the human species, the climate crisis is forcing us to consider the value and worth of life, of the life around us as well as our own. The meaning of our lives has indeed surfaced as a disturbing problem, and the question will not go away. Climate disruption is here for the near future. Ecological disturbance is therefore a psychological disturbance. We will recover stability only by achieving a new understanding of ourselves in relation to the Earth, achieving knowledge of the natural world as a self-knowledge. We come to see ourselves as active members of the natural world, rather than its exploiters or managers. We may be the brains of Gaia, in the sense argued by James Lovelock and Tim Flannery and others. But that makes us parts of a human superorganism, as the brain is part of the body, not an external controlling force, but an internal thinking force. We are not planetary engineers, still less are we gods. The world is no longer something ‘out there’ to be controlled by human will. 

Moreover, the creative universe is governed by forces largely beyond our control:

I have suggested that we now face a profound threat not because of our beliefs or even our attitudes, but because of the very way we see and understand the world, our way of being in the world. The scientific revolution taught us to understand ourselves in a new way, to feel radically separated from the world around us, to experience ourselves as isolated egos inside our bodies which must understand and act on the 'world out there'. The alternative is simply a different way of experiencing ourselves out of which a distinctive understanding and set of values arises. 




Mode of being in the world
[a radically desacralised cosmos – to be an avid participant in an animate universe]
The condition of the Earth reflects the human condition. The ancients would have seen the problem of global warming as sky trouble. The ancient world of the Sumerians, Hebrews, Greeks and Romans equated hubris or excessive pride with violence and so it is with our destruction of nature. (McIntosh 2008: 8-9).

Of all humans, we moderns alone have lived in a radically desacralised cosmos. (Eliade 1961: 17). Even Isaac Newton, the founder of the mechanistic worldview, was himself was an avid participant in an animate universe. ‘Newton, and almost all of those who came before him, differed from us not so much because of what they believed but because of their mode of being in the world.’

For them, in addition to its practical consequences, the disruption of the climate by human activity would have had religious meaning. Climate change would have meant sky trouble. For pre-modern men and women the sky was powerfully symbolic. It represented the infinite, the transcendent; it is where the gods dwell and where we aim to ascend after we have cast off our mortal form. As Mircea Eliade writes:'... a religious sense of the divine transcendence is aroused by the very existence of the sky'. With climate change mortal humans have violated the domain of the gods, disturbed the home of the transcendent. Why wouldn't the deities retaliate, the more so as we have aroused the heavens by digging into and releasing the energy of the underworld?
I am not sure this is such a primitive understanding of the meaning of climate change, for the signs that the sky retains its divine symbolism are everywhere: it is where the prayerful look; where the eyes of the goal-scorer turn; its moods impose themselves on ours; and it still feels eerie to fly in it. And nothing can better evoke a sense of cosmic mystery than the night sky. It is one thing, therefore, to foul our own realm on the surface of the Earth but quite another to violate the celestial vault, the realm of the gods. 




Making community - setting virtuous cycles in motion
The negative impact of human environmental action is expressed in degradation, loss of habitats and extinction of species. To counter this impact, we need to set virtuous cycles in motion. It is in this context that we may refer to community building. Our potentials to develop and flourish as social beings in community are the emergent properties of a moral ecology, their development being a universal theme that strikes a chord in all peoples and places, connecting the whole world together in the one story.

If humankind is to survive, let alone thrive, we must engage in a continuous process of community making, connecting and strengthening the threads that bind us to each other in society, and bind human society to the Earth. Seeing nature as a whole also involves seeing humanity as a whole.

We need to make community through changing our social relationships, building on our natural sympathy and empathy to extend and embed reciprocity at ever higher levels of loyalty. This means developing a social identity that connects self-interest and the general interest, so that in acting for oneself a person acts for the community and vice versa. Such an identity fosters an inclusive sense of belonging within mutual relationships.

Community as being, doing and having together
[being as the ever-deepening beauty that transcends ego - the great work of humanisation]

As Alastair McIntosh argues, ‘community involves being, doing and having together.’ (McIntosh 2008: 102). But it needs boundaries and a balance between freedom and responsibility, spaces that serve as ‘the sanctuary of another's subjectivity’, to use the words of Thomas Merton.

The problem is one of ungrounded egocentricity. ‘If we have not allowed something more to be made of ourselves, what more can there be?’ (McIntosh 2008: 62). The solution, as E.F. Schumacher argued, is metaphysical reconstruction. But on what ground does that reconstruction proceed? What is the ground of being? We need to identify the foundation of such a reconstruction.

God, as ineffable, surpasses understanding, so we should be cautious with any words we use. St. Thomas Aquinas wrote some four million words in his relatively short lifetime. He conceded in his final words of 6th December 1273 that: 'all I have written seems to me like so much straw compared with what I have seen and with what has been revealed to me'.

Ontological connection
Whether we know it or not, whether we want it or not, we need community in a most profound ontological sense. We are bound together, each in the other. The great metaphysical poet John Donne expressed the point perfectly in 1624: ‘No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main . . . Never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.’

Ontological connection is crucial to metaphysical reconstruction:

Communism, the word. Not the word before the notion, but the word as notion and as historical agent. (...) Nevertheless, it is sure that the word “communist” existed already in the XIVe century, with the meaning of “people having in common a property belonging to the category of “main morte” – that is, not being submitted to the law of heritage”. (...) Actually, those historical data are unable to give us the origin and the meaning – or, even better, the sense – of “communism”. No history, no etymology either, can produce anything like sense. (...) Communism – the word, again. The word as presence, as feeling, as sense (more than meaning).To a certain extent, it seems strange that the inquiry or commentary about this word should be so rare. As if it were always considered as self-evident… It is, in a way – but in which way, this deserves a little more reflection … (...) The same question arises : what becomes of togetherness when a whole is not given, and perhaps even not to be given in any way? (...) Communism is togetherness - the Mitsein, the being-with - understood as the belonging to existence of the individuals, which means, in the existential meaning, to their essence. Society means an unessential - even if necessary - link between individuals who are, in the final analysis, essentially separate.

(...) But me, I, never exists alone. It exists essentially with other existing beings. The with is no external link, it is no link at all : it is togetherness - relation, sharing, exchange, mediation and immediation, meaning and feeling. (...) Communism says more and says something else than a political meaning. It says something about property. Property is not only the possession of goods. It is precisely beyond (and/or behind) any juridical assumption of a possession. It is what makes any kind of possession properly the possession of a subject, that is properly an expression of it. Property is not my possession: it is me. (...) Collectivity means collected people: that is, people taken together from anywhere to the nowhere of the collectivity or of the collection. The co- of collective is not the same as that of communism. This is not only a matter of etymology (munire versus ligare). This is a matter of ontology : the co- of collectivism is a mere external "side by side" which implies no relationship between the sides or between the parts of this "partes extra partes". (...) Or even better : if the we can only and each time be a speech act, then only a we existentially spoken may perform its significance (what is exactly this significance is another matter : for now, I note only that it implies a relationship, not a mere side-by- side). (...) Communism, therefore, means the common condition of all the singularities of subjects, that is of all the exceptions, all the uncommon points whose network makes a world (a possibility of sense). It does not belong to the political. It comes before any politics. It is what gives to politics an absolute requirement: the requirement to open the common space to the common itself - that is neither to the private nor to the collective, neither to separation nor to totality - but without permitting any political achievement of the common itself, any kind of making a substance of it. Communism is a principle of activation and limitation of politics. (...) This is not politics, this is metaphysics or, if you prefer, this is ontology: to be is to be cum. (At the very moment I am writing this, I am surrounded by a singing crowd of futbol aficionados on a plaza in Madrid: there is there a multitude of symbols, problems, feelings about the common). (...) Another can be what I would name glory vs humility. ("The Humble", the name of a virtue became the name of poor people...). Capitalism is endlessness instead of infinity, or infinity as endless production of capital itself.'

Nancy, Jean-Luc. "On communism." in: Critical Legal Thoughts, 2009 (translated from the French).

I am in broad agreement with this, with this significant qualification – without substance we are back into the quagmire of groundless grounds. We have to stand somewhere, unless we want to keep going all the way down with the turtles. It’s just that I have a feeling that, in the descent, things start to slide in all directions so that no-one will know where they are or who they are anymore. I’ve seen that future. Leonard Cohen called it murder. (Leonard Cohen, The Future). 

 [life, faith, hope]
Only when the space between outer and inner life is spanned can the commonwealth of life be kindled. This is a community which allows us to have being and having, doing and knowing together. 

We need, further, to make community with the land, in Leopold’s expansive conception of the term. We need to learn how to tread lightly upon the Earth, live with reverence, treating the Earth as a sacred place in which to dwell. (Skolimowski 1993). I prefer the term sustainable living to sustainable development, but even more apt is the notion of sufficiency, an ability to appreciate the enough-ness of life. In practical terms, that entails a shift from a quantitative to a qualitative conception of wealth, emphasising a regenerative mode of ecological production, working with rather than against natural processes.

May the nourishment of the earth be yours. (John O’Donohue, Anam Cara).

Whilst looking to the stars, we need to keep our feet on the ground.

Self-realisation
Deep ecology delivers the most radical, expansive meaning of self-development, pushing it well beyond the narrow concern with personal growth to argue for the maximal self-realization of all beings, not just human beings. As Arne Naess argues: ‘Self-realization in its absolute maximum is ... the mature experience of oneness in diversity. . . . The minimum is the self-realization by more or less consistent egotism — by the narrowest experience of what constitutes one's self and a maximum of alienation. As empirical beings we dwell somewhere in between, but increased maturity involves increase of the wideness of the self’ (Naess, ‘Identification,’ 1985, 261). 

Community of soil and soul
Self-realisation is about getting real, living appropriately in reality. To become and be yourself and to elicit the same genius in others. ‘This is membership one of another - community of soil, soul and society’ (McIntosh 2008). A community of soil, soul and sociability.

It’s about what being human means in light of our dependence on environing nature. An eco-praxis suggests how we may develop 'modes of being' which are grounded in relations to others, nature, community, our public life as ecologically informed. Active participation in the community of life fosters an extended sense of identity in solidarity with others and expresses the bond of belonging to nature as a lived experience. I write of a cycle of belonging, becoming and being, something which is fostered by and strengthens our interaction with others and with the world in communion.

Mary Oliver evokes the naturalness of the spiritual and the spirituality of the natural in her poem, the world out there urging us to come home and play our part in the commonwealth of life.

You don’t have to be good.
you don’t have to walk on your knees
for a hundred miles through the desert, repenting.
you only have to let the soft animal of your body
love what it loves.
Tell me about despair, yours, and I will tell you mine.
Meanwhile the world goes on.
Meanwhile the sun and the clear pebbles of the rain
are moving across the landscapes, 
over the prairies and the deep trees, 
the mountains and the rivers.
Meanwhile the wild geese, high in the clean blue air, 
are heading home again.
Whoever you are, no matter how lonely, 
the world offers itself to your imagination, 
calls you like the wild geese, harsh and exciting – 
over and over announcing your place 
in the family of things.

Mary Oliver, ‘Wild Geese,’ from Dream Work 1994

John O’Donohue on belonging and virtue

A sense of belonging, however, suggests warmth, understanding and embrace. The ancient and eternal values of human life — truth, unity, goodness, justice, beauty and love — are all statements of true belonging.
Our hunger to belong is the longing to bridge the gulf that exists between isolation and intimacy. Distance awakens longing; closeness is belonging. Everyone longs for intimacy and dreams of a nest of belonging in which one is embraced, seen and loved. Something within each of us cries out for belonging. We can have all the world has to offer in terms of status, achievement and possessions, yet without a true sense of belonging, our lives feel empty and pointless. Like the tree that puts roots deep into the clay, each of us needs the anchor of belonging in order to bend with the storms and continue towards the light. 

In this post-modern world the hunger to belong has rarely been more intense, more urgent. With many of the ancient, traditional shelters now in ruins, it is as if society has lost the art of fostering community. Consumerism propels us towards an ever-more lonely and isolated existence. As consumerism numbs our longing, our sense of belonging becomes empty and cold…. From this perspective, it would seem that we are in the midst of a huge crisis of belonging. When the outer cultural shelters are in ruins, we need to explore and reawaken the depths of belonging in the human mind and soul that will lead us once again to unexpected possibilities of community and friendship.

Our world desperately needs to come in from the lost islands of desiccated individualism and learn to stand again on the fecund earth where vibrant and vital interaction can happen between people. Arnold speaks of islands separated by the 'unplumbed, salt, estranging sea'. Our world is facing so many crises ecologically, economically and spiritually. These cannot be overcome by isolated individuals. We need to come together. There is incredible power in a community of people who are together because they care, and who are motivated by the ideals of compassion and creativity. 

We are, in ironic contrast, almost completely blind to the huge control and subtle authoritarianism of consumerist image culture. On the one hand we are warriors for the free view and simultaneously absolute disciples of the god of quantity. Our crisp cynicism and compliant greed have meant that we have unwittingly severed huge regions of the invisible tissue which holds community and civility together. Our society is addicted to and incessantly nourishes and inflates the spectacular. The invisible tissue which sustains real belonging is never spectacular; it is quiet and unostentatious. In order to survive as a planet and as a society, we need to reawaken and retrieve these lost and forgotten capacities of ours. Such virtues may heal our absence from our true nature.

One of these quiet virtues is honour. Contemporary psychology and spirituality speak of 'honouring your gifts'; the focus is inevitably subjective and sometimes narcissistic. Honour is a broader and deeper presence. 
 The sense of honour would also begin to reveal the vast fissures in and the hollowness of the huge kingdom of image and PR. Television might cease indeed become some kind of genuine mirror for our real concerns. 
A sense of honour in the way we relate with each other would invite the return of respect; the recognition that every person is worthy of respect. No-one should have to earn respect. It could also mean a reawakening of our sense of courtesy. There is something very fine about a courteous person. Our times are so vulgar.

Compassion is another such quiet virtue. There is a huge crisis of compassion in contemporary society. This crisis has nothing to do with our inability to feel sympathy for others. It has more to do with the numbing of our compassion through our image exposure to so many of the horrors that are happening around the world. We feel overwhelmed and then hopeless. It is important to remember that a proportion of our numbness is convenient. We avoid the harrowing images or allow ourselves to be immediately overwhelmed. 
We have a duty to speak out for those who have no voice or are not being listened to. The practice of compassion would show us that no sister or brother deserves to be excluded and pushed onto the bleak margins where life is sheer pain and endurance. We should at least begin to have some conversations with these members of our human family. It would open our eyes. When our compassion awakens, our responsibility becomes active and creative. When we succumb to indifference, we blaspheme against the gifts that we could never earn that have been so generously given to us. The duty of privilege is absolute integrity.
Hope is another quiet virtue. We live in a culture where information is relentlessly meted out to us in abstract particles. So much of our information is a series of facts about how disastrous everything is. When we listen to the voices of doom, we become helpless and complicit in bringing the doom nearer. It is always astounding to see how willing humans are to give away their power and become disciples of helplessness. This accounts for the chromatic cynicism which reigns in our times. Cynicism is very interesting. Behind the searing certainty of the cynic, there is always, hidden somewhere, disappointed longing. It takes a good deal of energy to be a committed cynic. Time and again, life offers opportunities and possibilities. Time cannot help being a door into eternity. Within even the most cynical heart, eternity is a light sleeper. It takes considerable energy to con​tinually quell the awakening invitation. Argument with a cynic merely serves this sliced certainty. A more subtle approach that addresses not the argument but the residue of disappointed longing can bring change. Our world is too beautiful and our human eternity too magnificent that we should succumb to hopelessness and cynicism. The human heart is a theatre of longings. Under every hardened and chromatic surface — be it system, syndrome or corporation — there is a region of longing that dreams as surely of awakening to a new life of freedom and love as winter does of the springtime.
There are many other quiet virtues like care, sympathy, patience, confidence and loyalty. A new sense of community could gradually surface if we called upon some of these virtues to awaken. 
 They are unable to invite our sense of freedom and creativity to awaken and begin the new journey towards belonging. We need to take back our own power and exercise our right to inhabit in a creative and critical way the traditions to which we belong. 

John O'Donohue 1998 Eternal Echoes: Exploring Our Hunger To Belong 270-271
 
We need to exercise our belonging in a new and critical way.

Transpersonal community
In fine, consciously or otherwise, we are bound up with and in one another at the most profound level of reality.

Cycle of belonging – becoming alive to the aliveness of life

The metaphysical reconstruction I set out points the direction towards becoming ‘more and more alive to the aliveness of life.' (McIntosh 2008: 72). Choosing life means rejecting the deadness of apathy. As Alastair McIntosh explains, the Greek root of apathy - apatheia or apathos - literally means 'freedom from suffering'. But the other side of that freedom can be to be 'without feeling.’





Becoming aware of and acknowledging the effects of our actions on the social and natural environment is about developing the capacity to respond to others, about assuming responsibility within community.

Responsibility
We need to develop the capacity to respond to others and to the requirements of the natural world, we need to assume responsibility for our actions. The cultivation of environmental responsibility emerges as a key virtue in fostering ecopolis.

At some point, we are called upon to make some practical suggestions. Faced with a critical, and rapidly deteriorating, environmental condition, the question of what is to be done arises. Indeed, any window of opportunity that remains is so narrow, and so rapidly narrowing, that the question what, if anything, can be done. I have no objections to recycling, cleaning up the environment, banning plastic bags, defence of green spaces against development. James Lovelock refers to such actions as rearranging deckchairs on the Titanic. Alone, such actions give us something to do as we proceed inexorably towards eco-catastrophe. Some scientists think we are on course for near term human extinction. Lovelock thinks there will be survivors, some five hundred million human beings, knocked into shape by Gaia and learning the hard way what it takes to live right on the planet. What is for certain is that our destruction of the natural world has to stop. For our own sake, certainly, for ecocide is also our own suicide. But, comes the argument, such selfish instrumental thinking is precisely what has got us in the mess in the first place. We need, somehow, in some way, educate ourselves into seeing nature and natural things as possessing value in themselves and learn to value these things for their own sakes. Is this so impossible? Are human beings inevitably human-centred? It depends how one interprets the belief in God, a belief which has sustained civilisations in the past. Here, we have a conception of an entity that is greater than human beings, that encompasses the whole of Creation, an object of worship that is both the whole of things and yet still more. And countless millions of people throughout the ages have expressed a belief in such an entity. If so many human beings can, over extensive periods of time, sustain a belief in such a God, how much easier it should be for us to be able to invest the natural world upon which we depend with similar reverence, both as a whole and in its parts. It may, no doubt, be difficult to support such a belief system at the level of philosophical demonstration, but certainly no more difficult than defending the belief in an ineffable supreme being that is both existent and non-existent. It can be done.

What is clear is that human beings must assume responsibility for their actions. Neither God nor Nature has responsibility here. Human social and technical powers are certainly involved in the human impact upon the environment, but these are human powers, supra-individual forces which, without conscious, common control, are experienced as external forces. Assuming responsibility implies the creation of mechanisms of collective control, an institutional order that enables human beings to exercise their powers in an ecologically benign way. Effective action for the preservation of the environment is premised on the understanding that we are responsible for our actions and that nothing, no natural law, no divine intervention, no technological fix, will come to our salvation. To believe that some happy ending has been designed into nature or history as an inevitability is to indulge in bad teleology. What does exist is a direction and a potentiality, which it is our responsibility to further and realise by providing the appropriate conditions for healthy growth and flourishing. Such growth may be necessary, in the sense of a natural thing becoming what it has the potential to be. But it is not inevitable. Lines of development are frustratable. We may continue to erode the natural basis of a flourishing existence and commit ecocide. It is our responsibility to choose the most appropriate action and direction. We have the moral freedom and power to exploit, despoil and degrade nature. We have the insight to see that such actions would destroy the basis of our own society and are thus detrimental to our own health and well-being. We know this. But knowledge in itself is insufficient to induce right living and doing. Knowledge is not itself appetitive. We need to cultivate the virtues to create the disposition to act well in light of what we may come to know. And then, with the acquisition of the right virtues, we will come to use our moral freedom and power to change our behaviour so as to live in harmony with nature, coming to see it as our planetary home. Such a realisation of the responsibility that comes with being co-creators of the commonwealth of virtue amounts to much more than a change of behaviour, taking action: it is a change that takes us to an elevated state of being and consciousness.

A sense of place is our grounding on Earth
Creating community means sharing space, meaning and feeling. 
The starting point of Ecopolis is the recognition that we all find ourselves in an earthly state, we are all incarnate in our bodies, made alive in our needs, in place and in nature.

Awareness of our incarnate nature fosters a sense of place, which is our grounding on Earth. In this community of place we generate a Sense of Identity, which in turn embodies relationship, relationship to others, to place, to the world around us. A sense of identity depends upon a sense of values, which arise from the deeper well of knowing, the heart. The Sense of Values stimulates a Sense of Responsibility, which develops the capacity to respond. Building character, motivating action, and changing behaviour, the whole dynamic feeds on itself and propels itself forwards, co-creating and sustaining the world around us.

The ecopolis is the social and moral and natural ecology that brings together nature and culture through the mediating term of society. 

The mode of belonging, being and becoming gives meaning, purpose and direction, motivates action and generates the responsibility required for ecological health and well-being. 

The roots of life and what gives it meaning

To avert the threat of ecological catastrophe through climate change, we need to achieve substantial cuts in carbon emissions, and this requires both a substantial transformation in social structures, institutions and relations and a profound change in behaviour. In terms of energy infrastructures, this entails increasing energy efficiency and a reduction of use in the context of a transition to a low- or zero carbon economy. That is the easy part, and is within our technological reach. But is it within our political and, even more than that, our moral and psychological reach?

As George Monbiot writes:





Most of all, the challenge of climate change confronts us not with a threatening external nature, but with .. ourselves, and asks who we are, what we have been and have done, what we could still be, what we need to do. It follows that environmental crises cannot be resolved by ‘rational’ technical, economic and political measures alone. Climate science, economic valuation and market incentives, new technologies and energy infrastructures, political possibilities and policy frameworks – all these things are no doubt important. They refer to the mechanics of the outer world. They are necessary, but far from sufficient. Hence my emphasis throughout on the formation of the inner motives, on internal reason – for here it is that responsiveness is nurtured and developed, rendering external reason effective.

No one who is smart plays politics with climate change, the problem is too serious. The ‘art of the politically possible’ is trumped by the reality of what is likely to happen as a result of that failure to address the real issue. Which is, ultimately … ourselves, who we are and the way we live our lives. No one can pretend that we are solving this problem faster than we are continuing to create it.

The technical and economic aspects are difficult but possible. Next comes the political and institutional challenges. But at a much deeper level than all of this is the moral and psychological question, the question of who we are and why we are. This is the real existential significance of climate change. We are being challenged to know our world and ourselves for the very first time. We are faced not with an external, threatening, recalcitrant nature, but with ourselves. This is why I have sought to emphasise the need to reintegrate all ways of knowing and being within a conception of a whole and full humanity. Our social and environmental crisis is also an existential crisis, something that effects us to the very core of our being. This is a global or total crisis, a crisis in our way of being, and cannot be addressed by technical, economic and political resources and actions alone. All these measures will be required, but, on their own, they are means standing in need of ends, form requiring active content.  Most of all we need to address the existential dimensions of this crisis. And that means taking a good look at ourselves and ask, who are we? Why do we live? To what end? What purpose? What is the meaning of our lives? Where are we? The questions were put a long time ago; we have spent a long time admiring our handiwork to avoid answering.

Heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool. 
Where is the house you will build for me?
Where will my resting place be? 




Heaven and Earth are as directly connected as are God’s throne and footstool. Call the ground of being what you will, it’s about finding our true place in the creative universe, knowing the world we are a part of and thereby knowing ourselves. Metaphysical reconstruction is about ontological connection. It’s about housing the sacred. And that includes us.

Knowing ourselves involves more than a knowledge of the outer world of scientific reason, technological know-how, economic imperatives, and the arts of political possibility; it requires that we find the courage and the honesty to look into our inner world, all the way down into the moral and psychological depths of our being. It means coming to terms with life and what gives it meaning; it means developing a true sense of value, by knowing where true value lies.

28 PROPHECY AND HOPE
Reason and hope
The final pages in a book can be a treacherous place for a writer. There is an irresistible temptation, in the few pages left, to simplify greatly, ignore necessary clauses and qualifications, and indulge in a bout of wishful thinking. Here’s how the writing goes: begin by acknowledging the many problems we face, emphasise their seriousness to highlight the realism of one’s argument. List the reasons for the failure of all hitherto attempts to address the problems up until now. And then raise spirits by claiming that, despite all of the above, grounds for hope remain. Not naïve hope as some facile optimism, but hope as related to actually existing potentialities. Give those grounds. Then issue the call for action, pointing out how the realisation of these potentialities depends upon creative human agency. An ideal can be achieved, but only if we bring it about! And, having given reasons for hope, a writer can bring the whole thing to a conclusion on a note of philosophical and even, talent allowing, poetic grandeur.

Which sounds fine by me. If you can’t say what you mean clearly at the end of a book, when can you say it? A conclusion is where you get to the point, if there is one. And if you haven’t got something positive to say, why write the book in the first place?

Nevertheless, drawing conclusions at the end of a book on any kind of crisis is a perilous exercise, begging the questions that the previous pages, however numerous, have failed to answer. When something as complex as climate change is involved, any few handful of lines is bound to sound like unreasoning faith and hope. Here, the writer’s real motivations become manifest, all the previous arguments from reason, evidence and logic coming to seem to be no more than rationalisations of fundamental beliefs.

There is a risk of restating humanist pieties against an unfeeling, indifferent nature, with greater urgency, the closer the crisis, and with greater insistence, the less nature seems to care.

Even more treacherous, the end of a book is an invitation into the realm of prophecy. Here is where we have been and this is what we have done, here is where we are, facing the consequences of our actions, and here is where we go from here. The author then proceeds to express a view about the likely future course of history against the backdrop of the issues and developments presented in the main body of the book. 

And this is how books end, with an author noting current trends and tendencies before going on to point to negative and possibilities, concluding that it all depends upon the choices we make, whether we act or not, whether we act in time, how we act. In other words, it all depends …. Trends and tendencies are not inevitabilities, and so what has gone before is no more than a broad indication of where things could go next. But in all probability won’t. The future is more than the present enlarged. Human beings are reality constituting change agents capable of becoming active and conscious in relation to circumstances, and remaking realities rather than merely being passive functions of them. I affirm the indeterminacy of the future, a bold claim to make when facing the seemingly incontrovertible facts of the ever decreasing circle of ecological constraint. In saying this, I do not deny the facts of the case. I merely mean that it’s not the facts that matter most, but what we do with them.

That may seem like an unsatisfactory end, but it is actually invigorating; it places the responsibility in the hands of human beings as makers, actors, shapers of their own futures. What can be achieved depends on what we have to build with, and our capabilities in relation to our environment. Those capabilities, as this book has shown, refer to our personal powers, our moral sense, our character and qualities (virtues), the quality of our social relationships, the extent of our networks and communications, our technological power, our institutions for governance and mechanisms for social control. There is plenty we can do with respect to realising our potentialities by using those capabilities, both in a personal sense but, most of all, with respect to creating society as an appropriate habitus for the acquisition and exercise of the virtues.

From here, the question is about our relation to the environing world. Human agency is not unconstrained and, as we come to appreciate that the world is not wholly self-made, we are brought face to face with natural limits. We are makers, actors and shapers, just not in circumstances of our own choosing. Not only are we subject to social constraints, we live in a dependency upon a natural world that is not of our making. That, in one sense, is a shocking contradiction of our belief system, that our scientific, technological and industrial power gives possibilities of unlimited progress through the assertion of our power. In a more profound sense, however, we come to terms, at last, with nature, our natures most of all. We now have to answer the deepest question of all, who are we? Facing natural limits is not a contradiction of our power at all, it is a chance to appreciate it, shed the worship of things and become truly human.

There has been talk recently of ‘men as gods.’ In Of Gods and Gaia, I spent 900 pages trying to expose the dangerous delusions of this way of thinking, when presented in terms of the all too familiar deification of technology. Rather than admit that the modernist project of conquering nature is over, the likes of Stewart Brand (2010) and Mark Lynas (2011) take this project to the ultimate degree with respect to planetary engineering. Brand begins Whole Earth Discipline with the quote: ‘We are as gods and HAVE to get good at it.’ He proceeds to extol the virtues of a range of technologies available to us as gods, nuclear power, many forms of geo-engineering, GM food. In fine, there is a complete extinguishing of morality in favour of technology. It’s the technology that has become as gods. 

Environmental crisis contradicts this technocratic fantasy of a world completely rationally controlled. We need to ‘get good’ at using our technological powers in a humane sense. And this is a moral project. Far from being the radical and new thinking we need, this bout of planetary engineering was something which Lewis Mumford had long ago exposed as an expression of megamachine delusion:





As for ‘men as gods’, it depends on what, precisely, we mean. Delusions of god-like power can be both tedious and dangerous. Scientist and thinker Jacob Bronowski presents a contemporary mythology which sets the possibilities of science and technology in their proper context:

It is said that science will dehumanise people and turn them into numbers. That is false, tragically false. Look for yourself. This is the concentration camp and crematorium at Auschwitz. This is where people were turned into numbers. Into this pond were flushed the ashes of some four million people. And that was not done by gas. It was done by arrogance. It was done by dogma. It was done by ignorance. When people believe that they have absolute knowledge, with no test in reality, this is how they behave. This is what men do when they aspire to the knowledge of gods. 
We have to cure ourselves of the itch for absolute knowledge and power. We have to close the distance between the push-button order and the human act. We have to touch people. 

Bronowski 2011 ch 11

We have to touch people. That phrase bears repetition.

Poet Thorn Gunn writes of a German conscript in the Second World War who risked his life helping Jews to escape the death the Nazis had in store for them:

I know he had unusual eyes,
Whose power no orders could determine,
Not to mistake the men he saw,
As others did, for gods or vermin.

What persuades men and women to exalt some as gods and denigrate others as ‘animals’ is culture and ideas:





It is easy to understand how human beings may come to struggle and fight and even kill for access to scarce natural resources. Our genius strategists in government and the military are predicting a future of increasing conflict as resources become ever more scarce. On a much more complicated level is the conflict between social classes and groups concerning the way natural resources have been and continue to be appropriated and recreated as social resources, the rationing of goods and services as a matter of social and economic organisation. There is a degree of abstraction here, a second nature removed at some distance from first nature. But this abstraction at the level of culture is not artificial in the sense of being false. Ideas are real. Human beings map their world with ideas and live – or die - by ideas. It’s called culture. And if ‘men’ are not gods, neither are animals ‘mere’ animals, ‘vermin’. These are ideas, bad ideas, the kind that lead to destruction and death.

If possible, so far as it depends on you, live peaceably with all.
Romans 12:18

How are the bounds of the possible to be set?
Be a friend to all animals, human and non-human.
But that’s my reading, my particular cultural prejudice. Are my values merely invented? Do they rest on something more substantial than wishful thinking?

And so now I get my chance to prophesize. The trick is not to say that these things will happen, but that they could happen, depending on how and whether we act. Which isn’t saying much at all. But may be saying it all. It is still worth affirming the capacity of human agency to be a worldchanging force in relation to certain trends and tendencies at work in the world.

To cut things short, we could note the increasingly harsh facts concerning climate change, hold our hands up, plead guilty as charged and make peace with the world. 
Well, the environmental impact of human beings has been destructive, and we are now facing the consequences of our intervention in nature. And we should be making our peace in any case, with each other and with the world.

Some, like Guy McPherson, are talking of Near Term Human Extinction. James Lovelock doesn’t go so far. There will be survivors, he says, some 500 million human beings, and that is enough for a renewal of human civilisation at some future date. By then, surely, we will have become a species that has become ecologically wise and learned to fit the contours of our environing nature.

But that was then, an unchangeable past; what about now? It is too late to make the changes necessary to halt climate change, the issue now is how to address its reality - and halt the worst case scenario of runaway climate change. Again, we have already transgressed some boundaries, crossed certain thresholds and staggered our way past a few tipping points. There is no doubting the environmental degradation we have already inflicted, the only question is whether this damage is terminal – for ourselves more than for the planet. 

Some are utterly without hope. This could be a realistic appraisal of our predicament, it could be chronic crisis fatigue, or a defence mechanism, shutting out realities about which we think we can do nothing. I argue for a qualified hope, whose character depends on being related to true ends:





We are not the first generation to be confronted with an apparently hopeless situation, and we won’t be the last. The subjective factor is the factor that changes the direction of objective trends and tendencies:





Pushed too far, reason undermines life at its source. For Mumford, only the acceptance of a mystery beyond the compass of reason keeps human life from becoming devaluated and the spirit from becoming discouraged over the reports of reason. (Mumford 1944 ch 1). 

I’ll have to check what I have written over the years, but I am sure that I tend to avoid words like optimism and pessimism. For me, these are passive states and expressions of moods, a good indicator of personal qualities but a poor guide to real possibilities. To be an optimist or a pessimist requires nothing by way of intellectual and moral courage, just a passive waiting on trends and tendencies as they unfold in all their inevitability. This is a passive condition. And if it takes courage to hope, it takes real courage to act on that hope. To act when conditions seem to contradict all hope takes something immense, drawn from the depths of our soul. 

Neither optimism nor pessimism are considered views. They may be grounded in the world of fact, but see those facts differently. How the world looks depends on which way face. Me, I set my face forward to a bright green future, which puts me with the optimists. And maybe that would incline me to colour my facts green. I’ll admit the prejudice. The same goes for my commitment to all humankind. A hard scientific view says our numbers are unsustainable. Reduce our numbers to 500 million, and a large part of our problems are solved. Well, yes, resources become less scarce the less demands are made upon them. My ethical position sees people not just as problems, but as solutions. And I attempt the hard solution, to ensure a decent quality of life for all the people of the world. 

Can it be done? I argue that our actions count. Think of it this way, the scale of the problems we are facing now is testimony to the human power to change the world. We have not lost this power, we just need to get wise in using it, taking full responsibility for our actions. Because the actions we take in the next few years will matter to an extent that far exceeds our past actions.

Addressing climate change forces humanity to face reality. In being confronted by the consequences of their actions, human beings are having to face themselves, maybe for the first time. All masks, all pretensions, all delusions will have to be shed. This is a slow apocalypse, and we will now come to see ourselves and our world for the first time. At this point, we may well usher in the new world, casting aside the reign of greed, stupidity and violence to finally join together and make common cause. An age old ideal, certainly, that would seem to be contradicted by the very crisis we have brought upon ourselves. We have become sceptical of teleological forms of explanation that refer to stages of history, but our social evolution does evince a growth in cooperation and communication, a continuous expansion of in-group co-operation for out-group conflict. That growth is clear and shows evidence of purpose. Unfashionable maybe, but see where our realistic meaninglessness has brought us. We now have it in our powers to restore meaning, put aside past differences and finally recognize our common humanity in a common home. Human beings are good at coming together in the face of adversity. The environmental crisis now is the biggest universal of all, the climate, the conditions of life on Earth. If we can unite to meet this challenge, we will be united once and for all. We will have achieved the common good on the common ground to become one people on one Earth. The greatest ideal of human history is within our reach. Having come this far, it is worth striving a little longer.

At this point, I’ll give expression to my own personal belief and declare that I have hope. And I can give good reasons and grounds for hope. The knowledge, the know-how, most of all the desire on the part of millions of people the world over is out there, all-pervasive, even, it just has to be translated into meaningful, effective action. I have pointed to the expansion of global connections and communications, to a growing non-zero-sumness in the world. I could cite evolutionary arguments for hope as a survival strategy designed to keep human beings striving in the teeth of grim adversity. I could cite my favourite writer Dante and his affirmation of ‘the living hope’ over despair. I could cite the song I have sung many times from the old Anfield Kop, the theme song of Liverpool football club, You’ll Never Walk Alone, ‘walk on with hope in your hearts’. And, staying in Liverpool, I could cite one of the greatest songs to come from that great city of song, All Together Now by The Farm: ‘all those tears shed in vain, nothing learned, nothing gained, only hope remains’. The song ends with the call, ‘Let’s go home’. To our planetary home. Liverpool, my favourite city, the city of hopeless hope.

So there are many reasons why I am hopeful. But even in the absence of reason, I would still hope.
I have no misplaced hopes with respect to government and politics and economic systems. The alarm has sounded, and been heard and ignored too many times for anyone to have any illusions left in this respect. There are reasons to explain the insufficient response, and they are not to do with some general human passivity, stupidity and greed. We need to reclaim the institutions of our practical existence from the abstracting and alienating forces the remove the power of control and initiative from people. The abstract world rules by remote control, we need to take this power back. This restitution of our social power would amount not to the end of politics but its realisation through the political investment of our social world as an associational public. If the alien powers of state and capital will continue to pursue their own self-aggrandizement and self-expansion, millions around the world may come to reclaim their citizen identity and do the right thing. All the world over there is a mass mobilization in favour of action on climate change. For me, that is a mass constituency capable of forming an eco-public capable of taking action on climate change, no longer demanding it from governments subject to corporate capture:





It would be very good indeed.

The essential grammar of harmony
A more balanced way of looking at the world, and more harmonious ways of living.

We live in perilous times. What we do, or fail to do, will be of great consequence. 

These are the times that try [or test] men's souls: The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country; but he that stands by it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman.

Tom Paine, The American Crisis

Tom Paine wrote those words at a time when the American Revolution was faltering, and some people were starting to walk away. The test effect of times such as this is to show what a person is really made of. When the going gets tough and prospects are gloomy, do you stand up and be counted or leave? Courage comes in many forms. The most important quality of all is moral courage. It’s about standing up for what you believe in, regardless of calculations of success or failure.

Paine should have been alive in these times. Scientist Stephen Emmott believes that there is every prospect that the future world will be a ‘complete hellhole’. Paine’s words echo. ‘Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph.’

We live in testing times. We may well be charged with the task of conquering hell. 
This book seeks to offer realistic hope that a more harmonious, balanced way of living on the planet is possible. I argue, with many others, that we already have sufficient material tools and resources at our disposal, to enable us to pull back from the abyss and establish a healthy relationship with Nature:

How should humanity face up to its new and terrifying responsibility to manage the planet and its ill-understood life-support systems? With hope. There is little to support the view of pessimists that somehow we are draining the resources of our planet in such a way that we are doomed. Moreover the technologies that could drag us back from the abyss are well known, if not yet fully developed. And the cash is there, too, though largely still in military coffers. So is the ingenuity. About half of all the scientists in the world work for the military. If all this creative energy and money were spent on helping to develop the world there would be plenty of resources to go round.




1989 seems like a long time ago now. The technology and the ingenuity and the money are still there. Where we are deficient is in our political, institutional and moral capacity. And that is a big deficiency, for these are the areas that determine ends, set directions and deploy resources. In this book I have focused upon this field of practical reason, the field of politics and ethics, seeking to outline the contours of an appropriate universal ethical and institutional framework.

I will give reasons drawn from our social development as to why I believe this framework to be a realisable ideal. That is, it is an ideal immanent in the processes of our social evolution. Biologists may refer to natural selection here and, indeed, so shall I. But I would also make reference to an innate moral grammar, within human beings but also unfolding in the creative universe. We may call it the grammar of an essential harmony - a grammar within and without which is the measure of all things.

Grounds for pessimism
Whether we will attain our goals or fall short remains to be seen. We are being told it is ‘time for action’, with the implication that the crisis we face is resolvable. That is a rather large assumption. And what counts as achievable depends upon what our goals are. To the extent that we are co-creators in the creative universe, it is always ‘time for action’. Human beings are creative agents in the historical process. To become passive in relation to trends and tendencies describes a condition of alienation in which objects have acquired existential significance and the human subjects have been reduced to mere appendages.

Fromm is pertinent here:

Marx was not a 'determinist,' as it often is stated. His position is very much the same as Spinoza's: we are determined by forces outside of our conscious selves, and by passions and interests which direct us behind our backs. Inasmuch as this is the case, we are not free. But we can emerge from this bondage and enlarge the realm of freedom by becoming fully aware of reality, and hence of necessity, by giving up illusions, and by transforming ourselves from somnabulistic, unfree, determined, dependent, passive persons into awakened, aware, active, independent ones. Both for Spinoza and for Marx the aim of life is liberation from bondage, and the way to this aim is the overcoming of illusions and the full use of our active powers. Freud's position is essentially the same; he spoke less of freedom versus bondage than of mental health versus mental sickness. He, too, saw that man is determined by objective factors (the libido and its fate) but he thought that man can overcome this determination by overcoming his illusions, by waking up to reality, and by becoming aware of what is real but unconscious.

Fromm 1962 ch 9

To say that it is ‘time for action’ is to say that we need to overcome a condition of passivity in relation to alienated social circumstances, reclaiming our creative powers and reorganising them as social powers. This common conscious control of our reality changing praxis entails developing a moral capacity commensurate with our technical capacity. It is about assuming moral responsibility for our actions.

Achieving social control in this sense is precisely what is required to address the myriad environmental threats that are encroaching upon human society. We live in testing times. Will we make it through? Jared Diamond points to the many grounds for pessimism: ‘Even if every human now alive were to die tomorrow, the damage that we have already inflicted on our environment would ensure that its degradation will continue for decades.’ (Diamond 2005: 330-331). 





Diamond gives his Epilogue the title 'Nothing learned, and everything forgotten!' If this is indeed the ‘requiem for a species’ (Hamilton 2010), then here is our epitaph. Diamond admits that there are plenty of grounds for being cynical about humanity's future, but he states in forthright terms ‘that our situation is not hopeless.’

We are the only ones creating our problems, so it is completely within our power to solve them. 
Among the hopeful signs, there are many realistic, often discussed policies by which we could avoid disaster, such as limiting human population growth, preserving natural habitats, and adopting other environmental safeguards. Many governments are already doing some of these obvious things in some cases.




And … the many reasons which point to a growing social, economic, political and technological interdependency which mirrors biological and ecological interdependence. We have plenty positive forces for unity and integration to work with when coming to develop the common moral and political framework we need. ‘We do not need novel, still-to-be invented technologies to solve our problems. We just need more governments to do many more of the same obvious things that some governments are already doing in some cases. Nor is it true that the average citizen is powerless. There are many causes of extinction that citizen groups have helped throttle in recent years - for instance, commercial whaling, hunting big cats for fur coats, and importing chimpanzees caught in the wild, to mention just a few examples. In fact, this is one area where it is particularly easy for a modest donation by the average citizen to have a big impact, because all conservation organizations now have such modest budgets.’ (Diamond 2005: 332).

Against the ecology of fear
I’d like to comment on Dan Gardner’s Risk, described by The Economist as ‘a cheery corrective to modern paranoia.’ Gardner notes the paradox in the fact that whilst we are the safest and healthiest human beings who have ever lived, irrational fear is growing. Gardner is well aware that there are clouds on humanity's horizons. The problems we face seem so great as to generate a pervasive sense of helplessness and hopelessness. The age of progress is declared to be at an end. Progress is declared to be a delusion. Gardner makes us stop and question whether progress has indeed proven to be such a chimera. ‘Whatever challenges we face, it remains indisputably true that those living in the developed world are the safest, healthiest, and richest humans who ever lived. We are still mortal and there are many things that can kill us. Sometimes we should worry. Sometimes we should even be afraid. But always we should remember how very lucky we are to be alive now.’ (Gardner 2009: 352). 

Progress, in other words, is a real achievement, and we should count ourselves lucky to be alive. Instead, a significant proportion of ‘the safest, healthiest and richest humans who ever lived’ are increasingly hiding under their beds. Gardner points to the omnipresent marketing of fear by politicians, corporations, activists and non-governmental organizations who think that making people worry about injury, disease, and death is an effective way of gaining votes, sales, donations, support and memberships. ‘What matters is the goal. Fear is merely a tactic. And if twisted numbers, misleading language, emotional images, and unreasonable conclusions can more effectively deliver that goal — and they often can - so be it.’ (Gardner 2009 ch 12).

Gardner makes the case for right reasoning over gut instinct. ‘To protect ourselves against unreasoning fear, we must wake up Head and tell it to do its job. We must learn to think hard.’ (Gardner 2009 ch 12). Gut can mislead us. 'People are not accustomed to thinking hard,' Daniel Kahneman wrote, 'and are often content to trust a plausible judgment that quickly comes to mind.' ‘That is the most important change that has to be made. Gut is good, but it's not perfect, and when it gets risk wrong people can come to foolish conclusions’. 

Putting reason and emotion together does not involve the eclipse of reason. Reason retains a central place in the argument I present. The concept of ‘rational freedom’ contains a principle of authority which is capable of establishing the institutional framework of rational restraint and commanding common assent. Identifying the long term common good and coordinating particular interests in its attainment requires a strategic thinking capacity. Motivating and uniting people in a shared interest or goal requires a common ethic. That’s the case for reason and the conception of ‘rational freedom.’

‘Very often, Head and Gut will agree. When that happens, we can be confident in our judgments. But sometimes Head will say one thing, Gut another. Then there's reason to be cautious. A quick and final judgment isn't necessary to deal with most of the risks we face today so when Head and Gut can't agree, we should hold off. Gather more information. Think some more. And if Head and Gut still don't match up, swallow hard and go with Head.’ (Gardner 2009 ch 12).

Can I say that my instinct here tells me that this may not be quite right. Folk wisdom for years has felt that there is something not quite right about modern economics, and here and there economists are breaking ranks and confirming the popular gut.





You could have set down the most powerful computer ever made—with the most complete database of information ever assembled—in front of the smartest man in Plato's Athens. What good would it have done him? Would he have any idea what he had in his hands? Imagine Napoleon shivering in his tent. Give him the price of grain in New York or the number of atoms in a cubic centimeter of cognac and you do him no favor. You might as well ship him a crate of sunscreen. Information out of context is useless.




When Head and Gut have failed to match in my life, it’s Head that has consistently led me astray, persuading me into wrong actions by reason.





So, if forced, are we to trust Head or Gut?
The reason why the safest, healthiest, and wealthiest humans who have ever lived are not enjoying themselves is because of the threat of any number of crises and catastrophes. Energy depletion, climate chaos, terrorism, mass starvation and annihilating plagues are popular themes in bookstores and newspaper commentary pages. ‘Catastrophist writing is very much in vogue and it can be terribly depressing’, Gardner writes. He quotes James Howard Kunstler, author of The Long Emergency: 'Even after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, America is still sleepwalking into the future. We have walked out of our burning house and we are now heading off the edge of a cliff.' 

Armageddon is in the air. Gardner refers to Cormac McCarthy's The Road - a novel about a father and son wandering through a future America devastated by an unknown catastrophe, and Jim Grace's The Pesthouse, a novel about two people wandering through a future America slightly less devastated by an unknown catastrophe. ‘When two renowned authors working in isolation come up with near-identical plots, they are tapping into the Zeitgeist, and it is grim, indeed.’ (Gardner 2009: 356-357).

These are times that test men’s souls, wrote Paine. That the words apply as much to the contemporary world as they did when Paine wrote them should cause us to pause and consider whether our problems really are, as they seem to be to us, much greater than those faced in times past. That’s how they seem to us, because we are the ones being tested. But, writes Gardner, ‘history is an optical illusion: The past always appears more certain than it was, and that makes the future feel more uncertain - and therefore frightening - than ever. (Gardner 2009: 358). The roots of this illusion lie in what psychologists call 'hindsight bias.' Hindsight bias drains the uncertainty out of history. When Paine wrote of the times that test men’s souls, the fate of the American revolution hung in the balance. Indeed, prospects seemed bleak, and some were drifting from the fight. The future looked most uncertain for the American revolutionaries. Paine’s call for action inspired hope and raised the spirits and the rest, as they say, is history. We, looking back, know what happened in history and are inclined to think that whatever happened was likely to happen or even inevitable. We lose the uncertainty of history as a lived experience. Of course, when we live our own history, we experience uncertainty with respect to the future. We are inclined to see our future prospects as bleak. And it’s an optical illusion.

We have ‘an appointment with history’ here. My A level history teacher, Brother Victor, picked up the big, dense course book in the very first lesson, and told us that everything in here is what happened, or what historians citing the facts, claimed what happened. This is what we will be studying. But none of us should think that because these events are all written down as facts that this is the only way that things could have happened. That’s not how history is made; the finality of the facts in a history book is an illusion of determinism. Studying history is also about the roads that were never taken, the opportunities that were missed, the possibilities that were not realised, the alternatives that were not explored or were suppressed. Nothing is inevitable in history. Because the principal agents of history are human beings. Lesson learned. If you want to know what’s going on, study history. If you want to know about human beings, what they actually do, not merely what they believe, or tell you they believe, then study history. If you want to know about power and politics, study history:

When I teach or speak at universities, young people always ask me: "I want to be successful and travel around the world; what should I study?"
I always tell them the same thing: "Study history."
And they always look at me very perplexed and say, "What are you talking about. . . what about economics, what about marketing?"
"If you want to be successful," I always say, "you've got to understand history. You'll see how the world is always changing. You'll see how a lot of the things we see today have happened before. Believe it or not, the stock market didn't begin the day you graduated from school. The stock market's been around for centuries. All markets have. These things have happened before. And will happen again."

Jim Rogers in Bonner 2003 vi

Financial Reckoning Day by William Bonner, written in 2003. History shows that people who save and invest grow and prosper, and the others deteriorate and collapse.

I’ve seen the political and social movements come and go, heard all the slogans, the statements of principles, seen civilisations and nations rise and fall, kings and emperors, the lot, seen behind the high ideals, the mythologies of revolution and reaction. Historical change is always the product of material interests and metaphysical motives, always has been and always will be. Anyone who ignores real human beings, with all their biases and confusions and inconsistencies, in favour of some politics possessing slide-rule precision is going to be on the margins, missing opportunities and real possibilities for making history. How do you think a monarchist like George Washington ends up leading what many consider to be the most successful, even the only successful, revolution in history?

These are times that try men’s souls, wrote Paine. That the words apply as much to the contemporary world as they did when Paine wrote them should cause us to pause and consider whether our problems really are, as they seem to be to us, much greater than those faced in times past. That’s how they seem to us, because we are the ones being tested. But history is an optical illusion: The past always appears more certain than it was, and that makes the future feel more uncertain - and therefore frightening - than ever. The roots of this illusion lie in what psychologists call 'hindsight bias.' Hindsight bias drains the uncertainty out of history. When Tom Paine wrote the words ‘these are the times that try men’s souls’, the fate of the American revolution hung in the balance. Indeed, prospects seemed bleak, and some were drifting from the fight. The future looked most uncertain for the American revolutionaries. Paine’s call for action inspired hope and raised the spirits and the rest, as they say, is history. We, looking back, know what happened in history and are inclined to think that whatever happened was always likely to happen or even inevitable. We lose the uncertainty of history as a lived experience. Of course, when we live our own history, we experience uncertainty with respect to the future. We are inclined to see our future prospects as bleak. And it’s an optical illusion. When we seek certainty, we lose the sense of our own creative agency, will, choice, deliberation and collective action. And when we are so convinced by the truth of our own positions that we cannot understand why people are not immediately persuaded, and do as we tell them, we get frustrated, angry, disappointed, and give up.

Nobody said it would be easy. Here’s Tom Paine again:

Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly: it is dearness only that gives every thing its value. Heaven knows how to put a proper price upon its goods; and it would be strange indeed if so celestial an article as FREEDOM should not be highly rated”

‘So here we are, standing in the present, peering into the frighteningly uncertain future and imagining all the awful things that could possibly happen. And when we look back? It looks so much more settled, so much more predictable. It doesn't look anything like this. Oh yes, these are very scary times.’ We see the world we are born into as 'so much more dangerous' than the world that came before us. It’s not true but, ‘thanks to the foibles of the human mind, it can easily seem that way. (Gardner 2009 ch 12). 

Gardner gives a number of examples of predictions of future doom and catastrophe that proved to be erroneous. He focuses on Paul Erlich’s predictions of mass famine in particular. He cites Erlich’s 'insightful ideas about how to make society more resilient in the face of near-inevitable environmental and social catastrophes.' For Gardner, the only thing Ehrlich has learned from the past 40 years is to put the word 'near' in front of the word 'inevitable.' ‘One would think catastrophists would learn to be humble about their ability to predict the future but there is a noticeable absence of humility in the genre.’ (Gardner 2009: 365).

When astronomer Martin Rees wrote a book on threats emerging from scientific advances, he entitled it Our Final Century? However, Rees's British publishers didn't find that quite frightening enough, so they dropped the question mark. That wasn’t frightening enough for Rees's American publishers, so they changed 'century' to 'hour.' Fear sells.

So how long do we have left? Longer than the publicity would have us think. Rees is much less gloomy than his marketing. He points to the dangers of nuclear weapons, but considers it important to acknowledge the astonishing bounty science has heaped upon us. 'We are safer than ever before,' he says. We should be concerned by the real threats that confront us, but we should appreciate the fact that 'for most people in the world, there's never been a better time to be alive.' ‘Proof of this fundamental truth can be found in countless statistics and reports. Or we can simply spend an afternoon reading the monuments to our good fortune erected in every Victorian cemetery.’ (Gardner 2009 ch 12). It’s a view for which Stephen Pinker supplies the supporting facts and figures. Others supply contrary facts and figures. What do Head and Gut tell us here? My Gut tells me there is something awry in Pinker’s view. Something else tells me that Marx was smartest of all in seeing the ambivalent quality of capitalist modernity as a mode in which everything is pregnant with its contrary. 

The point is this, whatever the nature of the threats and crises that face us, we are better placed to meet them than any generation before us has been when facing their problems. But our problems are greater, comes the response. Greater than the Black Death, Fall of Rome, the war against Hitler? We have immense material resources and technological powers and communications, global connections, expert knowledge in the full range of disciplines. What on Earth is stopping us? The politics of fear saps the energy and steals the future from us.

Reclaiming the Ground of Hope
Prophecy and Hope
It is worth relating the predilection for the ‘catastrophe’ scenario to the apocalyptic tradition deriving the Bible, the book of Daniel, for instance, and the ‘pursuit of the Millennium’ during the Middle Ages by a number of anarchistic religious sects. (Cohn 1970.) Apocalyptic thinking involves the belief that we are approaching an earth-shattering cataclysm leading to the restoration of the true order of things. 

There is plenty to be said for the Apocalypse. Andrew Simms’ book Cancel the Apocalypse: The New Path to Prosperity argues for a new ‘qualitative’ conception of prosperity in order to avert the Apocalypse, by which he means ecological catastrophe. It is in the context of climate change that the term ‘Apocalypse' is entirely appropriate, not just as catastrophe, but as a revelation, bringing something to light. (see Apocalypse in Critchley, P. 2013., The Common Ground: Essays in Ecology vol 2 Political Ecology [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books)

And as prophecy. Indeed, the prophetic tradition needs to distinguished from the apocalyptic tradition. Jonathan Sacks explains what prophetic thinking entails:

Its most famous image is the journey of the Israelites across the desert towards the promised land. Here too there is a destination, but it is to be reached, not by upheaval, but rather through a long, slow journey, by 'joining together and marching'. The way is rarely straight. There are digressions and diversions, blind alleys and false turnings, backslidings and rebellions. At times the people despair and long to go back to a misremembered past, an idealised Egypt, the 'world we have lost'. But somehow, through a combination of coaxing and persistence, they reach sight of their goal, even though Moses, who has led them there, will not live to cross the Jordan. 'It is not given to you to complete the task,' said a first-century rabbi, summarising the moral enterprise, 'but neither are you free to desist from it.' (Mishnah, Avot, 2:21). 

Sacks 2000 ch 22

The prophetic vision is not about the Millennium as the end of the world, but about joining together and moving forward on a long, slow journey towards the good society. As against the cosmic vision of the apocalypse, prophecy possesses a moral vision. Prophecy does not entail the end of history, but reminds us that whatever the nature of our current predicament, we have it in our power to begin again. 

The emerging future is not predestined
The fact is that we are not helpless and therefore not hopeless. Where there is life there is hope, and where there is hope there is life. The future that is in the process of emerging future is not predetermined, although, admittedly, climate constraints are tight and tightening. What eventually emerges will be the outcome of how we handle those constraints. Even at this late stage, we can engage in intelligent action in order to avoid a runaway fate, we can identify what needs to be done (for one, we must keep carbon in the ground or we have had it!) and develop and get involved in the transition strategies that will take us from here to there. It may or may not lead us to a bright green future, but we will have a future nonetheless. 

The collapse scenario - abandoning hope
Sustainable development is a term that has been used, abused and diluted almost out of existence. I tend instead to refer to ‘sustainable living’, since it allows a focus on ecology as a way of life, and not just policies, actions and institutional targets and goals. Still, there is no evading the need to set human development within a sustainable social, economic and moral framework, unless one accepts that the climate crisis has reached such depths that we are in an age of ‘After Sustainability’. I shall, for reasons given throughout this piece, continue to use the term ‘sustainability’. 

*[cantankerous and crabby – should cut, serves no useful purpose]
I want to comment on this passage on Facebook.
‘I'm not clear about what could be done about climate disruption. The processes that appear to be engaged at this time seem to be so much bigger than we are. I agree, let's do something, but I'm concerned about appealing to our expectation and hope that we have the power or ability or know-how to effect geological processes which have apparently erased much of life in the past. Yes, we can change our behaviour. Yes, we can contribute to a movement to change the ways we governs ourselves, if this is what we wish to do. I'm also concerned about us raising a lot of anger and frustration around our thinking that ‘someone has to do something’ and I fear the emergence of more authoritarian forms of government because we haven't been able to address our pain around our unmet needs and come to an empowering place of exploring and creating together what we want. I imagine that we can be responsible for ourselves, but I also wonder if we can accept the possibility that there may be no escaping the consequences of the compounding actions of this civilization. good morning.’

Call me insensitive, but that invitation to wallow in grief, pain and powerlessness is not just poor politics, it’s a flabby spirituality for a narcissistic generation gone soft. 

1)	We can be clear about what can be done about climate disruption, it’s just that some have lost nerve and hope, if they ever had any. 
2)	The processes involved have always been bigger than we are, the question has always been about establishing collective mechanisms of control to address the global consequences of incremental actions. 
3)	If we don’t appeal to expectation and hope, then how do we ever act to bring about an alternate future? Obviously, don’t raise false expectations and hopes. But envisaging the future and acting to bring it about has always and will always require moral and political courage and imagination. Many are losing these qualities and will never be persuaded that a better world is possible.
4)	To characterise environmentalism as politics as ‘someone must do something’ is a caricature, there are many initiatives underway involving a lot of people doing something. I do read too many statements that somebody should do something, to which I would say that if you have something in mind, then you are that somebody to put it into practice.
5)	‘I fear the emergence of more authoritarian forms of government because we haven't been able to address our pain around our unmet needs and come to an empowering place of exploring and creating together what we want.’ Er, hello and a big wake-up call here. These authoritarian governments are already in existence and getting stronger by the year. The struggle for control over and access to ever more scarce resources will ensure that the big questions of government and politics will carry on beyond any collapse. If we don’t come together in politics and create that ‘empowering place’, then we will have authoritarian government, without question.
6)	There may be no escaping the consequences of the compounding actions of this civilization. There may be. The future is uncertain, it awaits creation. Those without vision and hope will not create it.

This is really about fear and paralysis, from first to last. Out of the belief that there is no escaping the eco-catastrophe to come, we are treated to a long lament that paralyzes the will and gets in the way of reclaiming the ground of being and hope through the practical reappropriation of our alienated social power.

We are in an era of ‘after sustainability’. After Sustainability is the title of John Foster’s book, the subtitle being Denial, Hope, Retrieval. Foster warns that not only is dangerous climate change coming, it is already too late to prevent it. To say otherwise, goes the argument, is to be guilty of the same pathological attachment to ‘progress’ as the climate change deniers. Indeed, recognising that we face a serious climate crisis, yet continuing to search for practicable, rational, feasible solutions is considered to be an even more deluded form of denialism than that practised by those mounting a blatant political defence of the status quo. Why? Because climate change deniers are clearly cynics who have got what they want and don’t give a damn about others. They will sacrifice the health and happiness of current generations, let alone future generations. And they think nothing of the extinction of species. For them, progress is already here. Those who think that this dire situation is capable of remedy are guilty of innocence rather than cynicism, but they are the most deluded of all – because they continue to adhere to a belief in progress, all evidence to the contrary. And sustainability is just the same progress given another name. 

This is how the After Sustainability thesis goes. We are in the age of tragedy. Here is a summary of a seminar introducing John Foster's After Sustainability at the UCL Institute for Sustainable Resources.

‘Dangerous climate change is coming. It has been clear since Copenhagen that the political will to make adequate cuts in global CO2 emissions isn’t going to be generated in any foreseeable future. The international attempt to shift the world by agreement onto a ‘sustainable’ trajectory, always half-hearted, has failed.
But denial is not confined to those who refuse to see the serious environmental damage we are doing; it extends equally to those who refuse to see that we have missed our chance to stop it. The roots of such embedded denial lie in progressivism. Exorbitant resource consumption is the form in which this mindset has caused environmental damage in the first place; latterly, it has manifested itself as wilfully self-blinded technological optimism.
But what if we stopped pretending?
Environmentalism is about what is wrong with us here and now, not only what that might mean for the future. Our environmental situation is tragic in the full sense. Tragedy entails losses which can’t be mitigated or compensated, but it can also reveal us to ourselves in ways from which we may be able to learn. We can’t really predict what will happen on the ground as global economic and ecological systems unravel. We must build existential as well as economic and social resilience, arming ourselves with recognition, insight and flexibility rather than with plans or blueprints. If we approach what is coming with a realism thus grounded in genuinely non-optimistic life-hope, we may here and there come through it.’
http://www.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/sustainable/sustainable-events/after_sustainability (​http:​/​​/​www.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk​/​sustainable​/​sustainable-events​/​after_sustainability​)

‘After sustainability’ does not mean the ‘end of the world’ as such, just the end of the world we have known. In this sense, sustainability and its pursuit remain part of a mode of thinking that has brought us to this impasse.

The claim is that there is a general refusal to face up to the fact that the world we have come to believe is the highest stage ever reached in civilisation – the world of unlimited material expansion and the ideal of the liberal democratic state – is now drawing to an end. The further claim is that many people, when called to justify themselves, equate their refusal to accept this fact with not abandoning hope.

This seems plausible on the surface level, and there is no denying the manifest failure of government and politics. But, schooled in history, politics and political economy, I am suspicious of generalisations like these. I feel like screaming that of course the international attempt to shift the world by agreement onto a ‘sustainable’ trajectory has failed, and of course the attempt was half-hearted. I’m damned I am going to be accused of a sophisticated denialism by people whose political insight is limited to bland general references to ‘us’ and ‘ourselves’. In an economic system that expands on the basis of class exploitation, there is no ‘us’ with a ‘them’.

I’ll make two quick points here before proceeding. Both these claims can be found amongst the varied ‘after sustainability’ literature that is being published, to which I am bound to offer a word in my self-defence. As to the first claim, my background is in the dialectical tradition of Hegel and Marx, a tradition in which there is no naïve assertion of uni-linear development and in which progress is always a contradictory process involving alienation and its overcoming. Critics may argue that this is merely a progressive mode of thought that is part of the modernist world coming to an end. The parallels between Hegel and Francis Fukuyama’s End of History would support that thesis. But it should still be born in mind that the Marxist project of the practical reappropriation of alienated social power doesn’t just entail redeeming all the progressive claims of modernity, but a qualitative shift in civilisation. It entails a common conscious control of the powers unleashed by modernity, the human creators taking moral responsibility for their creations in an existential society, the development of the productive forces as a humanisation and a naturalisation. It meant, in other words, the end of the world as we know it, the end of capitalist modernity.

The response to the second claim, that denying that the prevailing social order is approaching its end amounts to retaining hope, that is hardly worthy of comment. Hope entails much more than a vague feeling that ‘something will turn up,’ and much more than a bone headed denialism of plain facts. The criticisms may apply to those who have felt that progress is some automatic process associated with scientific and technological advance, economic growth and liberal democratic enlargement. That’s not so much hope as a naïve faith. Again, to whom does this apply? Critics of such a view have been legion in the twentieth century. ‘Progress’ has been out of fashion for ages. Back in the 1970s, Robert Heilbroner, a writer in the marxist tradition, wrote An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (1974). His view was that basic transformations in the modern world were creating a bleak prospect for the long term good. In 1980, Robert Nisbet wrote pessimistically with respect to the idea of progress: 'Disbelief, doubt, disillusionment and despair have taken over, or so it would seem from our literature, art, philosophy, theology, even our scholarship and science.' (Nisbet, 1980: 318) For Nisbet, the modern world is 'almost barren of faith in progress'. (Nisbet 1980: 353). 

I would agree that it is time to stop pretending, but I would just ask who, all along, has been pretending here. Exaggeration and hyperbole is unhelpful, as is endless diatribes against strawmen. If the charge is that I, as a political ecologist, am a denier clinging on to a naïve faith in progress and pretending that programmes delivered at the national and international level would suffice to bring about the fundamental transformation in the way of life we need, then I plead firmly and loudly ‘not guilty’. From the very first, I have always insisted on any political action that proceeds from above in the institutional domain can be effective only in the context of a radical social transformation from below which addresses the roots of the entire social metabolic order. There is no naïve faith in progress here, no misplaced hopes in the direction of government and politics. 

Here is a passage from my doctoral notes from the 1990s:

To realise Held’s constraint free vision of democracy, ‘double democratisation’ needs to be reformulated as one single process of democratisation. For the separation of the state from civil society is associated with the alienation of control which denies democracy. One can be sceptical of Held’s belief that the power of capital can be publicly controlled (Held 1987:283ff). Such a view places an ‘inadvisable degree of faith’ in the view that pervasive structures of private economic power can be altered through the mechanisms of political representation (McLennan 1989:253). Capitalism is not a public domain but a regime of private accumulation.

Critchley 2001 RFM vol I

And here is the full quote from the McLennan passage I cite above:





I make this point to set the record straight for those who would accuse me of being a ‘denier’ - here is one political environmentalist who knew fine well what we were up against in attempting to a) raise alarm about the climate crisis and b) take the necessary measures to address the crisis. I keep trying to draw attention to these systemic and institutional constraints when it comes to appeals to and action for the public good. Any hope I have here is backed by critical analysis.

So I shall repeat my long standing view. The capital system is not a public domain, it is not amenable to rational persuasion, it cares only for the systemic imperative to accumulate and will sacrifice all else to that narrow aim. But, of course, we have been living in an era when Karl Marx was anathema. I was reading Marx and engaging in class politics when the intellectuals and the politicians were beating a hasty retreat, on the pretence that the age of the grand narratives was over. Grand thinking was certainly over for them, and politics was dissolved into culture and lifestyle. I charted this degeneration throughout the 1990s, and it left us without a political and moral language with which to contest the continued enclosure and expropriation of the world. As the Left raised the white flag and abandoned grand narrative, capital went global as the grandest political narrative the world has ever seen.

But if tragedy it is, then how about making those who have brought us to this being the ones to pay the price first and hardest? No? It’s all about making peace now, expressing humility, letting go of anger, expressing grief, embracing loss, finding a mountain top to contemplate the insignificance of things whilst gazing at the stars. I wonder who is pretending now. Around the world, the military departments of the most powerful governments are preparing, equipping, advising, and it’s all about the class of people who have brought us to this denouement doing their utmost to retain strategic control of dwindling resources after the collapse. That’s right, I’m afraid, I have bad news for all the political innocents out there who see climate tragedy as the occasion for us to live humbly and simply and seek value in our own qualities and virtues – politics will always be with us, before the crash and after the crash, there will always be politics. I agree with learning how to live well, lord knows, I’ve been demanding a shift to the qualitative way of living for long enough. But see the vice like grip that the ruling classes continue to hold on power, and see how they grip all the more tightly the more crisis threatens to engulf the entire system, and then picture the aftermath of ecological catastrophe. If you think there is a community of local resilience that you can build that is free of such politics then you are deluded. I say that the solution to bad politics is not no politics, it is good politics, and good politics is all about living well, shedding delusions and pretensions and focusing upon the actualisation of healthy potentialities. It always was. We have been brought to the brink of collapse by well organised, well resourced, entrenched elites and above all by an expansionary, wasteful economic system that succeeded in subordinating government and politics to its accumulative requirements. I don’t need to be told about delusions of progress. One of the first things I ever wrote was entitled The Proletarian Public, and it was a vigorous defence of the proud history and tradition of working class self-emancipation and socialism from below. There, my middle class liberal friends, is the alternative we have needed all along. Rosa Luxembourg gave us the alternatives: Socialism or Barbarism. What we got was embourgoisification and a relocation of socialism from the social realm to the state level, a dictatorship of the officials over the proletariat, the professional middle class expropriating socialism from working class organisation and turning it into the rational regulation of capitalism from above. And there went the socialist alternative. Well this is how the age of political illusion ends.

The end of this world has been a long time coming. In 1918 Rosa Luxemburg gave choice before us: socialism or barbarism:

At this moment, one glance around us will show what a reversion to barbarism in bourgeois society means. This world war— that is a reversion to barbarism. The triumph of imperialism leads to the destruction of culture, sporadically during a modern war, and forever if the period of world wars which has just begun is allowed to take its course to its logical end.

Luxemburg in Howard 1971 Intro

Luxemburg had written the history of the twentieth century at its very beginning. That could be our history too. The historical necessity of socialism for all humankind is all too apparent in the contemporary world, and the choice, socialism or barbarism, remains the choice before us. Socialism or Barbarism is the title of a book by Hungarian philosopher Istvan Mészáros (2001). Mészáros profoundly influenced my work in the 1990s, and he is well worth quoting on this:









I have argued that government and politics, an effective policy/action framework and concerted international agreement and action are a part of any positive resolution of the environmental crisis we face, and further than this, are integral parts of any viable social order.

My point is simply this, there are many of us who have confronted the contradictory dynamics and realities of capitalist modernity over the years in an effort to affirm alternative possibilities for civilisation, what Marx called a ‘truly human society’ as opposed to some endless quantitative expansion. The ruling classes of the world waged a total war against such a vision, and brought about the extirpation of socialism as a mass political movement. The kind of hope that people like me hold has naught to do with denying that the world as we know it is coming to an end, the Marxist tradition always held that the capital system would destroy its own basis. We should have been preparing for the denouement all along. We have failed to develop the subjective factor, hence the current predicament: the old world is dying and the new one cannot be born. 

So, may I politely and respectfully ask that certain folk please restrict accusations of denialism and naïve hope to the liberals and social democratic reformists who fell for the complacent narratives of progress hook, line and sinker or, more accurately, sold these things as a false prospectus to the public they wanted to take to the market and flog. How many remember the assertions that capitalism no longer exists, that there is no such thing as class anymore, that we live in a mixed economy subject to public regulation? The end of that world has been a long time coming. But it’s glad that some are starting to notice. 

‘After sustainability’ is a recognition that the fight against climate change is over. The necessary actions and changes in behaviour have not occurred, with the result that massively disruptive climate change is now inevitable. More than just possible, more even than probable – inevitable. Over the years, reference has been made to a ‘window of opportunity’ available to us. I have used the phrase myself in recent years. So long as this window was open, the sustainability agenda could have averted climate disruption. That window is now closed and the sustainability agenda associated with it has failed. The emphatic assertion of failure is based on basic facts and elementary logic. We are charged with the task of keeping the average atmospheric temperature below the critical threshold of 2oC above pre-industrial levels if we are to avoid dangerous and potentially catastrophic climate change. The repeated warning over the years has been that if we don’t drastically reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, we won’t be able to keep the safe side of that threshold. We can check the facts on this: in the teeth of the biggest economic depression for 80 years, emissions have increased. I remember the warnings over the years – ‘seven years to save the planet’. That was written by Bill McGuire in 2008. (McGuire 2008).

The fact that so much needed to be done in so short a time should have been a call for rapid political and moral reconstruction. Instead, there was an overemphasis on scientific fact and knowledge and a phoney war with climate change deniers. Reason, fact and logic decide nothing. Too many have forgotten, or never realised, that knowledge is not appetitive, not a virtue, but needs a bridge to action. 

A simple grasp of politics should have told us that the institutional and psychological transformations required by a rapid shift to a low or zero carbon economy would be beyond us, in the absence of a mass worldwide social movement. Instead, the people called ‘sustainability elites’ pursued a reformist agenda through the very political institutions that are thoroughly embedded in the very expansionary capital system that is driving ecological destruction.

The stark, simple truth is this, that if the world is not already embarked on an effective, coordinated programme for substantial reductions in emissions worldwide, then we won’t remain below the critical threshold. It isn’t, and we won’t. 

Hence current predicaments and controversies. We need the substantial international programme of cuts, and hence support the likes of Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), for her sterling work over the years to get serious, effective action on this issue. At the point at which it seems there may be movement from the major governments of the world, we are being told that it is too late, and that to continue to press for such action is a denialism. It may be, having come this far, and got so close to effective action, it may be worth persevering a little longer. There is plenty to lose and a lot to gain. Runaway climate change will mean death, destruction and disruption of biblical proportions. If there is a chance to avert it, we should take it. 

Foster refers to ‘the periodic bluster of implausible politicians and the permanently crossed fingers of the international sustainability elite’. His point is that the chance, such as it was, is gone, we are in for the worst-case scenario. 

There’s a ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ quality to this kind of argument. To continue to push for climate action, by definition, is to deny that it’s too late for any action to be effective. It’s probably best to continue to support programmes and policies that are well within our material reach, and continue to work on extending our political and psychological reach.

For Foster, refusal to accept that we are not going to avoid catastrophic climate change amounts to a deeply embedded denial. He draws a parallel between climate change deniers with vested interests in an environmentally-destructive global economic system and climate change activists whose political and psychological vested interests mean that they cannot admit that it is too late to act. ‘Typical here is the Green Party member interviewed at a recent conference who said: it can’t be too late to stop climate change, because if it was, how could we find the energy to go on campaigning?’ That’s a rather cheap shot taken against the people who have sought to make environmentalism politically effective from the first. Because the fact is that much more considered statements than this can be found in Green Party literature over the years.

Next we are treated to the familiar ‘God that failed’ confessional, I once believed ‘this’ but now I have seen the light and believe ‘that’: ‘let me fully acknowledge that I was in a similar state of denial myself up to and including my last book, The Sustainability Mirage (​http:​/​​/​www.amazon.co.uk​/​The-Sustainability-Mirage-Illusion-Reality​/​dp​/​1844075354​). I struggled clear partly by luck – no-one would fund research proposals for radically critiquing the sustainability paradigm, however I dressed them up, so I was left free to think things through for myself from scratch – and partly thanks to one of those wry life-truths which Nietzsche identifies: ‘It is only late that one musters the courage for what one really knows’. Or putting it another way, one of the few good things about getting older is that your self-delusions can find themselves with fewer places to hide.’

I was once deluded, and selling books, and now … I’m getting older, and still selling books. I give mine away, don’t need the audience, still less their money, and so can speak plainly without an agenda other than the truth. And I’ll speak bluntly – it’s been the age of narcissism, and many are plainly excited to be around at the end of the world, as though the world has been waiting for them to say it’s over. That’s not for you or I to say. And you make your peace in silent humility.

It’s not that I don’t agree with the main direction of Foster’s argument, I just think it can be separated from a broad brush assault on environmental politics.
‘Denial so profoundly embedded and so resistant to challenge expresses …  a way of understanding ourselves in which the aspiration towards continuing ‘progress’ is so hard to give up, because it seems to offer an escape from our deeply-rooted inability to make sense of our own natural limitedness and finitude. But the fiercely willed optimism of that aspiration is now on a direct collision course with reality.’

At which point I have to stop quoting, because if ecology as politics has meant anything, it has meant trying to induce a recognition of natural limits, finite resources and our own finitude. Foster’s critique applies specifically to environmentalism as an attempt to manage our planetary interchange via existing institutions, with no radical transformation of political economy involved.

We cannot predict how many degrees of average temperature increase are in the pipeline. Foster argues that we are already committed to a climate disruption of such a scale that rising sea levels, extensive desertification and ecosystem breakdown world-wide is inevitable, bringing food, water and energy shortages, and famine, epidemics and homelessness on an epic scale. Those living in temperate parts may suffer less drastic warming effects but will come under enormous pressure from environmental refugees. The resources and infrastructure of entire nations will be overwhelmed. There will be a shutting of borders and a rise in inter-communal and international conflict. 
‘The world is set to become not just a less habitable but a vastly more divided, hostile and violent place.’

Gwynne Dyer’s book Climate Wars (​http:​/​​/​www.amazon.co.uk​/​Climate-Wars-Fight-Survival-Overheats​/​dp​/​1851688145​) shows how more divided, hostile and violent. So we have to get accustomed to the end of the world as we know it. It’s just that I had thought that the people arguing for the alternative ecological civilisation had been doing the hard work of political, psychological and moral preparation ushering in this new world. Does Foster’s critique apply to the likes of Ted Roszak? Capra? No. I’d need to know the specific target of this critique, because these comments apply to proponents of an environmental reformism within the prevailing system.

‘Coming out of denial about all this need not, in fact, mean abandoning hope – but I can testify that you have to be ready to tread a hard intellectual road.’
Foster’s rather broad brush treatment of environmentalism as politics shows little evidence of having travelled the hard intellectual road. All manner of different, and very contrary, individuals and groups are tarnished with the brush of denialism. For the record, I have never suffered from the delusions that Foster confessed to holding until very recently, so I bristle with a little anger at the accusation of being guilty of a deeply embedded denialism. I’d just ask of people who are only now, when it is so late, or too late, beginning to see the light – where on earth have you been? And now, seeing the need for a radical environmentalism against the capital system, they say it’s all too late and give up. Read Marx in the Grundrisse on how the bourgeois viewpoint is hopelessly split between seeing the capital system as the end of history or engaged in a romantic yearning to go back to nature. Going forwards to socialism is a road that is never entertained. When the necessity of socialism becomes plain, the bourgeois give up and tell the rest of us it is over. They can envisage the end of civilisation, the world, the human species, but not the capital system.

So what, really, is Foster’s main message? He thinks that we should be prepared to recognize the situation which we have brought on ourselves as a tragedy, involving terrible and uncompensated loss. That’s resignation, an acceptance of an inevitable and irremediable catastrophe. But, when coming to terms with the terrible truth, we should be more intellectually – and politically – rigorous and ask who, specifically, is the ‘we’ who have done most to bring us to this tragedy. Because I have bad news for those who think that coming to terms with future collapse is an opportunity for spiritual recovery – the powerful people and interests who brought the world to this are already preparing to retain control of the increasingly scarce resources after the collapse. People who advocate letting go of shame and guilt are in for a shock - politics isn’t going away. Settling accounts with the people who brought us to this will be a condition of dealing with any aftermath of eco-collapse. Letting go of politics is letting them off the hook, and letting them continue to control resources in a post-apocalyptic scenario. Foster’s neglect of underlying power relations gives his acceptance and resignation a certain ideological character, presenting issues in such a way as to conceal and preserve existing relations of power. Wars are won by breaking the will of your enemy to fight on. I fight on.

Foster argues that we should cease to view the climate crisis as a set of problems that human ingenuity must be able to solve. This concern with problem-solving via technical ingenuity characterises the progressivist template on which politics has been and still is fixated. This sounds like the familiar criticism of the reduction of political and social problems to technical questions, entailing technocratic solutions that leave fundamental power structures and relations unchanged. 

Foster is saying something different, though. For Foster, the only constructive activity left open to us is ‘the retrieval of whatever forms of organic resilience we can establish in the present, rather than the attempt to second-guess and manage the medium-term future.’ That is not so different from part of the thesis I have been arguing here. I am indeed arguing for a re-invigoration of the ‘communities’ of which we are a part, strengthening the everyday life world of solidary exchange, reciprocity and self-determination (I have argued the case from the first, Critchley 1997 BMP Vol 4).
I also agree that purely technocratic approaches to environmental management are inadequate in the absence of an ecological society and mode of being. I place the accent on the latter. At the same time, and this is where I do differ from the likes of Foster, I do argue for an overarching ethical and political framework, not as something raised above society, but as a social and moral matrix that is grounded in social identity, relations and character. My argument here is this, calls for organic and local resilience are all very well – and I fully support such a notion as part of a strengthening of communities of place and practice – but the problems we face are global and will require global action and coordination. Foster refers to the problem of environmental refugees. Much more than forms of local resilience will be required to deal with this problem. Our constructive activity must find a way of spanning the local and the global.

I agree very much with Foster’s demand that we reject atomistic liberal assumptions which define the individual as a free-standing autonomous rights-bearer to recover ourselves as natural beings and recognise a profound natural responsibility. Here lies genuine hope as an alternative to despair. 

For Foster, willed optimism is not an alternative to despair but a form of it, a denialism. I trust that it is clear that I write in a spirit of genuine hope, and eschew an optimism and pessimism related to elusive and illusory expectations of progress as automatically following scientific advance, technological innovation and industrial expansion. 

Foster rejects blueprints for the future in favour of ensuring that the direction of travel must be right. We should indeed avoid any detailed account of the destination. It can’t be given, not least because the future is something we create as we act. A life beyond illusion requires ‘not just a politics but a self-understanding – an existential philosophy – appropriate to an extended period of ecological tragedy.’ Which still means we require a politics, only this time a politics that is in touch with its human – and natural – roots. 

Foster acknowledges that, thus far, only the green movement has got near to first base on the politics. His view is that it has recently allowed itself to be diverted by sustainability thinking as a mutant form of progressivism and needs to rediscover some of its original perspectives whilst trying to find new allies. ‘And it could only be from re-conceiving ourselves within an essentially green framework that the philosophy could come. I don’t think it is impossible, even yet, that the broad green movement as trustee for the human spirit in the present age could rise to that.’

I shall end on that note, because it is the view I expressed in The Coming Ecological Revolution. I’d just add that, in that work, I was broadly supportive of Green politics, whilst warning that its tendencies to environmental reformism and pragmatism would result in a dilution and loss of the original principles and concerns. In which case, the attempt to find new allies at the political level would mean the Greens becoming just another ‘catch-all’ party attempting to manage the system from above. And that, indeed, is an illusion. 

To sharpen the judgement call a little, here is an example of how we may use our knowledge to come to terms with the demands of climate change. 
‘The Smithsonian Institution’s Grand Challenges Consortia invite you to consider how humans are transforming the climate and environments of the Earth at an accelerating rate through agriculture, urbanization, transportation, the use of fossil fuels, and many other activities. Our global imprint, and the certainty that more than seven billion people will profoundly change the environment and biota of the planet for many generations to come, have led many scientists to recognize a new period of geological time called the Anthropocene, or Age of Humans. Restoring Anthropocene environments to pre-industrial conditions may be impossible, but the future need not be apocalyptic if we act soon. To make a liveable Anthropocene, we must use our scientific knowledge to forecast environmental change and develop more resilient societies and cultural institutions that can adapt to the changes we can no longer avoid.’
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eduardo-diaz/a-new-shade-of-green-the_b_5916158.html (​http:​/​​/​www.huffingtonpost.com​/​eduardo-diaz​/​a-new-shade-of-green-the_b_5916158.html​)

Is this the kind of ‘progressivist’ mode that the ‘after sustainability’ thesis entails abandoning? There’s no denialism here, unless after sustainability calls for the abandonment of all attempts to use scientific knowledge in the cause of human betterment. Agreed, more than the use of scientific knowledge is required.

A New Shade of Green; The Anthropocene, Climate Change and Latinos

The Smithsonian Anthropocene; Earth in the Age of Humans (​http:​/​​/​www.smithsonianmag.com​/​science-nature​/​age-humans-living-anthropocene-180952866​/​?no-ist" \t "_hplink​) programme attempts a bridge between the world of science and the world of lived experience.

29 HOPE BEYOND PROGRESS
Abandoning utopias and avoiding dystopias
Abandoning delusions of ‘progress’, most particularly the fantasy of infinite expansion on a planet of finite resources, we need to avoid rejecting utopia only to embrace dystopia. In no time at all, we have gone from Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History in 1992, which celebrated the triumph of liberal democracy, to John Gray’s rejection of the ‘delusions’ of progress and ‘other modern myths’ in False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism (2009) and The Silence of Animals (2013).

In truth, scepticism about ‘progress’ has been around a long while now. In 1980, Robert Nisbet gave a pessimistic assessment of the idea of progress in the modern world: 'Disbelief, doubt, disillusionment and despair have taken over, or so it would seem from our literature, art, philosophy, theology, even our scholarship and science.' (Nisbet, 1980: 318) For Nesbit, the modern world is 'almost barren of faith in progress'. (Nisbet 1980: 353). Robert Heilbroner was similarly bleak with respect to the human prospect. And, of course, the limits to growth thesis had already warned that the days of endless economic growth were numbered. It’s just that our political and modern day belief systems did not heed the message.

The age of progress is coming to an end, so maybe the age of regress is upon us? Or, maybe, in shifting from quantitative to qualitative concerns, we are deepening and enriching the idea of progress, breaking the connection with economic growth, and restoring a concern with human growth, the development of the full human potential. That also entails a break with the view that factual knowledge and technological power in themselves are liberatory. We recover the world of meaning, purpose, and once more recover our sense of direction in life. Set in these terms, we are not exchanging progress for regress at all. Rather, we are coming to take a better, moral, measure of the powers we have unleashed. Our technical capacities have outstripped our moral capacities, with the result that we have been unable to control our powers for the good. ‘Man ought not to know more of a thing than he can creatively live up to', declared Nietzsche. In abandoning ‘progress’ as the endless expansion of material quantities, we are coming to creatively live up to our powers. Marx compared bourgeois society to the sorcerer’s apprentice:

Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.

Marx MCP Rev1848 1973: 73

Following this line of reasoning, progress is not the expansion of technological means and material quantities at all, but our conscious moral appreciation of our powers. 

The end of the foundational assumptions of modernity
For Clive Hamilton, awakening to the prospect of climate disruption compels us to abandon most of the comfortable beliefs that have sustained our sense of the world as a stable and civilising place. The foundational beliefs of modernity are being eroded. The faith in human advancement as a result of science, technology and industry is proving untenable. And we are losing the psychological stability that the belief in continuous progress once gave. Far from being mastered by our technology, nature has evaded our control and seems to have turned against us. And if, as Hamilton argues, nature can no longer be relied upon to provide the conditions for the flourishing of life, neither can our technology, however much we have worshipped it. We risk becoming orphans of our technology (Kingdon 1993: 315).





Honesty, resilience, appreciation of beauty and scale, and stability
In this sense, then, the rejection of the delusions of progress and the declaration that the age of progress has come to an end amounts not to a rejection of progress at all. On the contrary, from an overconfidence in our powers to be able to control and manipulate nature to our selfish ends, our confrontation with the consequences of such exploitative behaviour is forcing us to examine our powers more closely, to assume responsibility for their wise use, investing them with a greater moral depth and significance in the process. Such a qualitative revolution would represent real progress, away from overweening hubris and the fantasy of endless quantitative expansion, to an appreciation of use values, scale, balance, proportion, and a creativity that fits the contours of nature rather than runs against it. 

In other words, there is a real progress in moving from a naïve and uncritical worship of our powers to expressing a concern with determining the ends to which these powers are directed. From a tendency to equate progress with the technological control and manipulation of ‘external’ nature, we are now expressing a concern with the consequences of that ‘mastery’. And the concern with developing a wise technics also involves an appreciation that nature is not ‘out there’ in the sense of being external, but that we are a part of nature. Rejecting the idea of automatic progress through the expansion of our powers is the rejection of a bogus teleology, a belief system, a modern myth. As such, it represents a real human advance, an advance in our self-awareness and a coming to terms with the moral responsibility that comes with the power that knowledge and technology has placed in human hands. We are learning the lessons of the arrogant, unwise, use of power. We are learning that to make excessive demands risks the destruction of the cultural, moral and natural resources upon which civilised life depends. The worlds of science, philosophy and religion, so often at odds with each other with respect to means and ends, facts and values, are starting to make the same plea for balance and moderation in human development, make the same call for respect to be shown to the living and non-living world, make the same warning concerning the moral dangers of hubris, the dangers of overreaching ourselves through an overweening confidence in our powers. And the common message is that, to ensure the conditions of life, we need to engage in constructive ways of life based on a common understanding and joint commitment.

What may emerge from this gravitation towards a common insight is a merging of knowledge and ethics enabling us to redirect our energies towards positive goals with respect to the way we live on the planet. In learning how to use our technical power wisely and creatively, we at last come to express our moral power to the full, converting humanity from the worship of the false gods of money, capital, commodities, state and bureaucratic power to the active exercise of capabilities for creativity.

It is as well to recognise that the situation we face contains alternate possibilities of human growth or retreat, on the one hand an opening out to embrace a genuine internationalism and interconnection, on the other hand a closing down to secure some kind of survival in an increasingly harsh environment. In A Rough Guide to the Future, James Lovelock advocates climate-controlled cities as an alternative to a general fight against climate change, a fight he now considers to be hopeless. He may well be right that we are now in an era of coming to terms with the impact of climate change. But we need to ask some critical questions with respect to these climate controlled cities. They have the appearance of the old walled cities, keeping out unwanted outsiders, who would be left to fend for themselves in the landscape of ecological desolation. The whole idea has a faint echo of the old lifeboat ethics. And we should bear in mind Lovelock’s repeated statements that not all of us are going to make it through the times to come. So it seems highly likely that those who will be safe and secure in these new cities will be, as ever, the rich and powerful and those whose skills and knowledge are of service to them. Letting go of guilt and shame is a letting off of those rich and powerful people with most guilt and most need to feel shame.

Instead of an expansion of interconnection and interrelation, then, we have a retreat into a survivalism in which the wealthy and the pitiless use their power and skill to control increasingly scarce resources and deny others access to them. 

It is against the unfolding of this all too possible scenario that I make reference to the sharing of the commons, to commoning and to the need to create systems of common ownership and control. I also emphasise the extension of democratic power and control as an ecological self-socialisation, not just a social movement capable of contesting power, but a social force capable of building forms of social governance in the associational space of a transformed civil society. Such a social force is certainly necessary to contest the irresponsible, undemocratic and alien power of the elites and corporations that have captured government and subverted democracy. In fine, an active democracy based upon participatory structures and extensive public spaces is the only way of dealing with the implications of climate change for government and politics in a way that retains an ethical commitment to all humankind.  

Humankind is a Janus-faced creature, looking in different directions at the same time. Today, facing an uncertain future, there is a growing tendency to look backwards to closed and insular forms of community. Call it local resilience, call it climate-controlled cities. These are retreats from the large claims associated with the universal interest to safe havens. The bigger the issues facing us, the smaller our thinking and ambitions have become. I believe that our other face, the face looks forward to the future, is the one that continues to look for all humankind.

Too great an ambition? Perhaps. A commitment to all humankind, the old socialist ideal, could be dismissed as a naive hope in increasingly straitened ecological circumstances, were it not for the fact that the material and technological conditions for international solidarity are already in place. We can communicate and make friends with people thousands of miles away just as easily as we speak with people in the local community. Our information and knowledge is international as well as national. The facts of our planetary interdependence point to our land, air and sea as global commons to be shared amongst us as the conditions of our material life. 

Throughout history, human beings have learned to extend their loyalties beyond immediate family and local town and community to region and nation and to international authorities. To look forwards to the future with a human face is to entertain a further extension of loyalty to all humankind and, finally, to our planetary home:





The times may look bad. Times that ‘test men’s souls’ always do. The social and moral fabric is unravelling, the economy is in crisis, war, poverty, inequality … threats are accumulating everywhere and, topping it all, there is the threat of runaway climate change. The apocalyptic vision sees the world coming to an end. The prophetic vision sees something different, it sees grounds for hope in the fact that we remain social and moral beings. As one form of society and morality is imploding, we are busy creating the new form. If the old communities are decaying, we are capable of creating the new. We do not need a return to the old solidarities, we need to create the new solidarities. 

In Marxism and Christianity, Alasdair Maclntyre argues that ‘the Marxist project remains the only one we have for re-establishing hope as a social virtue’ (MacIntyre 1968: 88). Just over a decade later and MacIntyre had come to regard Marxism as part of the modernist Enlightenment faith in progress, as bankrupt as other modern political forms. (MacIntyre 1981). My view is that that idea of a political movement re-establishing hope as a social virtue remains pertinent. The recognition of hope as a social virtue is in itself valuable. It puts the responsibility for our lives back in our hands as moral beings. Prophecy is not prediction, but affirms the indeterminacy of the future. Prophecy is not a prediction of what will happen, but a warning of what could happen, addressing human beings as moral beings in the hope of inspiring them to change their behaviours and hence change the course of history. As my history teacher, dear old Brother Victor, dinned into our heads, there is nothing inevitable in history. We read the events contained in the books and get the impression that whatever happened was certain to happen, that optical illusion of historical certainty in the written form. Any situation always contains alternate possibilities, paths taken and not taken. As a journey, human history is not a power beyond our control, but a result of our responsible choices and actions. The road ahead is never straight but, through our creative agency, we are capable of transcending the apparent fixities of time and place. As a result, we overcome the determined past to embrace the future that lies open to us. That is the moral ground of hope as a social virtue.

Christopher Lasch explains the difference between ‘progress’, as the principal value of the Enlightenment, and the value of hope. Progress is the belief that through science and reason we can achieve an open-ended advance in the control of nature, a control which applies to human nature as well as to external nature. This belief is based on 'a denial of the natural limits on human power and freedom', a belief that cannot be sustained now that 'an awareness of those limits has become inescapable'. (Lasch 1991: 530). 

In complete contrast, hope





One can now see how easily modern society is prone to collapse into despair. Having abandoned power, control and responsibility to alien forces and powers, and having swallowed the belief that the constant advance of these forces and powers  – call it ‘economic growth’ – would deliver ‘progress’ as material abundance, freedom and happiness, we struggle with the realisation that things are not so straightforward after all. Whilst many are arguing that the age of progress is over, that progress is a chimera and a delusion and has failed to deliver on its promises, I think the situation is much more complicated and requires a more nuanced appraisal. We are the safest, healthiest and wealthiest human beings who have ever lived on the planet. Progress has been achieved in that respect. 

So what has gone wrong? Leaving aside the obvious, that the realities of climate change contradict the claim that we will achieve complete control over nature, that progress has left us with a bill we will struggle to pay, I want to look at the relation of a belief in progress to the conditions of optimism and pessimism:

The belief in progress gives rise to optimism, and the loss of optimism all too easily shades into despair and the apocalyptic imagination. Hope leads to something different: to courage. For though it does not protect us against calamity, we know that if it strikes we will not be alone. If our moral environment is in a state of health, we are surrounded by family and friends, colleagues and neighbours. We know that they will be there for us as we would be for them. They will give us the strength to grieve, to endure, to recover our independence, to reaffirm life. 

Sacks 2011 ch 22

Many of the pessimists are disillusioned optimists. They bought the promise of progress through the constant advance of science, technology, reason, industry, but don’t like the look of it now it has been delivered. Still less do they like the gathering storm clouds of climate change, not to mention the many other environmental threats. The conquest of nature has backfired. The optimists have been left high and dry by their modern idols and have thus become pessimists. Maybe they would reject the description. But their apocalyptic tone gives them away. They are not prophets, they are not warning us of what may happen if we refuse to change our behaviour; they are telling us what will happen. Our fate is sealed, this world is coming to an end, and the true moral order will return.

Against this view, I affirm hope as a 'signal of transcendence' (Berger 1970, 66-96.) In contrast to optimism and pessimism, hope is an active condition. Optimism and pessimism involve a passive waiting upon events and circumstances, waiting for the freedom and happiness which economic growth is supposed to deliver, waiting for the end of the world when all the promises of progress are withdrawn. (Macy and Johnstone 2012). Hope is empowering because it places the accent on what we can do in terms of our capabilities. Hope is transcendent in that it involves us in a moral striving after ends we have set ourselves. Hope brings us out of ourselves and into the wider world, it gives us the courage to look to others, to make a commitment to something greater than our own self-interest, to have ideals and to make the attempt to live up to them, to be giving, and receiving, to undertake great schemes, yet take care of the little things, to be true to ourselves as moral beings. Hope is to be found in the circles of association and communities of belonging that make up our social existence, and is sustained by the social practices and rituals which people engage in every day of their lives. Thoreau wrote that ‘the mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation. What is called resignation is confirmed desperation.’ In a world built upon the alienation of social power, there is reason enough for resignation to eventualities which are beyond our control. But we carry on, not out of desperation, but out of hope:

As so much in our world, privately, nationally and globally, becomes uncertain, it is the best way, perhaps the only way, of retaining our sense of the underlying goodness of the world and the miraculous gift of life itself. 

Sacks 2011: ch 22

Yes, the gift of life. Hope sustains a belief in the underlying goodness of the world, against plenty evidence to the contrary. There are reasons enough for despair:

Shortly after I finished this book, my dear son Marc, five years old, was taken from me. I dedicate All That Is Solid Melts into Air to him. His life and death bring so many of its ideas and themes close to home: the idea that those who are most happily at home in the modern world, as he was, may be most vulnerable to the demons that haunt it; the idea that the daily routine of playgrounds and bicycles, of shopping and eating and cleaning up, of ordinary hugs and kisses, may be not only infinitely joyous and beautiful but also infinitely precarious and fragile; that it may take desperate and heroic struggles to sustain this life, and sometimes we lose. Ivan Karamazov says that, more than anything else, the death of children makes him want to give back his ticket to the universe. But he does not give it back. He keeps on fighting and loving; he keeps on keeping on.

Marshall Berman, 1983 Preface to All That is Solid Melts into Air

We keep on fighting and keep on loving, and we keep on keeping on, in search of a home, somewhere to house the psyche:





Any home we find for ourselves will be a home we will have built together:

This is more than a coming to terms with the world we have created, it requires a revaluation of the natural world we have created out of.

So this is where we are, having to recognise that our times confront us with realities that are confusing to live with and hard to face. More positively, 'crisis' - political, economic, ecological etc. - is the starting point of an amazing journey that empowers us, enriches us and deepens the sense of our own aliveness. The purpose of this journey is to find and share with others the gift of Active Hope.

Whatever situation we face, we can choose our response. When facing overwhelming challenges, we might feel that our actions don't count for much. Yet the kind of responses we make, and the degree to which we believe they count, are shaped by the way we think and feel about hope. Active Hope is a practice .... it is something we do rather than have. It is a process we can apply to any situation, and it involves three key steps. First, we take a clear view of reality; second, we identify what we hope for in terms of the direction we 'd like things to move in or the values we 'd like to see expressed; and third, we take steps to move ourselves or our situation in that direction.

Macy and Johnstone 2012

Hope sees the invisible, feels the intangible, and achieves the impossible. Jonathan Sacks makes a strong case for the politics of hope:

It may seem naive to suggest that the recovery of hope through the re-moralisation of society can solve problems that have defeated some of the world's most powerful governments. But it did so in the past - in nineteenth-century Britain and America, and at many other moments of social crisis. 

Sacks 2011 ch 22

To be effective, the politics of hope is going to have to connect the process of re-moralisation with the practical restitution of social powers from alienated systems of government, production and control and with the reorganisation of these powers within the re-empowered community. To call for re-moralisation alone is to ignore the powerful forces of disenchantment and rationalisation which emptied the world of moral meaning in the first place. The power of persuasion and conversion will not be enough, it will just be adding more voices to the general cacophonous clash of value judgements. Rewiring social practices and patterns of behaviour implies deep transformations within the social metabolism, changes in social relations and identities. 

But there are reasons for hoping that this can be done as a moral project and not just as a result of triumphing over adversaries in a clash of social power:

I find it strangely moving that the Judaeo-Christian tradition, predicated on the sanctity of life, the priority of right over might, and the imperatives of justice and compassion for the vulnerable and disenfranchised, has survived for almost four thousand years while the great empires that persecuted its adherents have crumbled and vanished from the stage of history. Societies built on trust have a resilience and adaptability that no political order in and of itself can create. That is why totalitarianisms on the one hand, libertarian cultures on the other, initially dazzle by their power or creativity, but rapidly expend their energies and inevitably suffer death through decadence. 

Sacks 2000 ch 22 Reclaiming the Ground of Hope

Stephen Emmott, head of computational science at Microsoft Research in Cambridge and professor of computational science at Oxford, believes that the only genuine solution to our environmental problems is behavioural change. He just doesn’t think that enough people have what it takes to change. If scientists produced evidence to show that a large asteroid were on course to hit the Earth by a certain date, then every government would marshal its resources to find ways of altering the asteroid's path or mitigating its damage. Governments and peoples find it easier to mobilise against an identifiable, external threat. But the problem facing us is not external, it is internal. The problem is not an asteroid, the problem is us. 

At this point, I just find myself reaching for old Karl Marx:

The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.

Thesis III on Feuerbach

We change ourselves as we change the world. Indeed, that’s the only way the human world has ever changed and will ever change. All the facts and figures in the world, put to together to establish inescapable, incontrovertible conclusions will not suffice to produce behavioural change. Quite the contrary. Unrelated to actions and practices, they are psychologically overwhelming and invite paralysis and denial. 

This is the case for ethics and politics, for working through the character and practices of human beings, engaging in empowering strategies, widening circles of responsibility, plunging into the river of life and flowing as the river flows. ‘Character develops itself in the stream of life.’ (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe).We require faith that our small actions can have a large impact for the better. That is why ethics and politics are intertwined, and why that connection in the realm of practical reason is the only firm foundation for freedom and justice:

Renewing society's resources of moral energy is the programme, urgent but achievable, of a new politics of hope.

Sacks 2000 ch 22 Reclaiming the Ground of Hope

The case for rational restraint is made by Jonathan Sacks in terms of the need for a strong civil society:

Slowly we are beginning to realise that the story of man-the-political-and-economic-animal is only one half of the truth of our human situation. Without a strong civil society, political and economic structures fail. 
Neither the free market nor the democratic state can survive in the long run without internalised constraints' which prevent us - from a sense of honour or fidelity or decency or habit — from doing certain things which it may be to our advantage to do. 

Sacks 2000 ch 22 Reclaiming the Ground of Hope

Civil society rests on moral relationships. They are covenantal rather than contractual. 

‘There is nothing more frightful than ignorance in action’, wrote Goethe. Yet, in light of what I have written above, it is clear that we have no choice but to act despite not knowing. Much better is Goethe’s view that ‘life belongs to the living, and he who lives must be prepared for changes.’ There is something sublime in the choice to live in the face of uncertainty. ‘Our faith and courage are, in fact, sacred — they are our persistent choice for life itself.’ (Kauffman 2008: ch 14).

These dangerous times for Earth call not just for passion, imagination, intelligence and hard work, but - more profoundly - a sense of optimism that is willing to act without a full understanding, but with a faith in the effect of small individual actions on the global picture.

Papanek 1995 ch 1

The times call not just for commitment, enthusiasm, intelligence, imagination, innovation and hard work, but - more profoundly – for a sense of optimism that inspires the will to act in the face of not knowing, for a faith in the positive cumulative effects of small actions on the larger picture, and for hope. While there is life there is hope; and while there is hope there is life. (Mumford 1952 ch 2). 

Modo liceat vivere, est spes.
‘While there's life, there's hope.’
Terence, Heauton Timorumenos (The Self-Tormentor), Line 981.






That global picture extends into the future. And it is transcendental. 
Jonathan Sacks writes well on the connection between moral independence and hope:

Morality is the language of hope, for it presupposes that in a critical respect, man is not a part of nature. Because we are speakers of a language we are capable of imagination, of envisaging a reality other than that currently present to the senses. So, for us, there is a difference between 'is' and 'ought', between the world we observe and the world to which we aspire, and in aspiring begin to make. None of us can make that world alone, but we are not condemned to live alone. 
Kinship and covenant link us to our fellow human beings so that they know they can rely on us and we know we can rely on them. The knowledge that we are strangers teaches us to reach beyond the boundary of 'us' and extend friendship and reciprocity to 'them'. The knowledge, too, that the earth is not ours, that we are temporary residents, heirs of those who came before us and guardians for those who will come after us in turn, steers us away from the destructive impulse - whether to war or excessive exploitation - which may sometimes come to those who have no stake in a future beyond their lifetime. 

Sacks 2000 ch 22 Reclaiming the Ground of Hope

Pushed beyond its limitations, reason undermines life at its source. Henri Bergson thought that religion is a self-preservative effort to keep human beings from suicide upon becoming conscious of the fact of death: ‘only the acceptance of a mystery beyond the compass of his reason keeps his life from becoming devaluated and his spirit from becoming discouraged over the reports of reason.’  (Mumford 1944: 24-25). 

Mystery, psychic depths and reason
Robert Heilbroner finds some hope in the knowledge ‘that some human societies have existed for millennia, and that others can probably exist for future millennia, in a continuous rhythm of birth and coming of age and death, without pressing toward those dangerous ecological limits, or engendering those dangerous social tensions, that threaten present-day ‘advanced’ societies. In our discovery of ‘primitive’ cultures, living out their timeless histories, we may have found the single most important object lesson for future man.’





Regrounding the human condition
Since the tipping points of no return show signs of slipping, we are forced to abandon optimism and seek recourse in hope. Alastair McIntosh holds out ‘hope for humanity, not in spite of global warming, but precisely because it confronts us with a wake-up call to consciousness. Answering that call of the wild to the wild within us all invites outer action matched by inner transformation.’ (McIntosh 2008: 10).

It’s an invitation to take a walk on the wild side of life. Alastair McIntosh argues that the problem of climate change ‘is driven not by fundamental human needs, but by manipulated wants that find expression in consumerism.’ We have been ‘Consumed’, to use the title of Ben Barber’s book (2007). The roots of climate change lie in the deep drivers of consumerism:





To tackle a problem that goes so deep, argues Alastair McIntosh, ‘we need to call back the soul.’ ‘This means setting aside delusions of mere optimism about the future and blind faith in technical fixes, yet paradoxically, deepening our capacity for hope.’ McIntosh makes a powerful case for hope. There is no blind faith, facile optimism or shallow expectation here. Deepening our capacity for hope ‘means being prepared to be surprised by potential depths of being of which we might previously have been unaware.’ (McIntosh 2008: 10). It means precisely what McIntosh says it means, it means calling back the soul.

Metaphysical reconstruction and the world of politics, economics and technology
McIntosh attempts to shift the paradigm of climate change over a threshold and into a realm that speaks in poetry, myth and vision; he urges the restoration to consciousness of the metaphysical that was crushed in the heartless vice of uni-dimensional positivism. The extent to which I am in agreement with him should be apparent. McIntosh admits that he is unsure how this translates into the world of politics, economics and technology. And no one should be under any illusions in this respect: we do need to address the hard facts and practical realities in terms of politics, institutions, binding international agreements, ethics, economics, resources, distribution, incentives, technology, energy infrastructures, science. Neither a metaphysical reconstruction from above nor a do-it-yourself incremental reformism from below will suffice. Metaphysical reconstruction has to be more than an evasion of the practical by transcendental displacement.

McIntosh sums up what he does offer:









Being receptive to a new mind and a new heart
Hope is not about sitting back on tenterhooks and waiting for a miracle to happen. ‘Hope is being receptive to a new mind and a new heart. Hope is about setting in place the preconditions that might reconstitute life, and then getting on with it. All else is hubris on the bonfire of vanities.’ (McIntosh 2008: 250).

We either choose life, or we don’t. We can keep sounding the alarm, citing the latest research, and demanding that something should be done. At times, I feel we have been doing little more than writing our own obituaries. I swear if I hear the words ‘it’s time for action’ one more time ….(grr!!!) If you think somebody should be doing something, remember that you are that somebody. If you have a good idea, you implement it. If you think something should be done, do it. Because it’s time for action!

Imagining the future
The times are bad. The problems are great. The future is uncertain. Things look bleak. Our prospects poor. How things could turn out well is unimaginable. Yet imagining the future may well be the key to our having a future at all. 

We, the generation that faces the next century, can add the... solemn injunction, ‘If we don't do the impossible, we shall be faced with the unthinkable.’ 

Petra Kelly (1947-1992), founder of the German Green Party

Despair is a trap, it paralyzes the will and feeds on itself. We live in hope or die in despair. As the great Dante could tell us, despair is the easiest and most obvious option to take when faced with adverse circumstances. We are not the first generation to be tested in this way. Dante also knew despair to be the false option.

Ah, souls beguiled, creatures without reverence, 
who wrench your hearts away from so much good 
and set your minds on emptiness!

[Dante Paradiso XIX 10-12]

In The Song of the Earth, the Shakespearean scholar Jonathan Bate made the claim that poetry could save the world. He may well be right. Taking a cool, realistic appraisal of the situation, the problems we face are not insurmountable. The resources and technologies are available to enable us – even nine billion of us by 2050 – to live with a degree of environmental security and comfort. We know what the appropriate energy infrastructures are, we have the know-how, the design solutions are realistic. We certainly have the money, the $1.7 trillion global arms budget tells us that. The required social transformation is well within the scope of our abilities. The greatest obstacle standing in the way of the future ecological society is not the inadequacies of government and politics and not the power of vested interests, as though ours is the only age to have suffered vast, inflated, corrupt power! The biggest obstacle is the fact that we simply can't imagine the future society. Living on the disenchanted and demoralised terrain of modernity has impaired our powers of imagination. Weber referred to the steel hard cage of modernity. We have been in that cage for so long that we have forgotten how to fly. We have internalised the bars on the cage.

The irony about the ‘end of progress’ thesis is that, on any measure, progress has actually been achieved. In Risk: The Science and Politics of Fear, Dan Gardner argues that ‘there’s never been a better time to be alive’, backing his case chapter after chapter. Human beings have never been better fed and better educated and better looked after than in today’s civilisation, and in the greatest numbers. ‘To protect ourselves against unreasoning fear, we must wake up Head and tell it to do its job. We must learn to think hard. (Gardner 2009 ch 12). ‘Putting Head before Gut is not easily done, but for the fears it can ease, and the lives it can save, it is worth the effort.’ (Gardner 2009 ch 12). 

In a society boasting unprecedented wealth and technological capacity, we suffer from a poverty of imagination. It’s as though we have become so reliant on the perfection of means that we have forgotten how to set ends for ourselves. We have become used to politicians who substitute sound bites for serious thought, and journalists who recycle clichés, and pundits who are experts by way of nothing but a cynicism that is against everything and for nothing. All narrow horizons, with no world beyond the present considered possible.

In these circumstances, it takes real intellectual and moral courage to imagine a future that combines social and environmental justice. That is, to imagine not in the sense of a dream detached from realities, but as a preparation for future construction.

We don't have to take on the task of imagining that future for the whole world— though it helps when we do. We can start with imagining our own lives, our own futures, transformed to honor our deepest beliefs about how the world ought to be. We can imagine the day when we live well with no harm at all to the planet. We can imagine the day when the work we do makes not just a profit, but a difference. We can imagine our community of friends and neighbors thriving, and the politicians we vote for being, once again, people we respect and admire. Whatever our hopes for a better world, we can imagine living lives in which those hopes are realities.
Then we can get to work building those lives. We don't need to wait for the Revolution. No charismatic leader is required. The tools for the job are either at hand, or they are things we can create together. A bright green future begins when each of us, today, decides to live as though that future were already here.
Living that way is not only the greatest adventure life has to offer; but it is also the cure for despair. ‘Sentiment without action,’ environmental author Edward Abbey warns, ‘is the ruin of the soul.’ But action inspired by deep feeling gives meaning to our lives, connects us together, and raises our spirits. It also happens to be the formula for changing the world.
If this book has a message, it is this Imagine a better future. Find your allies. Share tools. Build it. Start now.
One final thought. It helps, when facing the future, to look from time to time toward the horizon. Too many people today assume that we are in decline, and that tomorrow is bound to be worse than today. It is a useful discipline, on occasion, to practice assuming they are all wrong, that the future will be unimaginably better, and that it will keep getting better, forever—that as H. G. Wells puts it, ‘All of the past is but the beginning of a beginning; all that the human mind has accomplished is but the dream before the awakening.’ 

Steffen 2008 ch 16

In the Afterword to Thorn Hartmann’s Last Hours of Ancient Sunlight, Neale Donald Walsch, author of Conversations With God, claims: ‘You have just read one of the most important books you will ever read in your life.’ This little effort of mine couldn’t rank in such company. But Walsch proceeds to make an argument that certainly fits my purpose:

And because you have gotten this far in this extraordinary book, you are one of the Crucial Ones. You are one of the people who will play a key role in co-creating our future on this planet. You may not have thought of yourself in that role, but if you've gotten this far in this book, you've been given it.
That's how Life works. That's how the Universe functions. That's how God converses with all of us. First we are confronted with data, information—a communication. Then we are invited, urged, or compelled to absorb the information, to receive the communication. Finally, we decide Who We Are in relationship to it.
That's what you're doing now. You're deciding Who You Really Are in relationship to the incredibly important information you've just absorbed. And now, no matter what you decide, you will play a key role in co-creating the future on Earth.
You may feel like a voice in the wilderness, but it is your voice we are waiting to hear. Yours is the crucial vote. You are the determining factor. We reach Critical Mass when we reach you—and you choose to reach others—with the simple message of this book: We are all One.
Let us act, at last, in the best interests of us all. Then the Sun will shine another day, and another still, and life will not merely go on, but achieve its highest expression, its grandest glory, its greatest joy. Can we give this gift to our children?
Please say yes.

Walsch Afterword in Hartmann 1999 

We need to address not only the external world of climate science, economic incentives, rational calculations, and public policy, but also the inner world, the psyche. We need to call back the soul. We need to tap the roots of life that feed politics and activate the very things that give life meaning.

This means abandoning facile optimism and blind faith concerning political action, policy initiatives, technical fixes, economic new deals, whilst at the same time deepening, nourishing and activating our capacity for hope:





And that task requires us to reach within ourselves, without flinching before our fears and dreams and visions, and finding and bringing to the surface hitherto unsuspected depths of our being. 

Erich Fromm wrote a book called The Fear of Freedom. We are paralysed and kept enchained by fear. These are times that require courage and faith:

Love does not succumb to compassion fatigue. Love cherishes the flesh-and-blood body of the world . . . infuses it... forgives it... constantly seeks to transfigure and to re-set the seeds of Eden as Heaven on Earth. That is our calling in these our troubled times. We are commissioned to draw out the flavour of what Providence provides; to be, in the words of the Master, ‘the salt of the Earth.’




It’s about who we are, what we do, and who and what we care for. Earthcare and soulcare go together.

Soulcare and grounding the human condition
It is worth pointing out that this, too, is an unfinishable book, a book about what we do as creative agents participating within the ceaselessly creative universe. 

I continue to affirm hope, active hope, not in spite of the depth of the crises we face, but because these crises confront our consciousness with a wake-up call. We have been given the challenge, it is for us to respond. That call of nature without speaks directly to our nature within, and demands that we ensure that our outer action is accompanied by an inner transformation. 

Our actions may seem small and insignificant, but they form patterns and circles that may expand outwards, generating examples for reconstruction that strengthen and inspire further action. It matters a great deal that we never give up. We move in the direction of becoming whole human beings at one in a whole world. 

Hope is not about waiting for a miracle, but about acting to create the preconditions necessary to reconstitute life, and then getting involved in bringing it all to fruition.

And that's as far as I can take this unfinishable argument. The rest, the greater part, is up to us all as creative agents.

30 THE AGE OF MISCHIEF IS NIGH
What the political and business elites who govern – or pretend to govern – the global megamachine have planned for the future is all too predictable – the same as before only a whole lot more. More free markets, more regulation (of the old kind), more planning (of the old kind), more surveillance, more restrictions, more production, more consumption, more acquisition, more social dislocation, more environmental destruction.

They fail to see that this obsessive pursuit of ‘more’ of the same is not the solution, but is precisely our problem. But how can they see this? For they do not govern at all, they are mere personifications of the accumulative dynamic that drives the whole social metabolic order – endless economic expansion associated with endless political aggrandizement. 

The elites who gamely man the ‘controls’ of the global market economy continue to extol the virtues of the ‘free’ market and private property. Yet, as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership exemplifies, the notion of free trade is a mask for the extension and entrenchment of corporate power, creating a de facto global authority to bypass courts and parliaments and sue any government that stands in the way of the corporate form. Drunk with heady ambitions to scale ever greater heights of economic development, the corporate elites are planning for the complete annexation of the global commons. Looming environmental destruction is for them a business opportunity.

But here, at the end, we return to where we began – two worlds on collision course. Whatever the people who think themselves to be masters of the universe have in mind, Gaia is not so easily controlled. Gaia’s needs lie with that commonwealth of life that exists all around us, of which we are ourselves a part. That we do not see ourselves a part of that commonwealth to anything like the extent we need to, but instead invest all our hopes and loyalties to the second nature we have created out of first nature, is a fundamental part of our predicament. Our future, if we are to have one, lies in joining forces with those unofficial agents and agencies who, within the shell of the decaying industrial order, are building a new kind of society based upon a new form of wealth. These are the people who are responding to Gaia’s reminder to one and all of the most ancient philosophical wisdom: nothing to excess and know thyself. These were two of the three phrases carved into the temple at Delphi. The third seems equally apt to where we are today: make a pledge and mischief is nigh. (Plato, Charmides 164d–165a). These are times which are calling upon us to pledge our love for the Earth and for each other. And act on it. ‘Such is the cry of the Earth to its own sweet child in time.’ (McIntosh 2008: 250). We need to respond to that cry. For an age of mischief is nigh.

The humane, ecological, way forward is for us together to create a shared safe space for all of us, a commonwealth in which all life may flourish. At some point, each of us has to face the world and ask the question, ‘if not me, then who?’ If we can manage to answer this question together, we may well have a future worth having. 

Optimism has a bad name these days. So many illusions are being shattered, so many assumptions dissolving, that anything that hints of a feasibly better future, heaven forfend anything as heady as peace, freedom and happiness, is treated with withering scorn. We are witnessing not so much Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ as the end of progress, the kind of progress that is predicated on a false prospectus. Underlying optimism in its most defensible form is the conviction that bold and imaginative thinking and acting are capable of bringing about not just change, but change for the better. The sources of such optimism could be biological. There are sound evolutionary reasons for believing that optimism is a survival mechanism. Human beings have frequently lived a parlous existence, dependent upon an environment that is unpredictable and beyond human will. The bare facts of a hand-to-mouth existence were often enough to tell human beings they were beaten and that there was no hope, yet something impelled them to carry on carrying on. Imagine if optimism had never existed or came to be eradicated from the human psyche and imagination. There are serious reasons for doubting that humanity would have survived through the many bad times. There are serious reasons for believing that humanity will not survive without an innate belief in the possibility that, no matter how bleak things look, a better world is possible. And the fact is that the possibility of a better world depends upon human beings being motivated enough to make the effort to bring it about. And that requires conviction, the belief that future could be better than the present. The arguments I have made throughout this book have been based on the assumption that a worthwhile earthly existence is a distinct possibility for all humankind. 

If that is an optimistic view, then it is based on a certain kind of optimism, one that connects technological, economic, political, institutional, ethical and psychological levels to create a full and whole humanness. As I have argued, this is a view which possesses an ancient pedigree. It amounts to a commitment to politics as creative human self-realisation and public life as integral to the good life. As long as human beings remain on nodding terms with their capacity to respond to suffering, cruelty and injustice, then they will be possessed with the concern to identify and overcome the sources of error and seek truth, goodness and beauty in their relationships to each other and express these qualities in their social and political organization. There is a transcendental quality to this way of thinking, the view that in turning potentials for a better future into actuals we transcend any given state. 

And this relates to politics in a very definite sense. Throughout this book I have referred to politics in its ancient sense of creative human self-realisation. Beginning in the civilization of the ancient Greeks, and given its most clear and concise expression in Aristotle, politics first emerged as a science and practice integral to the human quest for the good life. The word ‘politics’ derives from the ancient Greek ‘polites’, referring to those interested in public affairs. The antonym ‘idiotes’ refers to those individuals interested in private affairs only. The idiotes live only incomplete lives. For completeness, human beings need a public life. Politics is about creating and maintaining that public life as the context for human self-realisation. A conscious awareness that the existing social order fails to measure up to an ideal, but possible, society was, and remains, a constituent element in the quest for the good life. 

To dispense with that transcendental commitment in politics means that either we have come to feel entirely confident that we have now realised our capabilities to the full and achieved complete human self-realisation; or that we have lost all confidence in our abilities and have renounced what it is to be a social and political animal - to be a human being.

31 PAN AND LOVE
And yet, like Alastair McIntosh, my position borders on the perverse. I perversely hold out hope for humanity, not in spite of global warming, but precisely because it confronts us with a wake-up call to consciousness. Answering that call of the wild to the wild within us all invites outer action matched by inner transformation. This book takes an exploratory walk on that wild side.
 
And here I’ll end with this tale of mystery beyond the city walls.
In the Phaedrus, Socrates declares he could learn only from the behaviour of 'men in the city'. The stars, the stones, the trees could teach him nothing. That forgetfulness of the city's dependence upon the country expresses the delusion of the civilised man. To know oneself, as Socrates demanded, is to know that we are more than a disembodied mind in a walled-in city. We are parts of and dependent upon the web of ecological relations that connect human life with the humblest and most obscure creatures and organisms, bacteria, viruses, remote sources of energy, which nourish the body, and starry skies above that nourish the mind. That is the message I have emphasised in defining the commonwealth of virtue. In restricting virtue to ‘men in the city’, Socrates, it seems, was not so wise after all.

'Where are you going? And where do you come from?' Socrates asks Phaedrus. These are questions we all need to ask ourselves. Phaedrus is leaving his urban house to take a walk in the country, a dangerous place, a place where the mad god Pan has his shrine. 

At the end of the dialogue, Socrates prays to Pan, and to the other gods of this the wild country outside the city walls. He asks for a beautiful inside and for an outside that will be loved by that inside. 

The prayer acknowledges the limitations of 'pure' intellect, affirming the positive role of wild divinities associated with passion. 

The dialogue ends with the discovery of the mutual love of individuals based upon character. Socrates asks whether 'we' need anything more. 
Phaedrus replies: 'People who love each other share everything.'
'Let's go', says Socrates.

Go where? Back to the city of civilised individuals with Socrates? Or back to the wilderness? Or to a world where city and country are joined together? In that way, we could take a walk on the wild side without abandoning the comforts of civilised life. 

That would be to a world that joins a beautiful inside and a beautiful outside. A place of our own, where all things are common among friends, a place where friendship is more than philia, it is biophilia. That would be the home we need to build to house the sacred.


Being at One Bibliography

Agar, Nicholas., 2001. Life's intrinsic value: Science, ethics, and nature. New York: Columbia University Press.
Allen, R., Waste Not, Want Not: the production
and dumping of toxic waste. London: Earthscan, 1992
Alvard, M.S., 1994 Conservation by native peoples: prey choice in a depleted habitat. Human nature 5:127-54
Anderson, Elizabeth., 1998. Pragmatism, science, and moral inquiry. In In face of the facts: Moral inquiry in American scholarship, edited by Richard W. Fox and Robert B. West-brook, 10-39. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center and Cambridge University Press.
Anscombe, G. E. M., 1958. Modern Moral Philosophy, 
Aquinas, St. Thomas.,  Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus in communi
Aquinas, St. Thomas., Summa contra gentiles, Ed: Liber de veritate Catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium, sen Summa contra gentiles, ed. Ceslaus Pera et al. (Rome: Marietti, 1961-1967). Tr: Summa contra gentiles, tr. Anton C. Pegis et al. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975).
Arendt, Hannah., 1979. On Revolution, Penguin, 
Arendt, H., 1951. The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York
Ash, Maurice. 1992. The Fabric of the World, Towards a philosophy of the environment, Green Books, 
Axelrod, Robert., 1984. The evolution of cooperation, New York: Basic Books. 
Axelrod, R., 1997. The complexity of cooperation: Agent-based models of competition and collaboration. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Baer, Paul., "Equity, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Global Common
Resources," in Climate Change Policy: A Survey, ed. Stephen H. Schneider, Armin Rosencranz, and John O. Niles (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002): 393-408, p. 396.
Bahro, Rudolf., 1986. Building the Green Movement. Heretic Books/GMP, London
Bailey, R., 2000. The pursuit of happiness. Reason, December, 30. (Interview with P. Singer) (Available at http:// reason.com/0012/rb.the.shtml). 
Barber, Benjamin., 1984. Strong Democracy, University of California, 
Barber, Benjamin., 2007.Consumed. WW Norton, 
Baring, Anne., 2012. The Dream of the Cosmos: A Quest for the Soul
Barlow, Maude and Tony Clarke., 2002. Blue Gold, Stoddart 
Barry, J., 1999. Environment and Social Theory, Routledge,
Barnes, Barry and David Bloor., 1981. Relativism, rationalism and the sociology of knowledge. In. Rationality and Relativism, edited by Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, pp.21-47. Oxford: Blackwell
Bateson, Gregory., 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind.
Beck, U., 'From industrial society to the risk society: questions of survival, social structure and ecological enlightenment' in Featherstone, M., (ed.) Cultural Theory and Cultural Change (London: Sage, 1992).
Beck, U., 1992. Risk Society: towards a new modernity, London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage, 
Becker, Howard., Man in Reciprocity, 
Bedford, Sybille., A Biography Vol 1 1894-1939, Chatto and Windus, 1973 
Bedford, Sybille., A Biography Vol II 1939-63, Chatto and Windus, 1974
Begg, Alex., 2000. Empowering the Earth 
Bellah, Robert., 1985. Habits of the Heart, Harper and Row 
Berger, P., 1990. The Sacred Canopy, Anchor, 
Berger, Peter., 1970. A Rumour of Angels: Modem Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural, London, Allen Lane
Berman, Morris., 1981. The Reenchantment of the World, Cornel University
Press, Ithaca
Berman, Marshall., 1983. All That is Solid Melts into Air, Verso
Berry, Thomas., The Dream of the Earth, "Bioregions: The Context for Reinhabiting the Earth" (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1988), 163-70
Berry, T., 1999. The Great Work: Our Way Into the Future. New York: Bell Tower.
Berry, T., 1988. The Dream of the Earth. San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books
Berry, Thomas., 1994. 'Ethics and Ecology' unpublished paper.
Berry, Wendell., 1991. Standing on Earth, Golgonooza Press, Cambridge
Biehl, Janet. Ed., 1999. The Murray Bookchin Reader, Black Rose Books, 
Binmore, K., 1995. Game theory and the social contract. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Blewitt, John., 2006. The Ecology of Learning Sustainability, Lifelong Learning and Everyday Life, Earthscan
Bloom, William., 2004. Soulution, Hay House
Bohm, David., 1983. Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Ark
Bohm, David., 'A New Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter', in The Journal of the American Society of Psychical Research, vol. 80, no. 2.
Bonner, W., 2003, Financial Reckoning Day, Wiley
Bookchin, Murray., 1982. The Ecology of Freedom. The emergence and dissolution of hierarchy Cheshire Books 
Bookchin, Murray., 1991. Romanticising Organic Society: From “Twenty Years Later …” the Introduction to the revised edition of The Ecology of Freedom, 
Bord, Janet and Colin., 1982. Earth Rites Fertility Practices in Pre-industrial Britain, Granada
Bottomore T., 1985. Theories of Modern Capitalism, London Allen and Unwin
Bouratinos, Emilios., Network, no.76
Bowersox, Joe., 2002. The Legitimacy Crisis in Environmental Ethics and Politics in Democracy and the Claim of Nature, Ben Minteer and B Taylor, Rowman and Littlefield
Brand, Stewart., 2009. Whole Earth Discipline, Atlantic Books
Brenton, Tony., 1994. The Greening of Machiavelli, Earthscan
Brooks, M., 2012. Free Radicals: The Secret Anarchy of Science, The Overlook Press
Brown, Donald A. 2002. American heat: Ethical problems with the United States' response to global warming. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Brown, Donald A. 2002.  2009. The importance of creating an applied environmental ethics: Lessons learned from climate change. In Nature in common? Environmental ethics and the contested foundations of environmental policy, edited by Ben A. Minteer, 215-227. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Brown, Peter., 2001.The Commonwealth of Life, Black Rose, 
Brown, Lester., 2011. World on the Edge, Earthscan, 
Brown, Lester., 1992. The State of the World, Worldwatch Institute, Washington DC
Brown, Lester., 2001. Eco-Economy Building an Economy for the Earth, Earthscan.
Bronowski, Jacob., The Ascent of Man, BBC 
Brundtland Commission, 1987. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development. United Nations
Bryant, B. and Hockman, E., 2005. A Brief Comparison of the Civil Rights Movement and the Environmental Justice Movement. In Pellow, D. and Brulle, R. (Eds.) Power, Justice, and the Environment. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bryant, B. and Callewaert, J., 2003. Why Is Understanding Urban Ecosystems Important to Environmental Justice? In Berkowitz, A.R., Nilon, C.H., and Hollweg, K.S. (Eds.) Understanding Urban Ecosystems. New York: Springer.
Bryant, B. 2003., History and Issues of the Environmental Justice Movement. In Visgilio, G. and Whitelaw, D. (Eds.) Our Backyard: A Quest for Environmental Justice. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Bryant, B. 1996. Organizational Change and Development for Healing the Planet. Ann Arbor, Michigan. James Rowe Publication.
Bryant, B. (ed.)., 1995. Environmental Justice: Issues, Policies, and Solutions. Island Press: Washington, D.C.
Bryant, B., 1995. Pollution Prevention and Participatory Research as Methodology for Environmental Justice. Virginia Environmental Law Review. Vol. 14 (4): 589-613.
Buber, Martin., 1958. Paths in Utopia, Boston: Beacon Press, 
Buck, Susan J., 1997. Forum on the role of environmental ethics in restructuring environmental policy and law for the next century. Policy Currents 7: 1-13.
Bury, R.G., 1949. trans., Sextus Empiricus: Against the Professors. Hicks, R.D. (1925), trans.,Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vols. 1 and 2.
Buttel, Frederick H., "Rethinking International Environmental Policy in the Late Twentieth Century," in Environmental Justice: Issues, Policies, and Solutions, ed. 
Butler, W. P., and T. G. Acott., 2007. An inquiry concerning the acceptance of intrinsic value theories of nature. Environmental Values 16: 149-168.
Calleman, Carl Johan., 2009. The Purposeful Universe, Bear and Company 
Callicott, J. Baird., "The Case Against Moral Pluralism," Environmental
Ethics 12 (1990): 99-124.
Callicott, J. Baird., 1999. Beyond the Land Ethic, Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press
Callicott, J. Baird., Appendix: Reply to Bowersox, Minteer, and Norton in Democracy and the Claim of Nature, Ben Minteer and B Taylor, Rowman and Littlefield, 2002
Callicott, J. Baird., 1980. Animal liberation: A triangular affair. Environmental Ethics 2: 311-338.
Callicott, J. Baird., 1988. Animal liberation and environmental ethics: Back together again. Between the Species 4: 163-169.
Callicott, J. Baird., 1989. In defense of the land ethic: Essays in environmental philosophy. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Callicott, J. Baird., 1990. The case against moral pluralism. Environmental Ethics 12: 99-124.
Callicott, J. Baird., 1998. "Back together again" again. Environmental Values 7: 461-475.
Callicott, J. Baird., 1999a. Beyond the land ethic: More essays in environmental philosophy. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Callicott, J. Baird., 1999b. Silencing philosophers: Minteer and the foundations of anti-foundationalism. Environmental Values 8: 499-516.
Callicott, J. Baird., 2002a. The power and promise of theoretical environmental ethics: Forging a new discourse. Environmental Values 11: 3-25.
Callicott, J. Baird., 2002b. Reply to Bowersox, Minteer, and Norton. In Democracy and the claims of nature: Critical perspectives for a new century, edited by Ben A. Minteer and Bob Pepper-man Taylor, 105-114. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Callicott, J. Baird., 2009. The convergence hypothesis falsified: Implicit intrinsic value, operational rights, and de facto standing in the Endangered Species Act. In Nature in common? Environmental ethics and the contested foundations of environmental policy, edited by Ben A. Minteer, 142-166. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Camacho, Alejandro E., Holly Doremus, Jason S. McLachlan, and Ben A. Minteer. 2010.
Capra, F., 1996. The Web of Life, Anchor
Capra, Fritjof., 1983. The Turning Point. Flamingo, London
Capra, Fritjof., 2002. Hidden Connections: A Science for Sustainable Living, Harper Collins
Carse, James P., 1986. Finite and Infinite Games
Carver, Terrell. Ed., 1991. The Cambridge Companion to Marx, Cambridge University Press
Chomsky, N., 2012. How the world works, Hamish Hamilton, 
Chopra, D., 2000. How to Know God: The Soul's Journey into the Mystery of Mysteries. London: Rider.
Christ, C., 1989. 'Rethinking theology and nature', in J. Plaskow and C. Christ (eds.), Weaving the Visions: New Patterns in Feminist Spirituality. San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco: 314-25. 
Christ, C., 1995. Diving Deep and Surfacing: Women Writers on Spiritual Quest. (3rd edition) Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
Christ, C., 1997. Rebirth of the Goddess: Finding Meaning in Feminist Spirituality. New York: Routledge. 
Christ, C. and J. Plaskow., 1979. Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion. San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins.
Christie, I., and D Warburton., 2004., From Here to Sustainability: The Real World Coalition, Earthscan
Chuang Tzu, trans. James Legge, arranged by Clae Waltham, 1971. Ace Books, New York, 
Clarke, Tony., 1997. Silent Coup: Confronting the Big Business Takeover of Canada, Ottawa and Toronto: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and James Lorimer
Clarke, Simon., 1991. Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology, Macmillan, 
Clatworthy, Jonathan., 1997. Good God Green Theology and the Value of Creation, Jon Carpenter 
Coates, Ken and Tony Topham, ed., 1970. Workers’ Control 
Coase, R.H. 1976. Adam Smith’s view of man. Journal of Law and Economics 19: 529-46
Cohen, Steven., 2006. Understanding environmental policy. New York: Columbia University Press.
Cohen, Lizabeth., 2003. A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Cohn, Norman. 1970. The Pursuit of the Millennium, London, Paladin, 
Coles, Robert., 1997. The Moral Intelligence of Children, Bloomsbury, 
Collins, James P., and Martha L. Crump., 2009. Extinction in our times: Global amphibian decline. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Connor, R. C., 1995. Altruism among non-relatives: Alternatives to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 10, 84–86. 
Conway, E. and Naomi Oreskes., 2012. Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming 
Conway Morris, S., 2003. Life's Solution, Cambridge UP
Cotgrove, S., 1982. Catastrophe or Cornucopia: the environment, politics and the future (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 
Critchley, P. 1997., Beyond Modernity and Postmodernity: Vol 2 Active Materialism: Marxism as Revolutionary-Critical Praxis [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 1997., Beyond Modernity and Postmodernity: Vol 6 Associational Socialism [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 2007., Kant and the Ethics of Rational Nature. [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P., 2001. Kant and the Architectonics of Reason. [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Papers
Critchley, P., 2001. Kant’s Community of Ends. [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Papers
Critchley, P. 2012,. Kant and Virtue, http://www.praxisphilosophie.de/critchley_kant_and_virtue.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.praxisphilosophie.de​/​critchley_kant_and_virtue.pdf​)
Critchley, P., 2001. Reason, Freedom and Modernity : The Radical Transfiguration of the Greco-Germanic Concept of Rational Freedom vol 1 Contemporary Democracy Theory [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 2001., Reason, Freedom and Modernity : The Radical Transfiguration of the Greco-Germanic Concept of Rational Freedom vol 6 Mediation [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 2001., The Rational Community of Jurgen Habermas [e-book] Available through:Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Papers
Critchley. P., 2004 The City of Reason
Critchley, P. 2012. The Socratism of Immanuel Kant, http://www.praxisphilosophie.de/critchley_kant_socratism.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.praxisphilosophie.de​/​critchley_kant_socratism.pdf​)
Critchley, P. 2011., The Coming Ecological Revolution [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://independent.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 2004., The City of Reason vol 4 The Rationalisation of the City [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 2013., Immanence, Transcendence and Essence: The Dialectics of Progress
Critchley, P. 2013., The Common Ground: Essays in Ecology vol 2 Political Ecology [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 2011., Aspects of Green Economics [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Papers 
Critchley, P. 2011., Ecopolis [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Papers
Critchley, P. 2001., Reason, Freedom and Modernity : The Radical Transfiguration of the Greco-Germanic Concept of Rational Freedom vol 4 The Good Life [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 2012., Of Gods and Gaia: Men as Gods Gambling with Gaia [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://independent.academia. Edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P., 2013. Aquinas, Morality and Modernity: The Search for the Natural Moral Law and the Common Good [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 1995. Aristotle and the Public Good [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Papers
Critchley, P. 2001., Hegel and the Embodiment of Freedom Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Papers
Critchley, P. 2001., Reason, Freedom and Modernity : The Radical Transfiguration of the Greco-Germanic Concept of Rational Freedom vol 8 Political Structures [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 2013., Dante’s Enamoured Mind: Knowing and Being in the Life and Thought of Dante Alighieri [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books (​http:​/​​/​mmu.academia.edu​/​PeterCritchley​/​Books​)
Critchley, P. 2013., Immanence, Transcendence and Essence: The Dialectics of Progress [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 2013., The Common Ground: Essays in Ecology vol 2 Political Ecology [e-book] Available through: Academia website  http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 2013., The Common Ground: Essays in Ecology vol 3 Outlines of a Moral Ecology [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 2001., Hegel and the Embodiment of Freedom Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Papers)
Critchley, P. 1997., Beyond Modernity and Postmodernity: Vol 4 Modernity, Alienation and Rationalisation [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Critchley, P. 1995., Industry and Economy in Europe: Risks and Uncertainties in a Global Environment [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Papers
Critchley, P., 2001. Critical Studies in Rational Freedom: The Radical Transfiguration of the Greco-Germanic Principle of Rational Freedom [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books
Cuenot, Claude., 1965. Teilhard de Chardin, Helicon
Daly, Herman and John Cobb., 1990. For the Common Good, Green Print
Dalton, Rex., 2004. Natural resources: Bioprospects less than golden. Nature 429: 598-600.
Damasio, Antonio., 1995. Descartes's Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, Picador, London
Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, trans, by Charles S. Singleton, Bollingen Series LXXX, and Inferno, canto XI, lines 46-48 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970
Davidson, Julie., Citizenship and Sustainability: Rights and Responsibilities in the Global Age in Controversies in Environmental Sociology Rob White ed 2004 Cambridge University Press 174-175
Davies, P.C.W., in God and the New Physics, London Dent 1983
Dawe, A., 1971. 'The relevance of values' in A. Sahay (ed.), Max Weber and Modern Sociology, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Dawkins, R., 1976. The selﬁsh gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dear and Scott 1981
Desai, P. and S Riddlestone., 2002. Bioregional Solutions, Green Books 
Demeritt, David. 1994. Ecology, objectivity and critique in writings on nature and human societies. Journal of Historical Geography 20 (1): 22-37
Dennet, Daniel., 1995. Darwin's Dangerous Idea
Denton, J. Michael., 1998. Nature's Destiny How the Laws of Biology Reveal Purpose in the Universe, The Free Press
Desmond, A., and J Moore., 1992. Darwin, Penguin
Dewey, John., 1907. Review of The life of reason, or the phases of human progress, by George Santayana. In Volume 4 of The middle works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977.
Dewey, John., 1917. The need for a recovery of philosophy. In Volume 10 of The middle works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980.
Dewey, John., 1920. Reconstruction in philosophy. In Volume 12 of The middle works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982.
Diamond, Jared., 2005. Collapse How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, Penguin
Dickens, P., 1992. Society and Nature: towards a green social theory (Hemel
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
Diggs, B. J., 1973. The common good as reason for political action. Ethics 83: 283-293.
Dobson, Andrew., 1990. Green Political Thought. Unwin Hyman, London
Dobson, Andrew., 2006. ‘Thick Cosmopolitanism’, Political Studies 54 (2006) 165-184
O Dodson, Edward., 1984. The Phenomenon of Man Revisited A Biological Viewpoint of Teilhard de Chardin Columbia 
O’Donohue, John., 1997. Anam Cara: Spiritual Wisdom from the Celtic World
O'Donohue, John., 1998. Eternal Echoes: Exploring Our Hunger To Belong
Douglas, M., 1980 'Environments at Risk' in Dowie, J. and Lefrere, P., Risk
and Chance, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1980
Dunlap, W., R. Catton., 1980. 'A new ecological paradigm for post-exuberant sociology', American Behavioral Scientist 24, 1: 15—47. See also R. Dunlap (1979), 'Environmental sociology', Annual Review of Sociology 5: 243-73; R. Dunlap (1980), 'Paradigmatic change in social science. From human exemptionalism to an ecological paradigm', American Behavioral Scientist 24, 1: 5—13; R. Dunlap, W. Catton (1983), 'What environmental sociologists have in common (whether concerned with "built" or "natural" environments)', Sociological Inquiry 53, 2/3: 113-35; R. Dunlap (1983), 'Ecologist versus exemptionalist: the Ehrlich-Simon debate', Social Science Quarterly 64, March: 200-3.
Eagleton, Terry., 2003. After Theory, Basic Books
Easterbrook, Gregg., 2003. The Progress Paradox: How Life Gets Better When People Feel Worse, New York: Random House, cited by Robert J. Samuelson, "The Afflictions of Affluence," Newsweek, March 22, 2004
Ehrenreich, Barbara., 2008. Dancing in the Streets: A History of Collective Joy, Granta
Eckersley, Robyn., 2002. Environmental pragmatism, ecocentrism, and deliberative democracy: Between problem-solving and fundamental critique. In Democracy and the claims of nature: Critical perspectives for a new century, edited by Ben A. Minteer and Bob Pepperman Taylor, 49-69. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Eliade, Mircea., 1961. The Sacred and the Profane: The nature of religion,
Harper & Row, New York
Ehrlich, H. ed., 1996. Reinventing Anarchy, Again, AK Press Edinburgh San Francisco
Ehrlich, H., 1996. 'Anarchism and Formal Organisations' in Ehrlich
Elson, Diane., 2000. "Socializing Markets, Not Market Socialism," Socialist
Register
Engel, Mylan., 2005. Hunger, Duty, and Ecology: On What We Owe Starving Humans. In Environmental Ethics Louis Pojman ed., Thomson Wadsworth 
Everard, Mark., 2011. Common Ground, Zed Books
Farber, Daniel., 1999. Eco-pragmatism, Chicago 
Ferguson, Kitty., 2008. Pythagoras, Icon
Festenstein, Matthew., 1997. Pragmatism and political theory: From Dewey to Rorty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Finnis, John., 1980. Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford UP
Fish, Stanley. 1999. The trouble with principle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Flanagan, Owen., 2007. The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Flannery, Tim., 2005. The Weather Makers, Penguin
Flannery, Tim., 2010. Here on Earth, Allen Lane
Flathman, Richard E., 1966. The public interest: An essay concerning the normative discourse of politics. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Flourney, Alyson C. 2003. Building an environmental ethic from the ground up. UC Davis Law Review 37: 53-80.
Foglesong in Campbell and Fainstein 1996
Foot, Philippa. 2002. Virtues and vices and other essays in moral philosophy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Foucault, M., 1980. Power/Knowledge, Brighton, UK: Harvester.
Foucault, M., 1986, 'Disciplinary power and subjection'. In S. Lukes (ed.) Power, Oxford: Blackwell.
Foucault, Michel. 2007. Security, Territory, Population, Palgrave
Foucault, M., 1977. Discipline and Punish, Penguin
Foster, John., After Sustainability: Denial, Hope, Retrieval.
Fox, W., 1990. Toward a Transpersonal Ecology. Boston, MA: Shambhala.
Frankfurt, Harry G., 1971. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68, no. 1
Franklin, Ursula., 1992. The Real World of Technology, CBC Massey lectures series, Concord, ON: House of Anansi Press Limited.
Freud, Sigmund., 1995. Civilization and Its Discontents, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco.
Freyfogle, Eric T. 2003. The land we share: Private property and the common good. Washington, DC: Island Press/Shearwater.
Fromm, Erich. 1977. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, Penguin, London 
Fromm, Erich., 1960. The Fear of Freedom, Routledge
Fromm, E., 1965. The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil, Harper & Row, San Francisco
Fromm, E., 1962. The Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx
Freitas, D. 2005. Becoming a Goddess of Inner Poise: Spirituality for the Bridget Jones in All of Us. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass.
Fukuyama, F., 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin.
Galbraith, J. K., 1967. American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power Penguin
Galbraith, J. K., 1974. Economics and the Public Purpose, Penguin
Galbraith, J. K., 1970. The Affluent Society, Penguin
Garvey, James., 2008. The Ethics of Climate Change, continuum
Gardner, Dan., 2009. Risk: The Science and Politics of Fear Virgin Books
Jose Ortega y Gasset, 1984. Historical Reason, New York: Norton 
George, David., 2001. Preference Pollution: How Markets Create the Desires We Dislike, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
Giddens, A., 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity: self and society in the late
modern age, Cambridge: Polity Press
Giddens, A. 1984. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the theory of structuration, Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
Gimbutas, Marija., 1982. The Goddesses and Gods of Old Europe, Thames and Hudson
Goodin, Robert. E. 1995. Utilitarianism as a public philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Goodin, R., 1992. Green Political Theory, Oxford: Polity Press. 
Goodwin, B. and K. Taylor. 1982. The Politics of Utopia, Hutchinson
Goodwin, Brian., 1994. How the Leopard Changed its Spots, Weidenfeld
Gore, Al., 2006. Earth in the Balance, Rodale
Gottlieb, Robert., Linking Movements and Constructing a New Vision: Environmental Justice and Community Food Security in Democracy and the Claim of Nature, Ben Minteer and B Taylor, Rowman and Littlefield, 2002 
Gould, Stephen Jay., 1991. Bully for Brontosaurus, Hutchinson Radius
Gould, Stephen Jay., 1993 Eight Little Piggies
Gouldner, Alvin., "The Norm of Reciprocity," American Sociological Review, 25:2, 1960.
Gray, John., 2009. False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism 
Gray, John., 2013. The Silence of Animals.
Greene, Graham., 1948. The Heart of the Matter, London: Pelican Books
Greene, Brian., 2005. The Fabric of the Cosmos, Penguin
Gross, Paul R., Norman Levitt and Marin W Lewis, eds. 1996. The Flight from Science and Reason. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol 775 New York: New York Academy of Sciences
Grundmann, R., 1991. Marxism and Ecology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Guber, Deborah Lynn. 2003. The grassroots of a green revolution: Polling America on the environment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Guenon, Rene., 1995. The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times trans. Lord Northbourne, London: Luzac & Co., 1953; New York: Sophia Perennis et Universalis, 
Gundersen, Adolf G., 1995. The environmental promise of democratic deliberation. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Gunderson, L. H., Craig R. Allen, and C. S. Holling, eds. 2009. Foundations of ecological resilience. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Habermas, J., 1991. The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society, Cambridge Polity Press 
Habermas, J., 1991. The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society, Cambridge Polity Press 
Habermas J., 1991. 'What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Revolutions of Recuperation and the Need for New Thinking' in Blackburn ed 1991 
Habermas, J., 1989. The Theory of Communicative Action vol II Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, Cambridge Polity Press
Habermas, J., 1979. Communication and the Evolution of Society, London Heinemann
Habermas, J., 1992. Autonomy and Solidarity, P Dews ed., Verso 
Habermas, J., 1981. ‘The Dialectics of Rationalisation: An interview with Jurgen Habermas', by Axel Honneth, et al. Telos, 49 (Fall), 1981, p. 28.
Hamilton, Clive., 2010. Requiem for a Species
Hamilton, R., 1990. Earthdream, Green Books
Hampden-Turner,  Charles., 1971.  Radical Man:   The Process of Psychosocial Development. London: Duckworth
Hardin, G., 1982. Collective action. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
Harris, N., 1991. City, Class and Trade 
Harris, Sam., 2010. The Moral Landscape, Bantam
Hartmann, T., 1999. Last Hours of Ancient Sunlight, Hodder and Stoughton 
Hauser, Marc., 2006. Moral Minds, Little Brown 
Hauser, Oliver P., David G. Rand, Alexander Peysakhovich and Martin A. Nowak, Cooperating with the future, , Nature 511, 220–223
Haworth, Alan., 1994. Anti-Libertarianism Markets, Philosophy and Myth, Routledge
Heelas, Paul and Linda Woodhead., 2005. The Spiritual Revolution, Blackwell
Heilbroner, Robert., 1975. An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, Calder and Boyers
Held, Virginia., 1970. The public interest and individual interests. New York: Basic Books.
Held, D., 1983. Political Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Held, D., 1987. Models of Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Heller, Erich., The Disinherited Mind 
Heywood, A., 1998. Political ideologies: An introduction (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Hirst, Paul, 1994. Associative Democracy
Hodge, J., and Radick, G., 2003. The Cambridge companion to Darwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Horkheimer, Max., 1972. Critical Theory: Selected Essays 
Hirschleifer, J., and Martinez Coll, J. C., 1988. What strategies can support the evolutionary emergence of cooperation? Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 32, 367–398. 
Hindess, B., 1996. Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault, Oxford: Blackwell.
Hobsbawm, Eric., 1997. On History, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson
Jamison, A., 2001. The Making of Green Knowledge
James, Oliver., 2007. Affluenza, Vermilion
Jarman, Melanie., 2007. Climate Change, Oxfam
Jones, Alan., 1995. The Soul's Journey, Harper 
Jones, Steve., 2009. Darwin's Island: The Gelapagos in the Garden of England, Little Brown
Jones, S., 1999. Almost Like a Whale, Doubleday
Jones, S., 2005. The Single Helix, Abacus
Jung, C.G., 1955. Synchronicity - An Acausal Connecting Principle (London; 
RKP
Kant, I., 1991. The Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Routledge London and New York
Kant, Immanuel., Perpetual Peace A Philosophical Sketch in Kant Political Writings H Reiss ed 1996 Cambridge
Katz, Eric. 1991. Defending the use of animals by business: Animal liberation and environ​mental ethics. In Business, ethics and the environment: The public policy debate, edited by W. M. Hoffman, R. Frederick, and E. S. Petry, Jr., 223-232. New York: Quorum Books.
Katz, Eric., 1997. Nature as subject: Human obligation and natural community. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Katz, Eric., 2009. Convergence and ecological restoration: A counterexample. In Nature in com​mon? Environmental ethics and the contested foundations of environmental policy, edited by Ben A. Minteer, 185-195. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Katz, Eric, and Lauren Oechsli., 1993. Moving beyond anthropocentrism: Environmental ethics, development, and the Amazon. Environmental Ethics 15: 49-59. 
Kauffman, Stuart., 2008. Reinventing the Sacred, Basic
Kauffman, W., 1995. No Turning Back: Dismantling the Fantasies of Environmental Thinking. Basic Books, New York
Kay, J., 2004. The Truth about Markets, Penguin
Keeley, Jon E. 2006. Fire management impacts on invasive plants in the western United States. Conservation Biology 20: 375-384.
Kent, J, The End of the Line?: The Development of Christian Theology in the Last Two Centuries, London: SCM, 1982.
Keynes, Geoffrey Langdon. ed., 1966. "A Vision of the Last Judgment" from The Complete Writings of William Blake (London, Oxford University Press
Kingdon, Jonathan., 1993. Self-Made Man and His Undoing, Simon and Schuster
Kinneging, Andreas., 2009. The Geography of Good and Evil: Philosophical Investigations
Kloppenberg, James T., 1998. Pragmatism: An old name for some new ways of thinking? In The revival of pragmatism: New essays on social thought, law, and culture, edited by Morris Dickstein, 83-127. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Knight, Richard L., and Suzanne Riedel, eds. 2002. Aldo Leopold and the ecological conscience. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Kohn, Margaret., 2004. Brave New Neighborhoods: The Privatization of Public Space, New York: Routledge, 
Kolbert, Elizabeth., The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History
Kropotkin, P., 1998. Act for yourselves. London: Freedom Press. 
Kropotkin, P., 1902. Mutual aid: A factor of evolution. London: Heinemann. 
Kumar, Satish., 1992. No Destination:  Autobiography of a Pilgrim 
Lange, Martin., 2010. Common Wealth For a free, equal, mutual and sustainable society, Hawthorn Press
Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, trans. 1973. Gia-fu Feng & Jane English. London: Wildwood House, 
Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, trans. 1988. Stephen Mitchell. New York. Harper & Row
Lasch, Christopher., 1977. Haven in a Heartless World, New York, Basic Books.
Lasch, Christopher., 1979. Culture of Narcissism, New York, Norton. 
Lasch, Christopher., 1984.The Minimal Self, New York, Norton.
Lasch, Christopher., 1991.The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics, New York, Norton.
Lena E.  Johnson-Davis, 1994. Defining Sustainable Architecture, Lawrence, Kansas
Leopold, Aldo., 1949. A Sand County Almanac
Lerner, M. 1994. Jewish Renewal: A Path to Healing and Transformation. New York: Harper Perennial. 
Lerner, M. 2006. The Left Hand of God: Taking Back Our Country From the Religious Right. San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco.
Lewis, Martin W. 1996. Radical environmental philosophy and the assault on reason. In Gross, Levitt and Lewis 1996 pp 209-230
Light, Andrew, and Eric Higgs. 1996. The politics of ecological restoration. Environmental Ethics 18: 227-247.
Light, Andrew, and Eric Katz, eds. 1996. Environmental pragmatism. London: Routledge.
Light, Andrew, and Holmes Rolston III. 2002. Environmental ethics: An anthology. Maiden, MA: Blackwell.
Lipton, Bruce., 2008. The Biology of Belief
Lomasky, Loren., 1989. Socialism as Classical Political Philosophy, in Socialism E Paul, F Miller and J Paul ed. Blackwell
Lovelock, James., 1989 (2000). The Ages of Gaia: A Biography of Our Living Earth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lovelock, James., 2009. The Vanishing Face of Gaia: A Final Warning, Allen Lane
Luxemburg, Rosa., 1971. Selected Political Writings, Dick Howard ed. Monthly Review Press 
Lynch, Gordon., 2007. The New Spirituality. IB, Tauris
Lynas, Mark., 2011. The God Species, Fourth Estate 
Lyons, J.A., 1982. The Cosmic Christ in Origen and Teilhard de Chardin, OUP
MacIntyre, Alasdair., 1999. Dependent Rational Animals, Carus 
Maclntyre, A., 1981. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, London, Duckworth. 
Maclntyre, A., 1968. Marxism and Christianity, Penguin 
Mackie, J. L., 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London: Penguin
Macmurray, John., 1957. The Self as Agent, London, Faber & Faber.
Macmurray, John., 1961. Persons in Relation, London, Faber & Faber
Macy, Joanna and Chris Johnstone., 2012. Active Hope, New World
Marcuse, Herbert., 1972. "Nature and Revolution," in Counterrevolution and Revolt, Boston: Beacon Press.
Margulis, Lynn., 1998. The Symbiotic Planet, Phoenix
Markale, Jean., 1999. The Great Goddess, Inner traditions
Marshall, Peter., 1992. Nature's Web, Simon and Schuster; 
Marx, Karl., 1975. Early Writings, New Left Review
Marx, Karl., 1975. A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel in Marx Early Writings, New Left Review 
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels., 1975+, Marx and Engels Collected Works, an English edn. in 50 vols., Moscow, London and New York.
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels., 1999. The German Ideology
Marx, Karl., 1846. The German ideology. With F. Engels, CW 5.
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels., 1999. The German Ideology, Lawrence and Wishart, 
Marx, Karl., 1973. Grundrisse, Harmondsworth Penguin
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels., 1999. The German Ideology, Lawrence and Wishart
Marx, Karl., 1973. Surveys from Exile, D. Fernbach, Penguin
Max-Neef, M., 1992. 'Development and human needs', in P. Ekins and M. Max-Neef (eds) Real-life Economics: Understanding Wealth Creation, Routledge, London
May, Rollo., 1976. Power and Innocence, Fontana
May, Rollo., 1980. Psychology and the Human Dilemma. New York: W. W. Norton.
May, Rollo., 1983. The Discovery of Being. New York: W. W. Norton. 
May, Rollo., 1989. The Art of Counselling (revised edn). New York: Gardner Press. 
McCarthy, Donnachadh., 2014. The Prostitute State – How Britain’s Democracy Has Been Bought
McIntosh, Alastair., 2008. Hell and High Water, Berlinn
McIntosh, Alastair., 2008. Rekindling Community, Green Books
McIntosh, A., 2001. Soil and Soul: People versus Corporate Power, Aurum Press
McDermott, John., 1991. Corporate Society Class, Property and Contemporary Capitalism Westview
McGuire, Bill., 2008. Seven Years to Save the Planet, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
McKinnon, Christine., 1999. Character, Virtue Theories, and the Vices, broadview
McLennan, G., 1989. Marxism, Pluralism and Beyond Polity
McNeill, John., 2000. Something New Under the Sun 
Mcpherson, C.B. 1962 The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism
Meade, Michael., 1993. Men and the Water of Life: Initiation and the Tempering of Men. San Francisco: Harper.
Meadows, Donella H, Dennis Meadows and Jorgen Randers, 1992. Beyond the Limits, Earthscan, London
Meikle, Scott., 1995. Aristotle's Economic Thought, Clarendon Oxford
Meikle, Scott., ‘History of philosophy: The metaphysics of substance in Marx’ in Carver Cambridge Companion to Marx Terrell Carver ed 1991 Cambridge University Press
Meikle, Scott., 1985. Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx. Open Court
Mellor, Mary., 1992. Breaking the Boundaries, Virago
Merchant, Carolyn. 1992. Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World. New York: Routledge
Mészáros, Istvan., 2001. Socialism or Barbarism 
Mészáros, I., 1975. Marx's Theory of Alienation, Merlin Press
Mészáros, I., 1989. Power of Ideology, Harvester
Mészáros, Istvan., 1995. Beyond Capital
Midgley, M., 1978. Beast and Man, Harvester
Milani, Brian., 2000. Designing the Green Economy, Rowan and Littlefield 
Milbrath, Lester W., 1989. Envisioning a Sustainable Society: Learning Our Way Out, Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press.
Mill, John Stuart., 1972. ‘Utilitarianism’, chap. 3, in: J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, edited by H.B. Acton (London: Everyman, 1972).
Minteer, Ben and B Taylor., 2002. Democracy and the Claim of Nature, Rowman and Littlefield
Minteer, Ben A., 1998. No experience necessary? Foundationalism and the retreat from culture in environmental ethics. Environmental Values 7: 333-348.
Minteer, Ben A., 2006. The landscape of reform: Civic pragmatism and environmental thought in America. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Minteer, Ben A., 2008. Biocentric farming? Liberty Hyde Bailey and environmental ethics. Environmental Ethics 30: 341-359.
Minteer, Ben A., ed. 2009. Nature in common? Environmental ethics and the contested foundations of environmental policy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Minteer, Ben A., and Robert E. Manning. 1999. Pragmatism in environmental ethics: Democracy, pluralism, and the management of nature. Environmental Ethics 21:193-209.
Minteer, Ben A., 2000. Convergence in environmental values: An empirical and conceptual defense. Ethics, Place, and Environment 3: 47-60.
Mohai, P. and Bryant, B., 1996. Is There a "Race" Effect on Concern for Environmental Quality? Public Opinion Quarterly.(Submitted for publication).
Monbiot, George., 2006. Heat: How to Stop the Planet Burning, Allen Lane, London.
Moore, G. E., 1930. Principia Ethica, Cambridge
Morgan, G., 2007. Images of Organisation, Sage
Moss, Norman., 2000. Managing the Planet: The Politics of the New Millenium, Earthscan
Morris, S Conway., 2003. Life's Solution, Cambridge UP
Mumford, Lewis., 1944. The Condition of Man, Secker and Warburg
Mumford, Lewis., 1962. The Case Against Modern Architecture in The Lewis Mumford Reader, ed. Donald L. Miller, New York: Pantheon
Mumford, Lewis., 1957. The Transformations of Man, Allen and Unwin
Mumford, Lewis., 1966. The City in History, Penguin
Mumford, Lewis., 1952. The Conduct of Life, Secker and Warburg
Mumford, Lewis., 2000. Art and Technics, Columbia University Press
Mumford, Lewis., 1967. The Myth of the Machine Technics and Human Development, Harvest
O'Murchu, D., 1997. Reclaiming Spirituality. A New Spiritual Framework for Today's World. Dublin: Gateway. 
O'Murchu, D., 2004. Quantum Theology: Spiritual Implications of the New Physics. (Revised edition) New York: Crossroad. 
O'Murchu,  D., 2005.   Consecrated  Religious  Life:   The  Changing Paradigms. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis.
Naess, Arne., 1989. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Naess, Arne., "Identification as a Source of Deep Ecology Attitudes." In Deep Ecology. Edited by Michael Tobias. San Diego: Avant Books, 1985.
Nash, Roderick., 1989. The Rights of Nature, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Nasr, S.H., Religion and the Order of Nature, 1996. Oxford: Oxford University
Press
Nasr, S.H., 1997. Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis in Modern Man, Chicago, IL: Kazi.
Needham, Joseph., 1956. Science and Civilisation in China, Cambridge University
Press, London.
Neumann, Erich., 1972. The Great Mother, Princeton
Nisbet, Robert., 1980. History of the Idea of Progress 
Nisbet, Robert., 1990. The Quest for Community A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom ICS Press
Norton, Bryan., 1991. Toward Unity among Environmentalists, OUP 
Norton, Bryan G., Michael Hutchins, Elizabeth F. Stevens, and Terry L. Maple, eds. 1995. Ethics on the Ark: Zoos, animal welfare, and wildlife conservation. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Norton, Bryan, and Ben Minteer. 2002. From environmental ethics to environmental public philosophy: Ethicists and economists, 1973-future. In International yearbook of environmental and resource economics 2002/2003, edited by Tom Tietenberg and Henk Folmer, 373-407. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Norton, Bryan G., and Anne C. Steinemann. 2001. Environmental values and adaptive man​agement. Environmental Values 10: 473-506.
Norton, Bryan G., Michael Hutchins, Elizabeth F. Stevens, and Terry L. Maple, eds. 1995. Ethics on the Ark: Zoos, animal welfare, and wildlife conservation. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Norton, Bryan, and Ben Minteer. 2002. From environmental ethics to environmental public philosophy: Ethicists and economists, 1973-future. In International yearbook of environmental and resource economics 2002/2003, edited by Tom Tietenberg and Henk Folmer, 373-407. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Norton, Bryan G., and Anne C. Steinemann. 2001. Environmental values and adaptive management. Environmental Values 10: 473-506.
Nussbaum, Martha., 1986. The Fragility of Goodness, Cambridge University Press 
Nussbaum, Martha., 2011. Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach
Ophuls, William., 1977. Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity, San Francisco: Freeman.
Orr, David., 1992. Ecological Literacy, New York
Ostrom, Elinor., 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Insti​tutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Packard, Vance., 1957. The Hidden Persuaders 
Pagel, Mark., 2012. Wired for Culture, Allen Lane
Papanek, Victor., 1995. The Green Imperative, Thames and Hudson 
Parekh, Bhikhu, 1982. Marx's Theory of Ideology, Croom Helm.
Parfit, Derek., 1994. Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press
Pasnau, R. and C. Shields., 2004. The Philosophy of Aquinas, Westview 
Passmore, John., 1968. A Hundred Years of Philosophy, Penguin
Passmore, John., 1974. Man's responsibility for nature: Ecological problems and Western traditions. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Passmore, John., 1969. The Perfectibility of Man, (3rd ed.) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000)
Patal, Raj., 2009. The Value of Nothing, Portobello
Pateman, Carole., 1989.The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory, Polity Press.
Pearce, Fred., 2006. When the Rivers Run Dry, Eden product
Pearce, Fred., 1989. Climate and Man Vision Books
Pinker, Steven., 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and its Causes 
Plato Timaeus, 1965. trans HDP Lee, Harmondsworth Penguin 
Plimer, Ian., 2009. Heaven and Earth Global Warming: The Missing Science, Quartet.
Pojman, Louis P., and Paul Pojman, eds. 2007. Environmental ethics: Readings in theory and application. Fifth edition. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth.
Poole, R., 1991. Morality and Modernity, Routledge London
Popper, Karl., 1972. Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and Kegan Paul
Porritt, Jonathon., 1984. Seeing Green. Blackwell, Oxford 
Porritt, Jonathon and David Winner., 1988. The Coming of the Greens. Fontana, London
Pray, L. A., 2004. "Epigenetics: Genome, Meet Your Environment." The Scientist 14-20
Prigogine, Ilya and Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos.
London: Fontana Flamingo, 1985
Prigogine, Ilya Order Out of Chaos
Prinze, Jesse., 2012. Beyond Human Nature, Allen Lane
Proctor, Robert., 1988 Education's Great Amnesia 
Purchase, G., 1997. Anarchism and Ecology 
Pylkkanen, P., 1989. Search for Meaning, Crucible
Rachels, J., 1990. Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism, OUP
Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli and Charles Moore (eds.), 1957. A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Radkau, Joaquim., 2014. The Age of Ecology, Polity 
Radkau, Joaquim., 2008. Nature and Power, German Historical Institute and Cam UP 
Raine, Kathleen., The Underlying Order: Nature and the Imagination In Seeing God Everywhere: Essays on Nature and the Sacred,  Barry McDonald ed 2003 World Wisdom
Ray, Paul H., and Anderson, Sherry Ruth, The Cultural Creatives, Harmony Books, New York, 2000
Reik, W. and J. Walter, 2001. "Genomic Imprinting: Parental Influence on the Genome." Nature Reviews Genetics 2: 21
Rideau, Emile., 1967. Teilhard de Chardin A Guide to his Thought, Collins
Rifkin, Jeremy., 1992. Confessions of a Heretic, Simon and Schuster, New York
Rifkin, Jeremy., 1992. Biosphere Politics, New York, Harper/Collins
Rifkin, Jeremy and Ted Howard., 1980. Entropy: A New World View Viking Press, New York
Rogers, Carl R., 1961. On Becoming a Person. London: Constable.
Rogers, C., 1995. A Way of Being, Houghton Mifflin
Rogers, C., 1979. Personal Power, Constable London
Rorty, Richard., 1998. Achieving Our Country, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
Rolston, Holmes, III. 1975. Is there an ecological ethic? Ethics 85: 93-109.
Rolston, Holmes, III 1986. Philosophy gone wild: Environmental ethics. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.
Rolston, Holmes, III.  1988. Environmental ethics: Duties to and values in the natural world. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Rolston, Holmes, III. 1991. The wilderness idea reaffirmed. Environmental Professional 13: 370-377.
Rolston, Holmes, III. 1994. Conserving natural value. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rolston, Holmes, III. 1998. Saving nature, feeding people, and the foundations of ethics. Environmental Values 7: 349-357.
Rolston, Holmes, III. 1999. Respect for life: Counting what Singer finds of no account. In Singer and his critics, edited by Dale Jamieson, 247-268. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Rolston, Holmes, III. 2004. In situ and ex situ conservation: Philosophical and ethical concerns. In Ex situ plant conservation: Supporting species in the wild, edited by Edward O. Guerrant, Jr., Kayri Havens, and Mike Maunder, 21-39. Washington, DC: Island Press. 
Rolston, Holmes, III. 2009. Converging versus reconstituting environmental ethics. In Nature in common? Environmental ethics and the contested foundations of environmental policy, edited by Ben A. Minteer, 97-117. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Roszak, Theodore., Ecopsychology 
Roszak, Theodore., 1992. The Voice of the Earth, Touchstone, Simon and Schuster
Rousseau, J-J., 1973., The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole, Everyman's Library, London.
Rowland, R., Living Laboratories: women and reproductive techno​logy (London: Lime Tree, 1992
Russell, Bertrand., 1961. History of Western Philosophy London: George Allen and Unwin, 
Sacks, J., 2011. The Great Partnership, Hodder
Sacks, J., 2000. The Politics of Hope, Vintage, London
Sacks, J., 2005. The Persistence of Faith. (2nd edition) London: Continuum.
Sahtouris, Elisabet., Earth Dance: Living Systems in Evolution
Santayana, G., 1968. Selected Critical Writings of George Santayana, vol 2, Norman Henfrey ed. Cambridge University Press 
Sarewitz, D., 1996. Frontiers of Illusion: Science, Technology and the Politics of Progress, Temple University Press, Pennsylvania
Sartre, J-P., 1946. Existentialism is a Humanism 
Sayer, D., 1991. Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber, London Routledge
Schaub, B and R., 2003. Dante's Path, Gotham Books
Schor, Juliet., 1999The Overspent American: Why We Want What We Don't Need, New York: Harper Perennial, 
Schroeder, R., 1992. Max Weber and the Sociology of Culture, Sage London
Schrodinger, Erwin., 'Are there Quantum Jumps', The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3 (1952)
Schwartz, Barry., 2004. The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less, New York: HarperCollins
Sennett, R., 1971. The uses of disorder, London: Allen Lane, First published New York: Knopf
Seidler V.J. 1994 Unreasonable Men: Masculinity and Social Theory (London Routledge)
Schmookler, Andrew Bard., 1984. The Parable of the Tribes: The Problem of Power in Social Evolution. Berkeley: U of California
Schumacher, E.F., 1973. Small is Beautiful. Blond & Briggs, London 
Schumacher, E.F., 1977. A Guide for the Perplexed Jonathan Cape
Schumacher, E.F., 1980. Good Work. Abacus, London
Schweitzer, Albert., The Decay and Restoration of Civilisation
Sewell, Dennis., 2009. The Political Gene, Picador
Shearman, D., 1997. Green or Gone, Wakefield Press
Sheldrake, R., 2012. The Science Delusion, Coronet
Sheldrake, R., 1988. The Presence of the Past Collins
Sheldrake, R., 1990. The Greening of Science and God, Methuen
Sheldrake, R., 1981. A New Science of Life, Blond and Briggs
Sidgwick, Henry., The Methods of Ethics
Sica, Giulio (16 January 2008). "What part does spirituality play in the green movement?". The Guardian (London). Retrieved 23 May 2010
Singer, P., 1999. A Darwinian left, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Silverman, P. H. (2004). "Rethinking Genetic Determinism: With only 30,000 genes, what is it that makes humans human?" The Scientist 32-33
Simms, Andrew., Cancel the Apocalypse: The New Path to Prosperity 
Singer, Peter., The Expanding Circle, 
Skidelsky, R., 2010. The Return of the Master, Allen
Skolimowski, Henryk., 1993. A Sacred Place to Dwell, Element
Smith, Iain Crichton., 1986. Towards the Human: Selected Essays, Macdonald Publishers, Loanhead online at www.alastairmcintosh.com/general/resources.htm 
Smith 1998
Smith, Wealth of Nations
Smith, Mark J and Piya Pangsapa., Buddhist virtues and environmental responsibility in Thailand in The Environmental Responsibility Reader M Reynolds ed Zed 2009
Smith, Mark J and Piya Pangsapa, 2008. Environment and Citizenship: Integrating Justice, Responsibility and Civic Engagement.
Sokal, Alan and Jean Bricmont,.1999. Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science 
Sokal, Alan., 2008. Beyond the Hoax, Science, Philosophy and Culture, OUP, 
Sokal, Alan and Jean Bricmont., 2011. Intellectual Impostures
Sommers, Christina and Fred., 2001. Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life, Harcourt
Sorokin, Pitirim, 1992. The Crisis of Our Age, One World, Oxford, 
de Sousa, R., 2007. Why Think Evolution of the Rational Mind, Oxford UP
Spinelli, Ernesto (1989) The Interpreted World. London: Sage. Spinelli, Ernesto (1994) Demystifying Therapy. London: Constable. Spinelli, Ernesto (1997) Tales of Un-knowing. London: Duckworth.
Spretnak, Charlene., 1982. The Politics of Women's Spirituality. Doubleday, New York 
Spretnak, Charlene., 1985. 'The Spiritual Dimension of Green Politics', in Charlene Spretnak and Fritjof Capra, Green Politics. Paladin, Glasgow 
Spretnak, Charlene and Fritjof Capra, 1985. Green Politics. Paladin, Glasgow 
Spretnak, Charlene., 1990. 'Eco-feminism: our roots and flowering' in Irene Diamond & Gloria Feman Orenstein (eds) (1990) Reweaving the World. Sierra Club Books, San Francisco
Starhawk, 2004. The Earth Path, Harper Collins 
Starhawk, 1989. Spiral Dance, Harper
Starhawk, 1988. Dreaming the Dark, Beacon
Starhawk, Webs of Power, New Society, 2002
Stauth G and Turner B., 1988. Nietzsche's Dance Resentment, Reciprocity and Resistance in Social Life, Oxford Blackwell
Stearman, A.M., 1994. ‘Only slaves climb trees’, revisiting the myth of the ecologically noble savage in Amazonia. Human Nature 5: 339-57
Steffen, Alex. Ed., 2008. World Changing Abrams New York
Stern, Nicholas., 2010. A Blueprint for a Safer Planet, Vintage Books
Stewart, I. and J Cohen., 1997. Figments of Reality: The Evolution of the Curious Mind, CUP 
Stewart, Ian., 2007. Why Beauty is Truth, Basic Books 
Stringer, C and McKie, R 1996 African Exodus, Jonathan Cape, London
Stone, Christopher., 1988. Earth and Other Ethics, New York: Harper & Row
Surani, M. A., 2001. "Reprogramming of genome function through epigenetic inheritance." Nature 414
Surowiecki, James., 2004. The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies, and Nations, New York: Doubleday
Swearer, D. K., S. Premchit and P. Dokbuakaew (2004) Sacred Mountains of Northern Thailand and Their Legends, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.
Swidler, Leonard. ed., 1999. For All Life: Toward a Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic, White Cloud Press, Ashland, Oreg.
Tawney, R.H. 1982 The Aquisitive Society Wheatsheaf
Taylor, Paul W. 1986. Respect for nature: A theory of environmental ethics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Taylor, Bob Pepperman and Ben A, Minteer, 2002. Introduction Democracy and the Claim of Nature, Ben Minteer and B Taylor, Rowman and Littlefield, 
Taylor, M. (1982). Community, anarchy and liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, M. (1987). The possibility of cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, Charles 1989: Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cam​bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Tawney, R.H. 1982. The Acquisitive Society, Harvester 
Teilhard de Chardin 1978. Le Milieu Divin, Fount
An Introduction to Teilhard de Chardin 1973 Fontana
Thomas, Paul., 1994. Alien Politics, Routledge
Tipler, Frank, 1994. The Physics of Immortality, Macmillan
Tocqueville, Alexis de., 1969. Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books
Tolstoy, 1995. What is Art 
Toulmin, Stephen., 1982. The Return to Cosmology: Postmodern Science and the The​ology of Nature, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press
Trigg, R., 2015. Beyond Matter: Why Science Needs Metaphysics
Tuchman, Barbara W. 1978. A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century Alfred A. Knopf 
Tudge, Colin., 1996. The Day Before Yesterday, Jonathan Cape, London
Turner, B., 1993. Max Weber: From History to Modernity, Routledge London and New York
Turton, A. R., H. J. Hattinh, G. A. Maree, IX J. Roux, M. Claassen and W. F. Strydom (eds) (2006) Governance as the Trialogue: Government-society-science in Transition (Water Resources Development and Management), Springer.
Tuchman, Barbara W., A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14"' Century
Twain, Mark., 1938. Letters From the Earth, ed. Bernard Devoto 227-8.
Unger R.M., 1984. Knowledge and Politics, New York Free Press
Vanderheiden, Steve., 2008. Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change OUP
Vendler, 1984. "From Fragments a World Perfect at Last," New Yorker, March 19, 
Vickers, W.T., 1994. From opportunism to nascent conservation. The case of the Siona-Secoya. Human Nature 5: 307-37
Viner, Jacob., quoted in Coase, R.H. 1976. Adam Smith’s view of man. Journal of Law and Economics 19: 529-46
Volk, Tyler., Gaia's Body
Wainwright, Hilary., 1994. Arguments for a New Left: Answering the Free-Market Right, U.K.: Blackwell.
Waldrop, M. Mitchell., 1992. Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, New York: Simon & Schuster
Waller, R., 1973. Be Human or Die, Charles Knight and Co
Ward, Colin., 1996. Anarchy in Action, Freedom Press
Ward, B., R. Dubos., 1982. Only One Earth, Penguin
Ward, B., 1976. Home of Man 
Warwick, Dennis, Gary Littlejohn, 1992. Coal, Capital, and Culture: A Sociological Analysis of Mining Communities in West Yorkshire, 
Weber, M., 1991. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Gerth H.H. and Mills C W ed (London Routledge Kegan and Paul)
Weber, M., 1977. Science as a Vocation in Gerth and Mills 
Weber, M., 1970. From Max Weber. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds). London, Routledge.
Weber, M., 1985. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Unwin
Weber, M., 1968 On Charisma and Institution Building S Eisenstadt ed., Chicago University Press
Weber, M., 1964. Theory of Social and Economic Organisations, New York Free Press
Weber, M., 1966. General Economic History, New York: Collier
Weber, M., 1978. Economy and Society, 3 vols ed Roth and Wittich 
Weber, M., 1985. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Unwin
Weber M 1978. Selections in Translation, W.G. Runciman ed., Cambridge University Press
Weber, M., 1983. On Capitalism, Bureaucracy and Religion S Andreski ed., London Allen and Unwin
Weber, M., 1994. Weber: Political Writings, Lassman, P and Speirs, R ed., Cambridge University Press
Weber, M., 1989. Max Weber's 'Science as a Vocation’ Lassman P and Velody I ed., London Unwin Hyman
Weber, M., 1991. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Gerth H.H. and Mills C W ed., London Routledge Kegan and Paul.
Wertheim, Margaret., 1997. Pythagoras' Trousers, Fourth Estate 
West, C., 1991. The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought, Monthly Review Press
Westermarck, The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, Vol. II
Westra, Laura. 1994. An environmental proposal for ethics: The principle of integrity. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Westra, Laura. 2009. Why Norton's approach is insufficient for environmental ethics. In Nature in common? Environmental ethics and the contested foundations of environmental policy, edited by Ben A. Minteer, 49-64. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Wheeler, John Archibald 'Beyond the Black Hole', in Harry Woolf (ed.), Some Strangeness in the Proportion
Wheeler, John Archibald and Wojcieck Hubert Zurek, Quantum Theory and Measurement
Wheeler, J.A., 1973 in The Physicist's Conception of Nature, ed. J. Mehra, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel
Wheeler, John Archibald 'Law Without Law', in Wheeler and Zurek eds.
Whitehead, A. N., 1968. Modes of thought, New York, Macmillan
Whitehead, Alfred North.,1968. Modes of Thought, New York Free Press
White, Lynn, Jr. 1967. The historical roots of our ecologic crisis. Science 155: 1203-1207.
Wieseltier, Leon., 1998. Kaddish, New York: Knopf
Wilson, Edward O., 1975. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press
Wilson, E.O., 1984. Biophilia: The Human Bond with Other Species
Wiens, John A. 2009. Landscape ecology as a foundation for sustainable conservation. Landscape Ecology 24: 1053-1065.
Williams, John W., and Stephen T. Jackson. 2007. Novel climates, no-analog plant communities, and ecological surprises: Past and future. Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution 5: 475-482.
Williams, David Lay. 2007. Rousseau’s Platonic Enlightenment
Williams, Ted. 1997. The ugly swan. Audubon 99: 26-32.
Wilson, E. O. 2002. The future of life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Wilson, P. Eddy. 1995. Emerson and Dewey on natural piety. Journal of Religion 75: 329-346.
Wilson, E. O., 1993. The Diversity of Life, Viking
Wilson, E. O., 2012. The Social Conquest of the Earth, Liveright Norton
Wilson, E. O., 'Vanishing Before Our Eyes', Time Special Edition, April/May 2000, page 30
Wilson, E. O., 1984. Biophilia: The Human Bond with Other Species, 
Winston, R., 2005. The Story of God, Bantam
Wise, Steven M. 2000. Rattling the cage: Toward legal rights for animals. New York: Perseus Books.
Wise, Steven M. 2003. Drawing the line: Science and the case for animal rights. New York: Perseus Books.
Wilber, Ken., 2000. Integral Psychology - Consciousness, Spirit, Psychology, Therapy Shambala
Williams, B., 1981. ‘Internal and External Reasons’, in B. Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) pp. 101-113
Winthrop, Mansfield and Delba eds., 2000. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Wolﬀ, R. P., 1970. In defence of anarchism. New York: Harper Torchbooks. 
Woodcock, G. Ed., 1977. The anarchist reader. Brighton: Harvester Press.
Wright E.G. 1978 Class, Crisis and the State, London New Left
Wright, Robert., 1994. in the New Republic
Wright, Robert., 2001. Nonzero - History, Evolution and Human Cooperation, Abacus
Zohar, D. and I Marshall, 1993. The Quantum Society, Bloomsbury, 
Zohar, D., 1990. The Quantum Self, Bloomsbury
Zohar, D., and I Marshall, 2001. SQ Spiritual Intelligence, Bloomsbury, 
Zohar, D., and I Marshall, 2004 Spiritual Capital, Wealth we can live by, Bloomsbury, 






880



